Battle of Grozny (August 1996)
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Operation Jihad | |||||||
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Part of First Chechen War | |||||||
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Combatants | |||||||
Russian Federation | Chechen Republic of Ichkeria | ||||||
Commanders | |||||||
Konstantin Pulikovsky Doku Zavgayev |
Aslan Maskhadov Shamil Basayev |
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Strength | |||||||
August 6: 15,000-20,000 |
August 6: 1,500-2,000 |
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Casualties | |||||||
Official losses: 494 killed 182 missing 1,407 wounded |
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The August 1996 battle of Grozny was the rapid assault on the Chechnya capital Grozny by the Chechen rebels [1], which led to the final ceasefire in the First Chechen War. It was code-named Operation Jihad by the Chechens.
The Russians had occupied the capital since February 1995, and had garrisoned 10,000 Russian Ministry of the Interior (MVD) soldiers there. The Chechens managed to split the Grozny garrisons into several dozen small pockets of resistance, and to beat back and decimate several Russian armored brigades that tried to oust the militants. [1] The battle effectively ended the war.
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[edit] Background
In early July, after abandoning the peace process, the Russian leadership decided to continue military operations. Between July 9 and July 16, 1996 Russian armed forces carried out a series of major operations in the foothills and settlements of mountainous southern Chechnya, where the separatists had their bases. From July 20 onwards, the federal forces launched a large-scale operation in the south of the republic.
On August 6, 1996, at 5:50 AM local time, Chechen forces raided Grozny in a surprise attack. On that very day, Russians planned a major operation in the settlement of Alkhan-Yurt, southwest of Grozny, on the federal Rostov-Baku highway. To carry out this operation, it had been decided to move more than 1,500 Interior Ministry troops and pro-Moscow Chechen militiamen of Doku Zavgayev; ironically, these forces were already being moved out of the city as their opponents were entering it.
[edit] Chechen attack (August 6)
The Chechen units attacking Grozny consisted of 1,500 to 2,000 men. Within a week, their numbers had grown to between 6,000 and 7,000, as a result of the transfer of units from elsewhere in the republic, influx of volunteers, and also some of the Zavgayev's forces changing sides. Russian federal forces consisted of some 15,000 to 20,000 men; the Russians also enjoyed superiority in armored vehicles and artillery, and absolute control of airspace.
The Chechen chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov, employed tactics which proved highly damaging to the Russian forces. Chechen units entered Grozny and infiltrated between the various checkpoints, command buildings and other positions of Russian forces. The Chechens did not aim to capture or destroy these targets. It simply blockaded the checkpoints and command posts, isolating them from each other, and demoralizing them with a constant mortar and sniper fire. A group of trapped Russian troops took approximately 500 civilian hostages at the Municipal Hospital No. 9. [2] A separate attack was carried out on the administrative complex in the city center, which included the government building, the Interior Ministry, FSB, and others: along with servicemen, a number of Russian journalists were also holed up inside.
At the same time, Chechen units also attacked other major towns in the republic, namely Argun and Gudermes. While federal forces managed to hold the commander’s building in Argun, Gudermes was taken without a fight. A number of Chechens deemed to be collaborators were rounded up, detained, and executed; reliable sources have stated that the execution list for one region of Grozny comprised more than 200 names. [3]
[edit] Russian counterattacks (August 7-11)
The Russian Army forces stationed at Khankala and Severny Airport initially calculated that their opponents would leave the city of their own accord after the raid, and thus did not hurry to the aid of those under siege in the Interior Ministry. The first attempts to alleviate the situation were not undertaken until the afternoon of August 7, when an armored column was sent to the aid of the besieged Russian positions. However, the day before, a wagonload of anti-tank weapons had fallen into Chechen hands at Grozny railway station which was taken by the rebels. As a result, Russian tanks became sitting targets for the armed Chechen mobile units.
Another column was sent in the following day. But as had been the case during the New Year’s offensive 19 months before, they ran into ambushes and many tanks and APCs were blown up by the Chechens. On the fifth day 900 men of the 276th regiment tried to take the centre of the city; in two days they lost 150 dead and 300 wounded. Only on August 11, the sixth day of fighting, did one of the armored columns succeed in getting through to the city center, bringing some supplies and evacuating wounded.
[edit] Truce (August 11-14)
On August 10, Gen. Alexander Lebed was named the Russian President’s plenipotentiary to Chechnya. Having become convinced of the impossibility of achieving military victory with the means at his disposal, he decided to enter into negotiations with the separatists.
On the night of August 11 he opened negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov and compelled General Konstantin Pulikovsky to join them. The Minister of Defense, General Igor Rodionov, had been appointed with Lebed’s personal recommendation, which enabled the latter to control the military. The Interior Minister, Anatoly Kulikov, with the reputation of being a hawk, was neutralized by Lebed who accused him of abandoning Grozny. Lebed also convinced Russian President Boris Yeltsin of the correctness of his course, in part due to the extremely difficult situation of the federal forces.
[edit] Ceasefire (August 14-19)
Since August 14, the Chechen forces had almost completely controlled Grozny. The Russian command declined to take back the city and concentrated on retaining their bases at Khankala and Severny airport. In the city, there remained some centers of resistance with around 2,000 servicemen and militiamen still blocked in their positions. But with shortages of ammunition, medicine, food and water, they were doomed to destruction, either by enemy fire or by friendly air or artillery strikes. Argun and Gudermes were in the separatists’ hands, and the Chechen force was also increasing its activities around Urus-Martan and Vedeno.
Under these circumstances Lebed succeeded in obtaining a ceasefire in Grozny beginning August 14, and on August 17 General Pulikovsky signed an order terminating all military activity in the republic.
[edit] Renewed fighting and the ultimatum (August 19-20)
The hawks’ last attempt to torpedo the peace process occurred on August 19. On that day General Pulikovsky issued an ultimatum to the rebels to leave Grozny within 48 hours. In the event of non-compliance, attacks would be launched from all directions and with all available means.
Air and artillery strikes commenced in the early hours of August 20, before the end of the deadline. The attacks condemned the remaining federal forces in the city, as well as the civilian population, estimated by the human rights organization Memorial at between 50,000 to 70,000. As "the Russian bombs and shells destroyed entire apartment blocks and at least one hospital, and hit residential suburbs with wild inaccuracy" (HRW), terrified refugees tried to save themselves from the announced threat of even more deadly bombing. [4] Many of them were reported killed when their columns were hit as well. [5]
[edit] End to the war (August 20-30)
General Lebed, however, managed to avert further bloodshed; after returning to Chechnya on August 20, he negotiated a ceasefire and began a dialogue with the Chechens. On August 30, 1996, with his direct participation, the Khasav-Yurt Accord was signed.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- Hot August in Grozny by Oleg Lukin for Prague Watchdog
- The Battle(s) of Grozny
- Oliker, Olga (2001) Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat MR 1289, Rand, Santa Monica, CA, ISBN 0-8330-2998-3 Chapter 2: "Grozny I: 1994-1995" pp. 30-32
- Evangelista, Matthew (2002) The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., ISBN 0815724985
- Youngs, Tim (2000) The Conflict in Chechnya Research Paper 00/14, 7 February 2000, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, London, UK
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