Talk:Baghdad Railway
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Contents |
[edit] Comments
[edit] Split
Maybe this article should be split. To me it looks like a mix of articles about the Baghdad Railway and about German Colonies. -- 213.6.72.177 20:10, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
- Yah but the Bagdad Railway was always largely a dream, more percieved as a threat to split the British Empire in two. And for that reason it is significant. Nobs01 20:17, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Moved here from Talk:Causes of World War I cause it may have some relevent material to be expanded upon:
- The Berlin-Bagdad railway project was one of several large railway enterprises being considered in the Gilded Age. In America, it was the cross continent linking the Atlantic to the Pacific at Promontory, Utah; in Russia it was the Trans-Siberian Railroad; in Africa it was Cecil Rhodes' Cairo to Capetown Railway; the French Empire envisioned an attempt to "ring the Meditterranean" by rail (I think the Orient Express out of Paris was the first leg of it, and it envisioned linking Morroco to Cairo etc); and the Germans envisioned the Orient Express being extended into the Berlin-Bagdad Railway, which both the British Empire & French Empire feared threatened British & French interests East of Suez. It was at a minimum considered "colonial competition", and would cross what later became the Sykes-Picot line [1] defining British-French interests.(It should be noted, the Berlin-Bagdad Railway was not the only great envisioned railway building scheme that failed).
- Nobs01 5 July 2005 20:04 (UTC)
[edit] Pamphlet language
"The German imperialists who had invented the grandiose scheme failed to be enriched by it." - huh? Wording could be a bit more neutral?
New International Encyclopedia asserts that about 30 percent of the investors were French, and that a Swiss bank was deeply involved in the project. Germans were the pre-eminent railroad builders at that time, so they "stuck out like a sore thumb," as people say. Involvement in the creation of the railroad was not limited to Germans and Turks. ♣TooPotato 18:10, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Armenian labour in the construction during the war
Since the uses of Armenian labours during the process of construction is significant, I think this should be inclded in the article. Fad (ix) 21:04, 4 February 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Words printed in New International Encyclopedia in 1926
Bagdad Railway. The Asiatic link, a line 2500 miles long of the Great "Berlin to Bagdad" Railway, which was intended to further German penetration into the Near East. It was one of the most important "stakes of diplomacy" and as such may be regarded as one of the factors that contributed to bring about the War of 1914; indeed, the frustration of the German "Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad" plan was publicly declared by Allied and American leaders during the War to be a vital issue of the world conflict. Before the inception of the Bagdad Railway scheme, Central Europe had been connected with Constantinople by the Oriental Railway; and in the very year (1888) in which the first through train ran across the Balkans to the Ottoman Capital, a German syndicate headed by the Deutsche Bank obtained a concession to extend the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway as far as Angora, in the interior of Anatolia. As soon as this line was opened (in 1893), the same syndicate, operating through the Anatolian Railway Company, obtained permission to build a branch to Konia (completed 1896). Now a wider vista of economic-political penetration was unfolded to the ambitious German engineers and financiers; they now proposed to push the railway from Konia across the frowning Taurus mountains, through Cilicia and northern Syria, across the desert to Mosul on the Tigris; thence to Bagdad, and on to the Persian Gulf. Negotiation for this project, begun in the nineties, culminated in 1903 in the formal grant of the Bagdad Railway Concession by the Ottoman government to an Ottoman corporation, the Bagdad Railway Company controlled by German banks. Russia immediately objected; England and France, declining an offer of shares in the enterprise, raised obstacles in the way of the German advance. Nevertheless, the work of construction was begun, and section after section was completed; yet, because of diplomatic as well as engineering difficulties, the line was unfinished when the War began. Great gaps were still unbridged in northern Mesopotamia and in the Amanus mountains. Turkey's entry into the War was largely due to the politico-economic grip which the railway project had given Germany on the Ottoman Empire. During the conflict, Turks and Germans labored in frantic haste to complete the line, for military purposes. The celebrated Bagtché tunnel was pierced in 1915, a narrow-guage track was laid to Aleppo, and by the Armistice all but 325 miles between Nisibin and Bagdad, and the sector below Bagdad, remained unfinished. But not for Germany were the fruits of the enterprise reserved. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) cancelled all former German rights in the Bagdad Railway; The Treaty of Sèvres and the accompanying secret Anglo-French-Italian agreement (1920) provided that Turkey should appropriate the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, and transfer them to a Franco-British-Italian corporation. France, stealing a march on Britain by the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Angora (1921), obtained for a French syndicate (the Cilician-Syrian Railway Company) the concession for the middle section between Bozanti and Nisibin (i.e., between Cilicia and the Tigris) in 1922. The southeastern sections, from Samarra to Bagdad and thence to Basra, having been completed by the British army of occupation, were, of course, under British control. The northwestern or Anatolian section, from Haidar Pasha to the Cilician Gates, remained provisionally in Turkish hands, pending fulfillment of the Sèvres treaty or some other arrangement. It was a delicate problem, because the stockholders of the Bagdad Railway Company, which was to be expropriated, were by no means all Germans; about 30 per cent of the stock was owned by French investors, and a large block was held by the Swiss Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahmen, to which the Deutsche Bank had transferred its holdings. By purchasing a controlling interest in this Swiss bank, in May, 1923, British financiers hoped to obtain indirectly a dominating interest in the railway. A little later, a British financial group represented by Mr. Huguenin was reported to be negotiating with the Turkish government for a lease on the Anatolian railway. Such negotiations, of course, were pursued largely behind the scenes of public diplomacy, and could not be traced with certainty, nor had the ownership of the Anatolian-Bagdad system been definitely determined by 1924; but of one point there could be no doubt, that the magnificently ambitious German scheme, which had so profoundly stimulated the hopes of German imperialists and no less deeply stirred the enmity of Entente statesmen before the War, was no longer to be a German enterprise.
[edit] Verbatim
The passage above is an exact copy of the words in New International Encyclopedia, published in 1926. GhostofSuperslum 16:30, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
-
- One mile is 1.609 kilometers, ergo 2500 miles is 4022.5 km.
- Italy and Turkey fought a war in 1911. The nervousness generated by the Bagdad railroad may have played a part in fomenting that conflict, too. GhostofSuperslum 16:30, 31 October 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Problems
The article says historians agree that it was not a cause of World War I above the 1926 encyclopedia says It was one of the most important "stakes of diplomacy" and as such may be regarded as one of the factors that contributed to bring about the War of 1914; indeed, the frustration of the German "Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad" plan was publicly declared by Allied and American leaders during the War to be a vital issue of the world conflict - which is right, they can't both be, I would like a discussion here pointing to the WikiTruth of the matter sbandrews (t) 00:10, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
-
- the old encyclopedia was written before the documents were published in 1930s showing that the major parties had agreed on a settlement by June 1914. Rjensen 01:21, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
- Then if it was all settled, on the eve of war when tensions were high, why didn't they tell us that such an important issue had been settled? What was the settlement and was it fair? What weight does a settlement have when it is written on the eve of war, a war which was seen as inevitable from 1911 onwards by Churchill himself... regards sbandrews (t) 10:33, 20 March 2007 (UTC)
- tensions were not very high in June 1914 when settlement was reached (and it lowered the tensions that did exist). The RR was not really operational and did not in fact affect economic rivalry. Rjensen 00:11, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
- tensions were not high? I've read that before and frankly it sounds just as poor now as it did then - tensions were so *low* that the assassination of a minor royal triggered the biggest war in history - the RR? don't know that acronym - Tensions were certainly *lower* than they had been in the build up to the war, ever heard of the calm before the storm? sbandrews (t) 12:19, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
- calm before storm--yes, good point. No one saw the storm coming. and leaders thought they had just resolved the Railroad (RR) problem in June 1914. See quotes Rjensen 12:45, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
- would you care to expand on your theme "no one saw the storm coming" with reference to Churchill and his reaction to Agadir in 1911? sbandrews (t) 13:37, 23 March 2007 (UTC)
- Churchill was for peace in 1911 [Churchill was apparently sincere when he commented on the naval rivalry with Germany: `I deeply deplore the situation, for I have never had any but friendly feelings toward that great nation and her illustrious sovereign & I regard the antagonism which has developed as insensate. Anything in my power to terminate it I would gladly do'. And in fact the antagonism caused by the naval rivalry had subsided by the summer of 1914. q by Wilkinson, "Germany, Britain & the Coming of War in 1914" 2002] ; like most everyone else in London in 1914 was more worried about Ireland that WW1. Rjensen 12:23, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
- congratulations, you provided a quote from *before* the Agadir crisis, when, as well known, Churchill believed there would be peace. Agadir changed his mind. "..but from 1911 onward it is hard to find any military leader suggesting that war could or should any longer be avoided' Evans (1988) page 10. sbandrews (t) 12:35, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Ruth Henig quote
the following quote in the article: "Many economic and colonial issues which had been causing friction between French, German and British governments before 1914, such as the financing of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies, had been resolved by the summer of 1914." [5] isn't on page 39 of my copy of the Ruth Henig book, sbandrews (t) 17:26, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
-
- here's the whole page 39 from Questia.com:
closely the particular circumstances of 1914. For a start, there was no shortage of wars in precapitalist eras, and in the nineteenth century there were many wars throughout the world involving non-capitalist states. Neither Serbia nor Austria-Hungary could possibly be regarded as highly-developed capitalist states of the sort Lenin wrote about, and there is little evidence that highly organized financial monopolies and trading interests pressurized the Russian or French governments into pursuing the policies they actually followed in 1914. Furthermore, many economic and colonial issues which had been causing friction between French, German and British governments before 1914, such as the financing of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the future disposition of the Portuguese colonies, had been resolved by the summer of 1914. Because of a very narrow, largely economic definition of the word ‘imperialism’, socialist and Marxist accounts of the origins of the First World War have laid emphasis on colonial clashes and on economic rivalries which other historians have regarded as of secondary importance.
Certainly new ‘economic’ imperialism of the sort referred to by Lenin can be discerned in some of the policies pursued by the British, French and German companies and trading interests in Africa and the Far East from the 1880s onwards, and they did generate considerable economic and political tensions which their home governments often found difficult to resolve. But such colonial and trading disputes, while they may have contributed to a more inflamed international atmosphere, were largely resolved by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. Far more of a threat to international stability was posed by the older and more traditional imperial rivalries, involving struggles for power in areas regarded as strategically and militarily important. These rivalries provoked the most serious clashes: Austria-Hungary’s attempt to impose its will on Serbia, Russia’s hopes to spread its influence in the Near East, the dreams of the pan-German nationalists to secure German mastery of the Russian steppes. It was not the capitalist system as such which was giving rise to ambition, but traditional desires for prestige and influence and great power status. These may well have been sharpened directly or indirectly by economic competition and by the development of industry, but they were not caused primarily by these factors.
Some critics in the inter-war period blamed individual capitalists, and particularly armaments manufacturers, for the spiralling arms race in Europe before 1914 and for the consequent outbreak of war,
Book Title: The Origins of the First World War. Contributors: Ruth Henig - author. Publisher: Routledge. Place of Publication: London. Publication Year: 2002. Page Number: 39. Rjensen 18:38, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
- Ah, so it seems that the 1989 (Routledge) version and the 2002 version have different page numberings, the 1989 (Routledge) version (hardback, Luddite that I am) starts page 39 with "action against Serbia, was known to be sympathetic to Southern Slav ambitions," sbandrews (t) 18:49, 25 March 2007 (UTC)
- the problem with the above page from Henig is that it is 'cherry picked' from a chapter which talks about the political interpretations of history. First the text outlines the socialist perspective 'The contents of these confidential memoranda ... revealed the spoils of war and the imperialist booty that ... had been promised by the British' etc etc, 'indeed, they argued, inevitable connections between capitalism and war, and the important role imperialism had played in arousing tensions and driving nations to war in 1914'. The text then looks at 'non-Marxist' views, which you then quote. Any book which splits views into Marxist and non-Marxist and sees no further than that is to be questioned even *before* cherry picking! sbandrews (t) 12:21, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Historians agree!
Phrases like "historians agree" and "no one knew" are realy not good enough in an article like this. It is quite clear that there are two views on the effect this railway project had on the European instability that followed. Those two views represent to some degree the political bias of the historians - it is natural, we would all like to blame people who are not like us. Please respect *both* sides when making changes to the page and avoid meaningless POV phrases, regards sbandrews (t) 09:53, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
-
- well let's see some quotations from a historian of the last 60 years who says otherwise. I provided several quotes from historians who are pretty emphatic (and recent). Rjensen 13:43, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
- and I have already answered you in the thread above that you picked out the part of the text that supported your ideas, and left out the rest - historians do not agree, the very text you quote from goes on about how historians do not agree for pages - how have you missed this? Read what I have written above sbandrews (t) 16:42, 26 March 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Merge discussion
[edit] unsourced text from Constantinopel-Baghdad Railway page
(sbandrews (t) 14:42, 29 March 2007 (UTC))This text from the merge is rather controversial and unsourced so I'm leaving it here rather than put in the article or simply delete it:
Another aspect was to put pressure on the British and their growing influence in the oil-laden Persian gulf area. It could also serve as a possible spring board to get Germany into Persia and India. Thus after 1908, work progressed on the railine through Anatolia. Bridges, mountain ranges and deserts hindered swift progress. By the outbreak of the First World War the line was mostly finished, with a few hundred kilometers needed to be built in the Mountains of southern Turkey. Allied prisoners of War captured at the debacle at Kut, were soon slaving and dying on the railway, as Turkey needed to quickly finish the railway to move supplies, now that T.E. Lawrence had disrupted the Hejaz railway.
In the end, the railway never fulfilled the goal of a direct link from Potsdam to Persia. Rather, due to debts owing, it promulgated the Great War and dragged Turkey in on the side of the to-be-defeated German power. Parts in Turkey were finished by the Americans with the Chester concession in the 1920s.