Battle of Monte Cassino

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Battle of Monte Cassino
Part of World War II, Italian Campaign
Ruins of Cassino town after the battle
Date January 17, 1944 – May 19, 1944 Location Monte Cassino, Italy Result Allied victory
Combatants
United Kingdom United States Poland New Zealand Canada Free France India and others	Germany
Commanders
Harold Alexander Mark Clark Oliver Leese	Albert Kesselring Heinrich von Vietinghoff Frido von Senger
Strength
105,000	80,000
Casualties
54,000	20,000

Italian Campaign
Invasion of Sicily – Invasion of Italy – Armistice with Italy – Winter Line – San Pietro – Anzio – Monte Cassino – Gothic Line

The Battle of Monte Cassino (also known as the Battle for Rome and the Battle for Cassino) was a costly series of four battles during World War II, fought by the Allies with the intention of breaking through the Winter Line and seizing Rome. In the beginning of 1944 the Gustav Line was being anchored by Germans holding the Rapido, Liri and Garigliano valleys and certain surrounding peaks and ridges, but not the historic abbey of Monte Cassino, founded in 524 AD by St. Benedict, although they manned defensive positions set into the steep slopes below the abbey walls. On February 15 the monastery, high on a peak overlooking the town of Cassino, was destroyed by American B-17, B-25, and B-26 bombers. Two days after the bombing, crack German paratroopers poured into the ruins to defend it. From January 17 to May 18, it was assaulted four times by Allied troops, for a loss of over 54,000 Allied and 20,000 German soldiers.

Contents 1 Strategic background 2 The First Battle 3 Background to the Second Battle 4 Destruction of the Abbey 5 After the bombing 6 The Second Battle (Operation Avenger) 7 The Third Battle 8 The final battle (Operation Diadem) 9 The Adolf Hitler line 10 Breakout at Anzio and the advance to Rome 11 Epilogue 12 See also 13 Bibliography and references 13.1 English 13.2 French 13.3 German 13.4 Italian 13.5 Polish 13.6 Belarusian 13.7 Footnotes

[edit] Strategic background

The Allied landings in Italy in September 1943 were followed by an advance northward on two fronts, one on each side of the central mountain range forming the "spine" of Italy. On the western front, the U.S. 5th Army, commanded by General Mark Clark, moving from the main base of Naples up the Italian 'boot', made slow progress in the face of difficult terrain, wet weather and skillful German defenses. The Germans were fighting from a series of prepared positions in a way to inflict maximum damage and then pulling back, so buying time for the construction of the Winter Line defensive positions south of Rome. The original estimates that Rome would fall by October 1943 were proved much too optimistic.

Although in the east the Winter Line had been breached on the British 8th Army's Adriatic front and Ortona captured, the advance had ground to a halt with the onset of winter blizzards at the end of December making movement in the jagged terrain and close air support impossible. The route to Rome from the east using Route 5 was thus excluded as a viable option leaving the routes from Naples to Rome, highways 6 and 7, as the only possibilities; highway 7 (the old Roman Appian Way) followed along the west coast but south of Rome ran into the Pontine Marshes which the Germans had flooded. Highway 6 ran through the Liri valley. Dominating the south entrance to this valley was the hill mass behind the town of Cassino. Excellent observation from the peaks of several hills allowed the German defenders to detect Allied movement, prevent any advance northward, and direct artillery fire on Allied units. Running across the Allied line of advance was the fast flowing River Rapido which rose in the central Apennine mountains, flowed through Cassino and across the entrance to the Liri valley (where the Liri joined the Rapido) after which its name changed to the River Gari (or Garigliano) and it continued to the sea. With its heavily fortified mountain defenses, difficult river crossings (not only was the river fast flowing, but the Germans had temporarily diverted the Rapido at the head of the valley so as to flood the valley bottom and make conditions underfoot most difficult for any attackers), Cassino formed a linchpin of the Gustav Line, the most formidable line of the defensive positions making up the Winter Line.

Because of the historical significance of the Benedictine monastery, in December 1943, the German commander-in-chief in Italy, Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, ordered German units not to include the monastery itself in German defensive positions, and informed the Allies accordingly. Controversy exists regarding the extent to which this order was followed.

Some Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported seeing German troops inside the monastery. The monastery had excellent observation of the surrounding hills and valleys, and thus was a natural site for German artillery observers. What is clear is once the monastery was destroyed, the Germans made use of the rubble to build defensive positions. Ultimately, however, the military arguments leading to the monastery's destruction rested on its potential threat (real or imagined) rather than its actual state of occupation.

[edit] The First Battle

The plan of U.S. 5th Army commander Mark Clark was for British X Corps, on the left of a twenty mile front, to attack on January 17, 1944 across the Garigliano near the coast (British 5th and British 56th Infantry Divisions). (British 46th Infantry Division) was to attack on the night of January 19/20 across the Garigliano below its junction with the Liri in support of the main attack by U.S. II Corps on their right. The main central thrust by U.S. II Corps would commence on January 20 with 36th (Texas) U.S. Infantry Division making an assault across the swollen Rapido river five miles downstream of Cassino. Simultaneously the French Expeditionary Corps, under General Alphonse Juin would continue its "right hook" move towards Monte Cairo, the hinge to the Gustav and Adolf Hitler defensive lines. In truth, Clark did not believe there was much chance of an early breakthrough^[1] but he felt that the attacks would draw German reserves away from the Rome area in time for the attack on Anzio where U.S. VI Corps (British 1st and U.S. 3rd Infantry Divisions) were due to make an amphibious landing on January 22. It was then hoped that the Anzio landing, with the benefit of surprise and a rapid move inland to the Alban Hills, which command both routes 6 and 7, would so threaten the Gustav defenders' rear and supply lines that it might just unsettle the German commanders and cause them to withdraw from the Gustav Line to positions north of Rome. Whilst this would have been consistent with the German tactics of the previous three months, Allied intelligence had not understood that the strategy of fighting retreat had been for the sole purpose of providing time to prepare the Gustav line where the Germans intended to stand firm. The intelligence assessment of Allied prospects were therefore over-optimistic.^[2]

The Fifth Army had only reached the Gustav line on January 15 having taken six weeks of heavy fighting to advance the last seven miles through the Bernhardt Line positions during which time they had sustained 16,000 casualties.^[3] They hardly had time to prepare the new assault, let alone take the rest and reorganisation they really needed after three months of attritional fighting north from Naples. However, because the Allied Chiefs of Staff would only make landing craft available until early February, the Anzio landing had to take place in late January with the co-ordinated attack on the Gustav line some three days earlier.

The first assault was made on January 17. Near the coast British X Corps (56th and 5th Divisions) forced a crossing of the Garigliano (followed some two days later by British 46th Division on their right) causing General von Senger, commander of German XIV Panzer Corps and responsible for the Gustav defences on the south western half of the line, some serious concern as to the ability of the German 94th Infantry Division to hold the line. Responding to Senger's concerns, Kesselring ordered the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Rome area to provide reinforcement. There is some speculation as to what might have been if X Corps had had the reserves available to exploit their success and make a decisive breakthrough. The Corps itself did not have the extra men but there would certainly have been time to alter the overall battle plan and cancel or modify the central attack by U.S. II Corps to make men available to force the issue in the south before the German reinforcements were able to get into position. As it happened, 5th Army HQ failed to appreciate the frailty of the German position and the plan was unchanged. The two divisions from Rome arrived by January 21 and stabilised the German position in the south. In one respect, however, the plan was working in that Kesselring's reserves had been drawn south. The three divisions of X Corps sustained 4,000 casualties during the period of the first battle^[4]

The central thrust by U.S. 36th Division commenced three hours after sunset on January 20. The lack of time to prepare meant that the approach to the river was still hazardous from uncleared mines and booby traps and the highly technical business of an opposed river crossing lacked the necessary planning and rehearsal. Although a battalion of the 143rd Regiment was able to get across the Rapido on the south side of San Angelo and two companies of the 141st Regiment on the north side, they were isolated for most of the time and at no time was Allied armour able to get across the river leaving them highly vulnerable to counter-attacking tanks and self-propelled guns of General Rodt's 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The southern group were forced back across the river by mid-morning of January 21. Maj. General Keys, commanding II Corps, pressed Maj. General Fred Walker of 36th Division to renew the attack immediately. Once again the two regiments attacked but with no more success against the well dug-in 15 Panzer Division: 143rd Regiment got the equivalent of two battalions across but once again there was no armoured support and they were devastated when daylight came the next day. 141st Regiment also crossed in two battalion strength and despite the lack of armoured support managed to advance half a mile. However, with the coming of daylight, they too were cut down and by the evening of January 22 the regiment had virtually ceased to exist with 40 men making it back to the Allied lines. The assault had been a costly failure with 36th Division losing 2100^[5] men killed, wounded and missing in 48 hours.

The next attack was launched on January 24, 1944. The U.S. II Corps, with 34th Infantry Division under Maj. General Charles Ryder spearheading the attack and French colonial troops on its right flank, launched an assault across the flooded Rapido valley north of Cassino and into the mountains behind with the intention of then wheeling to the left and attacking Monte Cassino from high ground. Whilst their task was made easier by the fact that the Rapido upstream of Cassino was fordable, the flooding made movement very difficult. In particular, armour could only move on paths laid with steel matting and it took eight days of bloody fighting across the waterlogged ground for 34th Division to push back General Franck's 44th Infantry Division to establish a foothold in the mountains.

On the right, the French made good initial progress against the German 5th Mountain Division, commanded by General Julius Ringel, gaining positions on the slopes of their key objective, Monte Cifalco. Forward units of the 3rd Algerian Division had also by-passed Monte Cifalco to capture Monte Belvedere and Colle Abate. General Juin was convinced that Cassino could be bypassed and the German defenses unhinged by this northerly route but his request for reserves to maintain the momentum of his advance was refused and the one available reserve regiment (from 36th Division) was sent to reinforce 34th Division.^[6] By January 31 the French had ground to a halt with Monte Cifalco, which had a clear view of the French and U.S. flanks and supply lines, still in German hands. The two French divisions sustained 2,500 casualties in their struggles around Monte Belvedere^[7]

It now became U.S. 34th Division's task (joined by 142nd Regiment of 36th Division) to fight southward along the linked hilltops towards the intersecting ridge on the south end of which was Monastery Hill. They could then break through down into the Liri valley behind the Gustav Line defenses. It was very tough going: the mountains were rocky, strewn with boulders and cut by ravines and gullies. Digging foxholes was out of the question and each feature was exposed to fire from surrounding high points. The ravines were no better since the scrub a gorse growing there, far from giving cover, had been sown with mines, booby-traps and hidden barbed wire by the defenders. The Germans had had three months to prepare their defensive positions using dynamite and to stockpile ammunition and stores. There was no natural shelter and the weather was wet and freezing cold.

By early February American infantry had captured a strategic point near the hamlet of San Onofrio, less than a mile from the abbey and by 7th February a battalion had reached Point 445, a round top hill immediately below the monastery and no more than 400 yards away. An American squad managed a reconnaissance right up against the cliff-like abbey walls, with the monks observing German and American patrols exchanging fire. However, attempts to take Monte Cassino itself were broken by overwhelming machine gun fire from the slopes below the monastery. Despite their fierce fighting, the 34th Division never managed to take the final redoubts on Hill 593 (known to the Germans as Calvary Mount), held by the 3rd batllion of the German 2nd Parachute Regiment, the dominating point of the ridge to the monastery.

On February 11, after a final unsuccessful 3 day assault on Monastery Hill and Cassino town, the Americans were withdrawn. U.S. II Corps, after two and a half weeks of torrid battle, was fought out. The performance of 34th Division in the mountains is considered to rank as one of the finest feats of arms carried out by any soldiers during the war. In return they sustained losses of about 80% in the Infantry battalions, some 2,200 casualties.^[8] [1].

It had been the closest run thing. At the height of the battle in the first days of February General von Senger had moved 90th Division from the Garigliano front to north of Cassino and had been so alarmed at the rate of attrition, he had "...mustered all the weight of my authority to request that the Battle of Cassino should be broken off and that we should occupy a quite new line....a position, in fact, north of the Anzio bridgehead".^[9] Kesselring refused the request. At the crucial moment von Senger was able to throw in the 71st Infantry Division whilst leaving 15th Panzer Grenadiers (whom they had been due to relieve) in place.

During the battle there had been occasions when, with more astute use of reserves, promising positions might have been turned into decisive moves. Some historians suggest this failure to capitalise on initial success could be put down to General Clark's lack of experience. However, it is more likely that he just had too much to do, being responsible for both the Cassino and Anzio offensives. This view is supported by General Truscott's inability, as related below, to get hold of him for discussions at a vital juncture of the Anzio breakout at the time of the fourth Cassino battle. It is interesting to note that whilst General Alexander chose (for perfectly logical co-ordination arguments) to have Cassino and Anzio under a single army commander and splitting the Gustav line front between U.S. 5th and Brtitish 8th Armies, Kesselring chose to create a separate 14th Army under General von Mackensen to fight at Anzio whilst leaving the Gustav line in the sole hands of General von Vietinghoff's 10th Army.

The withdrawn American units were replaced by the New Zealand Corps (2nd New Zealand Division and 4th Indian Division) from the British 8th Army on the Adriatic front. The New Zealand Corps was commanded by General Bernard Freyberg.

[edit] Background to the Second Battle

With U.S. VI Corps under heavy threat at Anzio, Freyberg was under equal pressure to launch a relieving action at Cassino. Once again, therefore, the battle commenced without the attackers being fully prepared. As well, Corps H.Q. did not fully appreciate the difficulty in getting 4th Indian Division into place in the mountains and supplying them on the ridges and valleys north of Cassino (using mules across 7 miles of goat tracks over terrain in full view of the monastery, exposed to accurate artillery fire — hence the naming of Death Valley). This was evidenced in the writing of Major-General Howard Kippenberger, commander of New Zealand 2nd Division, after the war: "Poor Dimoline [Brigadier Dimoline, acting commander of 4th Indian Division] was having a dreadful time getting his division into position. I never really appreciated the difficulties until I went over the ground after the war".^[10]

Freyberg's plan was a continuation of the first battle: an attack from the north along the mountain ridges and an attack from the south-east along the railway line and to capture the railway station across the Rapido less than a mile south of Cassino town. Success would pinch out Cassino town and open up the Liri valley. However, Freyberg had informed his superiors that he believed, given the circumstances, there was no better than a fifty-fifty chance of success for the offensive.^[11]

[edit] Destruction of the Abbey

Increasingly, the opinions of certain Allied officers were fixed on the great abbey of Monte Cassino: in their view it became the abbey - and its presumed use as a German artillery observation point - that prevented the breach of the ‘Gustav Line,’ and not the futility of successive, costly frontal attacks on determined and skilled defenders.

The British press and C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times frequently and convincingly and in (often manufactured) detail wrote of German observation posts, artillery positions, etc. inside the abbey. According to the U.S. Army Airforces official history, Air commander Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker accompanied by Lieutenant-General Jacob Devers personally observed during a fly-over in a Piper Cub at less than 200 feet, a radio aerial, German uniforms on clothes lines inside the walls, and German soldiers within 50 feet of the abbey walls.^[12]

The view in New Zealand Corps H.Q., as articulated in the writings of Major-General Kippenberger, was that the monastery was probably being used as the German's main vantage point for artillery spotting since it was so perfectly situated for the purpose that no army could refrain from using it. There is no clear evidence to this effect, but he went on to write that from a military point of view the current state of occupancy of the monastery was immaterial: "If not occupied today, it might be tomorrow and it did not appear it would be difficult for the enemy to bring reserves into it during an attack or for troops to take shelter there if driven from positions outside. It was impossible to ask troops to storm a hill surmounted by an intact building such as this, capable of sheltering several hundred infantry in perfect security from shellfire and ready at the critical moment to emerge and counter-attack....Undamaged it was a perfect shelter but with its narrow windows and level profiles an unsatisfactory fighting position. Smashed by bombing it was a jagged heap of broken masonry and debris open to effective fire from guns, mortars and strafing planes as well as being a death trap if bombed again. On the whole I thought it would be more useful to the Germans if we left it unbombed".^[13]

Major General Francis Tuker, whose division, 4th Indian Division, would have the task of attacking Monastery Hill, had made his own appreciation of the situation. In the absence of detailed intelligence at U.S. 5th Army H.Q., he had found a book dated 1879 in a Naples bookshop giving details of the construction of the abbey. In his memorandum to General Freyberg he concluded that whether the monastery was currently occupied by the Germans or not, it should be demolished to prevent its effective occupation. He also pointed out that with 150 foot high walls made of masonry at least 10 feet thick there was no practical means for field engineers to deal with the place and that bombing with "blockbuster" bombs would be the only solution since 1000lb bombs would be "next to useless".^[14]

On February 11, 1944, the acting commander of 4th Indian Division, Brigadier H. W. Dimoline requested the bombing of the abbey of Monte Cassino. Major General Tuker, reiterated again his case for bombing the monastery from his hospital bed in Caserta, where he was suffering a severe attack of a recurrent tropical fever. Gen. Bernard Freyberg transmitted his request on February 12, 1944. Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark of Fifth Army and his chief of staff Major-General Alfred Gruenther were unconvinced of the “military necessity”. When handing over the U.S. II Corps position to the New Zealand Corps, General Butler, deputy commander of U.S. 34th Division had said "I don't know but I don't believe the enemy is in the convent. All the fire has been from the slopes of the hill below the wall".^[15] Clark pinned down theater commander General Sir Harold Alexander: “You give me a direct order and we’ll do it.” He did. The ancient abbey’s fate was sealed.

The bombing mission in the morning of 15 February 1944 involved 142 B-17 Flying Fortresses together with 47 B-25 Mitchell and 40 B-26 Marauder medium bombers. In all they dropped 493 tons of ordnance on the Monte Cassino complex within four hours. Many Allied soldiers and war correspondents cheered as they observed the spectacle. Generals Eaker and Devers watched; Gen. Juin was heard to remark “. . . no, they’ll never get anywhere this way.” Generals Clark and Gruenther refused to be on the scene and stayed at their headquarters. That same afternoon and the next day, in an aggressive follow-up, concentrated artillery barrages and additional tonnage onto the ruins by 59 fighter bombers convulsed the rubble of the great abbey.

The air raid however, had not been coordinated between the air and ground commands, with the timing driven by the Air Force projecting it as a separate operation, considering the weather and to be fitted in with other requirements on other fronts and theaters and without reference to the ground forces (indeed, the Indian troops on the Snake's Head were taken by complete surprise when the bombing actually started^[16]). The raid took place two days before The New Zealand Corps were ready to launch their main assault. Many of the troops had only taken over their positions from U.S. II Corps on February 13 and besides the previously mentioned difficulties in the mountains, preparations in the valley had also been held up by difficulties in supplying the newly installed troops with sufficient material for a full-scale assault because of incessantly foul weather, flooding and waterlogged ground. In the context of the planned assault the bombing therefore achieved nothing and it helped no-one

[edit] After the bombing

Pope Pius XII was silent after the bombing; however, his secretary of state, Cardinal Maglione, bluntly stated to the senior U.S. diplomat to the Vatican, Harold Tittmann, that the bombing was “a colossal blunder . . . a piece of gross stupidity.”

What is certain from every investigation that followed since the event, is the fact that the only people killed in the monastery by the bombing were Italian civilians seeking refuge in the abbey. There was never any evidence, then or now, that the bombs dropped on the Monte Cassino monastery that day killed a single German. However, given the imprecision of bombing in those days (it was estimated that only 10% of the bombs from the heavy bombers, bombing from high altitude, hit the monastery) bombs did fall elsewhere and killed German and Allied troops alike.

The American government's position on the bombing changed over a quarter century in installments, in small corrections, in evasive and subtle rewording from “irrefutable evidence” of German use of the abbey to the final correction in 1969 of the U.S. Army’s official history, that “the abbey was actually unoccupied by German troops.”

On the day after the bombing at first light, most of the civilians still alive fled the ruins. Only about 40 people remained: the six monks who survived in the deep vaults of the abbey, their then 79 year old abbot, Gregorio Diamare, three tenant farmer families, orphaned or abandoned children, the badly wounded and the dying. After artillery barrages, renewed bombing and attacks on the ridge by 4th Indian Division, the monks decided to leave their ruined home with the others who could move at 7:30 in the morning on 17 February 1944. The old abbot was leading the group down the mule path towards the Liri Valley, reciting the rosary. After they arrived at a German first-aid station, some of the badly wounded who had been carried by the monks were taken away in a military ambulance. After meeting with German officers, including the commander of XIV Korps, General von Senger und Etterlin, the monks were driven to the monastery of Sant'Anselmo. One monk, Carlomanno Pellagalli, returned to the abbey; when he was later seen wandering the ruins, the German paratroopers thought he was a ghost. After 3 April 1944 he was not seen anymore.

Paratroopers of German 1st Parachute Division occupied the ruins of the abbey and turned it into a fortress that withstood all that was thrown at them for the next three months.

[edit] The Second Battle (Operation Avenger)

As stated before, the air raid, through lack of co-ordination, came too early for the ground forces who were not close to being ready to launch their assault on February 15, the day of the raid. Attacks in the mountains had to be made in darkness (because of the lack of cover). On the night following the bombing a company of the 1st battalion Royal Sussex Regiment (one of the English elements in 4th Indian Division) attacked the key point 593 from their position 70 yards away on Snakeshead Ridge. The assault failed with the company sustaining 50% casualties.

The following night the Sussex Regiment were ordered to attack in battalion strength. There was a calamitous start. Artillery could not be used in direct support targeting point 593 because of the proximity and risk therefore of shelling friendly troops. It was planned therefore to shell point 575 which had been providing supporting fire to the defenders of point 593. Unfortunately, the topography of the land meant that shells fired at 575 had to pass very low over Snakeshead ridge and in the event, some fell among the gathering assault companies. After reorganising, the attack went in at midnight. The fighting was brutal and often hand to hand but the determined defence held and the Sussex battalion was beaten off, once again sustaining over 50% killed, wounded, captured or missing. Over the two nights the Sussex Regiment lost 12 out of 15 officers and 162 out of 313 men who took part in the attack.

On the night of February 17 the main assault took place. The 4/6 Rajputana Rifles would take on the assault of point 593 with the depleted Sussex Regiment held in reserve to pass through them to attack point 444 once 593 had been taken. In the meantime, the 1/2 Gurkha Rifles and 1/9 Gurkha Rifles were to sweep across the slopes and ravines in a direct assault on the monastery. This latter was across appalling terrain but it was hoped that the Gurkhas, from the Himalayas and so expert in mountain terrain, would succeed. This proved a faint hope. Once again the fighting was brutal but no progress was made and casualties heavy. The Rajputanas lost 196 officers and men, the 1/9 Gurkhas 149 and the 1/2 Gurkhas 96. It became clear that the attack had failed and on 18 February 1944 Brigadier Dimoline and Freyberg called off the attacks on Monastery Hill.

In the other half of the main assault the two companies from 28th (Maori) Battalion from the New Zealand Division forced a crossing of the Rapido and attempted to gain the railroad station in Cassino town; they succeeded but crucially were unable to throw a bridge across the final gap in the railway causeway before daylight so were without armoured support. With the help of a constant smoke-screen laid down by Allied artillery to hide their positions from the German artillery on Monastery Hill they were able to hold their position for much of the day. However their isolation and lack of armoured support and anti-tank guns when the armoured counter-attack came in the afternoon of February 18 made their position hopeless. They were ordered to pull back to the river when it became clear to headquarters that both the attempts to break through (in the mountains and along the causeway) would not succeed. It had been very close. The Germans had been very alarmed by the capture of the station and, from a conversation on record between Kesselring and 10th Army commander von Vietinghoff, had not expected their counter-attack to succeed^[17]

[edit] The Third Battle

For the third battle, it was decided that whilst the winter weather persisted, forcing the Rapido downstream of Cassino town was an unattractive option (after the unhappy experiences in the first two battles). The "right hook" in the mountains had also been a costly failure and it was decided to launch twin attacks from the north along the Rapido valley: one towards the fortified Cassino town and the other towards Monastery Hill. The idea was to clear the path through the bottleneck between these two features to allow access towards the station on the south and so to the Liri valley. British 78th Infantry Division, which had arrived in late February and placed under the command of New Zealand Corps, would then cross the Rapido downstream of Cassino and start the push to Rome.

None of the Allied commanders were very happy with the plan but it was hoped that an unprecedented preliminary bombing by heavy bombers would prove the trump. Three clear days of good weather were required and for twenty one successive days the assault was postponed as the troops waited in the freezing wet positions for a favourable weather forecast. Matters were not helped by the loss of Gen. Kippenberger, commanding 2 New Zealand Division, wounded by an anti-personnel mine and losing both his feet. The good news was that the German counter-attack at Anzio had failed and been called off.

The third battle finally started on 15th March. After a bombardment of 1,000 tons of bombs, starting at 8.30am and lasting three and a half hours, the New Zealanders advanced behind a creeping artillery barrage from 610 artillery pieces. Success depended on taking advantage of the paralysing effect of the bombing. However, the defences rallied more quickly than expected and the Allied armour was held up by bomb craters. Nevertheless success was there for the New Zealanders' taking but by the time a follow-up assault on the left had been ordered that evening it was too late: defenses had reorganised and more critically, the rain, contrary to forecast, had started again. Torrents of rain flooded bomb craters, turned rubble into a morass and blotted out communications, the radio sets being incapable of surviving the constant immersion. The dark rain clouds also blotted out the moonlight, hindering the task of clearing routes through the ruins. On the right, the New Zealanders had captured Castle Hill and point 165 and as planned, elements of 4th Indian Div had passed through to attack point 236 and thence to point 435, Hangman's Hill. In the confusion of the height, a company of the 1/9 Gurkha Rifles had taken a track avoiding point 236 and captured point 435 whilst the assault on point 236 by the 1/6 Rajputana Rifles had been beaten off.

By the end of the February 17 things looked better. The Gurkhas now held Hangman's Hill (point 435), 250 yards from the Monastery, in battalion strength (although their lines of supply were compromised by the German positions at point 236 and in the northern part of the town) and whilst the town was still fiercely defended, New Zealand units and armour had got through the bottleneck and captured the station.

February 19 was planned for the decisive blow in the town and on the monastery. However, a surprise and fiercely pressed counter-attack from the monastery on Castle Hill by the impressive 1st German Paratroop Division completely disrupted any possibility of an assault on the monastery. In the town the attackers made little progress and overall the initiative was passing to the Germans whose positions close to Castle Hill, which was the gateway to the position on Monastery Hill, crippled any prospects of early success. On February 20 Freyberg called off the attack. The German 1st Parachute Division, some weeks later described by General Alexander, the Italian theater commander, in a conversation with General Kippenberger as "...the best Division in the German Army...",^[18] had taken a mauling but it had won.

The next three days were spent stabilising the front, extracting the isolated Gurkhas from Hangman's Hill and reorganising. The exhausted 4th Indian Division and 2 New Zealand Division were withdrawn and replaced respectively in the mountains by British 78th Division and in the town by British 1st Guards Brigade. In their time on the Cassino front line 4th Indian Division had lost 3,000 men and the New Zealand Division 1,600 men killed, missing and wounded.^[19]

[edit] The final battle (Operation Diadem)

General Alexander's strategy in Italy was now "...to force the enemy to commit the maximum number of divisions in Italy at the time the cross-channel invasion is launched."^[20]Circumstances now allowed him the time to prepare a major offensive to achieve this. His plan was to draw the bulk of the British 8th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant General Oliver Leese, from the Adriatic front across the spine of Italy to join the U.S. 5th Army and attack along a 20 mile front between Cassino and the sea. The 5th Army (U.S. II Corps and French Expeditionary Corps) would be on the left and the 8th Army (British XIII Corps and 2nd Polish Corps) on the right. With the arrival of spring the weather and ground conditions were improved and it would be possible to deploy large formations and armour effectively.

The plan for 'Operation Diadem' was that U.S. II Corps on the left would attack up the coast along the line of Route 7 towards Rome. The French Corps to their right would attack through the Aurunci Mountains which formed a barrier between the coastal plain and the Liri Valley. British XIII Corps in the centre right of the front would attack along the Liri valley whilst on the right 2nd Polish Corps (3rd and 5th Division) commanded by Lieut. General Władysław Anders, which had relieved 78th Division in the mountains behind Cassino on April 24, would attempt the task which had defeated 4th Indian Division in February, isolate the monastery and push round behind it into the Liri valley to link with XIII Corps' thrust and pinch out the Cassino position. It was hoped that being a much larger force than their 4th Indian Division predecessors they would be able to saturate the German defences which would as a result be unable to give supporting fire to each other's positions. Improved weather, ground conditions and supply would also be important factors. Once again, the pinching manoeuver by the Polish and British Corps were key to the overall success. Canadian I Corps would be held in reserve ready to exploit the expected breakthrough. Once the German Tenth Army had been defeated, U.S. VI Corps would break out of the Anzio beachhead to cut off the retreating Germans in the Alban Hills.

The large troop movements required for this took two months to execute. They had to be carried out in small units to maintain secrecy and surprise. U.S. 36th Division was sent on amphibious assault training and road signposts and dummy radio signal traffic were created to give the impression that a sea-borne landing was being planned for north of Rome. This was planned to keep German reserves held back from the Gustav line. Movements of troops in forward areas were confined to the hours of darkness and armoured units moving from the Adriatic front left behind dummy tanks and vehicles so the vacated areas appeared unchanged to enemy aerial reconnaissance. The deception was successful. As late as the second day of the final Cassino battle, Kesselring estimated the Allies had six Divisions facing his four on the Cassino front. In fact there were thirteen.

The first assault (May 11–May 12) on Cassino opened at 23:00 with a massive artillery bombardment of 1,000 guns on the 8th Army front and 600 guns on the 5th Army front, manned by Britons, Americans, New Zealanders, South Africans, French and Poles. Within an hour and a half the attack was in motion in all four sectors. By daylight U.S. II Corps had made little progress but their 5th Army colleagues, the French Corps, had achieved their objectives and were fanning out in the Aurunci Mountains towards the 8th Army to their right, rolling up the German positions between the two armies. On the 8th Army front, XIII Corps had made two strongly opposed crossings of the Rapido (by British 4th Infantry Division and 8th Indian Division). Crucially, 8th Indian Division engineers had by the morning succeeded in bridging the river enabling the armour of 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade to cross and provide the vital element (so missed by the Americans in the first battle and New Zealanders in the second battle) to beat off the inevitable counter-attacks from German tanks that would come. In the mountains above Cassino for three days Polish infantry attacks made little progress and brought heavy losses to both sides; Col. Heilmann of 4th Parachute Regiment calling the destroyed town a "miniature Verdun."

By the afternoon May 12 the Rapido bridgeheads were increasing despite furious counter-attacks whilst the attrition on the coast and in the mountains continued. By the May 13 the pressure was starting to tell. The German right wing began to give way to the 5th Army. The French Corps had captured Monte Maio and were now in a position to give material flank assistance to the 8th Army against whom Kesselring had thrown every available reserve in order to buy time to switch to his second prepared defensive position, the Adolf Hitler Line, some eight miles to the rear. On May 14 Moroccan Goumiers, travelling through the mountains parallel to the Liri valley, ground which was undefended because it was not thought possible to traverse such terrain, outflanked the German defense materially assisting XIII Corps in the valley. In 1943 the Goumiers were colonial troops formed into four Groups of Moroccan Tabors (GTM), each consisting of three loosely organised Tabors (roughly equivalent to a battalion) specialised in mountain warfare. Juin's French Expeditionary Corps consisted of the Command of Moroccan Goumiers (CGM) (with the 1st, 3rd and 4th GTM) of General Guillaume^[21] totalling some 7,800 fighting men,^[22] broadly the same infantry strength as a division, and 4 more conventional Divisions: the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division (2 DIM), the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (3 DIA), the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division (4 DMM) and the 1st Free French Division (1 DM).

On May 15 British 78 Division came into the XIII Corps line from reserve passing through the bridgehead divisions to execute the turning move to isolate Cassino from the Liri valley. On May 17 the Polish Division renewed their assault in the mountains and by the early hours of May 18 78 Division and the Polish Corps had linked up in the Liri valley 2 miles west of Cassino town.

In the early morning of May 18 a reconnaissance group of Polish 12th Podolian Uhlans Regiment raised an improvised regimental pennant over the abandoned ruins of the monastery, the only remnants of the defenders were a group of emaciated German wounded who were too sick to move. Monte Cassino had fallen without a fight as the German paratroops, with supply lines threatened by the advance up the Liri valley, had evacuated the night before, commanded to continue fighting at another place.

[edit] The Adolf Hitler line

The 8th Army units advanced up the Liri valley and the 5th Army up the coast to the Adolf Hitler defensive line (re-named the Dora Line at Hitler's insistence to minimise the significance if it was penetrated). An immediate follow-up assault failed and 8th Army then decided to take some time to re-organise. Getting 20,000 vehicles and 2,000 tanks through the broken Gustav line was in itself a major job taking several days. The next assault on the Dora Line commenced on May 23 with the Polish Corps attacking Piedimonte (defended by the redoutable 1st Parachute Division) on the right and 1st Canadian Infantry Division (fresh from 8th Army reserve) in the centre. On May 24 the Canadians had breached the line and 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division poured through the gap. On May 25 the Poles took Piedimonte and the Hitler / Dora line collapsed. The way was clear for the advance northwards on Rome and beyond.

[edit] Breakout at Anzio and the advance to Rome

As the Canadians and Poles launched their attack on May 23, General Lucian Truscott, who had replaced Lieut. General John P. Lucas, launched the U.S. 3rd Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions of U.S. VI Corps from the bridgehead at Anzio. The German Fourteenth Army facing this thrust was without any armoured Divisions because Kesselring had sent his armour south to to help the German Tenth Army in the Cassino action. A single armoured division, the 26th Panzer, was in transit from north of Rome where it had been held anticipating the non-existent seaborn landing the Allies had faked and so was unavailable to fight.

By May 25, with the Tenth Army in full retreat, VI Corps were as planned driving eastwards to cut them off. By the next day they would have been astride the line of retreat and the Tenth Army with all Kesselring's reserves committed to them, would be trapped. At this point, astonishingly, General Mark Clark ordered Truscott to change his line of attack from a north-easterly one to Valmontone on Route 6 to a North Westerly one directly towards Rome. Reasons for Clark's decision are unclear and controversy surrounds the issue. Truscott later wrote in his memoirs that Clark "was fearful that the British were laying devious plans to be first into Rome"^[23]a sentiment somewhat reinforced in Clark's own writings. However, Alexander had clearly laid down the Army boundaries before the battle and Rome was allocated to the Fifth Army. The 8th Army were constantly reminded that their job was to engage the Tenth Army, destroy as much of it as possible and then by-pass Rome to continue the pursuit northwards (which in fact they did , harrying the retreating German Tenth Army for some 225 miles towards Perugia in 6 weeks).^[24]

At the time, Truscott was shocked, writing later "...I was dumbfounded. This was no time to drive to the north-west where the enemy was still strong; we should pour our maximum power into the Valmontone Gap to insure the destruction of the retreating German Army. I would not comply with the order without first talking to General Clark in person. ...[However] he was not on the beachhead and could not be reached even by radio....such was the order that turned the main effort of the beachhead forces from the Valmontone Gap and prevented destruction of the German Tenth Army. On the 26th the order was put into effect."^[25]. He went on to write "There has never been any doubt in my mind that had General Clark held loyally to General Alexander's instructions, had he not changed the direction of my attack to the north-west on May 26, the strategic objectives of Anzio would have been accomplished in full. To be first in Rome was a poor compensation for this lost opportunity".^[26] An opportunity was indeed missed and seven divisions of the Tenth Army^[27] were able to retreat to the next line of defence, the Gothic Line north of Florence.

Rome fell on June 4, 1944 just two days before the Normandy invasion.

[edit] Epilogue

In the course of the battles the historic monastery of Monte Cassino, where St. Benedict first established the rule that ordered monasticism in the west, was entirely destroyed by the US Army Air Forces. Fortunately, prior to the offensive, German Lieutenant Colonel Julius Schlegel had initiated a transfer of the library (consisting of approx. 1,200 historical documents and books) and further art treasures of the monastery to the Vatican in Rome in order to prevent them from being destroyed.

Immediately after the cessation of fighting at Monte Cassino, the Polish government in Exile (in London) created the Monte Cassino campaign cross to commemorate the Polish part in the capture of the strategic point. It was also during this time that Polish song-writer Feliks Konarski, who had taken part in the fighting there, wrote his anthem Czerwone maki na Monte Cassino (The Red Poppies on Monte Cassino). Later, an imposing Polish cemetery was laid out; this is prominently visible to anybody surveying the area from the restored monastery.

The day following the battle, colonial troops attached to the French Expeditionary Forces rampaged through the surrounding countryside committing mass rape at Ciociaria.[2] Such crimes became known in Italy by the adjective Marocchinate meaning to be Maroccaned.

The Commonwealth War Graves cemetery on the western outskirts of Cassino is the final resting place of the British, New Zealand, Canadian, Indian, Gurkha and South African casualties. The French and Italians are on Route 6 in the Liri Valley; the Americans are at Anzio. The German cemetery is approximately 3 kilometers north of Cassino in the Rapido Valley.

The destruction of the abbey was also the inspiration for Walter M. Miller Jr. to write his critically acclaimed novel A Canticle for Leibowitz, which gives a view of monastic life in a post-apocalyptic world. He served as a bomber crew member in the U.S. Army Air Forces during the battle and it was his traumatic first-hand experience of the destruction of the monastery that led to him writing the book.

In 2006 a memorial was unveiled in Rome honouring the Allied forces that fought and died to liberate the city.[3]

The II Polish Corps hoisted the Polish banner over the abandoned ruins of the Monte Cassino monastery.	German propaganda poster in Polish issued during the battle	Allied soldiers at the foot of Monte Cassino	Polish bugler master corporal (plutonowy) Emil Czech plays the Hejnał mariacki, announcing the German strategic withdrawal.
Cross of Monte Casino

[edit] See also

• Barbara Line
• Brazilian Expeditionary Force
• Bernhardt Line
• European Theatre of World War II
• Italian Campaign (World War II)
• Battle of San Pietro Infine
• Operation Shingle
• Winter Line

[edit] Bibliography and references