Classified information in the United States
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The United States Government classification system is established under Executive Order 13292, the latest in a long series of executive orders on the topic. Issued by President George W. Bush in 2003, Executive Order 13292 replaces earlier executive orders on the topic and lays out the system of classification, declassification and handling of national security information generated by the United States Government and its employees and contractors, as well as information received from other governments.
The desired degree of secrecy about such information is known as its sensitivity. Sensitivity is based upon a calculation of the damage to national security that the release of the information would cause. The United States has three levels of classification — confidential, secret, and top secret. Each level of classification indicates an increasing degree of sensitivity. Thus if one holds a top-secret security clearance, one is allowed to handle information up to the level of top-secret including secret and confidential information. If one holds a secret clearance, one may not then handle top-secret information, but may handle secret and confidential classified information.
In the United States, information may not, by law, be classified merely because it would be embarrassing or to cover illegal activity; information may only be classified to protect national security objectives of the nation.
[edit] Accessing classified information
Regardless of sensitivity level, information that is classified is restricted in its dissemination based on the "need to know" the information. Having a "top-secret" clearance does not give one access to all documents classified at that level. Rather, information is disseminated based upon sensitivity level and the need to know. In addition, dissemination of information is often compartmentalized, requiring special additional clearance requirements. Individuals with access to one type of compartmentalized information may, for that reason alone, be denied access to other compartmentalized information. Individuals who need access to the most sensitive intelligence information hold a "TS/SCI" clearance — Top-Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information. In addition, there are Special Access Programs or "SAPs" that restrict access to all information relating to that program or project to a limited number of pre-approved people.
[edit] Classified vs. unclassified information
In the U.S. information is called "classified" because it has been assigned one of the three levels: Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. Information which is not so labeled is called unclassified information. The term declassified is used for information which has had its classification removed, and downgraded refers to information that has been assigned a lower classification level, but is still classified. Many documents are automatically downgraded and then declassified after some number of years. The U.S. government uses the term sensitive but unclassified (SBU), or Critical Program Information (CPI), or For Official Use Only (FOUO) to refer to information that is not confidential, secret or top secret, but whose dissemination is still restricted. Reasons for such restrictions can include export controls, privacy regulations, court orders, and ongoing criminal investigations as well as national security. Information which was never classified is sometimes referred to as "open source" by those who work in classified activities.
[edit] Levels of classification used by the U.S. Government
The United States Government classifies information according to the degree which the unauthorized disclosure would damage national security. There is a misconception that having Top Secret Clearance allows the viewing of all Top Secret documents; however, this is not true. All US military pilots are required to obtain Top Secret Clearance but this only allows them access to documents directly related to their orders.
[edit] Top secret
This is the highest security level (Level 3) that is publicly disclosed, and is defined as information which would cause "exceptionally grave damage" to national security if disclosed to the public. Despite public mystique, little information is classified at "Top Secret" when compared to the other levels of classification. Only that which is exceptionally sensitive (weapon design, presidential security information, nuclear-related projects, various intelligence information) is classified at the Top Secret level. In other cases the nature of the gathering method used to obtain the information is what causes the information to be classified "Top Secret", though the information itself may be mundane and unimportant. Examples would be signal interceptions (SIGINT) or human intelligence (HUMINT).
[edit] Secret
The second highest classification (Level 2). Information is classified secret when its release would cause "serious damage" to national security. Most information that is classified is held at the secret sensitivity.
[edit] Confidential
The lowest classification level (Level 1). It is defined as information which would "damage" national security if disclosed.
[edit] Unclassified
Unclassified is not technically a "classification"; this is the default, and refers to information that can be released to individuals without a clearance (Level 0). Information that is unclassified is sometimes restricted in its dissemination as SBU or FOUO. For example, the "law enforcement bulletins" often reported by the U.S. media when United States Department of Homeland Security raises the U.S. terror threat level are usually classified as "U//LES" or "Unclassified - Law Enforcement Sensitive." This information is only supposed to be released to Law Enforcement groups (Sheriff, Police, etc.) Because the information is unclassified, however, it is sometimes released to the public as well. Information which is unclassified, but which the government does not believe should be subject to Freedom of Information Act requests is often classified as U//FOUO - "Unclassified - For Official Use Only". In addition to FOUO information, information can be categorized according to its availability to be distributed (Distribution D may only be released to approved Department of Defense and Government Contractor personnel). Also, the statement of NOFORN (meaning No Foreign Nationals) is applied to any information which may not be released to any non-US Citizen. NOFORN and Distribution statements are often used in conjunction with classified information or alone on SBU information. Documents subject to export controls have a specific warning to that effect.
The Restriction of NOFORN no longer applies to Australia or Britain when the matter concerns either a) military operations (including training) in which they are participating or b) the broader war on terror. It was reported this change took place in July 2004 when President Bush signed a presidential decree changing US national disclosure policy.
Finally, information at one level of classification may be "upgraded by aggregation" to a higher level. For example, a specific technical capability of a weapon system might be classified Secret, but the aggregation of all technical capabilities of the system into a single document could be deemed Top Secret.
Use of information restrictions outside the classification system is growing in the U.S. government. In September 2005, J. William Leonard, director of the U.S. National Archives Information Security Oversight Office was quoted in the press as saying "No one individual in government can identify all the controlled, unclassified [categories], let alone describe their rules."[2]
[edit] Restricted
During and before World War II, the U.S. had a category of classified information called restricted, which was below confidential. The U.S. no longer has a restricted classification, but many other nations and NATO do. The U.S. treats "restricted" information it receives from other governments as confidential. The U.S. does use the term restricted data in a completely different way to refer to nuclear secrets, as described below.
[edit] Above top secret?
A common question about U.S. classified information is whether a level above Top Secret exists. Looked at one way, the answer is almost certainly no. Executive Order 13292 clearly states that Top Secret is the highest level of classification (Sec. 1.2). If there were some secret Executive Order that created a still higher level, there could be questions of adequate legal notice if someone mishandling that information were to be prosecuted. On the other hand, if a U.S. government agency wants to create a program so secret that the program's name itself is known to only a short list of hand picked individuals who have been recently subjected to the most thorough and intrusive vetting process imaginable, they can do so under the code word and special access program provisions of Executive Order 13292 (Sec. 4.3). Stringent additional security measures beyond those prescribed for ordinary Top Secret can also be required for the program, which would nevertheless still be classified at the Top Secret level, but with a code name and other markings added. As a practical matter the distinction is mostly semantic.
[edit] Sensitive Compartmented Information
Widely misunderstood as a classification level or specific clearance is "Sensitive Compartmented Information" (SCI). In fact the term refers to a method of handling certain types of classified information that relate to specific national security topics or programs whose existence is not publicly acknowledged, or the sensitive nature of which requires special handling. The SCI paradigm addresses two key logistical issues encountered in the day-to-day control of classified information:
- Individuals with a legitimate need-to-know but who hold only a Secret clearance may not be able to function effectively without knowing certain Top Secret facts about their work. However, granting all such individuals a blanket DoD Top Secret clearance would be undesirable, not to mention prohibitively expensive.
- The government may wish to limit certain types of sensitive information only to those who work directly on related programs, so that even someone with a general DoD Top Secret clearance cannot gain access unless it is specifically granted.
To achieve selective separation of program information while still allowing full access to those working on the program, a separate "compartment," identified by a unique codeword (itself sometimes classified), is created for the information. This entails establishing communication channels, data storage, and work locations (SCIF – Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) which are physically and logically separated not only from the unclassified world, but from general Department of Defense classified channels as well. Thus established, all information generated within the compartment is classified according to the general rules above. However, to emphasize that the information is compartmented, all documents are marked with both the classification level and the codeword (or sometimes the caveat "Handle via <compartment name> Channels Only").
A person is granted access to a specific compartment after the individual has: a) had a Single Scope Background Investigation similar to that required for a DoD Top Secret clearance; b) been indoctrinated ("read" or "briefed") into the nature and sensitivity of the compartment; and c) signed a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The individual now has access to all compartmented information, regardless of its classification (assuming a need-to-know). However, access does not extend to any other compartment; i.e., there is no single "SCI clearance" analogous to a Top Secret clearance. In fact, the individual may or may not hold a DoD Top Secret or even a DoD Secret clearance; a separate process must be initiated to obtain those. In practice, having been granted SCI access, an individual would certainly qualify for a Secret clearance, and probably a Top Secret clearance; obtaining these, however, represents additional cost to the individual's employer, and so it is not always pursued.
Examples of SCI topics are sensitive intelligence activities, nuclear secrets, and stealth technology. One or more compartments may be created for each area, and each of these compartments may contain multiple programs or projects (e.g. a specific reconnaissance satellite, ICBM, or stealth fighter), themselves with their own codenames.
[edit] Proper procedure for classifying U.S. government documents
To be properly classified, a classification authority (an individual charged by the U.S. Government with the right and responsibility to properly determine the level of classification and the reason for classification) must determine the appropriate classification level as well as the reason information is to be classified. A determination must be made as to how and when the document will be declassified and the document marked accordingly. Executive Order 13292 describes the reasons and requirements for information to be classified and declassified. Individual agencies within the government develop guidelines for what information is classified and at what level.
[edit] Protecting classified information
| -1 | UNCLASSIFIED |
| 0 | FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (green) |
| 1 | RESTRICTED (light blue) |
| CONFIDENTIAL (blue) |
|
| 2 | SECRET (red) |
| 3 | TOP SECRET (orange) |
| 4 | SCI (yellow) |
[edit] Facilities and Handling
One of the reasons for classifying state secrets into sensitivity levels is to allow the level of protection to be tailored to risk. The U.S. government specifies in some detail the procedures for protecting classified information. The rooms or buildings where classified material is stored or handled must have a facility clearance at the same level as the most sensitive material to be handled. Good quality commercial physical security standards generally suffice for lower levels of classification; at the highest levels, people sometimes have to work in rooms designed like bank vaults (see SCIF). The U.S. General Services Administration sets standards for locks and containers used for storage of classified material. The most ubiquitous approved security containers look like heavy duty file cabinets with a combination lock in the middle of one drawer. Advances in methods for defeating mechanical combination locks have led the U.S. government to switch to electro-mechanical locks that limit the rate at which combinations can be tried out. After so many failed attempts these locks will permanently lock, requiring a locksmith to reset them.
Classified U.S. government documents are typically required to be stamped with their classification on the cover and at the top and bottom of each page. It is often a requirement that each paragraph, title and caption in a document be marked with the highest level of information it contains, usually by placing appropriate initials in parentheses at the beginning (or sometimes end) of the paragraph. It is common to require that a brightly-colored cover sheet be affixed to the cover of each classified document, to prevent observation of a possibly classified title by someone unauthorized (shoulder surfing) and to remind users to lock up the document when it is unattended. The most sensitive material requires two person integrity, where two cleared individuals are responsible for the material at all times. Approved containers for such material have two separate combination locks, both of which must be opened to access the contents.
There are restrictions on how classified documents can be shipped. Top secret material must go by special courier. Secret material can be sent within the U.S. via registered mail, and confidential material by certified mail. Electronic transmission of U.S. classified information requires the use of National Security Agency "Type 1" approved encryption systems.
Specialized computer operating systems known as trusted operating systems are available for processing classified information. These enforce the classification and labeling rules described above in software. However, as of 2005 they are not considered secure enough to allow uncleared users to share computers with classified activities. So if one creates an unclassified document on a Secret device, the resultant data is classified Secret, until it can be manually reviewed. Computer networks for sharing classified information are segregated by the highest sensitivity level they are allowed to transmit, for example, SIPRNet (Secret) and JWICS (Top Secret-SCI).
The destruction of classified documents requires burning, shredding, pulping or pulverizing using approved procedures and must be witnessed and logged. Classified computer data presents special problems. See Data remanence.
[edit] Lifetime Commitment
When a cleared individual leaves the job or employer for which they were granted access to classified information, they are formally "debriefed" from the program. Debriefing is an administrative process that accomplishes two main goals: it creates a formal record that the individual no longer has access to the classified information for that program; and it reminds the individual of their "lifetime commitment" to protect that information. Typically the individual is asked to sign another NDA, similar to that which they signed when initially briefed, and this document serves as the formal record. Note that the debriefed individual does not lose their security clearance; they have only surrendered the "need to know" for information related to that particular job.
[edit] Classifications and clearances between U.S. government agencies
In the past, clearances did not necessarily transfer between various U.S. government agencies. For example, an individual cleared for Department of Defense Top Secret had to undergo another investigation before being granted a Department of Energy Q clearance. Agencies are now supposed to honor background investigations by other agencies, if they are still current. Because most security clearances only apply inside the agency where the holder works, if one needs to meet with another agency to discuss classified matters, it is possible and necessary to "pass" one's clearance to the other agency. For example, officials visiting at the White House from other government agencies would pass their clearances to the Executive Office of the President (EOP).
[edit] Categories that are not classifications
There are also compartments, or "code words", which pertain to specific projects, and are used to more easily manage which individuals require certain information. Code words are not levels of classification themselves, but a person working on a project may have the code word for that project added to his file, and then will be given access to the relevant documents. Code words may also label the sources of various documents; for example, there are code words used to indicate that a document may break the cover of intelligence operatives if its content becomes known. The WWII code word ULTRA identified information found by decrypting German ciphers, such as the Enigma machine, and which — regardless of its own significance — might inform the Germans that Enigma was broken if they became aware that it was known.
The United States also has a system of "restrictions" which can be added to a document; these are constantly changing, but can include (in abbreviated form) a requirement that the document not be shared with civilian contractor, or not leave a specific room. Some of these include NOFORN, meaning no distribution to foreign nationals, NOCONTRACTOR, meaning no distribution to contract personnel, CRYPTO, meaning methods involved in encrypting communications between government agencies, and CCO, meaning handle by COMINT (communications intelligence) Channels Only. Another similar to CRYPTO is CCI (Controlled Cryptographic Items), these items are limited in access and distribution but do not contain classified keys and alone are not classified. They do however require to be accounted for routinely. These restrictions are not classifications in and of themselves, rather, they restrict the dissemination of information within those who have the appropriate clearance level and possibly the "need to know" the information. Remarks such as "eyes only" also limit the restriction. One violating these directives might be guilty of violating a lawful order or mishandling classified information.
[edit] Restricted data
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 sets requirements for protection of information about nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials. Such information is "classified from birth," unlike all other sensitive information which must be classified by some authorized individual. However, authorized classifiers still must determine whether documents or material are classified or restricted.
The U.S. Department of Energy recognizes two types of Restricted Data:[3]
- Restricted Data. Data concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; production of special nuclear material; or use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.
- Formerly Restricted Data. Classified information jointly determined by the DOE and the Department of Defense to be related primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons, and removed from the Restricted Data category.
Documents containing such information must be marked "RESTRICTED DATA" (RD) or "FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA" (FRD) in addition to any other classification marking. Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data are further categorized as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. The Department of Energy security clearance required to access Top Secret Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and National Security Information, as well as Secret Restricted Data, is a Q clearance. The lower-level L clearance is sufficient for access to Secret Formerly Restricted Data and National Security Information, as well as Confidential Restricted Data, Formerly Restricted Data, and National Security Information.[4]
[edit] Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information
Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI) is a U.S. Department of Defense category of TOP SECRET Restricted Data or SECRET Restricted Data that reveals the theory of operation or design of the components of a nuclear weapon. Access to CNWDI is supposed to be kept to the minimum number of individuals needed.
[edit] Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information
While most Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information is sensitive, it may or may not be classified. The United States Navy recognizes that the public has an interest in environmental, safety, and health information, and that the basic research the Navy carries out can be useful to industry.
[edit] Yankee White clearance
Contrary to popular lore, the Yankee White clearance given to personnel who work directly with the President is not a classification. Individuals having Yankee White clearances undergo extensive background investigation. Yankee White cleared personnel are granted access to any information for which they have a need-to-know, regardless of which organization classified it or at what level. The Yankee White clearance includes a requirement for absolute absence of any foreign influence on the individual. This means they must be a natural-born citizen of the United States, not be or have been married to a person of foreign descent, or have travelled to countries that are considered to be unfriendly to the United States.[5]
[edit] Sharing of classified information with other countries
In cases where the United States wishes to share classified information bilaterally (or multilaterally) with a country that has a sharing agreement, the information is marked "REL" (release) and the three-letter country code. For example, if the U.S. wanted to release classified information to the governments of France, UK, and Canada, it would mark the document "REL FRA, GBR, CAN." Those countries would have to maintain the classification of the document at the level originally classified (TOP-SECRET, SECRET, etc.). The United States has military and national security information sharing agreements with most of its allies.
[edit] Claims of U.S. government misuse of the classification system
While the classification of information by the government is not supposed to be used to prevent information from being made public that would be simply embarrassing or reveal criminal acts, it has been alleged that the government routinely misuses the classification system to coverup misdeeds. See, for example, The Pentagon Papers. Many conspiracy theories such as the JFK assassination theories suggest that the government has classified information as top secret that reveals the involvement of agencies such as the CIA.
Various UFO conspiracies mention a level "above top secret" used for UFO design information and related data. They suggest such a classification is intended to apply to information relating to things whose possible existence is to be denied, such as aliens, as opposed to things whose potential existence may be recognized, but for which access to information regarding specific programs would be denied as classified. The existence of an “above top secret” classification is considered by some as unnecessary to keep the existence of aliens a secret, as they say information at the "Top Secret" level, or any level for that matter, can be restricted on the basis of need to know. Thus, the U.S. Government could conceal an alien project without having to resort to another level of clearance. The "need to know" would limit the ability to have access to the information. Some suggest that claims of the existence of such a classification level may be based on the mistaken belief that the ‘’levels’’ of classification are themselves classified: As such they feel that books available claiming to contain "above top secret" information on UFOs or remote viewing should arguably be taken with a grain of salt.
[edit] References
- ^ William D. Gerhard and Henry W. Millington, Attack on a Sigint Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty, 1981
- ^ Michael J. Sniffen, "Report: Gov't Secrecy Grows, Costs More," Associated Press, September 5, 2005 (accessed December 15, 2006)
- ^ Los Alamos National Laboratory, Guide to Portion Marking Documents and Material, Appendix B, Definitions, accessed December 15, 2006
- ^ Los Alamos National Laboratory, Clearance Processing, accessed December 15, 2006
- ^ The Football, GlobalSecurity.org
[edit] Additional sources
- Executive Order 13292 text at WikiSource
- DoD 5220.22-M National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)
- 400 Series DOE Directives by Number The 400 series of directives is where DOE keeps most security and classification related items.
- Atomic Energy Act of 1954 42 USC 2168 [1] or [2]
- Espionage Act 18 USC 793, 794, 798 [3]
[edit] See also
- Classified information for international usage
- Controlled Cryptographic Item
- Espionage Act
- Executive Order 13292
- Information Security Oversight Office
- Invention Secrecy Act
- List of U.S. security clearance terms
- Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information
- Secrecy News, a newsletter that covers U.S. classification policy
- SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility)
- Work of the United States Government
