Battle of Maaten al-Sarra

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Maaten al-Sarra
Part of the Toyota War
Date September 5, 1987
Location Maaten al-Sarra Air Base, Libya
Result Decisive Chadian victory
Combatants
Libya Chad
Commanders
Uknown Hassan Djamous[1]
Strength
2,500[1] 2,000[2]
Casualties
1,000[3][4]–1,713[5] killed
300 PoW
70 tanks
30 APCs
26[6]–32[4] aircraft		 65 killed
112 wounded[7]

The battle of Maaten al-Sarra was a battle fought between Chad and Libya on September 5, 1987 during the Toyota War. The battle took the form of a surprise Chadian raid against the Libyan Maaten al-Sarra Air Base, meant to remove the threat of Libyan airpower, that had already thwarted the Chadian attack on the Aouzou Strip in August. The first clash ever held in Libyan territory since the beginning of the Chadian-Libyan conflict[2], the attack was fully successful, causing a high number of Libyan casualties and contributing to the definitive ceasefire signed on September 11 among the warring countries.[6]

[edit] Background

Since 1983 Libyan troops had invaded Chad in support of the rebel Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) fighting against the Chadian government led by Hissène Habré. French military interventions had limited the Libyan-GUNT advance to the 16th parallel (the so-called Red Line), frozing the situation on the ground till 1986, when the bulk of the GUNT forces turned against their Libyan patrons, an opportunity that was immediately taken by Habré, that in December gave orders to his troops to attack Libyan positions in Northern Chad.[8] Starting with Fada and continuing with B'ir Kora and Ouadi Doum, the Chadian National Armed Forces' (FANT) commander-in-chief Hassan Djamous reported a series of victories that forced Libyan forces to fall back on the Aouzou Strip.[9]

Ignoring French pleas for restraint, Habré assumed a militant attitude towards the Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip; his troops successfully took Aouzou on August 8, but were repulsed on August 28, partly due to French refusal to provide air cover for Habré's attempt to regain Aouzou.[10][11]

[edit] Attack

Already before the final Libyan assault Habré had withdrew Djamous and most of his veteran troops projecting to let them repose for a new offensive that would secure once and for all the Strip. Habré, judging by the decisive role played in the setback at Aouzou by close-range Libyan air strikes[4], concluded that Libya's greatest advantage was its ability to conduct endless airstrikes. To remove this asset Habré ordered Djamous to destroy with 2,000 troops the main Libyan airbase in southern Libya, Maaten al-Sarra, 60 miles north of the Chadian-Libyan border.[1][12] Habré may also have been encouraged in his raid by French President François Mitterrand's public declaration on September 3 that the Red Line was obsolete and thus French troops in Chad would not be binded by it any more.[13]

Chadian military preparations were made for what was taken for an attempt to retake Aouzou once again; instead, encouraged by the United States that supplied satellite intelligence, the FANT attacked on September 5 Maaten al-Sarra, taking completely by surprise the Libyans, and apparently also the French, that reacted by refusing to provide intelligence or logistic support.[11][10] Djamous' troops were careful to follow the wadis, thus avoiding to expose themselves, and also took advantage of Libyan carelessness in patrolling and security, consenting to take the airbase's garrison and its defenders by surprise.[1] To majorly confuse the Libyans the FANT forces had first proceeded north and northwest in Libyan territory, in a second moment turning left and descending over Maaten al-Sarra; as a result, the Libyan officers took them for reinforcements and attempted to join them.[3]

Nowithstanding its 2,500-strong garrison, brigade of tanks, artillery and extensive fortifications, the Chadian troops rapidly overcoming the Libyan forces and assuming control of the base, starkly revealing the professional incompetence of the Libyan military.[12] While the FANT's losses were minor, Libya suffered staggering casulties, with 1,713 Libyans killed, 300 taken prisoners and and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the surrounding desert. The Chadians then proceeded to demolish all the equipment they could not bring with them, such as 70 tanks, 30 APCs, 8 radar stations, a radar scrambling device, numerous SAMs, 26 aircraft - including 3 Mig-23, 1 Mi-24, 4 Mirages, and made unoperative the base's two runaways.[3][6] Then, traveling without lights beneath the moon and stars, the FANT column withdrew to Chadian soil on September 6.[2]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press, 396. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2. 
  2. ^ a b c Greenwald, John (1987-09-21), "Disputes Raiders of the Armed Toyotas", Time
  3. ^ a b c Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge, 125. ISBN 90-5699-582-0. 
  4. ^ a b c Collelo, Thomas (1990). Chad. US GPO. ISBN 0-1602-4770-5. 
  5. ^ 1987-09-13, "CHAD; NDJAMENA SENDS TROOPS INTO LIBYA", The New York Times
  6. ^ a b c K. Pollack, 396–397
  7. ^ K. Pollack, 397
  8. ^ K. Pollack, 382–390
  9. ^ K. Pollack, 390–394
  10. ^ a b Popper, Steven W. (1989). The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements. RAND, 147. ISBN 0-8330-0934-6. 
  11. ^ a b Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press, 222. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3. 
  12. ^ a b Vanderwalle, Dirk J. (2006). A History of Modern Libya. Cambridge University Press, 148. ISBN 0-5218-5048-7. 
  13. ^ S. Nolutshungu, 224–225
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org../../../b/a/t/Battle_of_Maaten_al-Sarra_7943.html"