Talk:Channel Tunnel fire

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This is a great article! --Mr. Blake 11:34, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Nice of you to take the time to say so. Personally, I think the descriptions are too complex. Some graphics would help but I haven't the time to do them. Ecb 21:47, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

Artfully sanitised.--Achim 19:45, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

Achim, looking at this and at our past discussions on Talk:Channel Tunnel, I get the feeling that your contribution above aims to damn this article with faint praise. If this is so, then I am offended.

I did not intend to write an "artfully sanitised" description of the fire, and I think I succeeded. The things that Eurotunnel were heavily criticised for (e.g. poor operational procedures) are emphasised: the things that were mentioned in passing (e.g. spalling concrete hampering the firefighting operations, no fire separation in the HGV carrier wagons) are hardly mentioned.

On Wikipedia, we ought to all assume good faith. So ironic comment (if that is what your contribution is?) is no use. If you can be more specific about what you believe has been sanitised, and can point to direct references that support your viewpoint, then we can modify the article to address those points.

Ecb 21:47, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

You included nothing about the applicability of STUVA findings or the Eureka findings, which have been incorporated into applicable codes on the continent. I repeated several of the references more than once on the previous talk page. It's an undersea tunnel with no fireproofing (incomprehensible in itself) and the fire chewed up the concrete down to a thickness of two inches, which was widely reported in fire protection cirlces outside the tunnel business. The project management cancelled the purpose-designed fire doors on the cars. All of this was described and you said nothing about any of it. But frankly, I'm tired or arguing about it because we've both been there and done that. It is inconceivable for any fire protection insider to think that Eureka findings and STUVA findings would be inapplicable to any underground traffic thoroughfare such as this. If it were inapplicable, why would so many European governments have actively participated? What more can I say? After all the time spent going over this material, on the record, I could easily be offended that you took absolutely no notice of it. After all that? You won't look at the role of passive fire protection despite an abundance of peer reviewed, empirical and interpreted evidence, which was provided to you in writing. There is no logical basis for ignoring such facts that I can think of, particularly, since the discussion of them are exclusively what led you to this re-write. --Achim 02:15, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

It is known in fire protection circles, that fire modelling had an influence on the design of the fire safety plan and systems in this facility. Contrary to common practice in many modern subterranean tunnel facilities, this tunnel omitted fireproofing, which resulted in the reduction of the concrete liner to a thickness of 2". Is there any official statement on the difference between the models used and what really happened and the cost cutting measures that were instituted on the basis of the models? What was the modelling program used and the experience of the party responsible for the modelling? Furthermore, what is the technological basis for continuing to omit fireproofing in this undersea tunnel? I offer the following as an intellectual framework on the topic of fire modelling and performance based codes:

http://www.geocities.com/achim_hering/Articles/performance_based_building_codes.html

As well, before judging passive fire protection measures for traffic tunnels, I suggest a look at the following: Eureka "Firetun" project:

http://www.sp.se/fire/Eng/Protection/Tunnel.htm

Also: http://www.stuva.de/index-e.html

Furthermore, pictures and data concerning this topic can be seen on this page: http://www.promat-tunnel.com/idprt001.htm

A balanced approach to fire protection includes all three aspects:

--Achim 22:17, 29 July 2006 (UTC)

1 Some clarification required

[edit] Some clarification required

[edit] Red signals?

The article states that 7539 stopped at a red signal before entering the tunnel. In fact there are no line side signals in the TVM 430 in-cab signalling scheme. The stop indication is a flashing '000' on the in cab TVM430 display (the target speed), which instructs the driver to stop at the next section marker.

[edit] Position of the amenity car

The article gives a bit more thanan impression that the amemity car was at the front of the train. The amenity car is in fact located at the French end of all HGV shuttle trains. It is not moved from one end of the train to the other as the journey direction changes. In the subject train where the train was heading towards the UK, the amenity car would have been at the rear of the train. The report that I read suggested that some smoke had entered the car while the train was still moving. This is consistent with the car being behind the source of that smoke.

86.132.205.207 10:54, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

User:86.132.205.207 has two objections here. I don't know or care whether the red signal was on the cab console or on a line side signal post, so I'll leave that to others. But the amenity coach was unquestionably at the front (UK end) of the train in November 1996, and that was the usual position.

The report of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority into the fire (first reference in the article, it's available online) shows clearly that in train 7539, the amenity coach was at the front the train (Figure 7). In chapter 1, paragraph 8 (page 6) the report confirms that this was normal practice at the time of the fire: it says that "The Amenity Coach is normally situated immediately behind the train's leading locomotive."

Eurotunnel's policy may well be different now (they might now put the amenity coach at the French end—I don't know) but it was definitely at the UK end in train 7539.

As an aside, I'd be surprised if they do put the amenity coach at the rear of the train on a regular basis. If they've got a fire on a truck in the middle of a train stopped in the tunnel, the duty RCC has the choice of blowing smoke past the train driver (bad) or blowing smoke past the truck drivers and train crew (worse). Could a Eurotunnel employee comment?

Ecb 20:28, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Rake?

This article says "rake" alot but i think it is supposed to be "rack". Is "rake" a British spelling of "rack"? Or is it a bunch of typeos? Because rake usally refers to Rake (tool) --Nick Scratch 22:06, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

It's definitely rake, which is Eurotunnel's term for its rolling stock. See the attached link, which is the glossary from the inquiry report into the fire: