Cogito ergo sum

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René Descartes (1596–1650)
René Descartes (15961650)

"Cogito, ergo sum" (Latin: "I think, therefore I am") or Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum (Latin: "I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am") is a philosophical statement used by René Descartes, which became a foundational element of Western philosophy. "Cogito ergo sum" is a translation of Descartes' original French statement: "Je pense, donc je suis", which occurs in his Discourse on Method (1637).

Although the idea expressed in "cogito ergo sum" is widely attributed to Descartes, many predecessors offer similar arguments—particularly St. Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei (books XI, 26), who also anticipates modern refutations of the concept. (See Principles of Philosophy, §7: "Ac proinde haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium prima et certissima etc.").

Contents

[edit] Introduction

The phrase "cogito ergo sum" is not used in Descartes' most important work, the Meditations on First Philosophy, but the term "the cogito" is (often confusingly) used to refer to an argument from it. Descartes felt that this phrase, which he had used in his earlier Discourse, had been misleading in its implication that he was appealing to an inference, so he changed it to "I am, I exist" (also often called "the first certainty") in order to avoid the term "cogito".

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt – his argument from the existence of a deceiving god – Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any has survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence he finds it: it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon, the tool he uses to stop himself sliding back into ungrounded beliefs), his belief in his own existence would be secure, for how could he be deceived unless he existed in order to be deceived?

"But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (AT VII 25; CSM II 16–17)

There are three important notes to keep in mind here. First, he only claims the certainty of his own existence from the first-person point of view — he has not proved the existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of the meditations. Second, he is not saying that his existence is necessary; he is saying that if he's thinking, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle). Third, this proposition "I am, I exist" is held true not based on a deduction (as mentioned above) nor on empirical induction, but on the clarity and self-evidence of the proposition.

Descartes does not use this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can stand as he works to restore his beliefs. As he puts it:

"Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable." (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)

According to many Descartes' specialists including Etienne Gilson, the goal of Descartes in establishing this first truth is to demonstrate the capacity of his criterion -the immediate clarity and distinctiveness of self-evident propositions- to establish true and justified propositions despite having adopted a method of generalized doubt. As a consequence of this demonstration, Descartes considers science and mathematics to be justified to the extent that their proposals are established on a similar immediate clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence that present itself to the mind. The originality of Descartes thinking, therefore, is not so much in expressing the cogito -a feat accomplished by other predecessors, as we have seen- but on using the cogito as demonstrating the most fundamental epistemological principle, that science and mathematics are justified by relying on clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence.

[edit] Criticisms of the cogito

There have been a number of criticisms of the cogito. The first of the two under scrutiny here concerns the nature of the step from "I am thinking" to "I exist". The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists", and that extra premise must surely have been rejected at an earlier stage of the doubt.

It could be argued that "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists" is self-evident, and thus not subject to the method of doubt. This is because the instantiation principle states that: "Whatever has the property F, exists", but within the method of doubt, only the property of thinking is indubitably a property of the meditator. Descartes does not make use of this defence, however; as we have already seen, he responds to the criticism by conceding that there would indeed be an extra premise needed, but denying that the cogito is a syllogism. Jaakko Hintikka offered a non-syllogistic interpretation. "I exist" is immune to Descartes' method of doubt because it is impossible to be mistaken about one's own existence. If we do not exist then we cannot be mistaken, so we might as well believe we do.

Perhaps a more relevant contention is whether the 'I' to which Descartes refers is justified. In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. The main objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I", is more than the cogito can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche put forward a similar form of criticism, suggesting a more appropriate phrase would be "it thinks".

Williams provides a meticulous and exhaustive examination of this objection. He argues, first, that it is impossible to make sense of "there is thinking" without relativising it to something. It seems at first as though this something does need not be a thinker, the "I", but Williams goes through each of the possibilities, demonstrating that none of them can do the job. He concludes that Descartes is justified in his formulation (though possibly without realising why that was so).

Note, however, that there is a more fundamental potential refutation to the cogito; i.e., namely of the thesis that 'perception' requires 'thinking.' If the solipsist were merely being created instantaneously from moment to moment with all memory intact and updated, he would only think he is 'thinking' — i.e., have a perception of thinking. In fact, no operation or activity has truly taken place from percept to percept (think of how the 'still' frames of a moving picture film strip blend into the appearance of motion) — only the passage of time.

[edit] Williams' argument

Whilst the preceding two arguments against the cogito fail, other arguments have been advanced by Bernard Williams. He claims, for example, that what we are dealing with when we talk of thought, or when we say "I am thinking", is something conceivable from a third-person perspective; namely objective "thought-events" in the former case, and an objective thinker in the latter.

The obvious problem is that, through introspection, or our experience of consciousness, we have no way of moving to conclude the existence of any third-personal fact, verification of which would require a thought necessarily impossible, being, as Descartes is, bound to the evidence of his own consciousness alone.

[edit] Parodies and pop-cultural references

  • The radio program Philosophy Talk has a blog with the motto "Cogito Ergo Blogo" I think therefore I Blog.
  • The Ephebian philosophers in Terry Pratchett's Discworld series are often shown interpreting the statement incorrectly, resulting in statements such as "We are therefore we am." and "I think, therefore I do sums."
  • Philosopher Ayn Rand would frequently say "I am, therefore I'll think."
  • British actor Robert Llewellyn recently released a low-budget film it²i², (It thinks therefore it is), about the internet developing consciousness.
  • Television series The Tribe made a massive reference to the Cogito ergo sum in the final episode stating. 'I think, therefore I am.' - 'But do I think because I am - or am I because I think?' This appeared in a scene where an insane character repeatedly rambles philosophical citations.
  • In episode 2 of series 1 of The Office, David Brent (Ricky Gervais) humorously uses the phrase when talking to his employees about possible redundancies. In real life, comic Ricky Gervais actually studied a Philosophy degree at the University College London, England, and also refers to Cogito, ergo sum in a podcast when discussing its meaning with comic genius Karl Pilkington.
  • Bangalore-based company, Ittiam Systems, is named after Descartes' famous line - "Ittiam" is an abbreviation of "I think therefore I am".
  • In a Saved By The Bell episode, one of the ditzier characters stated "I think, therefore I am. But if I think not, am I not? I think not."
  • In The Moody Blues song "In The Beginning", Graeme Edge makes a reference to Cogito, Ergo Sum. Saying "I think. I think I am. Therefore I am. I think."
  • An advocacy T-shirt slogan states, "I think, therefore I am a vegetarian."
  • Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) print the slogan 'I fly, therefore I am' on their tickets and Boarding passes.
  • The science fiction suspense anime Ergo Proxy, makes many references to this phrase, including the Cogito virus which makes robots self aware.
  • There is a humorous saying in British student culture "I'm pink therefore I'm Spam." (Obvious Monty Python reference.)
  • A dead teacher in Neil Gaiman's Sandman series, Issue #24, is quoted criticising "Cogito" for its assumption of the speaker's existence.
  • On "Cogito", a website for math and science oriented gifted youth, an area of interest is named Ergo Sum.
  • In the Star Trek episode "Ship in a Bottle" Professor James Moriarty played by Daniel Davis, states "Cogito Ergo Sum" when confronted about the Physics of leaving the Holodeck.
  • In the Red Dwarf Episode Waiting for God, the talking toaster says "I toast, therefore I am".
  • Artist Barbara Kruger created a piece entitled "I Shop, Therefore I Am".
  • Finnish black metal band Impaled Nazarene's 2000 album Nihil opens with a song titled "Cogito Ergo Sum."
  • Smart Bomb: Cogito, ergo boom. Dutch Loesje movement quoted in Amsterdam Weekly magazine: Volume 4, Issue 11, March, 15-21, 2007

[edit] References

  • Quotations from Descartes' work use the standard form: first a reference to the twelve-volume edition of Descartes' works by Adam and Tannery (abbreviated "AT"), followed by a reference to the three-volume English edition translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and (in vol. III) Anthony Kenny (abbreviated "CSM" for volumes I and II, "CSMK" for volume III).

    [edit] Further reading

    • W.E. Abraham, "Disentangling the Cogito", Mind 83:329 (1974)
    • Z. Boufoy-Bastick, Introducing 'Applicable Knowledge' as a Challenge to the Attainment of Absolute Knowledge , Sophia Journal of Philosophy, VIII (2005), pp 39–52.
    • R. Descartes (translated by John Cottingham), Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. II (edited Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch; Cambridge University Press, 1984) ISBN 0-521-28808-8
    • G. Hatfield, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes and the Meditations (Routledge, 2003) ISBN 0-415-11192-7
    • B. Williams, Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry (Penguin, 1978) OCLC 4025089

    [edit] External links