British Caledonian in 1978

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British Caledonian termed 1978 the "Gatwick Year". There were several reasons for this.

By 1978 the airline had fully recovered from the 1974 crisis year, which had threatened its very existence at that time. After the severe contraction forced upon it by the early '70s' oil crisis, the company's core scheduled operation was growing again with new widebodied aircraft and routes being added and schedules being expanded. Furthermore, business was booming with planes being fuller than at any time in the firm's history and it expected to earn record profits during that year.

To underline BCal's confidence about its future prospects, the interiors of the airline's narrowbodied fleet were undergoing a major refurbishment at that time. (These aircraft - including the entire 16-strong, short-haul BAC 1-11 fleet comprising nine larger series 500s and seven smaller series 200s - were given "widebody look" interiors featuring new seat covers that prominently displayed BCal's corporate logo among several other improvements to give customers the same travel experience as on the newly delivered DC-10s.)

During the second half of 1978 BCal also introduced an updated livery and replaced its single Piper PA-23 "Aztec" acquired in 1975 with a pair of larger Piper PA-31 "Navajo Chieftains". (BCal used one of these aircraft to inaugurate a new Gatwick-Birmingham feeder route at the start of the 1978/'79 winter timetable period.) [1]

BCal also became a "scheduled service only" airline during 1978 [2] implementing a decision taken the year before when the share of passengers travelling on charter flights had declined to just 15% of all passengers carried (as opposed to two-thirds at the time of the airline's inception seven years earlier). There were two main reason's for BCal's withdrawal from the charter market:

  • A 25% contraction of the transatlantic ABC flights market as a result of the initial success of the daily Laker Airways "Skytrain" low-fares, "no frills" scheduled operation between London Gatwick and New York JFK, which began during the previous year's autumn season. [3]
  • A steady decline in charter rates in the European package tour holiday market where BCal used to supply whole-plane charter seats to its Blue Sky Holidays tour operator affiliate as well as third party tour companies.

Prior to "Skytrain", BCal had been a major operator in the ABC market running regular flights to the US, Canada and West Africa from its Gatwick base and a number of other UK departure points. These flights were sold through its Golden Lion Tours tour operator affiliate. BCal found that it could deploy this long-haul capacity far more profitably to increase the number of routes and flights in its most important long-haul scheduled markets because the yields on its prime long-haul scheduled routes were much higher than in the ABC market.

Although operating short-/medium-haul whole-plane charters enabled the airline to improve the utilisation of its BAC 1-11 fleet - especially at week-ends, the company's increasing focus on the scheduled side of its business (as opposed to charter flights) meant that overall costs were increasing as well. The reason for this increase in costs was the greater number of overheads that were required to support the expanding scheduled operation. This, in turn, meant that the firm had acquired significantly higher costs than most of its contemporary charter airline rivals, thereby making it more and more difficult to compete profitably in this market at the prevailing low rates. In addition, there always used to be problems with the aircraft's configuration. [4] (BCal used to operate its short-/medium-haul schedules and charters with the same planes as its whole-plane charter market activities were not of the scale that would have justified keeping a dedicated fleet for these activities. This, of course, meant that the airline was unable to adopt separate high- and low-density seating arrangements to meet the differing, specific requirements of the scheduled and charter markets.) [4] Moreover, there used to be time-keeping issues resulting from operating scheduled and charter flights with the same aircraft that negatively impacted the scheduled services' punctuality whenever these were delayed due to the knock-on effect created by late-incoming charter flights. [5]

1978 was the first year BCal operated the majority of its scheduled services plying the prime long-haul routes to West Africa and South America with state-of-the-art widebody equipment.

At the start of that year's summer timetable period flight frequencies on BCal's Gatwick-Glasgow and Gatwick-Amsterdam routes increased to five round-trips per day on week days (Monday to Friday). During that period the airline also resumed its Edinburgh-Newcastle-Copenhagen service, which it had abandoned in 1974.

During 1978 Abidjan joined BCal's scheduled route network. Benghazi and Birmingham joined the network at the start of the 1978/'79 winter timetable period when the airline increased frequencies between London Gatwick and Paris Charles de Gaulle to seven daily round-trips on week days, with flights operating at two-hourly intervals. The addition of twice-weekly flights to the Libyan port city of Benghazi to the existing five weekly services to Tripoli meant that for the first time BCal was able to offer its passengers daily flights to Libya, an important market for highly profitable, oil-related business travel. [6] BCal's introduction of a 747 on the daily Gatwick-Houston schedule also enabled it to replace its two-class configured 1-11-500s on the West African coastal schedule to Banjul and Freetown via Casablanca and Las Palmas with 707s. The 707's greater range (compared with the 1-11) enabled it to cut out the intermediate stops and offer its passengers a more convenient, direct routing that took less time. BCal furthermore replaced two-class 1-11s operating on the Tripoli route with 707s.

In addition, the BAA had just completed the first phase of a major refurbishment and extension of BCal's Gatwick base. The centrepiece of this revamp was a completely refurbished centre pier featuring eleven telescopic, widebody-compatible loading bridges. [7][8] These were the first loading bridges to be installed at Gatwick, which was a single-terminal airport at the time. For the first time in its history, BCal also gained a dedicated check-in area for all its flights. This allowed its passengers to avoid the so-called "bucket-and-spade" brigade (as the airport's charter airline passengers were commonly referred to during the 1970s and early '80s). [8] These passengers had given Gatwick a poor public image during the '70s and '80s. At the peak of the annual summer holiday season the press used to descend on Gatwick to take photographs of hundreds of families with small children crowding the airport's terminal while awaiting announcements of their delayed charter flights' departures.

Moreover, the Government had announced its intention to take pro-active steps to help ensure Gatwick's development as a genuine alternative to Heathrow the year before. It was hoped that this in turn would assist BCal's development as a serious alternative to BA and the other major, established scheduled airlines.

These steps included inviting BCal and Britain's other Independent airlines to apply to the CAA for route licences to operate scheduled services to destinations in the British Isles and on the Continent that were not already served from Gatwick, thereby increasing the reach of the airport's scheduled route network as well as providing more connecting traffic for BCal. (At the time BCal was Gatwick's principal scheduled airline, which operated almost all of the airport's long-haul scheduled services as well as the bulk of its short-haul schedules.)

The CAA had conducted a public hearing into competing applications for the award of several licences to commence new short-haul scheduled services from Gatwick during 1977. The applicants included BCal as well as BA, BIA and Dan-Air. At the time BCal had applied to begin scheduled services from Gatwick to Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Oslo and Stockholm [9][10] as well as to add Aberdeen to its existing Edinburgh-Newcastle-Copenhagen licence. BCal was keen to expand its limited short-haul European network beyond the existing four routes linking London Gatwick with Paris Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam-Schiphol, Brussels-National (Zaventem) and Genoa (a former BUA route). The airline needed to develop its connecting traffic through Gatwick by growing the European network to include destinations in Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia and Southern Europe in order to help it increase load factors on its long-haul flights to Africa, South America and the US as well as to improve the profitability of these services.

BA had applied to serve Dublin, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt and Zurich from Gatwick. [10] It also asked the CAA to confirm several licences it already held to serve additional destinations in Europe from Gatwick.

BIA had applied to serve Dublin, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Milan Linate and Zurich from Gatwick. In support of its application, BIA had proposed to operate these services with 65-seater Fokker F-28 1000 series "Fellowship" jet aircraft, rather than the larger BAC 1-11-500s its rivals had planned to use on their services. These had almost twice the seating capacity of the Fokker jets. Using smaller aircraft would have enabled BIA to offer more frequent flights, thereby offering a more attractive product for the business travel market. BIA reckoned that this would improve its chances of being awarded these licences.

Dan-Air had applied to run scheduled services to several of the aforementioned destinations as well as to Berlin Tegel, where a number of that airline's aircraft were already based, and Munich.

In the event, the CAA decided to approve both BCal's as well as BA's applications but to reject BIA's and Dan-Air's applications. The CAA argued at the time that the Scandinavian routes BCal had applied for constituted important feeder services for the airline's long-haul flights to Africa, South America and the US, thereby aiding the future development of the company's scheduled route network at Gatwick. The CAA also argued that BA in its capacity as the UK's primary flag carrier could not be excluded from Gatwick's further development. The CAA furthermore argued that both BIA and Dan-Air lacked the necessary expertise to take on the established scheduled airlines on major international trunk routes.

However, BCal was unable to use its newly awarded licences as there was no provision in the bilateral air services agreements the UK had concluded with Denmark, Norway and Sweden for another carrier to operate scheduled services on the main trunk routes between London and these countries in addition to the incumbent flag carriers' services. This meant that BA and Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) had an effective monopoly on most routes between the UK and Scandinavia. To help secure BCal's reciprocal traffic rights on the main trunk routes between London and Scandinavia, the UK Government agreed to begin negotiations on a new bilateral air services agreement with its three Scandinavian counterparts in December 1978. [9] It was hoped that this would enable BCal to commence its first-ever scheduled services from London to Scandinavia at the start of the 1979 summer timetable period.

BA, which was facing no such bilateral restrictions, was able to commence operations an all four routes for which it had been awarded licences at the start of the 1978 summer timetable period itself. [6] However, it chose to run low-frequency services offering no more than a single daily round-trip on each of these routes.

Despite this setback for BCal, it was still able to offer its passengers a greater number of possible connections at Gatwick during 1978 compared with the year before as a result of additional frequencies on existing domestic routes as well as new domestic feeder routes operated/launched by other Independent British airlines.

British Midland replaced its Vickers Viscount turboprops with which it had operated a thrice-daily service between Gatwick and Belfast ever since it had taken over the route from BCal in 1974 with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 jets. As a result of the jets' higher cruising speed, British Midland was able to operate up to four daily round-trips on that route. In addition the DC-9's seating capacity was greater than that of the Viscount, thus resulting in a significant overall capacity increase.

Brymon Airways began a new twice daily Gatwick-Plymouth service using an 18-seater De Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter commuter plane. [6]

Air Westward, a newly formed regional airline, began a new service linking Gatwick with its base in Exeter operated with an 18-seat Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante. [6]

Dan-Air commenced a new thrice weekly Gatwick-Bergen 1-11 schedule. [6] This service in particular had scope to deliver additional high-yield, oil-related connecting traffic to BCal as Bergen was one of the twin centres of the Norwegian oil and gas industry.

In addition, Aer Lingus became the first foreign airline to split its scheduled operations between Heathrow and Gatwick when it launched a daily Gatwick-Dublin service to complement BA's service on that route. [6]

Government initiatives in support of Gatwick's development also included new policies to transfer all scheduled services between London and Canada as well as London and the Iberian peninsula from Heathrow to Gatwick on April 1, 1979 and to compel all airlines that were planning to operate a scheduled service to or from London for the first time to use Gatwick instead of Heathrow. The latter policy was officially known as the "London Air Traffic Distribution Rules". It came into effect on April 1, 1978 and was applied retrospectively from the beginning of April 1977. These rules were designed to achieve a "fairer" distribution of traffic between London Heathrow and London Gatwick, the UK's two main international gateway airports. The policy was aimed at increasing Gatwick's utilisation to help the airport make a profit.

In the event, only BA transferred all of its scheduled services to Gibraltar, Portugal and Spain from Heathrow to Gatwick at the start of the 1979 summer timetable period, after the Secretary of State for Transport had instructed it to do so. Air Canada, Iberia and TAP Air Portugal all refused to follow suit. [8] (Air Canada in particular argued that Gatwick's runway was too short to enable it to operate fully laden 747s from there non-stop to the Canadian West coast with a viable payload. It had also threatened to make Frankfurt its "number one" destination in Europe if the UK Government forced it to move its London operations to Gatwick.)

The "London Air Traffic Distribution Rules" stated that airlines that did not already operate an international scheduled air service from/to Heathrow prior to April 1, 1977 would not be permitted to commence operations at that airport. Instead, they would have to use Gatwick for all their London-based operations. However, airlines that did not already operate at Heathrow prior to this law taking effect could still commence domestic scheduled services at the airport provided that the BAA, which ran both Heathrow and Gatwick on behalf of the Government, as well as the incumbent Secretary of State for Transport granted them permission to do so. In addition, the "London Air Traffic Distribution Rules" banned all new all-cargo as well as all charter flights from Heathrow as of April 1, 1978.

Avianca, the CAAC (Air China's predecessor) and Philippine Airlines were among the first batch of airlines directed to use Gatwick instead of Heathrow as a result of the "London Air Traffic Distribution Rules". (Both Braniff Airways and Delta Air Lines commenced operations from Gatwick at the same time as a result of Bermuda II.)

Another pro-active measure the Government took to aid BCal's and Gatwick's development at the time was to grant permission for a high-frequency helicopter shuttle service linking both of London's main airports. [6]

Contents

[edit] Reaching new financial heights

BCal recorded a pre-tax profit of £12.2m at the end of the 1977/'78 financial year on October 31, 1978 [11] (the airline had changed the end of its financial year from September 30 to October 31 in the meantime). This translated into a £10m retained profit. It was the company's best-ever financial result since its formation back in November 1970. It also was a clear sign that it had left the dark days of late 1974 and early 1975 when its very existence was under threat firmly behind.

BCal's senior management decided to allocate £644,000 of the retained profit to a new profit-share scheme [11] to reward its staff for their hard work, which had succeeded in bringing about a dramatic turnaround in the airline's fortunes. BCal's profit-share scheme, which began the following year, was the first of its kind in the UK airline industry.

The good results boosted BCal's management's confidence in the airline's long-term future prospects. They also boosted staff morale and made everyone working for BCal at the time proud of their company's achievement.

[edit] Linking Heathrow and Gatwick by air

A new, high-frequency helicopter shuttle service linking London Heathrow and London Gatwick was inaugurated on June 9, 1978. [12]

This service was operating ten times a day in each direction using a 28-seater Sikorsky S-61N helicopter, which was owned by the BAA. BCal held the licence to operate the service and provided the cabin crew. [13] (A single crew member used to look after the passengers on this ten-minute flight.) British Airways Helicopters, the wholly owned helicopter subsidiary of BA whose headquarters were located at Gatwick, provided the flight deck crew and engineering support. [6]

The service gave BCal's passengers easier access to flight connections at Heathrow, especially to destinations not served by scheduled flights from Gatwick at the time.

It was used by 60,000 passengers during the first year of its operation. [14]

The service ended in 1986 when its licence was withdrawn on environmental grounds following the completion of the M25 London orbital motorway. (There were growing complaints about the "excessive" noise created by a low-flying helicopter from people living underneath the Gatwick-Heathrow Airlink's flight path in politically sensitive constituencies.) [14]

[edit] Supersonic ambitions

1978 was also the year BCal set up a task force headed by the late Sir Peter Masefield, at the time BCal's deputy chairman, to investigate the possibility of operating the Aerospatiale-BAC Concorde supersonic airliner viably on the airline's long-haul route network as there were still a few unsold, "white tail" examples available at that time.

Another important reason for BCal's decision to set up a Concorde task force was that the 1976 aviation policy review had left open the possibility of BA launching supersonic services to prime business and leisure destinations within BCal's sphere of influence, such as Lagos or Rio for example. To ward off this potential threat, BCal's senior management decided to develop its own Concorde plans, either independently or in partnership with BA. [15]

The most obvious choice for a supersonic service was Gatwick-Lagos, the backbone and main money spinner of BCal's scheduled operation. BCal's Concorde task force's brief was to assess the viability of a second daily all-premium supersonic service complementing the airline's existing daily subsonic, mixed-class widebody service on this route.

BCal put in a bid to acquire one of these "white tail" aircraft. (BA, which had jointly introduced the world's first commercial supersonic service with Air France in 1976, was bidding for the aircraft as well.) In the event, BCal's bid was not successful.

Following the unsuccessful bid to acquire Concorde direct from the manufacturer, BCal eventually arranged for two aircraft to be leased from BA and to have them maintained by Air France. It became necessary to find additional work for BCal's envisaged two-strong, leased Concorde fleet to increase the aircraft's utilisation, thus permitting a profitable operation. Therefore, BCal decided to use the second aircraft to launch a supersonic service between Gatwick and Atlanta. The reason BCal chose to operate its first supersonic service to the US to Atlanta rather than Houston, a far more profitable destination due to the oil-related traffic, was Concorde's range limitation. (BCal's Concorde task force had come to the conclusion that only non-stop supersonic services were viable.)

Both supersonic services were to be launched at the start of the 1979 summer timetable period.

However, the changing geopolitical situation - especially, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the subsequent tripling of crude oil prices - as well as the sheer complexity of the operational arrangements eventually put paid to BCal's Concorde plans.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 347
  2. ^ High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 340
  3. ^ British Airports Authority Annual Report and Accounts 1978/9, British Airports Authority, London, 1979, p. 20
  4. ^ a b It was nice to fly with friends! The story of Air Europe., Simons, G.A., GMS Enterprises, Peterborough, 1999, pp. 94/5
  5. ^ It was nice to fly with friends! The story of Air Europe., Simons, G.A., GMS Enterprises, Peterborough, 1999, p. 114
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h British Airports Authority Annual Report and Accounts 1978/9, British Airports Authority, London, 1979, p. 21
  7. ^ British Airports Authority Annual Report and Accounts 1977/8, British Airports Authority, London, 1978, p. 19
  8. ^ a b c High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 354
  9. ^ a b High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 360
  10. ^ a b British Airports Authority Annual Report and Accounts 1977/8, British Airports Authority, London, 1978, p. 18
  11. ^ a b High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 365
  12. ^ British Airports Authority Annual Report and Accounts 1978/9, British Airports Authority, London, 1979, pp. 21, 76
  13. ^ High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, pp. 355/6
  14. ^ a b High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, p. 356
  15. ^ High Risk: The Politics of the Air, Thomson, A., Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1990, pp. 316/7