Talk:Chindits

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Contents 1 Sources please 1.1 Some Sources 2 Command 3 section on 1944 planning 4 1943 chindits after 1943 5 Order of Battle 6 1944 strategy

[edit] Sources please

For most of this article sources are not really needed as the "facts" are widely available. However there are a number of statements about individules which are a POV and ought to have a source to justify who said them, or are about operational details not widely available and so are not generally known, here is an inital list which if they can not be sourced ought to be removed:

Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in this force, officially because their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Indian castes and religions. But in practice, Wingate disliked having non-european troops under his command in roles other than as guides and native pathfinders. He used Gurkha Battalions in both operations and even an african brigade in the second operation, but he used these units because they were what he was given rather than them being what he wanted.

Its no secret that Wingate did not want Indian Army soliders in the Chindits. The "official" excuse of diet, religion and training was proved false during operations in 1943. It is also no secret that in 1943 wingate campaigned for the use of the 70th British Division and against the use of other forces. His 1943 report (uncensored) repeated attacks indian army personnel and commanders without regards to facts or reason. The paragraph, as stands, is close to neutral in that it least makes a halfway attempt not to stand all with one side or the other. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Sources should be given if asked for and I am asking for them (please see Wikipedia:Verifiability). Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

If you apply that tight a standard to others, it will now be applied to you as well. I tried to go halfway and give you one source (the wingate 1943 report) but that does not seem to have been good enough correct? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Wingate also had plans for a general uprising of the Kachin population of Northern Burma. He fought over his plans with the leadership of Force 136, which was concerned that a premature uprising of the Kachins without a permanent British military presence would lead to their slaughter by the Japanese at the end of operations. Force 136 also had their own plans for a rising to be coordinated with the arrival of the regular army into Burma. Wingate was eventually convinced to scale back his original plans

The trouble is that sources which are not detailed tend to give what happend not what might have happend, so what is the detailed source for this?

That Wingate and Force 136 were both planning Kachin uprisings in 1944 is no secret. The relivant material here concerns the purposes, operation changes and other details of Dah Force in 1944 primarily. The cites would be from IWM (Wingate papers) and other archives. They can be produced but I'm not going to go to all that effort when the rest of the page is full of statements that would require similar citations but don't have them. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

If it is from the Windgate papers directly there is a danger of this falling under WP:NOR issue. There should be a secondary source which could be quoted. I mention this because there is no harm in extracting a fact from a Primary source, eg "Windgate was flying from ABC to XYZ on the first Monday in the month". But "He fought over his plans with the leadership" involves drawing a conclusion from several primary sources and that would fall foul of the WP:NOR.

Oh come on! You can't seriously be suggesting that this page should be blind to the primary sources. You would then be ignoring actual facts in favor of the opinions of biographers and official historians. The war diaries, reports and official communications are definitive on the subject. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

As you will be aware Windgate is still a controversial figure, and with controversial subjects it is better to ere on the side of too many footnotes than too few. Please see Bombing of Dresden in World War II for an example of a controversial WWII article with footnotes. Just because the subject has few footnotes to date does not mean that we can not add them. --Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

I'm concerned that I'm put to a whole lot of effort to please someone who wants to rewrite the page but can't even spell the man's name right. (Its "Wingate"). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

The other Brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The impulsive personalities of certain of the officers closest to Wingate raised questions about their suitability for such an enormous command responsibility.

This is not the resons Slim gives in Defeat into Vicory Page 265-6.

This is not an attempt to quote Silm directly, but to describe the circumstances of a very controversial decision in a way that is fair to all points of view. If necessary, more detail on the relative experience of the potential candidates and their personalties can be provided. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

But it ought to be sourced otherwise we should remove it an replace it with a statement which can be sourced. It will not be as detailed but it will be an accurate Encyclopaedia entry. Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Rather than being accurate, it will simply reflect the bias of the particular secondary source picked which tend to fall on one side or the other. The art of being accurate is about blending facts together into a better truth rather than blindly parrot secondary sources that in many cases don't even agree with each other. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

19 Allied soldiers, who were so badly injured as to be beyond hope of recovery and could not be moved, were shot by the medical orderlies.

This last one is not a POV but is contriversial so it ought to be footnoted. --Philip Baird Shearer 11:59, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

It is not controversial. It is unpleasent. But nobody has ever denied that it happened or given an account markedly different from the text above. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Some Sources

Wingate refused to use Indian Army formations in this force, officially because their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Indian castes and religions.

Burma 1942-1945, R. Callahan, Davis-Poynter 1978. The remainder of the para. is POV.

The other Brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience.

Summarised in Allen, Burma: The longest War from D. Tulloch (Wingate's Chief of Staff) in Wingate in Peace and War. Again, the rest of the para. is POV.

HLGallon 22:06, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Do you have page numbers for these as it would be better to footnote them properly? --Philip Baird Shearer 22:17, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Callahan, p. 101
Allen, pp. 348-351

HLGallon 23:09, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

Not sure if Wingate staff officers lacked the necessary comabt experiance. Because Slim complains in "Defeat into Victory" on page 216-217 that Windgate got the whole of the 70th division as it was not allocated to the 14th Army at the time W. aquired it and goes on to say that Windgate had an "elaborate staff". Surly although Slim does not say so, many of the staff must have come from the battle hardened and jungle warfare trained 70th.Philip Baird Shearer

In WW2, the Chief of Staff of a British division was the GSO 1, a Lieutenant-Colonel. The Chindits, being a "force" with no defined establishment or precedent, had Brigadier Derek Tulloch as its Chief of Staff (a full two ranks above a Lt. Colonel), and no doubt similarly inflated ranks to handle the various departments. The comparatively junior staff officers of 70th Division would be lost in the crowd at Special Force HQ.

Every formation led by Wingate tended to be hollowed out and not what it seemed. For example, a large percentage of men in the 1943 mission were recruited at random during the fall of 1942 rather than coming from the original two battalions given to Wingate. Wingate also considered every existing formation (battalions, brigades, divisions) to be obsolete and would remake them along lines that looked nothing like the rest of the army. "3rd Indian Division" in 1944 if you look at it in detail in the war diaries was nothing like a division. And Wingate wasn't a believer in command structure. - anon —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Masters, in The Road past Mandalay reports a cynical Joe Lentaigne claiming that Wingate had brought many of his contemporaries from the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich to fill the staff billets at Special Force. This suggests that Wingate went for familiarity when selecting his staff (although he favoured proven conduct in the field when selecting commanders).

HLGallon 06:24, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Fair point. I am very happy to go with Masters or who ever, but the comments like these should be sourced. I'll add the two you (HLGallon) have provided please see that I have got them correct. --Philip Baird Shearer 00:23, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Command

Today I removed a section on confusion to whom Windgate reported. Slim in "Defeat into Victory" on page 216 write "His force finished its training in India, and was now placed under my commad. I called Windgate to clear up several matters...". Slim goes on to say that Windgate announced that he felt at liberty to contact Slim's superiors directly if he did not agree with Slim to which Slim pushed a message pad over his desk to Windgate to call his bluff. --Philip Baird Shearer 23:44, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

I wish you had not done that. This is another extremely complicated subject and taking Slim's "defeat into victory" as sole source isn't a good choice. The commanders themselves (including Slim) each had their own opinion as to who Wingate reported to. There are many issues with regard to Wingate where there is no "one" definitive source and careful wording is necessary to avoid taking sides. And Wingate did make contact with Slim's superior's directly. - anon (December 2, 2005). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

He was not the only one in that campaign who was a little caustic, Vinegar Joe was known to be difficult. But AFAICT Windgate reported to the 14th Army and that meant Slim. He may have chosen to talk to Slim's superiors, but that does not mean that the chain of command was not clear cut. Which in the case of Vinegar Joe was not true because he did have multiple commands. If you have a source which repudiates this and in fact Windgate did officially report to more than one commander during Operation Thursday, then please provide the source and integrate it into the text. --Philip Baird Shearer 00:39, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

Please read what I wrote again. The question of who Wingate reported to is complicated. You have made a change based on one questionable source that is not by any means definitive. AFAICT means that you are the one that needs to produce more sources to back up the claim you are making. The original text reflected a great deal of ambiguity to do with the question. Your sources are not sufficient to resolve that ambiguity. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Why do you think that Slim is a questionable source and why is it not definitive? Can you produce another author to back up you assertion that Slim is a "questionable source that is not by any means definitive"? Do you have a source other than Wingate which confirms Wingate's view that his chain of command was not through Slim? Page 220 of D into V, Slim writes "[Windgate] made one last attempt to make me change by saying that he would not accept the order I had drafted. I gave him an unsigend copy of the draft, told hem to take it away, sleep on it that night and come back at ten the next morning, when I would give the same order signed. I told him I had never had a subordinate officer refuse an order, but if one did, I knew what to do. General Giffard happened to be visiting my headquaters and I asked him to be in my office the next day when Wingate came." Slim says that next morning Wingate accepted the order without comment. --Philip Baird Shearer 15:57, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] section on 1944 planning

The new section on 1944 planning completely misrepresents the prepartions and goals of the Chindits in 1944. This is an immensely complicated subject and the plans changed repeatedly right up to the launch of the operations. Putting a small selection of directives on the page and suggesting that they represent "the plan" for 1944 is extremely misleading. - anon (December 2 2005) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 22:28, 2 December 2005 (talk • contribs) 63.133.154.10.

I put the details in because before I did so there was nothing to say what it was that the Chindits where tasked to do. It might be obvious to you who presumably know something about the operation but to someone who has never read anything else about the operation there was nothing in the article to say what the objectives were for Operation Thursday or why the Chindits were doing it.

The question of what the Chindits were tasked to do is another very complicated subject on which its difficult to find an easy answer even with access to a tremendous amount of material. To even suggest that there were fixed objectives when the operation started is an almost fatal assumption.

On the other two fronts the plans laid by SEAC went pair shaped when the Japanese attacked, but on the Northern Front the initiative remained with the Allies and the strategic objectives were met.

You are making a conclusion about plans based on the result which is a very dangerous sort of assumption to make. Further, by your own standards you are making conclusions which your sources are not sufficient to support.

The details of the tactical plans might of change up to the start of the operation. But the joint directive was issued one day before the start of the operation and is in my opinion a fair overview of what it was that the Chinits were expected to do during the campaign.

Who considers the operations to have started on that day? The day you are talking about is the day 16th Brigade marched off. Most people consider the start of operation thursday to be when the main force flew into burma in March (almost a month later). The plans were changing up to the point where the force flew in and even after. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Again, "in my opinion" falls short of the standards you are imposing on the page. Unless you have a complete understanding of the entire planning process leading up to the operation that you can cite sources for, your conclusions are opinion and by your own standards are not allowed. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

If you wish to add a some paragraphs about the detailed alternative plans why they were abandoned and why the final plans were adopted I will be most interested to read them. --Philip Baird Shearer 23:18, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

Sorry. I will be busy finding citations for my own work now based on your demands. I do not have time to correct your work. If you cannot correct your flawed narrative with proper sources, it should be removed. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 63.133.154.10 (talk • contribs) 22:55, 2 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] 1943 chindits after 1943

In the change comments there were some material about the wording of how the 3/2nd gurkhas and kings battalion left the chindits in 1943. I'm not happy with the wording either, but language needs to be provided that clearly says that the 1943 Chindits were sent away by Wingate as whole battalions after operations. This distinction all too often seems to be blurred. - anon (December 2 2005)

[edit] Order of Battle

Because of the size of the article I think it is time to consider moving the Order of Battle to its own page. I would favour Order of Battle of the Chindits rather than Chindits' Order of Battle or Chindits' order of battle or order of battle of the Chindits. I don't like the apostrophe in the name and the name is similar to Order of Battle of the Waterloo Campaign. But I am open to suggestions on the name and if it should be done. --Philip Baird Shearer 01:03, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] 1944 strategy

Yesterday I replaced the section on 1944 plans with a simplified version that explains the 1944 planning process in a very direct way. A short, to the point and non-controversial version is better in my opinion than a long misleading one. Depending on Slim's account and highlighting the version of "orders" he gives in his book is not the best approach. Slim's book also plays fast-and-loose with the chronology of his discussions with Wingate. I also strongly disagree with the over-emphesis of the SEAC conference. Some sources, rather than deal with the details of planning simply develop a narrative of conferences which is misleading.

This issue of planning is historically very important to get right because it plays heavily into arguments over events after the death of Wingate. What can be said to have been planned in 1944 was the entry of the Chindits into the strongholds in north burma and the advance of 16th brigade overland. Little in the way of firm plans beyond that existed or were followed.

Full explaination of the planning process would be very long. It would involve tracing events from August until March. It would require dealing with a large number of sources and seperating out decisions that matter from those that dont. Its not something to be done in a few hours. For those reasons, I advocate for a short direct version that explains the high level details of the operation but that does not depend on Slim's directive issued a month before the main operation was even launched. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 205.188.117.11 (talk • contribs) 18:42, 3 December 2005 (UTC)

You can sign you posts with 4 tildes ~~~~ and the system will automatically convert them to a name and time stamp. I think it would be better if you had an account but failing that the IP address with a time stamp is better than nothing.

Slim writes on pages 204,205, that by the end of November an overall strategic plan had been drawn and it was agreed at the SEAC level that the Chindits would be tasked "(V) To help Stilwell's advance, a long range penetration operation behind the Japanese opposing him, by Wingate's Special Force". Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

Slim writes on page 213 that the 7 point plan he highlights on 204 (Point V as above was the strategic use of the Chindits) was agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Cairo Conference at the end of Novemeber. Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

Slim says (P 213) only a week later to accomidate Stalin it was agreed that most amphbious forces were to be transfered to Europe and at the end of December the Chiefs of Staff informed Mountbattan that all amphbious craft were to be withdrawn to Europe and as Chiang Kai-shek had made his Yunnan offensive conditional on the amphbious landings they were gone as well. So he says on page 214 the plans were scaled back to:

1. an overland Arakan advance
2. an advance by Stillwell's Chinese on Myitkyina
3. "A long-range penetration operation by Wingate's force to help Stilwell
4. An advance on the "main front" (Central Front) in Assim by 4 Corps to the Chindwin.

Are you saying that Slim is mistaken and this is not what happened?

You can argue that the details of the tactical plans were not fixed until late in the process, and I don't think anyone would disagree, but what at the strategic level is wrong with what Slim writes, because it seems that Stilwell's operation with Wingate in support was the only stratigic constant from November on? --Philip Baird Shearer 22:07, 3 December 2005 (UTC)