Black Hawk Incident (April 1994)

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Black Hawk Incident (April 1994)

A United States F-15 fighter fires an air-to-air missile.
Date April 14, 1994
Location Arbil, Iraq
Result Two U.S. military helicopters destroyed,
29 military and civilian personnel killed

The Black Hawk Incident, sometimes referred to as the Black Hawk Shootdown Incident, was a "friendly fire" incident over northern Iraq that happened on April 14, 1994 during Operation Provide Comfort in which the pilots of two United States Air Force F-15s fighter aircraft fired on a pair of United States Army MH-60 Blackhawks helicopters, destroying both helicopters and killing 29 military service members and civilians from the U.S. and other countries.

Contents

[edit] Background

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[edit] Incident

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[edit] Investigation

[edit] Series Of Errors

The 1994 Blackhawk shootdown was not the fault of a single error but several perventble errors that were known about but never addressed by either the United States Army or the Airforce staffs.

A view of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with "wing"-mounted fuel tanks similar to the ones mounted on the two helicopters involved in the shootdown incident.
A view of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter with "wing"-mounted fuel tanks similar to the ones mounted on the two helicopters involved in the shootdown incident.

[edit] AWACS error

The first was inside the AWACS controlling northern Iraq. one of the tracking screens aboard the AWACS was not functioning and thus its operator was moved to a backup station on the other side of the control center. While this was not in and of itself a problem, it created difficulties because of the standard and informal procedures aboard the AWACS. In theory at least, AWACS operators "pass" aircraft from their screen onto a colleague's by oral and electronic communication. However, in Iraq, the standard operating method had been for the operator covering Southern Turkey to simply nudge the operator covering Northern Iraq when he wanted to pass a plane or helicopter along. This system worked because these two operators were always seated next to one another. However, on the day in question, due to the failed screen, these operators were on opposite sides of the control center. They were still linked by headset and computer, and were even within shouting distance, but their normal routine was not possible.

Even more important than the informal norm (as opposed to written regulation) of "nudging" rather than talking was the norm of not passing helicopters off at all. Given that most helicopters in the No-Fly Zone were only jumping about 100 yards over the border, most AWACS operators just preferred to keep them on the Southern Turkey screen and avoid the hassle of changing operators. On this day, however, the Blackhawks were going unusually far into the zone, and this generally passable informal norm may have proven deadly. A final AWACS factor was that this particular AWACS crew had never flown together before, and had disturbingly low morale and low opinions of their superiors. Generally, American AWACS crews in this theater were constantly deployed, and given the fact that this particular crew was not a real team and had a poor command climate, it is understandable why they posed a risk to the pilots they monitored.

[edit] Inter-service rivaliry

The Army's helicopters were poorly integrated into the USAF-dominated system. The helicopter flights were not given to Air Force aviators on their daily flow sheets. Therefore, given that Blackhawks look something like Iraq's Russian-made helicopters, it is not surprising that these particular F-15 pilots were suspicious. More importantly, the interservice rivalry between the Army and USAF was such that no army aviator was given specific instructions concerning IFF codes. When an Air Force aircraft moves from Turkey into the no-fly zone, it switches to a specific IFF frequency that all other planes in the theater recognize. Because the two services did not coordinate much, if at all, the Blackhawk pilots were unaware of this operating routine, and failed to "squawk" the appropriate code once they crossed the Iraqi border.

the results of the F-15 fly-by identification were almost predetermined. Given that the Army aircraft looked somewhat like enemy choppers, were not on the flight plans they had been given, and were not squawking the correct IFF, the expectations of the USAF pilots totally conditioned what they saw. The shooting down of the two helicopters was therefore the result of a number of interacting factors; factors which resulted from the development of informal routines in the context of interservice rivalry, poor command structures, and a lack of communication.

[edit] Aftermath of the investigation

As a result, Brig. Gen. Jeffrey S. Pilkington, who commanded the Provide Comfort Combined Task Force received an official letter of admonishment for "his failure to fulfill his responsibilities as a commander" and was reassigned.

Brig. Gen. Curtis H. Emery II was serving as commander of the Combined Air Force Component at the time. He also received an official letter of admonishment for "failure to maintain adequate control and aircraft integration within the tactical area of responsibility."

Additionally, one officer received an Article 15 and five others received letters of reprimand. The letters were all placed in unfavorable information files, to remain there for two years.

The two F-15 pilots--Lt. Col. Randy W. May and Capt. Eric Wickson--were taken off flying status for at least three years. Additionally, AWACS officers Capt. Jim Wang, Capt. Joseph M. Halcli and 1st Lt. Ricky L. Wilson were disqualified from controlling aircraft for three years.[1] As of May, 2005 Jim Wang was still serving in the U.S. Air Force but remained at the rank of Captain, having been denied promotion.[2]

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[edit] References

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Arana-Barradas, "Black hawk incident 'tragic series of errors'", [1]
  2. ^ Chu Lin, Friendly Fire Doesn't Shoot Down Wang

[edit] Books

  • Diehl, Alan E. (2003). Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups. Potomac Books. ISBN 1574885448. 
  • Kern, Tony T. (1999). Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot. McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing. ISBN 0070349274. 
  • Piper, Joan L. (2001). Chain of Events: The Government Cover-up of the Black Hawk Incident and the Friendly-fire Death of Lt. Laura Piper. Brassey's. ISBN 1574883445. 
  • Snook, Scott A. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton University Press. 

[edit] Web

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