Axe Murder Incident

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The tree that was the object of the 1976 Axe Murder Incident (Photo 1984). Deliberately left standing after Operation Paul Bunyan, the stump was later replaced by a monument in 1987.
The tree that was the object of the 1976 Axe Murder Incident (Photo 1984). Deliberately left standing after Operation Paul Bunyan, the stump was later replaced by a monument in 1987.

The Axe Murder Incident (Korean: 판문점 도끼 살인 사건) was the killing of two United States Army officers by North Korean soldiers on August 18, 1976 in the Joint Security Area (JSA) located in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which forms the de facto border between North and South Korea. The killings and the response (Operation Paul Bunyan) heightened tensions between North Korea and the United States of America / South Korea.

The incident is also known as the Hatchet Incident and the Poplar Tree Incident.

Contents

[edit] Background

OP#5, where the pictures of the Axe Murder were taken from.
OP#5, where the pictures of the Axe Murder were taken from.
View from KPA#7 (near CP#2) towards CP#3.
View from KPA#7 (near CP#2) towards CP#3.
The Joint Security Area layout in 1976.
The Joint Security Area layout in 1976.

In the JSA, near the Bridge of No Return, a 100 ft (30 m) poplar tree blocked the line of sight between two United Nations Command (UNC) checkpoints (CP #3, Observation Post (OP)#5).

The northernmost UNC checkpoint, CP#3, situated next to the Bridge of No Return was only visible from one other UNC site, OP#5 during the summer months. During the winter months, another UNC checkpoint (CP#2) could only see the top of CP#3. Running across the middle of the bridge was the Military Demarcation Line between North Korean and South Korean territories. The Korean People's Army (KPA) had made numerous attempts to grab the UNC personnel from CP#3 and drag them across the bridge into North Korean territory. Because of this proximity to North Korean territory, being surrounded on all access routes by North Korean checkpoints, and repeated attempts to kidnap the UNC personnel working there, CP#3 was often referred to as “The Loneliest Outpost in the World”.

[edit] Axe Murder Incident

[edit] Initial trimming

On August 18, 1976, a group of five Korean Service Corps (KSC) personnel escorted by a UNC security team consisting of the Joint Security Force (JSF) Company Commander (Captain Arthur Bonifas), his South Korean ROK Army counterpart, Captain Kim, the platoon leader of the current platoon in the area (1st Lt. Mark Barrett), and 11 enlisted personnel, both American and South Korean, went into the JSA to trim the tree, as previously scheduled. The two Captains did not wear sidearms, as members of the Joint Security Area were limited to only five armed officers and 30 armed enlisted personnel at a time. However there were mattocks in the back of the 2½ ton truck. The KSC workers had the axes they brought to prune the tree branches. The tree had been scheduled to be trimmed 7 days earlier, but rain had forced the work to be rescheduled.

After trimming began, 15 to 16 KPA soldiers appeared commanded by Senior Lt. Pak Chul, whom the UNC soldiers had nicknamed ‘Lt. Bulldog’ for his history of confrontations.[1] Pak and his subordinates appeared to observe the trimming without concern for approximately 15 minutes, until Pak abruptly told the UNC to cease their activity. Capt. Bonifas, ordered the detail to continue their work, and turned his back to ‘Lt. Bulldog’.

According to some sources, Senior Lt. Pak had at some point stated that the tree had been planted by Kim Il Sung himself. While this cannot be documented, being a verbal communication, it seems plausible in that Kim Il Sung was often portrayed by the North Korean Communist Party propagandists as being responsible for almost everything in North Korea.[2][3]

[edit] The attack

After being ignored by Capt. Bonifas, Pak Chul sent a runner across the Bridge of No Return. Within minutes a North Korean guard truck crossed the bridge and approximately 20 more North Korean guards disembarked carrying crowbars and clubs. Pak Chul again demanded that the tree trimming stop, and when Capt. Bonifas turned his back to him, Pak Chul removed his watch, carefully wrapped it in a handkerchief, placed in it his pocket, and then shouted “Kill Them!” as he swung a karate chop to the back of Capt. Bonifas' neck, killing him instantly. Using the axes dropped by the tree-trimmers, the KPA killed the two U.S. soldiers, Capt. Bonifas and Lt. Barrett, and wounded all of the UNC guards except one.[4][1]

While Capt. Bonifas had died instantly, Lt. Barrett had jumped a low wall (presumably to go help another UNC guard who had been chased there by KPA guards) which led into a 15 ft. (4½ m), tree filled depression. From the road level, there was no visibility into the depression, only the tree tops were visible. The entire fight had lasted only about 20 – 30 seconds before the UNC Force had managed to disperse the KPA guards enough to get loaded into their truck with Capt. Bonifas' body. However, there was no sign of Lt. Barrett and the two UNC guards at OP#5 could not spot him.

They did however observe the KPA guards grab (by the heels) approximately 5 members of their own force and drag them back across the bridge. They also observed the KPA guards at KPA#8 (along the UNC emergency egress road) exhibiting strange behaviour, in that one guard would take an axe and go down into the depression area for a couple of minutes, and then come back up and hand the axe to another guard who then repeat the process. This went on for approximately 90 minutes until the UNC guards at OP#5 were informed that Lt. Barrett was missing, at which time they informed their superiors about the KPA activity in the depression. A search and rescue squad was quickly dispatched to the area, where they found the remains of Lt. Barrett.

A helicopter on a training mission was quickly dispatched to the location (its crew issued yellow armbands and .45 automatics) and used for a medevac, but neither American survived.

A Corporal witnessed the attack from OP#5 and recorded the murders with a movie camera.

[edit] Reaction

Shortly after the incident, North Korean media began airing reports of the fight. The DPRK version stated:

“Around 10:45 a.m. today, the American imperialist aggressors sent in 14 hoodlums with axes into the Joint Security Area to cut the trees on their own accord, although such a work should be mutually consented beforehand. Four persons from our side went to the spot to warn them not to continue the work without our consent. Against our persuasion, they attacked our guards en masse and committed a serious provocative act of beating our men, wielding murderous weapons and depending on the fact that they outnumbered us. Our guards could not but resort to self-defense measures under the circumstances of this reckless provocation.”

Within four hours of the attack, Kim Jong-Il (son of North Korean Leader Kim Il-Sung), addressed the Conference on Non-Aligned Nations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where he presented a prepared document describing the incident as an unprovoked attack on North Korean guards, led by American officers. He then introduced a resolution asking the conference to condemn that day's grave U.S. provocation and called on participants to endorse both the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Command, which was seconded by Cuba. With such a short time since the incident, and with details still sketchy, members of the conference passed the resolution.[5]

[edit] Image gallery

[edit] Operation Paul Bunyan

In response to the Axe Murder Incident, the UN Command determined that instead of trimming the branches that obscured visibility, they would instead cut down the tree using an overwhelming force. The operation was conceived as a US/South Korean show of force, but was also carefully managed to prevent further escalation. The operation was planned over two days by General Richard Stilwell and his staff at the UNC headquarters in Seoul.

[edit] Forces

Operation Paul Bunyan was carried out on August 21 at 7 AM, just three days after the killings. A convoy of 23 American and South Korean vehicles (‘Task Force Vierra’, named for Lieutenant Colonel Victor S. Vierra, commander of the United States Army Support Group) drove into the JSA without any warning to the North Koreans, who only had one observation post manned at the early hour. In the vehicles were two eight-man engineer teams (from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division) equipped with chain saws to cut down the tree. The engineer teams were accompanied by two 30-man security platoons from the Joint Security Force armed with pistols and axe handles. The 2nd Platoon would secure the northern entrance to the JSA by the “Bridge of No Return”, while the 3rd Platoon would secure the southern edge of the area.

In addition, a 64 man ROK special forces company accompanied them, armed with clubs and trained in Tae Kwon Do, supposedly without firearms. However, once they parked their trucks near the Bridge of No Return, they started throwing out the sandbags that lined the truck bottoms, and handing out M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers that had been concealed below. Several of the special forces men also had Claymore mines strapped to their chests with the firing mechanism in their hands, and were shouting at the North Koreans to cross the bridge.[6] [7]

A U.S. infantry company in 20 utility helicopters and 7 Cobra attack helicopters circled behind them. Behind these helicopters B-52 bombers, escorted by U.S. F-4 fighters and ROK F-5 fighters were visible flying across the sky at high altitude. At Osan Air Base, F-111 fighters had been armed and fueled, ready to take off at short notice. The Midway aircraft carrier task force had also been moved to be stationed just off-shore. In addition, near the edges of the DMZ, many more heavily armed U.S. and ROK infantry, artillery, and armor were waiting to back up the special operations team. The bases near the DMZ were prepared for demolition in the case of a military response.

Altogether, Task Force Vierra consisted of 813 men, almost all of the men of the United States Army Support Group, of which the Joint Security Force was a part, a ROK reconnaissance company, a ROK Special Forces company which had infiltrated the river area by the bridge the night before, and members of a reinforced composite rifle company from the 9th Infantry Regiment. In addition to this force, every UNC force in the rest of South Korea was on full battle alert with all weapons loaded, ready to fire if needed.

[edit] Actual operation

Engineers begin the tree cutting.
Engineers begin the tree cutting.

The engineers in the convoy disembarked from their vehicles once the convoy arrived, and immediately started cutting down the tree while standing on the roof of their truck, while the 2nd Platoon truck was positioned to block the Bridge of No Return. The remainder of the task force dispersed to their assigned areas of responsibility around the tree and assumed their roles to guard the engineers.

North Korea quickly responded with about 150-200 troops, who arrived mostly in buses, armed with machine guns and assault rifles, where they sat watching the events unfold. Upon seeing the expected arrival of North Korean forces, LTC Vierra relayed a radio communication, whereupon the helicopters and Air Force jets became visible over the horizon. The North Koreans quickly disembarked their buses and began setting up two-man (machine gun) positions, where they watched in silence as the tree was felled in 42 minutes, and a violent confrontation was avoided. Also removed were two road barriers illegally installed by the North Koreans, while the South Korean troops also overzealously vandalized two North Korean guard posts. The stump of the tree (which was still almost 20 feet, or 6 metres tall) was left as a deliberate reminder.

[edit] Aftermath

Although the operation was carried out peacefully, there was concern that it could spark a wider conflict. The incident led to increased tensions along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, but did not develop into full-scale war. Some shots were fired at the US helicopter carrying Major General Morris Brady circling Panmunjon later that day, but nobody was injured. The fire stopped abruptly when six Cobras banked line abreast and swung into firing position, their laser sights illuminating the North Korean gun position.

The United Nations Command had demanded that the North Koreans “punish those involved and make adequate reparations to the families of those killed and injured”. Later on the day of Operation Paul Bunyan, they received a message from Kim Il-sung expressing regret at the incident without accepting responsibility. While not going far enough to satisfy a previously discussed ‘acceptable’ Northern response, the US administration decided to emphasize this as a step in the right direction, clearly not intent on further escalation.

The Joint Security Area's Advance Camp (Camp Kitty Hawk) was later renamed Camp Bonifas in honor of the slain Company Commander.[8] The site of the tree, whose stump was cut down in 1987, became the location of a stone monument with a brass plate inscribed in the memory of both men. The UN command has held commemorative ceremonies at the monument on anniversaries. [9] [10]

The close-by UNC checkpoint (CP#3, situated next to the Bridge of No Return) was no longer used after the mid 1980s when cement filled posts were placed in the road to make vehicle passage impossible.

[edit] Image gallery

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b Operation Paul Bunyan (from Imjinscout.com, based on a story in the Korea Times, Friday 17 August, 2001)
  2. ^ The Real Picture of Human Rights in North Korea: Personality Cult Worship of the Leader - International Human Rights League of Korea
  3. ^ North Korea: ten years later - Association For Asia Research, Wednesday 07 July 2004
  4. ^ The "Axe Murder Incident" and Operation Paul Bunyan (from a Veterans of Foreign Wars organization website)
  5. ^ Hazardous Duty - Singlaub, John K., Major General, chapter 12 (partial reprint with author's permission)
  6. ^ Memories of the JSA from SP4 Bill Ferguson (from an eyewitness account (Bill Ferguson) of Operation Paul Bunyan)
  7. ^ Excerpt from Diary of SP4 Mike Bilbo (from another eyewitness account (Mike Bilbo) of Operation Paul Bunyan)
  8. ^ Camp Bonifas (database entry from globalsecurity.org)
  9. ^ Military marks date of DMZ incident in which two Army officers were slain - from Stars & Stripes, Pacific edition, Saturday, 18 August, 2001
  10. ^ Memorial roll call for soldiers killed in infamous DMZ incident - from Stars & Stripes, Pacific edition, Sunday, 20 August, 2006

[edit] External links

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