Cheek v. United States

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Cheek v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 3, 1990
Decided January 8, 1991
Full case name: John L. Cheek, Petitioner v. United States
Citations: 498 U.S. 192; 111 S. Ct. 604; 112 L. Ed. 2d 617; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 348; 59 U.S.L.W. 4049; 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,012; 67 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 344; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 305; 91 Daily Journal DAR 371
Prior history: Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Holding
(1) A genuine, good faith belief that one is not violating the Federal tax law based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law is a defense to a charge of "willfulness", even though that belief is irrational or unreasonable; (2) a belief that the Federal income tax is unconstitutional is not a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, and is not a defense to a charge of "willfulness", even if that belief is genuine and is held in good faith.
Court membership
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter
Case opinions
Majority by: White
Joined by: Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy
Concurrence by: Scalia
Dissent by: Blackmun
Joined by: Marshall
Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
Title 26, § 7201 of the United States Code

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991)[1], was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a tax protester's belief that he was not violating the Federal tax law based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law itself -- if a genuine, good faith, actually held belief -- would be a valid defense to charges of tax evasion, willful failure to timely file income tax returns, and willful failure to timely pay taxes, even though that belief is irrational or unreasonable. The Court also ruled that a belief that the tax law is invalid or unconstitutional is not based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, and is not a defense.

Contents

[edit] Facts

The defendant, John L. Cheek, was an airline pilot who for six years had failed to file the tax returns he was required to file. He was tried for tax evasion[1] and willful failure to file a return or pay tax.[2] While admitting that he had not filed his returns, he argued that his conduct was not willful. He testified that he did not believe that his wages were taxable income; and that he believed that the income tax was unconstitutional. He was convicted, and appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court based on these defenses.

[edit] Issue

The Supreme Court was presented with the same question raised individually by each of these defenses:

  1. Is it a defense to fail to obey a law based on the honest belief that said law is unconstitutional?
  2. Is it a defense to fail to obey a law based on the honest belief that the law was not intended to reach the activities in which the individual was engaged?

[edit] Discussion

Under U.S. criminal law, the general rule is that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is not a valid defense to criminal prosecution. However, there are exceptions to that rule. Some U.S. criminal statutes provide for what are known as "specific intent" crimes, where ignorance of the law may be a valid defense. The criminal statutes in the Cheek case are example of statutes for specific intent crimes.

[edit] Result

The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, ruled that the defendant's belief that the tax laws were unconstitutional was an unreasonable mistake of governing law – not a defense, no matter how honestly held. To the contrary, Cheek's acknowledgement that his failure to file tax returns was based on a belief about constitutionality was evidence of his awareness of the law and of the willfulness of his crime.

However, his asserted belief that his wages were not income was an unreasonable mistake of non-governing law – which may be a defense if that belief is actually held, because the statute required that the conduct be willful to be punishable. The Court interpreted "willfully" as meaning that the person had knowledge (awareness) of the law and the purpose to violate the law. The Court specifically pointed out that even if this asserted belief was irrational or objectively unreasonable, the belief could nevertheless be a valid defense to a charge of "willfulness" -- if the belief was actually held by the defendant. The question of whether the belief was actually held by the defendant was, however, a question for the jury to decide.

The Court then concluded that, because the tax code is so complicated, the defendant could have been in error about what income was taxable, and remanded the case to the trial court to re-try on that issue.

[edit] Holdings

The two essential holdings of the Court in the case are:

A genuine, good faith belief that one is not violating the Federal tax law based on a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law is a defense to a charge of "willfulness", even though that belief is irrational or unreasonable.
A belief that the Federal income tax is unconstitutional is not a misunderstanding caused by the complexity of the tax law, and is not a defense to a charge of "willfulness", even if that belief is genuine and is held in good faith.

[edit] Dissent

Justices Harry Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall agreed with the Court's ruling that a belief that the Federal income tax is unconstitutional is not a defense to a charge of willfulness. These two justices complained, however, about the Court's ruling that a genuine, good faith belief based on a misunderstanding of the Internal Revenue Code is a valid defense. In dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote:

It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with "the complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 200, but with the income tax law in its most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income? [ . . . ] [I]t is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least minimum intellectual competence.

[edit] Later developments

Some tax protesters have incorrectly cited this case as "proof" that it is possible to avoid paying taxes without punishment by using the kind of defense raised by Cheek about a good faith misunderstanding of the tax law itself. This belies the fact that Cheek was the subject of a criminal prosecution. He was required to repay all of the taxes that he had failed to pay up to that point.

Further, the case was remanded for a re-trial. In the re-trial, the jury rejected Mr. Cheek's argument that he actually "believed" that wages were not taxable. He was again convicted and sentenced to jail time. The second conviction was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[3]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ See 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
  2. ^ See 26 U.S.C. § 7203.
  3. ^ United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994).

[edit] External link