Batallón de Infantería de Marina 5

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The Batallón de Infantería de Marina 5 (5th Marine Corps Battalion, BIM-5) is a battalion of the Argentine Navy Marine Corps.

Currently BIM-5, together with the 4th Marine Corps Battalion (BIM-4), is based at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego Province as part of the Argentine Navy's Fuerza de Infantería de Marina Austral (Southern Marine Corps Force, FAIA), formerly "Fuerza de Infantería de Marina N°1 (N°1 Marine Force, FIM1). They started the "Black Beret" tradition from a design made by First Marine Lieutenant Abelardo "Tigre" (Tiger) Terré at the beginning of 1977, with then Marine Commander Manuel Tomé as its CO. After a gruelling Mountain and Cold Weather commando fighting course, they were dubbed the "Aguilas Australes" (Southern Eagles) and wore a black beret with a silver flash. Later on, the flash was changed to the unit's crest, and the use of the said beret spread throughout FIM1/FAIA. The Original "Aguilas Australes" flash is currently the semi-official logo of the Rio Grande Marine Garrison (Agrupación IM Río Grande).

[edit] History

Commanded by Marine Commander Carlos H. Robacio (now retired as a Marine Rear Admiral), BIM-5 was arguably the best Argentine infantry unit in the Falklands War. Although made up by conscripts, the unit's core of highly-professional NCOs and commissioned officers, along with a well developed training and logistics system, rendered BIM-5 a tough unit that fought well in the defense of Tumbledown Mountain. Different Argentine authorities have repeatedly decorated BIM-5's colors, while Marine Admiral Robacio is a holder of the French Légion d'Honneur, along with other Argentine and foreign orders and medals.

[edit] Falklands War and Battle of Mount Tumbledown

Tumbledown Mountain, Mount William and Sapper Hill lie west of Port Stanley (called aldo Puerto Argentino). They were held by BIM-5, a reinforced, cold weather trained and equipped, marine battalion. During preparations for movement to the Malvinas/Falklands the Marine battalion was brought up to full strength of a light brigade with a company of the amphibious engineer company and a battery of the 1st Marine Artillery Regiment. The 5th Marines were further strengthened by three Tigercat SAM batteries of the 1st Marine Anti-Aircraft Regiment, and a heavy machine-gun company of Headquarters Battalion.

The BIM 5 positions around Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino were mercilessly bombarded, both from the sea by naval gunfire and from the air by the Royal Air Force Harriers. Despite the firepower advantage available to the British forces, the battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was not easily won thanks in large part to the Marine brigade. At 4.30 p.m., on 7 June, a British Harrier bombing positions held by the 5th Marine Battalion was hit by concentrated fire from M Company (under Marine Lieutenant Rodolfo Cionchi) on Sapper Hill. It withdrew trailing smoke. According to Argentine sources, the crippled Harrier crashed as it attempted to take off from the San Carlos airstrip on 8 June. During the night of 11/12 June an Exocet was launched from the Naval shore battery - headed by Commander Julio Perez, an Argentine Naval missile engineer who later became Rear Admiral and dean of the Argentine Naval University, and two Marine Lieutenant J.G.'s - with a makeshift launcher, causing serious damage to the light cruiser HMS Glamorgan which had been bombarding Two Sisters Mountain, killing thirteen sailors.

12 June proved to be the toughest day for the Argentine Marines. From the moment the 2nd Battalion, the Scots Guards had finally been moved to Goat Ridge by helicopter, 3,000 rounds of artillery, descended upon the Marines, in preparation for the coming infantry assault. But the Argentine Marines were still resisting. During the morning, a British Royal Air Force Harrier bombing positions held by the Argentine Marine force was hit by fire from that unit. The crippled Harrier (XW 919) piloted by Flight Lieutenant Murdo McLeod was however landed successfully on board the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes. First reports suggested a bullet, but John Smith who later wrote 74 Days: An Islander's Account of the [Argentine] Occupation indicated that it was a Marine Tigercat proximity fuzed missile, which caused substantial damage to the engine and showered the powerhouse roof with shrapnel, fracturing the aft reaction control pipe. Subsequently, in the process of deceleration during recovery, the aircraft started leaking fuel and caught fire, which was promptly extinguished by the ground crew. Declared non effective, it was shipped back to Britain for repairs. An Argentine Army unofficial account about their artillery groups' performance, citing a lieutenant in the field, credits anti-aircraft artillery splinters for the success.

On 13 June a diversionary action was fought to the northeast in order to raid the Cortley Ridge fuel dump. If the intent had been to divert the crack Argentine 601st and 602nd Commando Companies from the prepared defence of Stanley town, it had been successful. The 101st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group's B Battery (B/GADA101) was assigned to defend the Fresinet Peninsula, a long, narrow piece of land running from Moody Brook to form the northern arm of Stanley, when their troops came under attack at 11 p.m. The incursion was carried out by the SAS and SBS. The attack proved unsuccessful, for the Marine Battalion had sent a platoon to guard the fuel dump. Marine automatic weapons raked four landing craft, wounding four occupants and when the fighting subsided three landing craft were seen drifting ablaze.

Further south, action was initiated shortly after 8 p.m., as the 2nd Scots Guards' Reconnaissance Platoon carried out a diversionary attack, advancing with four Blues & Royals light tanks. Just as the British tanks came into range of the 5th Marine Battalion's O Coy (O/BIM5), one of the Scorpion tanks was blasted out of action by a booby-trap. In a determined firefight which lasted two hours, three Marines were killed (Marine Conscripts Omar Iniguez, Omar Patrone and Juan Rava). The Guardsmen decided to fall back towards the south, but O Company had foreseen that possibility and had carefully sown the area with mines, just in case it was employed as an escape route. The Guardsmen were then caught in a well-timed crossed from the Mortar Platoon on Mount William and the Marines' 105mm pieces. BIM 5 even coordinated fire support from not only Bravo Battery of the 1st Marine Field Artillery Battalion (B/BIAC), but also guns of the Argentine Army's 3rd and 4th (Airborne) Artillery Groups (GA3/GAA4). The Guardsmen sustained twelve casualties. They withdrew, leaving two dead, as was verified when the abandoned British webbing was removed from the Mount William sector. At about 1.30 a.m. on 14 June, the commander of the 5th Marines ordered O Company of the Marines, who had fought so well along the lower slopes of Mount William, to withdraw with the British kit in order to stand in reserve. O Coy's rest in reserve was to be short lived, when during the predawn darkness on 14 June the platoon commanders were instructed to put the platoons on one hour's notice to move.

Meanwhile, to the north of Mount William, just Marine Lieutenant Eduardo Villarraza's N Company of the 5th Marines (N/BIM5) - only a hundred conscripts and regulars at the most - occupied Mount Tumbledown. At 10.30 p.m., they were attacked from Goat Ridge. It was Left Flank Company 2nd Scots Guards. About 300 metres from the first Argentinian position, the Marines opened fire with MAG machine-guns and FAL rifles. Both British forward platoons started to take casualties from the well sited Marine machine-guns and sniper rifles. Before Left Flank Company could get within stabbing distance the Marines were able to shoot dead two Guardsmen and drive off the others with mortar fire. In shock the Scots Guards retreated to the western rocks and reorganized themeselves. Argentinian shells also started landing among the Guardsmen. By 2.30 a.m., part of the high ground was in enemy hands. The situation of the defenders became uncertain. In the centre of the mountain, one Scots Guards platoon managed to secure a small piece of high ground where they were able to set up a fire base that pinned down several Marine positions for the remaining five hours of the battle. The odd man could pick up where the machine-guns were firing from and engaged them but without any appreciable effect. Commander Robacio told Captain Eduardo Villarraza to send a fighting patrol to deal with the fire base. He sent Marine Lieutenant J.G. Hector Miño with his 5th Platoon accompanied by Second Lieutenant Augusto La Madrid (Argentine Army) with his 1st. Platoon. In the meantime the members of the Marine N Company (N/BIM5) were told to stay below ground in their pits and the position was raked with artillery bombs from the Argentine artillery. Using the cover of the British artillery, the Scots Guards dashed across 300 metres of no-man's-land and were on top of the Marines before they could get out of their bunkers. Marine Private Jorge Sanchez, in the book 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands (Leo Cooper, 2003), recalled:

The fighting was sporadic, but at times fierce, as we tried to maintain our position. By this time we had ten or twelve dead including one officer [Second Lieutenant Oscar Silva, Argentine Army]. I hadn't fired directly at a British soldier, as they had been too hard to get a clear shot at. I can remember lying there with all this firing going over my head. They were everywhere. The platoon commander [Marine Lieutenant J.G. Carlos Vazquez] then called Private Ramon Rotela manning the 60 millimetre mortar and Rotela fired it straight up into the air so that the bombs landed on ourselves. At this point I had been up and in actual combat for over six hours. It was snowing and we were tired. Some of the guys had surrendered, but I didn't want to do this. I had only twenty rounds left and I decided to continue the fight from Mount William. I popped up, fired a rifle grenade in the direction of 8 to 10 British soldiers to keep their heads down, and then ran for the 2nd Platoon. I can remember saying some type of prayer hoping the British wouldn't shoot me in the back.

Two Argentinian platoons (Second Lieutenant La Madrid and Marine Lieutenant J.G. Miño) on the eastern of Tumbledown counter-attacked, and Right Flank Company, 2nd Battalion the Scots Guards, went out to meet them. During this heroic action Marine Lieutenant J.G. Miño was wounded in the leg but refused medical assistance until all the wounded men received medical attention. Miño and La Madrid were decorated for these actions.

However, the fall of Wireless Ridge and the heavy expenditure of mortar and machine-gun ammunition in support of the 7th Infantry Regiment (RI7) on the ridgeline overlooking Moody Brook rendered the situation of the Marines very tenuous. Using armour-infantry-co-operation the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2PARA) had smashed through the RI 7 companies. By this time O Company, BIM 5 (O/BIM5) had been sent up to the Moody Brook area and moved into blocking positions to the south and east of Moody Brook. In due course firing broke out in the direction of Battalion HQ at Moody Brook, confirming fears that the 5th Marine Battalion had enemies behind them. At 7 a.m., the Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines reported his command post near Moody Brook had come under enemy fire from Wireless Ridge. The Battalion HQ was isolated and rumour was that the SAS had mixed in with the 7th Infantry Regiment and infiltrated to the rear. By dawn the approach of more British companies was detected by the Marines. They were the Gurkhas, advancing to secure Mount William. The 5th Marines (BIM5) were thus facing off with three battalions (2nd Battalion the Scots Guards (2SCOTS), 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2PARA) and the 1st Battalion the 7th Gurkha Rifles (1/7GURKHA)). The Gurkhas tried to sneak along the northern lower slopes of Tumbledown and attack Mount William from the north but the Marines were ready for them. Machine-guns and rifles turned on them, then mortar bombs and artillery bombs rained down on their companies, which wounded eight Gurkhas, and considering the accurate artillery fire the figure could have reached 50 killed and wounded. Only the soft peat prevented loss of lives in the Gurkha battalion.

As the Marine commanders on Tumbledown and Mount William awaited reinforcements, they received orders to withdraw. Despite these orders, the Marines continued to hold out. By 9 a.m., the Marines had again been ordered to withdraw. In a daring action, Major Oscar Jaimet and his RI 6 company in spite of numerous casualties sustained, succeeded in holding up Right Flank Company while the 5th Marine Battalion's N Coy (N/BIM5) carried out an orderly withdrawal to Sapper Hill still determined to put up a fight. Around eight RI 6 personnel were killed and eighteen captured, many of them wounded. But the 6th Regiment's B Coy (B/RI6) successfully withdrew with its equipment to set up defensive positions around Sapper Hill. Five of the Marine platoon positions now fell to the British. About 9 a.m. Gurkhas, supported by massive artillery fire, launched the final assault against Mount William. The Marines, though were still not finished. Taking positions on Sapper Hill, three companies of Marines prepared to make their last stand. Commander Robacio began to reorganize his defences. These Marine conscripts believed in their battalion's motto "Fighting I Die For The Fatherland"(Pugnam Pereors per Patriam). By 10.a.m. the 5th Marine Battalion's position had stabilized. The Argentine commanding officer, Marine Commander Robacio and a RI7 Officer, Major Jaimet were determined to continue fighting. In the battle report Marine Commander Robacio wrote: "I was convinced that we could still resist, and that is why I ordered the O Company - which was ready - to begin a counter-attack together with the M Company. I planned to direct this attack myself personally." (Marine Rear Admiral Carlos Büsser, El BIM 5 en las Malvinas, Boletin del Centro Naval, pp. 318-319) .

Generals Mario B. Menendez (the commander of the Argentinian garrison) and Oscar Jofre (commander of the crack 10th Brigade, responsible for the defence of Stanley), following a quick conference, agreed that to continue resistance would entail useless loss of lives. And the Kelpers were bound to get hurt. Marine Commander Robacio had no choice but to call off the planned Marine counterattacks. By 1 p.m., the 5th Marines had initiated their withdrawal, after destroying their vehicles and heavy equipment. Minutes later Marine Midhsipman Alejandro Koch's 3rd Platoon, M Coy (M/BIM5) covering the withdrawal of the Marine battalion were attacked by C Company of 40 Commando (C/40 Cdo.) jumping off from eight Sea King helicopters, two of which were riddled with bullets and had to be taken out of service for several months while repairs were completed.

Three Argentinian Marines (Marine Conscripts Roberto Leyes, Eleodoro Monzon and Sergio Robledo) were killed covering the last withdrawal. Two Royal Marine Commandos were shot in the action and two were wounded when they stepped on mines. Eventually, Panhard armoured cars from the 10th. Armored Recce. Sqn., Argentine Army (under Major David Carullo) came forward to fire on the advancing Royal Marines.

As they entered Port Stanley BIM 5 marched in parade order, carrying their individual weapons. The Marine companies felt far from defeated. They gave the British their toughest fight of the Stanley sector, with Brigadier Tony Wilson's 5th Infantry Brigade losing 9 dead and 60 wounded on Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, Sapper Hill and Cortley Ridge. Surrounded by three full-strength and crack British battalions BIM 5 kept its head. It stood and fought, as good battalions should, when retreat and rumours about the SAS were rampant in the 7th Regiment. The 5th Marine Battalion had 16 dead and 64 wounded. Thirty-four Argentinian Marines were killed and one-hundred-and-five wounded in the Falklands War.

Marine Commander Robacio, commanding the Marine battalion, spoke to British journalists after the war and said, "At about seven o'clock I received the order to withdraw prior to a surrender. Our military code states that for an Argentine military unit to surrender it must have spent all its ammunition or lost at least two-thirds of its men. It was awful to have to ask the units which were still fighting to withdraw." (Michael Bilton & Peter Kosminsky, Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, p. 213, Andre Deutsch, 1989)