Talk:Battle of Lundy's Lane

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[edit] American Decision to Retreat

Langmann's edit summary of September 8 claims:

There is no evidence the Americans were worried about additional British forces, rather they were worried about resupply due to lack of support from Cmdore Chauncey. Read Graves before publishing op.

I need hardly mention that it is not acceptable practice to demand that contributors base their edits on any single source among the hundreds that may cover a given topic, especially when more recent publications exist. Both Zuehlke (Zuehlke, Mark. The Canadian military atlas: the Nation's battlefields from the French and Indian Wars to Kosovo. Toronto, Stoddart Publishing, 2001. ISBN 0-7737-3289-6) and Chartrand (also employed by the Department of National Defence) affirm that the American retreat was based at least in part on the knowledge that British reinforcements were forthcoming.

I've rather meekly stated, "The Americans may also have realized that they would soon be perilously outnumbered by additional British forces in the vicinity." There's no justifying the removal of this information given the manner in which I presented it. Albrecht 04:45, September 8, 2005 (UTC)

Langmann replies:

- Those sources are also discussed in Grave's book. Much of the British/Canadian perspective is based upon Drummond's report, which is incredibly biased and much an attempt to cover his shortcomings which would be further demonstrated in his supreme failure at Fort Erie.

You are confusing the American withdrawal due to additional British forces in the vicinity with what was happening later in the east where British forces were coming in from the finished European theatre. In this actul battle, there is no evidence based upon American records that they were that worried about futher British forces but rather that they had lost so many officers, had suffered a large amount of attrition, and had no hope of being reinforced by Commodore Chauncey that they had retreat to Fort Erie and await further orders and supplies. In fact Ripley (now in command due to Brown's injuries) discovered that some 1000 Americans reinforcements were waiting at Chippawa.

Brown later ordered Ripley to return to the field of battle and attempt to defeat the British. Ripley did not do so since he felt that his army was in serious danger of being overstretched without supply and effective officers. Therefore they withdrew.

Zuehlke seemed to indicate that on top of Drummond's 1,600 men and Riall's 1,000, there was a third British force nearby at Ten Mile Creek (1,000 regulars), but he isn't clear on whether any of these were committed during the engagement. The reinforcements he speaks of may indeed have been those along the general front, i.e. based in Quebec City. But the broad concept of the Americans being in danger of losing numerical parity if they remained in Canada, minus the phrase "in the vicinity", remains essentially unchanged.

They were not particularly worried about British reinforcements, there is no evidence for that from American reports. Since Graves bases his book upon the actual data, I think we should believe him. His book is the definitive source in this particular case.

Probably. Of course, it's rather presumptuous of you to categorically denounce every other historian's methodology as inferior by default. Simply stating that Ripley may have feared British reinforcements seems more reasonable than trying to affirm that Ripley wasn't at all worried about British reinforcements.

What is often not mentioned is that the British also withdrew to Queenston and did not follow the American army until several days later. They were also suffering from the same problems that the Americans were.

The article describes both armies as equally exhausted, and of course, the casualties indicate as much (quite compellingly). Don't hesitate to add emphasis to this matter if you think it presently lacking.

What really caused the Americans to quit this front was not Lundy's Lane, in fact Drummond seriously botched Fort Erie so that wasn't really a factor either, but rather that the eastern front was being rapidly enforced by the British. The later invasions and burning of Washington left this front, which was generally a feint at best, out of mind.

I agree that Canada was generally no longer imperiled by 1814. However, that doesn't mean that the Americans couldn't have enjoyed immense local success in the Niagara theatre if successful at Lundy's Lane. Lake Erie was already mare nostrum. They held both flanks of the Niagara River at Fort Erie and Fort George. Had the Americans defeated Drummond's army on the night of July 22, I doubt the British could have offered effective resistance before Burlington.

Anyhow add what you want, but I see no reason to remove large parts of the article I contributed to, which is what you did.

Looking back, I may have been too hasty in my deletions. Drummond's failure to screen his guns, for instance, should definitely be mentioned. However, I feel I should remind you that much of your contribution was either unencyclopaedic (overuse of Harvard referencing) or POV ("Graves is the best/most accurate, etc." – your opinion, unless you care to present a historical journal in which the leaders of academia have voiced their consensus).
Let me also point-out that your own reversions have removed some of my stylistic and grammatical improvements, i.e. "Lundy's Lane was characterized by messy fighting in close quarters" vs. "It was messy fighting in close quarters."

Moreover declaring it a "Canadian victory" is really erroneous because Canada was not a real entity, rather this was a British American war more than anything.

Let's not go building objections on chimeras and technicalities. It's pretty clear in context that "Canada" alludes to the collective socio-cultural identity of Britain's central North American colonies (known as the Canadas since 1792), not to "a Dominion established by the Confederation of four British provinces in 1867." However, since most of the soldiers involved were in fact British rather than Canadian, the distinction – not affecting substance – could be useful.

Saying that this battle halted the American advance into upper canada and was likely a British strategic victory even though the battle itself was a British tactical loss is acceptable, and Graves seems to agree as he says as much.

I doubt the results of the battle favoured the Americans enough to justify crediting them with a "tactical victory".
The Battle of Jutland, for instance, is a well-known case of the British losing tactically but winning strategically: a much larger British fleet was savagely handled by the Kriegsmarine, which suffered only about a third and a half of British casualties in men killed and in tonnage, respectively (tactical). But the Germans then fled back to Baltic waters, leaving the British fleet intact and in control of the Atlantic (strategic).
The reasoning involved needs little explanation, and the strategic results hardly differ from those of Lundy's Lane. In 1814, however, the British weren't markedly more numerous than their enemies, and didn't suffer many more casualties. Instead, two roughly equal forces mauled each other almost to the point of dissolution before staggering away through shadows and smoke. The next day, neither battered army held the field, and neither was in any condition to fight. Surely, the previous version's "indecisive" was most in harmony with the facts.

To deal with sources: part of what makes Wikipedia so unreliable and unacceptable as a source is the lack of references. I have out of courtesy viewed your references and they are seriously lacking as are many publications about Lundy's Lane (it seems an aura of myth more than reality permeates this particular historical event), in fact one reference you quote covers Lundy's Lane in a single paragraph. (Cdn Military Atlas).

Wrong. Four paragraphs describe the battle in the Military Atlas. Furthermore, Zuehlke's bibliography contains War of 1812 books published in 1999 and 2000.

I am not trying to "revise history" as you claim (in fact I am a Canadian myself) but rather I am saying that here we finally have an exceptional book of 332 pages solely dealing with Lundy's Lane that uses both Canadian and American military records, as well as personal letters and other sources. I encourage you to read this book (Where Right and Glory Lead, By Graves (A renowned Canadian military historian) and I am sure you will be amazed at its perception. I invite you to examine the excerpt and the reviews from his website: http://www.ensigngroup.ca/Right-Glory.htm

Will do. In the meantime, I'm reverting the article to my last version. If you care to do me another service out of courtesy, please incorporate your material into the existing body text of that article. If you can refrain from altering the battlebox's "indecisive" – which I view as the linchpin of objectivity in a topic like this (there can be no departing from the overall principle that the battle ended in a stalemate) – while keeping all the above comments in mind, I think we can cooperate in reconciling Graves' observations with the traditionalist view without further difficulties. If time permits, I'll investigate Graves in detail shortly.
Thank you for your contributions and for your civility and common comradeship. Albrecht 23:40, September 8, 2005 (UTC)

-->Four paragraphs describe the battle in the Military Atlas. Furthermore, Zuehlke's bibliography contains War of 1812 books published in 1999 and 2000.

- I don't want to be rude, but Zuehkles's book (with only 1 paragraph really talking about the actual battle) pales in comparison to a thesis of 332 pages that Graves writes. I would not consider Zuehkle's book the ultimate authority nor would anyone. Rather it is a very concise summary and summaries are often confusing ie: regarding the reinforcement issue. Secondly while Grave's book is not published in a Military Journal (because journals rarely publish 332 pages) his book has been reviewed by several editors of Military Journals in both Canada and the United States. Some are listed on his web page I gave and others listed elsewhere if you look you'll find them. As journal articles are often viewed by three references that is sufficient. Moreover his book uses articles from journals as reference as well. In his aknowledgements are many astute historians who have given him support. Graves book, of which I have the current version was actually reprinted in 2003 with corrections. It is finally the most current work. All his statements and claims are clearly referenced, as any journal article or thesis would be. Graves is widely considered the ultimate authority and the most competent Canadian historian in regards to the War of 1812 in North America as one reviewer from the Journal of American History stated. This is not my POV, this is the POV of historians of this field - and that means something.

I thought this was clearer: The point was not to compare a survey with an in-depth treatise. The idea was to cite something that outlined the traditional interpretation of the battle. I picked Zuehlke because it sits on my shelf, but it need not be Zuehlke in particular. Consult just about any other thesis on the subject; Zuehlke's is the standard position.
I should also remind you that the contention does not rest on the issue of Grave's scholarship or reputation as an historian; rather, your insistence that "Grave and only Grave" should inform edits to this article was what I found irritating. But at any rate I think it stretches believability to rely on reviews taken from Grave's own for-profit website, created to promote and advertise his work, as providing a balanced view. This should be obvious. Albrecht 01:32, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

I have reverted the article for several reasons:

1. The Americans voluntarily left the heights after the British had retreated. They won a tactical victory. The British had tried to retake the heights three times and failed. There would be no repeated attempt. Fighting stopped. The Americans held the field - how many days they would have had to hold to field for you to consider it a victory isn't important.

This is where we differ, and sharply. As far as I can tell, every point above is a gross misrepresentation of the facts. A temporary disengagement (if indeed the British left first)—owing to the deterioration of battlefield conditions—hardly constitutes a "retreat": it was a common enough measure of the period, and, considering the prospects of forthcoming reinforcements, a damn sensible one. There would be no repeated attacks on the heights because the Americans disappeared, mere hours after the British broke off, leaving the precious "captured" guns behind. If that's a "victory," it's a pretty thin one, and fraudulent as well.

This particular battle during the time of when shooting started to when it ended was a tactical victory for the American army, somewhat similar to the Jutland scenario you proposed.

No. The Kaiserliche Marine savaged the British at Jutland, while both sides suffered virtually the same casualties at Lundy's Lane. There's no comparison.

Strategically the British may have won, though as Graves wrote to me: "Once Yeo emerged on Lake Ontario in September 1814 with a ship of the line, the US lost control of that lake and knew full well that they would not be in a position to take it back until the spring of 1815. Therefore, advancing north again from Fort Erie to L Ontario and thence to Burlington Bay and York [Toronto] would have been very difficult. In fact, the American commander, Izard, decided to go into winter quarters. Both sides planned major offensives in 1815 but the war ended. " <--- here lies the real reason the Americans did not continue the campaign especially since they had dealt Drummond such a beating at Fort Erie. This isn't Grave's opinion, but rather from American military records and personal correspondence.

2. Canada was not the main combatant or protagonist. This was largely a British war largely held by historians to be due to British provocation of the US. In fact Canadians appear to have fought on both sides. Stating anything such as "this was a Canadian strategic victory" is very erroneous.

Fair enough. The idea I meant to convey was one of a "strategic victory for Canada." I think you'd agree with this, but in any case it's not important.

3. You made large deletions of my text without justifiable reasons. Feel free to add what you want if you like to the article, just don't in effect trash what I have written as it is the only material in the article actually based upon a reviewed reference.

I'm sorry if my edits annoyed you, but let me state that these "large deletions" were actually the removal of a few POV sentences praising Grave's book. You're welcome to start an article on his work, but it really had no place here. Albrecht 01:32, 22 April 2006 (UTC)

Please feel free to state in so many words : this battle halted the American advance into upper canada and was likely a British strategic victory even though the battle itself was a British tactical loss is acceptable, and Graves seems to agree as he says as much. I think you really ought to examine the sources for the American regress to Fort Erie from the American perspective, after all their reasons for their reposition at Fort Erie are all that matters after all. Fleshing out the whole reinforcement issue would do a service instead of trusting a summary. As I stated before, Ripley had 1000 fresh reinforcements only a few miles away at Chippawa and why he didn't use them doesn't appear to be based upon potential British reinforcements but rather his lack of supplies, decent officers, and marine support.

Feel free to edit grammar, much is not mine but was contributed before me. I did not make any major deletions to what was there before.

Please read Graves' book and then get back to this, and feel free to write to the author himself as he replies to questions. I really think you'll like this book, but also I did read your references so please read mine. I think you'll be very impressed.

I have every intention of doing so. You'll notice, at least, that I've refrained from editing the article. Anyway, I suppose I could agree to "Tactical American victory, strategic British victory." Albrecht 01:32, 22 April 2006 (UTC)
I have been at this article, with images and orbats. I have also added information from a good recent American summary of the war (John R. Elting's Amateurs to Arms). They don't upset the concensus that the Americans withdrew exhausted rather than defeated, and that Drummond used poor tactics. I note from the orbat that there were indeed several hundred Canadians (perhaps 900 regulars or full-time troops and 600 militia) at Lundy's Lane (and 100 fighting for the Americans). HLGallon 15:59, 22 August 2006 (UTC)
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