Battle of Cape Esperance

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Battle of Cape Esperance
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

The heavily damaged Japanese cruiser Aoba disembarks dead and wounded crewmembers near Buin, Bougainville and the Shortland Islands a few hours after the battle on October 12, 1942.
Date October 11, 1942 – October 12, 1942
Location Off Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal
Result United States victory
Combatants
United States Empire of Japan
Commanders
Robert L. Ghormley
Norman Scott		 Gunichi Mikawa
Aritomo Gotō†
Takatsugu Jojima
Strength
4 cruisers
5 destroyers		 3 cruisers
8 destroyers
2 seaplane tenders
Casualties
1 destroyer sunk,
1 cruiser,
1 destroyer heavily damaged,
163 killed[1]		 1 cruiser,
3 destroyers sunk,
1 cruiser heavily damaged,
565 killed,
111 captured[2]
Guadalcanal campaign
Tulagi – Savo I. – Tenaru – Eastern Solomons – Edson's Ridge – Matanikau – Cape Esperance – Henderson Field – Santa Cruz Is. – Naval Guadalcanal – Tassafaronga – Ke – Rennell I.
Solomon Islands campaign
1st Tulagi – Guadalcanal – Blackett Strait – Cartwheel – Death of Yamamoto – New Georgia – Kula Gulf – Kolombangara – Vella Gulf – Horaniu – Vella Lavella – Naval Vella Lavella – Treasury Is. – Choiseul – Bougainville – Rabaul carrier raid – Cape St. George – Green Is.
The Solomon Islands area in the south Pacific. The Japanese base at Rabaul is at the upper left. Guadalcanal (lower right) lies at the southeastern end of "The Slot," the route utilized by Japanese "Tokyo Express" missions.
The Solomon Islands area in the south Pacific. The Japanese base at Rabaul is at the upper left. Guadalcanal (lower right) lies at the southeastern end of "The Slot," the route utilized by Japanese "Tokyo Express" missions.

The Battle of Cape Esperance, also known as the Second Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the Sea Battle of Savo Island (サボ島沖海戦) took place October 11 – 12, 1942, and was a naval battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and United States (U.S.) Navy. The battle was the third major naval engagement during the Guadalcanal campaign and took place at the entrance to the strait between Savo Island and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.

On the night of October 11 the Japanese sent a major supply and reinforcement convoy to their forces on Guadalcanal consisting of two seaplane tenders and six destroyers. At the same time but in a separate operation, three heavy cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Japanese Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō were to bombard the Allied airfield on Guadalcanal (called Henderson Field by the Allies) with the object of destroying Allied aircraft and the airfield's facilities. Shortly before midnight on October 11, a U.S Navy force of four cruisers and five destroyers, under the command of U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, intercepted Gotō's force as it approached Savo Island near Guadalcanal. Taking the Japanese by surprise, Scott's warships sank one of Gotō's cruisers and one of his destroyers, heavily damaged another cruiser, mortally wounded Gotō, and forced the rest of Gotō's warships to abandon their mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire, one of Scott's destroyers was sunk and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged. In the meantime the Japanese supply convoy successfully completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey to the Japanese naval base at the Shortland Islands without being discovered by Scott's force. Later on the morning of October 12, three Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned-back to assist Gotō's retreating, damaged warships. Air attacks by Allied aircraft from Henderson Field sank two of these destroyers later that day.

In spite of Scott's victory in the action, the battle had little immediate, strategic implications. Just two nights later two Japanese battleships approached Guadalcanal unopposed and bombarded and almost destroyed Henderson Field.


Contents

[edit] Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.[3]

Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on August 8 the Allied landing forces, mainly consisting of United States Marine Corps units, had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The airfield was later named Henderson Field by Allied forces. The Allied aircraft that subsequently operated out of the airfield became known as the "Cactus Air Force" after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal[4]

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. Beginning August 19, 1942, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal with the goal of driving Allied forces from the island.[5]

Due to the threat by Allied aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver their troops and supplies to the island. Instead, the Japanese used warships to carry their forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers or destroyers, were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to Allied air attack. Delivering the troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the soldier's heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high speed warship runs to Guadalcanal, which occurred throughout the campaign, were later called the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.[6]

Due to either the inability or unwillingness of Allied naval commanders to challenge Japanese naval forces at night, the Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about 200 miles) was in great danger from damaging air attack. This "curious tactical situation" would exist for the next several months during the campaign.[7]

The first attempt by the Japanese Army to recapture Henderson Field was defeated on August 21, 1942 in the Battle of the Tenaru. The next attempt, from September 12 through September 14, was defeated in the Battle of Edson's Ridge.[8]

After Edson's Ridge, the Japanese set their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for October 20 and moved most of the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch West Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. Between September 14 and October 9, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division as well as General Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the Japanese seaplane tender Nisshin to deliver heavy equipment to the island including vehicles and heavy artillery that the other warships couldn't carry due to space limitations. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by not only delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, but by stepping-up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield.[9]

U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott.
U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon, commander of United States Army forces in the the South Pacific, convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific, that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next, expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on October 8, the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of October 13.[10]

To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64, consisting of four cruisers and five destroyers under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships that approached Guadalcanal and threatened the arrival of the transport convoy. Up to this point in the war with Japan, the Allies had lost every naval surface night battle with the Japanese Navy, losing eight cruisers and three destroyers without sinking a single Japanese warship. Scott conducted one night battle practice with his ships on October 8, and then took station south of Guadalcanal near Rennell Island on October 9 to await word of any Japanese naval movement towards the southern Solomons.[11]

Japanese Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō.
Japanese Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō.

Continuing with preparations for the October offensive, Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa scheduled a large and "singularly important" Tokyo Express supply run for the night of October 11. Nisshin would be joined by the seaplane tender Chitose to deliver four large howitzers, two "field" guns, one antiaircraft gun, and a large assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the Shortland Islands and at Buin, Bougainville to Guadalcanal. Six destroyers, five of them carrying troops, would accompany Nisshin and Chitose. The supply convoy was under the command of Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation the three heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6, under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō, were to bombard Henderson Field with special explosive shells with the object of destroying the Cactus Air Force and the airfield's facilities. Due to the fact that U.S. Navy warships had yet to attempt to interdict any Tokyo Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese weren't expecting any opposition from naval surface forces that night.[12]

[edit] Battle

[edit] Prelude

Allied reconnaisance aircraft sighted Jojima's supply convoy on the afternoon of October 11 and reported it as two "cruisers" and six destroyers. Gotō's force, traveling behind the supply convoy, wasn't sighted. In response to the sighting of the supply convoy, Scott, at 16:07 turned his ships toward Guadalcanal for an interception.[13]

Knowing that the Japanese had the advantage in night fighting, Scott intended to use his destroyers to illuminate the targets with their searchlights and destroy them with shellfire.

[edit] Action

He ordered his force to turn into line ahead, and managed to "cross the T" of the approaching Japanese; but an error in the execution of the turn placed his destroyers between the two forces, and the Duncan was hit by shells from both sides and crippled, sinking the next day.

The Japanese were taken by surprise and Goto was mortally wounded when his flagship Aoba was hit in the opening moments. The Furutaka following Aoba drew the massed fire of the San Francisco, Salt Lake City , Boise and Helena, and sank. The Fubuki, Japanese name for Blizzard, was caught in a blizzard of shellfire by the combined American Task force and was instantly sunk. The Hatsuyuki, and Kinugasa both turned away from the American Task force and were quickly disengaged on the safe side of the battle. Boise received two 8-inch hits from Kinugasa, detonating her forward ready ammunition and killing the crews of turrets 1, 2, and disabling turret 3. The rest of the American formation was in disarray and this confusion allowed the Japanese enough time to recover and escape.

[edit] Retreat

By 00:20 on the 12th the shooting was over, and sailors set about saving their ships. Fubuki had already sunk at 23:45, while Furutaka lasted until 00:40. Boise was saved by flooding, which put out the most dangerous fires. Duncan was abandoned at 02:00, but at 03:00 a party from McCalla boarded and attempted damage control until noon of the next day, by which time the main deck was awash and the salvage party had to leave Duncan to her fate.

[edit] Aftermath

The American victory led to the wrong lessons being learned. The line-ahead tactic worked well at Cape Esperance, but the later battles of Tassafaronga and Kolombangara showed that at night linear gunfire tactics — the gun flashes lighting up ships and revealing their positions — were highly vulnerable to torpedoes.

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[edit] References

[edit] Books

[edit] Web

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 310.
  2. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 309.
  3. ^ Hogue, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 235-236.
  4. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 14–15 and Shaw, First Offensive, p. 18.
  5. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 113-114, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143, 198-199, 205, and 206, and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 113
  6. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 113-114, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143, 198-199, 205, and 206, and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 113
  7. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 113-114, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143, 198-199, 205, and 206, and Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 113
  8. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143, 156-158, 228-246, & 681.
  9. ^ Rottman, Japanese Army, p. 61, Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 152, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 224, 251-254, 266-268, & 289-290 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 132 & 158.
  10. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 293.
  11. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 295.
  12. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 295, and Hackett, HIJMS Aoba: Tabular Record of Movement.
  13. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 296.
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