Bin Laden Issue Station

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The Bin Laden Issue Station (1996-2005) was a unit of the Central Intelligence Agency dedicated to tracking Osama bin Laden.

Contents

[edit] Conception, Birth and Growth

The idea was born from discussions within the CIA's senior management, and that of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). David Cohen, head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, and others, wanted to try out a "virtual station", modeled on the Agency's overseas stations, but based near Washington DC and dedicated to a particular issue. The unit "would fuse intelligence disciplines into one office ≈ operations, analysis, signals intercepts, overhead photography and so on".

Cohen had trouble getting any Directorate of Operations officer to run the unit. He finally recruited Michael Scheuer, an analyst then running the CTC's Islamic Extremist Branch; Scheuer "was especially knowledgeable about Afghanistan". Scheuer, who "had noticed a recent stream of reports about Bin Ladin and something called al Qaeda", suggested that the new unit "focus on this one individual". Cohen agreed.

The Station opened in January 1996, as a unit under the CTC. Scheuer set it up and headed it from that time until spring 1999. The Station was an "interdisciplinary" group, drawing on personnel from the CIA, FBI, NSA and elsewhere in the intelligence community. Formally known as the Bin Laden Issue Station, it was codenamed Alex, or Alec Station. (It is presumably the "Alex Base" referred to by Able Danger liaison Anthony Shaffer.[1]) By 1999 the unit's staff had nicknamed themselves the Manson Family, "because they had acquired a reputation for crazed alarmism about the rising al Qaeda threat".

The Station originally had twelve professional staff members. This figure grew to 40-50 employees by Sept. 11, 2001. (The CTC as a whole had about 200 and 390 employees at the same dates.)[2]

CIA chief George Tenet later described the Station's mission as "to track (bin Laden), collect intelligence on him, run operations against him, disrupt his finances, and warn policymakers about his activities and intentions". By early 1999 the unit had "succeeded in identifying assets and members of Bin Laden's organization ...".[3]


[edit] The New View of Al-Qaeda, 1996-98

Soon after its inception, the Station began to develop a new, deadlier vision of al-Qaeda. In spring 1996, in what Scheuer called "a stroke of luck", Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl walked into the US's Eritrean embassy and established his credentials "as a former senior employee" of Bin Laden. Al-Fadl had lived in the US in the mid-1980s, and had been recruited to the Afghan mujaheddin through the al-Kifah center at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn. Al-Kifah was the interface of "Operation Cyclone, the American effort to support the mujaheddin", and the Pakistan-based Services Office of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, whose purpose was to raise recruits for the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Al-Fadl had joined al-Qaeda in 1989, apparently in Afghanistan. Peter Bergen called him the third member of the organization (presumably after Azzam and bin Laden). But al-Fadl had since embezzled $110,000 from al-Qaeda, and now wanted to "defect".

Al-Fadl was persuaded to come to the United States by Jack Cloonan, an FBI special agent who had been "seconded" to the Bin Laden Issue Station. There, from late 1996, under the protection of Cloonan and his colleagues, al-Fadl "provided a major breakthrough on the creation, character, direction and intentions of al Qaeda". "Bin Laden, the CIA now learned, had planned multiple terrorist operations and aspired to more" ≈ including the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium. Another, anonymous, "walk-in" source "corroborated" al-Fadl's claims. "By the summer of 1998", Scheuer later summed up, "we had accumulated an extraordinary array of information on (al-Qaeda) and its intentions."

Unfortunately the "reams" of data that the Station had been "developing ... had not been pulled together and synthesized for the rest of the government". Policymakers knew there was a dangerous individual named Osama bin Laden whom they had been trying to capture and bring to trial. But they did not yet share the Bin Laden unit's consciousness of a structured worldwide organization called al-Qaeda, referring rather to bin Laden and his "associates" or "network". And a 1997 CIA National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism only briefly mentioned bin Laden.

Al Qaeda operated as an organization in more than sixty countries, the CIA's Counterterrorist Center calculated by late 1999 (a figure that was to help underpin the "War On Terror" two years later). Its formal, sworn, hard-core membership might number in the hundreds. Thousands more joined allied militias such as the (Afghan) Taliban or the Chechen rebel groups or Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan. ...[4]


[edit] The First Capture Plan and the US Embassy Attacks, 1997-98

In May 1996 bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan. Scheuer saw the move as, another, "stroke of luck". Though the CIA had virtually abandoned Afghanistan after the fall of the Soviet puppet regime in 1991, case officers had re-established some contacts while tracking down the Pakistani gunman who had murdered two CIA employees in 1993. "One of the contacts was a group associated with particular tribes among Afghanistan's ethnic Pashtun community."

By autumn 1997 the bin Laden unit had roughed out a plan for these tribals to capture bin Laden and hand him over for trial, either to the US or an Arab country. In early 1998 the Cabinet-level Principals Committee apparently gave their blessing, but the scheme was abandoned in the spring for fear of collateral fatalities during a capture attempt.

In August 1998 militants truck-bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. President Clinton ordered cruise-missile strikes on bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. But there was no "follow-up" action to these strikes. [5]


[edit] New Leadership and the New Plan, 1999

In December 1998 CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on Osama bin Laden.[6] Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden". In the spring he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies".

As an evident part of the new strategy, Tenet removed Mike Scheuer from the leadership of the Bin Laden Station. (Later that year Scheuer resigned from the CIA.) Tenet appointed "Richard" (Rich, Richie), a "fast-track executive assistant" who "came directly from Tenet's leadership group", to have authority over the Station. "Tenet quickly followed this appointment with another: He named Cofer Black as director of the entire CTC."[7]

The CTC produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and "previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management at the end of July" 1999. In September Tenet unveiled "the CIA's new Bin Ladin strategy. It was called simply, 'the Plan'."

... (Cofer) Black and his new (sic) bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations ≈ as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. ... Black wanted recruitments, and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations.

(T)he CIA (also) considered the possibility of putting U.S. personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. The CIA had been discussing this possibility with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and found enthusiasm on the working level but reluctance at higher levels. CIA saw a 95 percent chance of (SOCOM) forces capturing Bin Ladin if deployed ≈ but less than a 5 percent chance of such a deployment. ...

Black also arranged for a CIA team, headed by Station chief Richard, to visit Northern-Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, to discuss operations against bin Laden. The mission was codenamed "JAWBREAKER-5", the fifth in a series of such missions since autumn 1997. The team went in late October 1999, "a hazardous journey in rickety helicopters that would be repeated several times in the future". They stayed for seven days. "The Bin Laden unit was satisfied that its reporting on Bin Ladin would now have a second source." Contemplated operations would be coordinated with the CIA's other prospective efforts against al-Qaeda.

But even with Tenet's support they struggled for resources. ... Once again, a plan was not translated into action.[8]

Coincidentally Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan in November-December 1999, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as 9/11. Al-Hazmi undertook guerrilla training at Qaeda's Mes Aynak camp (along with two Yemenis who were unable to get US entry visas). The camp was located in an abandoned Russian copper mine near Kabul, and was for a time in 1999 the only such training camp in operation. Atta, al-Shehhi and Jarrah met Qaeda leaders in Kandahar, and were instructed to go back to Germany to undertake pilot training.[9]


[edit] "Steal Our Thunder": Able Danger and the 9/11 Hijackers

The military intelligence operation "Able Danger" was set up in autumn 1999. It was a cooperation of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). It used the new technique of data mining to uncover Islamist activists by association with known terrorists. But Major Anthony Shaffer, Able Danger's DIA liaison officer, called it a planning operation, not an intelligence one. "Ultimately, Able Danger was going to give decision-makers options for taking out al-Qaeda targets."[10]

In September 1999 Shaffer visited the CIA representative at SOCOM headquarters to explain the difference between the CIA's approach and theirs. The CIA rep told him

"I clearly understand the difference. I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottomline is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this." ...

I (Shaffer) believe he was being a friend. I believe he was sincerely telling me this because it was the truth. He said, short of (SOCOM chief) General Schoomaker calling George Tenet directly, the best information would never be released. To my knowledge, and to my other colleagues' knowledge, there was no information ever released to us because CIA chose not to participate in Able Danger. ...

I was frankly shocked ...

And, indeed, anyone might have difficulty swallowing it.

By early 2000 the Able Danger operation had discovered about 60 individuals, including the future leading hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi. It termed these the "Brooklyn cell", because of some associations with the New York district. (Able Danger's first discovery, Mohamed Atta, was apparently found by his associations with "terrorist mastermind" Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was at Brooklyn's Farouq mosque in the early 1990s.) Shaffer briefed CIA chief Tenet on legal issues regarding the members of the "Brooklyn cell".[11]

As for the CIA. The Agency erratically tracked Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar as they traveled to and attended the al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000. "The Counterterrorist Center (CTC) had briefed the CIA leadership on the gathering in Kuala Lumpur ... The head of the Bin Ladin unit (Richard) kept providing updates", unaware at first that the information was out-of-date. By March 2000 it was learned that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had departed for (or returned to[12]) Los Angeles. But no-one outside the CTC was informed. The men were not registered with the State Department's TIPOFF list, nor was the FBI told.[13]


[edit] "Afghan Eyes" and the Predator Drone, 2000-2001

In spring 2000, officers from the Bin Laden Station joined others in pressing for "Afghan Eyes", the Predator reconnaissance drone program for locating bin Laden in Afghanistan. In the summer, "The bin Laden unit drew up maps and plans for fifteen Predator flights, each lasting just under twenty-four hours." The flights were scheduled to begin in September. In autumn 2000, officers from the Station were present at Predator flight control in the CIA's Langley headquarters, alongside other officers from the CTC, and US Air Force drone pilots. Several likely sightings of bin Laden were obtained as drones flew over his Tarnak-Farms residence near Kandahar. Late in the year, the program was suspended because of bad weather.[14]

Resumption of flights in 2001 was delayed by arguments over an armed Predator. A drone equipped with adapted "Hellfire" anti-tank missiles could be used to try to kill bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders. Cofer Black and the bin Laden unit were among the advocates. But there were both legal and technical issues. In the summer the CIA "conducted classified war games at Langley ... to see how its chain of command might responsibly oversee a flying robot that could shoot missiles at suspected terrorists". And a series of live tests in the Nevada desert (involving a mockup of bin Laden's Tarnak residence) produced mixed results.

Tenet advised cautiously on the matter at a meeting of the Cabinet-level Principals Committee on September 4, 2001. If the Cabinet wanted to empower the CIA to field a lethal drone, Tenet said, "they should do so with their eyes wide open, fully aware of the potential fallout if there were a controversial or mistaken strike". National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice concluded that the armed Predator was required, but evidently not ready. It was agreed to recommend to the CIA to resume reconnaissance flights. The "previously reluctant" Tenet then ordered the Agency to do so.[15]


Shortly after 9/11 Michael Scheuer came back to the Station as special adviser. He stayed until 2004.[16]


The Bin Laden Station was reportedly disbanded in late 2005.[17]


[edit] See also

MQ-1 Predator


[edit] References

Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin, 2005. (This is an updated version of the original, Penguin, 2004.)

9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States), July 2004

Jack Cloonan interview, PBS, 13 July 2005

Michael Scheuer interview, PBS, 21 July 2005


[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Shaffer interview on Able Danger, Government Security News, Aug. 2005.
  2. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.319, 456; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, p.109 (HTML version); ibid, Notes, p.479, note 2 (to chapter 4, p.109) (HTML version)
  3. ^ Tenet Testimony to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, pp.4, 18
  4. ^ Andrew Marshall, "Terror 'blowback' burns CIA ...", Independent on Sunday, Nov. 1, 1998 (copy); 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 2, pp.58-9, 62; ibid, chapter 4, pp.109, 118; (HTML version); Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.155, 336, 367, 474; Jack Cloonan interview, PBS, July 13, 2005; Michael Scheuer interview, PBS, July 21, 2005; Jane Mayer, "Junior: The clandestine life of America's top Al Qaeda source", The New Yorker, Sept. 4, 2006 (issue of Sept. 11, 2006)
  5. ^ 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, pp.109-115 (HTML version); Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.*.
  6. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.436-7 and p.646 note 42; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 11, p.357 (HTML version).
  7. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.451-2, 455, 456; Tenet Testimony to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, p.14. Richard was appointed head of the "section" or "group" that included / had authority over the Station: 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, p.142 (HTML version); cf. ibid, chapter 6, p.204 (HTML version)
  8. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.457, 466-72; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, pp.142-3 (HTML version).
  9. ^ 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 5, pp.155-8, 168 (HTML version)
  10. ^ Said Shaffer, speaking anonymously at the time. "Pentagon team spotted Sept. 11 leader a year before attacks" Telegraph (UK), August 10, 2005
  11. ^ Altogether, said Shaffer, Able Danger found "five cells, [including] one ... in the United States", and "two of the three cells which conducted 9/11, to include Atta". Congressman Curt Weldon confirmed that one of these was the "Brooklyn cell". Shaffer interview on Able Danger, Government Security News, Aug. 2005; Bill Gertz et al, "Inside the Ring", Washington Times, Sept. 30, 2005.
  12. ^ According to some press accounts, in November 1999 al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were present in Los Angeles, when they were driven from LAX airport to the Parkwood apartments, where they obtained the lease of an apartment. Amy Goldstein, "Hijackers Led Core Group", Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2001, p.A01; Goldstein et al, "Hijackers Found Welcome Mat on West Coast", Washington Post, Dec. 29, 2001, p.A01
  13. ^ 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 6, pp.181-2 (HTML version)
  14. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.527, 532; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 6, pp.189-90 (HTML version)
  15. ^ Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.580-1; Tenet Testimony to the 9/11 Commission, March 24, 2004, pp.15, 16; Barton Gellman, "A Strategy's Cautious Evolution", Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2002, p.A01; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 6, pp.210-14 (HTML version); ibid, Notes, p.513, note 258 (see note 255) (HTML version)
  16. ^ Dana Priest, "Former Chief of CIA's Bin Laden Unit Leaves", Washington Post, Nov. 12, 2004, p.A04
  17. ^ New York Times, July 4, 2006; Washington Post, July 4, 2006
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