Battle of Mikata ga Hara

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Battle of Mikata ga Hara
Part of the Sengoku period
Date 1572
Location Mikata ga hara, north of Hamamatsu, Mikawa Province
Result Successful Tokugawa retreat
Takeda victory
Combatants
forces of Takeda Shingen forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu
Commanders
Takeda Shingen, Takeda Katsuyori, others Tokugawa Ieyasu, Matsudaira Ietada, Sakai Tadatsugu, others
Strength
Roughly 30,000 8000 Tokugawa troops, plus 3000 reinforcements from Oda Nobunaga
Campaigns of the Takeda
Nashinokidaira - Un no Kuchi - Sezawa - Uehara - Kuwabara - Fukuyo - Nagakubo - Kojinyama - Takatō 1545 - Ryūgasaki - Uchiyama - Odaihara - Shika - Uedahara - Shirojiritoge - Fukashi - Toishi - Katsurao - Kiso Fukushima - Kannomine - Matsuo - Kawanakajima - Musashi-Matsuyama - Kuragano - Minowa - Hachigata 1568 - Odawara 1569 - Mimasetoge - Kanbara - Hanazawa - Fukazawa - Futamata - Mikata ga Hara - Iwamura - Noda - Takatenjin 1574 - Yoshida - Nagashino - Omosu - Takatenjin 1581 - Temmokuzan - Takatō 1582
Campaigns of Tokugawa Ieyasu
Kakegawa - Anegawa - Futamata - Mikata ga Hara - Yoshida - Nagashino - Temmokuzan - Komaki - Nagakute - Sekigahara

The battle of Mikata ga Hara (三方ヶ原の戦い Mikata ga Hara no tatakai?) was one of the most famous battles of Takeda Shingen's campaigns, and one of the best demonstrations of his cavalry-based tactics.

As Takeda Shingen drove south, seeking to attack Tokugawa Ieyasu at his fortress at Hamamatsu, his forces were met by the Tokugawa on a high plain called Mikata, just north of the fortress. According to the Kōyō Gunkan, the contemporary Takeda military history, Shingen outnumbered Ieyasu three-to-one, and organized his men in the gyōrin (fish-scale) formation, enticing his opponent to attack. Ieyasu's troops were arranged in a line, so they could make the best use of their arquebusiers.

At around four in the afternoon, snow began to fall, and the arquebusiers opened fire, along with a number of peasant stone-throwers. Firearms being quite new to Japanese warfare, were probably considered an unbalancing factor; Ieyasu may have expected his superior weaponry to defeat Shingen's tactical attempts. Shingen then let loose his famous cavalry charge; his horsemen raced towards the gunners, and overran them; some of the Tokugawa stood firm, but many withdrew or were killed.

Shingen then withdrew these forward troops, offering them an opportunity to rest; a new set of horsemen initiated a new charge, led by Takeda Katsuyori and Obata Masamori. They were soon joined by the main body of the Takeda army, which drove their adversaries into full retreat. Ieyasu sent one of his commanders, Ōkubo Tadayo, to plant his giant golden fan standard (uma-jirushi) to serve as a rallying point at Saigadake, where the high plains began to drop off. He then sought to re-engage the Takeda army, to free his trapped generals, but was persuaded by Natsume Yoshinobu to retreat; Ieyasu's life was too important. Yoshinobu then led a charge into the Takeda line, and was killed.

When Tokugawa returned to the Hamamatsu fortress, he was reportedly accompanied by only five men; the battle had gone ugly. Nevertheless, he commanded that the fortress gates remain open, and that braziers be lit to guide his retreating army back to safety. Sakai Tadatsugu beat a large war drum, seeking to add encouragement to the returning men of a noble, courageous retreat. This tactic is called the "empty fort strategy". When the Takeda vanguard, led by Baba Nobuharu and Yamagata Masakage heard the drums, and saw the braziers and open gates, they assumed that Tokugawa was planning a trap, and so they stopped and made camp for the night. Had they pushed though, it could be argued that they might have taken the fortress.

In the night, a small band of Tokugawa warriors attacked the Takeda camp, forcing them into a ravine, where they lay helpless. The Takeda withdrew the following morning.

[edit] References

  • Turnbull, Stephen (1998). 'The Samurai Sourcebook'. London: Cassell & Co.