Battle of Hurtgen Forest

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Battle of Huertgen Forest
Part of World War II
Date September 19, 1944 – February 10, 1945 Location German-Belgian border Result Pyrrhic Allied victory
Combatants
United States	Germany
Commanders
Courtney Hodges	Walter Model
Strength
120,000	80,000
Casualties
33,000 casualties	12,000—16,000 deaths[1] (est.; total casualties unknown)

Siegfried Line Campaign
Moerbrugge - Market Garden - Nancy - Hurtgen Forest - Crucifix Hill - Aachen - Scheldt - Metz - Queen

Western Front (World War II)
France - The Netherlands - Dunkirk - Britain - Dieppe - Villefranche-de-Rouergue - Normandy - Dragoon - Siegfried Line - Market Garden - Aintree - Scheldt - Hurtgen Forest - Aachen - Bulge - Colmar Pocket - Plunder

The Battle of Huertgen Forest (German: Schlacht im Hürtgenwald) is the name given to the series of fierce battles fought between U.S. and German forces during World War II in the Hürtgen (also: Huertgen) Forest. The battles took place between September 19, 1944, and February 10, 1945, in a strategically insignificant corridor of barely 50 square miles (129 km²) east of the Belgian–German border.

U.S. commanders’ initial goal was to pin down German forces in the area so as to keep them from reinforcing the front lines further north, between Aachen and the Rur (Roer) River, where the Allies were basically fighting a trench war between a network of fortified towns and villages connected with field fortifications, tank traps, and minefields. A secondary objective may have been to outflank the front line. The Americans' initial objectives were to take Schmidt, clear Monschau, and advance to the Rur. The Germans viciously defended the area for two reasons: It served as staging area for the Ardennes Offensive (what became the Battle of the Bulge) that was already in preparation, and the mountains commanded access to the Schwammenauel Dam^{[verification needed]} (Rurtalsperre Schwammenauel) at the head of the Rur Lake (Rurstausee) which, if opened, would flood low-laying areas downstream and deny any crossing of the river. The Allies only recognized this after several heavy setbacks, and the Germans were able to hold the region until they launched their final major, last-ditch offensive on the Western Front, into the Ardennes.

Contents 1 Overview 2 Background 3 Hürtgen Forest 4 Opposing armies 5 First phase 6 Second phase 7 Casualties 8 Aftermath 9 Other 10 Units 10.1 U.S. Divisions 10.2 German Divisions 11 Trivia 12 Footnotes 13 References 14 Further reading

[edit] Overview

The American high command was flush with success after the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead and hoped they could quickly break through and push further into Germany. Multiple divisions were sent in to the Hürtgen Forest, only to be decimated and replaced by still more divisions. Even with armor, air, and artillery support, all advantages held by the Americans were negated by the inhospitable forest terrain. Despite smaller numbers, the Germans were able to impede the larger American force thanks to the difficult terrain and having good defensive positions—plus they had ample experience in winter and mountain warfare that the Americans mostly lacked.

It was the perfect military scenario for the overstretched German army. If overtaken, the Germans could have easily flooded the entire Rur river system downstream from the dam, delaying the Americans' advance. The Germans were heavily entrenched in the forest and also made use of the Siegfried Line defenses in the area, inflicting heavy casualties in the longest single battle the U.S. Army has ever fought in its history^[2]: The Americans suffered well over 24,000 direct casualties during the battle, plus another 9,000 casualties due to fatigue, illness, and friendly fire; casualties among the Germans also reached 12,000. Despite this, the Battle of Hürtgen Forest is largely forgotten because the Battle of the Bulge, which began shortly afterwards, stole the spotlight. The victory was hard-fought, the engagement was long, and the casualties tremendous, making it a difficult event to glorify from either side.

[edit] Background

By mid-September 1944, the Allied pursuit of the German army after Normandy had slowed due to extended supply lines and the consequent German recovery. The next strategic objective was to move up to the Rhine River along its entire length and prepare to cross it. Courtney Hodges’ 1st Army experienced hard resistance pushing through the Aachen Gap and perceived a potential threat from enemy forces using the Hürtgen Forest as a base.

In early October, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division arrived, joining elements of the U.S. XIX Corps and VII Corps, which had encircled Aachen. Although the 1st Infantry Division called for the surrender of the German garrison in the city, German commander Colonel Gerhard Wilck refused to capitulate until October 21.

It was also necessary to remove the threat posed by the Rur dam^{[verification needed]}. In German hands, the stored water could be readily released, swamping any forces operating downstream. The direct route to the dam^{[verification needed]} was through the forest.

In hindsight, military historians are no longer convinced of these arguments. An American historian, who served in the Hürtgen battle, has described it as “a misconceived and basically fruitless battle that should have been avoided.”

[edit] Hürtgen Forest

The Hürtgen Forest occupies a rugged area between the Rur river and Aachen. The dense conifer forest is broken by few roads and tracks and firebreaks and vehicular movement is restricted. In the autumn and early winter of 1944, the weather was cold and wet and often prevented air support. Ground conditions varied from wet to snow cover.

The German defenders had prepared the area with blockhouses, minefields, barbed wire, and booby-traps, hidden by the snow. Also there were a number of bunkers in the area, mostly belonging to the deep defenses of the Siegfried Line, which were also centers of resistance. The dense forest allowed infiltration and flanking attacks and it was sometimes difficult to establish a front line or to be confident that an area had been cleared of the enemy. The small numbers of routes and clearings had also allowed German machine-gun, mortar and artillery teams to pre-range their weapons and fire accurately. Apart from the bad weather, the dense forest and rough terrain also prevented proper use of the Allied air superiority which had great difficulties to spot any targets.

The American advantage in numbers (as high as 5-to-1), armor, mobility, and air support was greatly reduced. In the forest, relatively small numbers of determined and prepared defenders could be highly effective. As the American divisions took casualties, inexperienced recruits were brought up to the front as replacements: the U.S. Official History^{[verification needed]} says: “Any numerical advantage the Americans may have possessed lay in bug-eyed replacements, who began to arrive in small, frightened bunches.”^{[cite this quote]} The impenetrable forest also limited the use of tanks and hid anti-tank teams equipped with panzerfausts. Later in the battle, it proved necessary to blast tank routes through the forest. Transport was similarly limited by the lack of routes: at critical times it proved difficult to reinforce or supply front-line units or to evacuate their wounded. The Germans were hampered by much of the same difficulties, of course— their divisions had taken heavy losses on the retreat through France and were hastily filled up with untrained boys, men unfit for service, and old men. Transport was also a problem, not only through the difficult roads but by lack of trucks and fuel, and a lot of the supplies were manhandled to the front line. But the German defenders had the advantage that their commanders and many of their soldiers had been fighting for a few years and had learned the necessary tactics for fighting efficiently in winter and forest, whereas the Americans were often well-trained but inexperienced.

The tall forest canopy also favored the defenders. Falling artillery rounds were often primed to detonate as tree bursts. While defenders were protected from shell fragments (and wooden splinters from the trees) by their dug-in defensive positions, attackers were in the open and much more vulnerable.^[3] Conversely, U.S. mortar platoons needed clearings in which to work—these were few and dangerous, so support was often unavailable to rifle platoons.

[edit] Opposing armies

The Hürtgen Forest lay within the area of Courtney Hodges’ U.S. First Army. Responsibility fluctuated between the V Corps and VII Corps.

At the start, the forest was defended by the German 275th and 353rd Infantry Divisions; under strength but well prepared—5,000 men (1,000 in reserve)—and commanded by General Schmidt^{[citation needed]}, they had little artillery and no tanks. As the battle progressed, German reinforcements were added. American expectations that these troops were weak and ready to withdraw were not matched by events.

[edit] First phase

This phase concentrated on the town of Schmidt, astride an important German supply route, and the southern part of the forest.

The engagement began on September 19, 1944, with a probe by the U.S. 60th Infantry Regiment that entered the Hürtgen Forest but was beaten back by the terrain and opposition.

On October 5, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division attacked the town of Schmidt using the 60th and 39th Infantry Regiments while the 47th held a defensive position. The Monschau–Düren road was quickly cut but both regiments were slowed by defenses and suffered significant casualties: the 60th’s 2nd battalion was reduced to a third after the first day. The 39th was halted at the Weisser Weh stream; there were problems with narrow paths, air bursts in trees, fire breaks blocked or enfiladed. Evacuation and supply was difficult or impossible.

The slogging match continued. By October 16, 3,000 yards had been gained at the cost of 4,500 casualties. The U.S. 28th Infantry Division, a Pennsylvania National Guard unit, arrived on October 16 to relieve the battered 9th.

The 28th Division was reinforced with armor, tracked transport Weasels and air support. Of its three regiments, one was deployed to protect the northern flank, another to attack Germeter, and the third to capture Schmidt, the main objective. The area had terrible terrain with the Kall Trail running along a deep river ravine. This was not tank country, despite the need to support the infantry.

The attack by 28th Division started on November 2; the defenders were expecting it and were ready. The 109th Infantry Regiment was impeded after 300 yards by an unexpected minefield, pinned down by mortar and artillery fire and harassed by local counterattacks. One mile was gained after two days, the 109th dug-in and endured casualties. The 112th Infantry Regiment attacked Vossenack and the neighboring ridge, which were captured on November 2. The 112th was then halted on the Kall by strong defenses and difficult terrain. The 110th had to clear the woods next to the River Kall, capture Simonskall, and maintain a supply route for the advance on Schmidt; again these were very difficult tasks due to weather, prepared defenses, determined defenders, and terrain. The weather prevented tactical air support until November 5.

The 112th captured Schmidt on November 3, cutting the German supply route to Monschau but no American supply, reinforcement or evacuation was possible as the Kall Trail was blocked. A strong German counterattack by tanks of 116th Panzer Division and infantry from 89th Division rapidly expelled the Americans from Schmidt and they were unable to counterattack. For two days, the 112th remained hard pressed to hold its positions outside Schmidt.

On November 6, the 12th Infantry Regiment was detached from the 4th Division and sent to reinforce the 28th Division.

At Vossenack, the 2nd battalion of the 112th disintegrated after constant shelling and fled a German attack. Following the providential arrival of two U.S. armored platoons of tanks and M10 Wolverine tank destroyers, supported by those 2nd battalion men who had held tight and two companies of 146th Engineers operating as infantry, the fighting for Schmidt continued until November 10.

[edit] Second phase

In this phase, the U.S. 4th Div was to clear the northern half of the forest between Schevenhütte and Hürtgen, capture Hürtgen and advance to the Rur (Roer) River south of Düren. From November 10, this would be VII Corps' responsibility and it was part of the main VII Corps effort to reach the Rur. The 4th Division was now fully committed to the Hürtgen, although its 12th Infantry Regiment was already mauled from its action at Schmidt, leaving just two fully effective regiments to achieve the divisional objectives. U.S. VII Corps was opposed by German forces, mainly from the 81st Corps, consisting of three understrength divisions. In the Hürtgen, there was the 275th Division—6,500 men with 150 artillery pieces. They were well dug-in and prepared.

The abstract of a Defense Technical Information Center report describes what happened:^[4]

The VII (U.S.) Corps, 1st Army attacked 16 November 1944 with 1st Inf Div, 4th Inf Div, 104th Inf Div, and CCR 5th AD to clear Huertgen Forest and the path of 1st Army to the Roer River. After heavy fighting, primarily by the 4th Infantry Division, VII Corps' attack ground to a halt. V Corps was committed on 21 November 1944. Attacking with 8th Inf Div, and CCR 5th AD, the V Corps managed to capture Huertgen after stiff fighting on 28 November 1944.

The attack started on November 16. The two infantry regiments attacked in parallel columns: the 8th along the northern edge of the forest towards Düren, the 22nd further south in parallel. The open flanks invited infiltration. Similar tactics elsewhere in Hürtgen had “invited disaster”.

Attacks by the 8th Infantry Regiment on Rother Weh stream hit heavy resistance and were repulsed with heavy losses. The 22nd failed to take Raven’s hedge, beaten back by heavy machine-gun and artillery fire along the firebreaks. After three days there were 300 losses, including officers and NCOs.

By November 18 tanks were deemed essential, so engineers blasted tank routes through the forest. Communications and logistics remained a problem, so on November 19 the attack paused to allow re-supply and evacuation of the wounded. German reinforcements arrived from 344th and 353rd Divisions and resistance stiffened further. On November 20, Russell J. York, a medic with the 4th Engineer Battalion , earned a Silver Star in the Weisser Weh battle when heavy shelling hampered efforts to install a bridge.

Responsibility was returned to V Corps and, on November 21, 8th Division attacked the Weisser Weh valley, continuing towards Hürtgen. The 121st Infantry Regiment hit heavy defenses immediately. Despite armored support from the 10th Tank Battalion, daily advances were less than 600 yards. Hürtgen was taken on November 29 and the battle continued to Kleinhau, one mile north.

The final action in the Hürtgen Forest was at Merode, on the northeastern edge of the forest. Two American companies took the village but they were later destroyed in a German counterattack.

Elements of the 8th and the 28th Infantry Divisions then advanced on Brandenberg. The 28th Division, just like the 9th before it (and the 4th Infantry Division, which would relieve the 28th), also took heavy casualties during its stay in the Hürtgen Forest. On November 14, the 2nd Ranger Battalion arrived to relieve elements of the 112th Infantry Regiment. On December 6, the Rangers moved on Bergstein and subsequently took the strategic position of Hill 400. Shortly thereafter, on December 12, the towns of Gey and Strass were taken by American Forces.

[edit] Casualties

The U.S. Official History^{[verification needed]} estimated that 120,000 troops, plus replacements, were committed to Hürtgen; by the end there had been 24,000 casualties plus 9,000 non-battle. Two divisions, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, were so badly mauled that they were withdrawn from the line to recuperate.

The battle for Schmidt cost 6,184 U.S. casualties—compared with about 4,000 losses by the two divisions at Omaha Beach. German casualties were fewer than 3,000.

In the second phase, the U.S. 4th Division had advanced 1½ miles by November 20, having suffered 1,500 battle casualties plus non-battle casualties numbering in the several hundreds due to trench foot, frostbite, and exhaustion. After two weeks, three miles had been gained for 4,053 battle and 2,000 non-battle casualties, bringing the November totals to 170 officers and 4,754 men. The 22nd Infantry Division had 2,500 casualties compared to its starting strength of 2,500.

Some units fighting in this operation also fought at Omaha Beach; comparing the two, veterans said the Battle of Hürtgen Forest was a much bloodier fight than Omaha. Ernest Hemingway, who was there, described the battle as “Passchendaele with tree bursts”^[3], an appropriate epitaph.

[edit] Aftermath

On December 16, 1944 German forces began the Ardennes Offensive, more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge. The surprise German offensive caught Allied forces off guard and forced a gigantic bulge in their lines. American units stationed in the area, including the 8th Division, the 104th, the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne staged a heroic defense, typified by the defense of Bastogne, in one of the most important battles of the war and the largest in U.S. history.

The Ardennes Offensive was completely halted by mid-January, and in early February, American forces attacked through the Hürtgen Forest for the final time. On February 10, the Schwammenauel dam was taken by American forces, although the Germans had opened the floodgates of the dam the day before and thus the Rur Valley was flooded, halting the U.S. push for the Rhine across the little river for two further weeks, until the attackers finally managed to cross the river on February 23rd when the waters had sunk again.

Two soldiers of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division were awarded Medals of Honor for action in the battle one of whom was Lieutenant Colonel George Mabry[1], the second-most highly decorated U.S. soldier of World War II.

Private Edward Donald Slovik, assigned to the 28th Division, chose a court martial rather than fight in the Hürtgen Forest. On January 31, 1945, he became the first American soldier to be executed for desertion since the American Civil War.

[edit] Other

There is an ongoing discussion of whether the American battle plan made any sense. One possibility is that U.S. strategy grossly underestimated the individual strength and determination remaining in the psyche of the German soldier at this late point in the war. In addition, the Americans concentrated on the village of Schmidt and neither tried to conquer the strategic Rur Dams nor recognized the importance of Hill 400 until an advanced stage of the battle.^[5]

Today tourists can visit a museum in Vossenack, look at a few of the many Siegfried Line-bunkers, and take a walk on the famous Kall Trail.

[edit] Units

[edit] U.S. Divisions

• 1st Infantry
• 3rd Armored
• 4th Infantry
• 8th Infantry
• 9th Infantry
• 28th Infantry
• 78th Infantry
• 83rd Infantry
• 104th Infantry
• 5th Armored
• 7th Armored
• 366th Fighter Group
• 82nd Airborne

[edit] German Divisions

• 3rd Fallschirmjäger
• 12th Volksgrenadier
• 47th Volksgrenadier
• 89th Infanterie
• 116th Panzer
• 272nd Volksgrenadier
• 275th Infanterie
• 344th Infanterie
• 353rd Infanterie

[edit] Trivia

• A multiplayer and singleplayer map based upon this battle was featured in the game Call of Duty. The last mission in the computer game Medal of Honor: Allied Assault (Return to Schmerzen) is also partly based on this battle.
• In Call of Duty 2, the player plays a U.S. Army Ranger in the 2nd Ranger Battalion which, among other missions, captures the town of Bergstein and Hill 400.
• The movie When Trumpets Fade (1998), directed by John Irvin, is set during the Battle of Hurtgen Forest and evokes the gritty battle.
• The unaired pilot for revival of the The Time Tunnel television series in 2002 centered on the Battle of Hurtgen Forest.

[edit] Footnotes

1. ^ Corresponding German Wikipedia article (“Schlacht im Hürtgenwald”)
2. ^ Regan., p.178.
3. ^ ^{a b} “Tree bursts” refers to a technique using air bursts by deploying artillery shells set to go off in the treetops. This causes hot metal shrapnel and wood fragments to rain down. Since American soldiers had been trained to react to incoming artillery fire by hitting the ground, the technique proved particularly deadly until American GIs learned to “hug a tree” instead during bombardment.
4. ^ Huertgen Forest: Offensive, Deliberate Attack, Forest, 16 November 1944. http://www.dtic.mil/+(1984).+Retrieved on February 3, 2007.
5. ^ “Hopes Dashed in the Hürtgen” by Edward G. Miller and David T. Zabecki August 16, 2005, originally an article in World War II magazine

[edit] References

• Regan, G. More Military Blunders. Carlton Books, 1993.
• Whiting, Charles. The Battle of Hurtgen Forest. Orion Books, New York, 1989
• The West Wall Series, Volume 4. Combined Publishing, 2000
• Miller, Edward G. “A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944–1945” in the Military History Series, Volume 39. Texas A&M University Press.
• Astor, Gerald. The Bloody Forest: Battle for Hurtgen September 1944—January 1945. Presidio Press, 2000

[edit] Further reading

• The 22d Infantry Regiment in the Battle of Hürtgen Forest
• 5th Armored Division
• The Battle of Hürtgen Forest
• The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest