Basic belief
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In foundationalism, basic beliefs (also commonly called foundational beliefs) are the axioms of a belief system.
Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be believed. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories:
- Beliefs which are properly basic, in that they do not depend for their justification on other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief ("non-doxastic justification");
- Beliefs which are derivative of one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity;
Within this basic framework of foundationalism, there are a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as properly basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs.
- In classical foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either self-evident axiom, or evident to the senses (empiricism). However Anthony Kenny and others have argued that this is a Self-refuting idea[1]
- In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or incorrigible[citation needed]. One such axiom is Rene Descartes's axiom, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. uncorrectable) beliefs are those which one can believe without possibly being wrong[citation needed]. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic, because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion;
- In fallible foundationalism, the division between inferential and non-inferential belief is retained,
but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility.
- In reformed epistemology, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible worldview. This rather broad criterion can include faith in our senses, faith in our memory, and belief in God.
[edit] Notes and References
- ^ Anthony Kenny What is Faith? Oxford: OUP 1992 ISBN 0192830678 pp9-10. This particular chapter is based on a 1982 lecture which may explain the shift in the meaning of the term "foundationalism" since then
