Talk:Battle of Savo Island

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[edit] Friendly Fire Theory on the Canberra

At 14:32, 5 April 2006, 136.1.1.101 changed [1] the article to say:

Canberra sped up and turned to avoid enemy torpedoes, then to try to bring her guns to bear. Beginning at 01:44, as the ship's gunners were attempting to aim, she took a torpedo, probably fired by the US destroyer Bagley

As it lacked any supporting source citations, I reverted this claim of friendly fire. In reviewing the "official" account of the battle, I cannot find any confirmation that Bagley torpedoed Canberra. While there are allegations making this claim [2], others [3] dispute any friendly fire. While it is technically possible that Canberra was struck by a friendly torpedo, I do not feel we can honestly say that she was probably struck by Bagley. Doing otherwise strikes me as being a poster child for what wikipedia is not. --Kralizec! (talk) 21:38, 5 April 2006 (UTC)

Loxton's book presents compelling evidence that Bagley torpedoed Canberra. I'm going to include that in the article, but also provide the alternate theory on what might have caused the damage to the Canberra's starboard side, and I won't use the word probably. Cla68 23:06, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] There Was No Chance of a Dawn Airstike by Allies Due to Early Withdrawal of Carriers

"Mikawa ordered a return to Rabaul instead of attacking the now defenseless Allied transports. He may have also been apprehensive of Allied air attacks once dawn broke, which would have found his ships scattered in the vicinity of Guadalcanal if he had gone after the transports."

The Japanese did not know this, but they had no need to fear US Airstikes in the morning -- Admiral Fletcher had, over the objections of the officers in charge of the Guadalcanal invasion, withdrawn his carrier task force on August 8 at 1810, 12 hours ahead of schedule. This was a major factor in the decision to withdraw the transports prematurely.

I'll be discussing this in the article. Cla68 23:07, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Caption or map incorrect?

The caption on the picture of the Quincy states "Quincy, in a view from either Furutaka, Yubari, or Tenryu". I believe this may be in error. When I compare it to the IJN map, there seems to be a number of problems. For one, the Yubari does not even appear on the map as being attached to any part of the attack, although the article text does mention it. But more interesting, given the angle of the bow compared to the ship taking the picture, it would appear the image would have to come from one of the ships in Crudiv 18, which the map claims is the Tatsuta and Tenryu. The Furutaka would have been on the other side (right) of the Quincy, if the map is correct.

Can someone shed some light on this?

Maury 23:34, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

The map is incorrect. The Tatsuta should be Yubari. Also, the map doesn't show (and the text doesn't yet say) that Furutaka experienced a problem, perhaps with steering, that caused her to switch from the CruDiv 6 column to the more westward column with CruDiv 18. Richard B. Frank is the source for the photo caption and I believe he bases his assumption on where the picture is taken from due to that fact that the photo shows Quincy from the port side and Furutaka, Yubari, and Tenryu were on that side of Quincy during the battle. I'll eventually correct the map once I'm back at a computer with image alterating capability software. Cla68 01:24, 15 August 2006 (UTC)
Excellent, thanks! Maury 11:53, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Fletcher's withdrawal

"216.203.96.42", although your change to the text is cited, it has some problems. Almost every one of the other sources listed in the reference section, including Morison's, Frank's, Hammel's, and Loxton's books state that Fletcher didn't withdraw his carrier "as planned," but, in fact, unilaterally decided to withdraw 24-hours earlier than what he had previously told Turner was his projected withdrawal time. The "demoralized" statement comes directly from the source cited, who cites an original source for the statement. I'm going to put Lundstrom's opinion in the footnote, so it won't be deleted. It's just that the preponderance of historians reporting on the event tell it different than Lundstrom. Cla68 04:30, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Effects of Mikawa's withdrawal

It seems to be historical revisionism for me to alway emphasize that the "The Japanese owned hard, but missed the golden opportunity for the win." Those "missed" transports were withdrawn the next day, without unloading heavy equipment and supplies. The US had plenty of transport ships and supplies, so not destroying them didnt "lose the battle" as they would have been easily replaced. The story could be written as: {The "foolish" Americans withdrew the transports while they were in no real danger. (If not counting Betty bombers with torpedoes from nearby air bases. :) ) Thus, they left the Marine division "stranded" on Guadalcanal.} The real cause of this defeat is the japanese pilot training system, which was too "elitist", so they had too few "elite" pilots, which were flying with fragile aircraft. So, after the battle of Santa Cruz, the Japans had carriers, but didnt have the naval pilots to fly the aircrafts. There were still a few months for carrier battles, before the Essex-class carriers would have arrived. (Of course, the Pacific War was eventually decided by economical superiority, not battles... ) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 62.201.95.137 (talk) 21:07, 6 January 2007 (UTC).

Actually, at that time, the U.S. didn't have "plenty of transport ships and supplies," at least, not in the Pacific area. Because of the "Germany first" agreement with the UK, most of the U.S. war materiel, troops, and their transportation were in the Atlantic area, not the Pacific. Thus, if Mikawa had destroyed the Allied transport ships off Guadalcanal and Tulagi on August 8, the U.S. probably would have had to withdraw its forces from Guadalcanal and wait until more forces and transport ships came available, which probably would have been awhile, perhaps as long as a year. That would have given Japan time to try to finish its conquest of eastern New Guinea (not necessarily assured, since the Australian and U.S. forces under MacArthur had something to say about that) and establish larger, more mutually supportive bases in the Solomons and perhaps even attack the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Samoa, and Tonga to deny them as forward operating bases for the Allies and cutting the support lines between the U.S. and Australia. The Allied landings at Guadalcanal occurred at a crucial juncture in the war in the South Pacific and Japan's failure to respond effectively, including in the Savo Island battle, is what allowed Guadalcanal to become the "turning point," strategic victory for the Allies that it became. Cla68 00:15, 7 January 2007 (UTC)
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