Austro-Prussian War
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| Austro-Prussian War (Seven Weeks' War) | |||||||||
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| Part of the wars of German unification | |||||||||
 Battle of Königgrätz, by Georg Bleibtreu. Oil on canvas, 1869. |
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| Combatants | |||||||||
| Austria, Saxony, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Hanover and some minor German States (formerly as the German Confederation) | Prussia, Italy, and some minor German States | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 600,000 Austrians and German allies | 500,000 Prussians and German allies 300,000 Italians |
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| Casualties | |||||||||
| 20,000 dead or wounded | 37,000 dead or wounded (German and Italian) | ||||||||
| Austro-Prussian War and Third Italian Independence War |
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| Nachod – Custoza – Trutnov – Langensalza – Mnichovo Hradiště – Jičín – Königgrätz – Valtellina – Vezza d'Oglio – Lissa – Bezzecca |
The Austro-Prussian War (also called the Seven Weeks War, the Unification War[1], or the German Civil War) was a war fought in 1866 between the Austrian Empire and its German allies and the Kingdom of Prussia with its German allies and Italy, that resulted in Prussian dominance over the German states. In Germany and Austria it is called the Deutscher Krieg (German war) or Bruderkrieg (war of brothers). In the Italian unification process, this is called the Third Independence War.
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[edit] Causes
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For centuries, the Holy Roman Emperors who mostly came from the Habsburg family had nominally ruled all of 'Germany' - the so-called Holy Roman Empire. In fact, however the territory of Central Europe was split into hundreds of tiny states, each jealously maintaining its sovereignty and de facto independence with the assistance of outside powers, particularly France. Austria was traditionally considered the leader of the many German states, but Prussia was becoming increasingly powerful and by the nineteenth century was ranked as one of the great powers of Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars had ended in 1815 the German states were reorganized in a loose confederation: the German Confederation, under Austrian leadership.
In the meantime, partly in reaction to the triumphant French nationalism of Napoleon, and partly as an organic feeling of commonality glorified during the romantic era, German nationalism became a terrifically potent force during this period. The ultimate aim of most German nationalists was the union of all Germans into one state. Two different ideas of national unification eventually came to the fore. One was a Grossdeutschland that would include all German-speaking lands, including the multi-national empire of Austria; the other (preferred by Prussia) was a Kleindeutschland that would exclude Austria and be dominated by Prussia.
There are many different interpretations of Otto von Bismarck’s actions in the lead up to the Austrian – Prussian war which mainly concentrated on whether the ‘iron chancellor’ had a master plan that resulted in the Austrian – Prussian war and after the North German confederation and eventually the unification of Germany.
Bismarck maintained that he orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the Franco-Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany. However many historians such as A.J.P Taylor, dispute the interpretation and believe that Bismarck didn’t have a master plan, but was just an opportunist who took advantage of the favourable situations that presented themselves. A.J.P Taylor thinks that Bismarck didn’t have a master plan but he just manipulated events into the most beneficial solution possible for Prussia, although he did confuse his own aims with those of his country. We can see that this point may be true when Bismarck set up the Austrian alliance, which can be seen as his ‘masterstroke’ and his highlight. A.J.P Taylor also believes that it “was a test for Austria rather than a trap ” and that it wasn’t set up to provoke a war with Austria which Bismarck later said in his memoirs was the main reason for setting up the alliance. It was in Prussia’s best interests to gain an alliance with Austria so then the combined force of them both could easily defeat Denmark and therefore sort out (gain) the issue of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. It can also be seen that the alliance was also set up to for one reason not again to provoke Austria into a war but rather to aid the Prussian expansion. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian expansionist, rather than a unifier of Germany. It is later at the convention of Gastein that it can be seen that it was set up to lure Austria into a war.
Feutchwanger believes that the Gastein Convention was a “provisional solution rather than a definitive one ”. It can therefore be seen that it wasn’t set up to lure Austria into a war if both the German powers knew it was only a temporary solution. Carr believes that the people who believed that he was “lasting for a settlement with Austria as a bulwark against the revolution can be dismissed out of hand ” so therefore believes that the Gastein Convention was set up to mainly sort out the issue over the two duchies but also to provoke Austria into a war if needed. Bismarck at this stage didn’t want a war but he could see that an Austrian – Prussian war may be necessary and in order to make this happen he would need something to go to war over this was it. It was perfect because he could draw Austria into a war and make it seem that Austria was the aggressor, which is therefore more favourable because it would mean European powers wouldn’t join in on the side of Austria.
The meeting at Biarritz is significant when discussing the issue of whether Bismarck was solely responsible for the outbreak of the Austrian – Prussian war. Many believe that an agreement was forged there between Bismarck and Napoleon III. Feutchwanger believes that Bismarck would offer Venetia to France in the result of a Prussian victory, which is what he offered to Italy if they were involved in the war. He also believes that “Bismarck pointed out that the benevolent neutrality of France was essential ”. A.J.P Taylor believes that an agreement for French neutrality was made here and it was now that Bismarck realised that a war with Austria without the aid of France wouldn't be well received but French involvement wasn’t absolutely necessary. Bismarck also knew that he had to make an alliance with France because “of all the risks which a war between Austria and Prussia would entail, the possibility of French intervention remained one of the greatest ”, indicating that Bismarck is thinking about a future war with Austria. It also indicates that he was preparing for it but it doesn’t prove that he is the sole cause for the war and more to the point it doesn’t prove that he actually wants it.
Feutchwanger also believes that that Bismarck’s decision to go to war did not occur until later, a lot later than what he said in his memoirs. He believes that Bismarck made the decision to go to war in the spring of 1866, which is around the time, when the Italian alliance was set up. This alliance only lasted three months so if an Austrian – Prussian war came within that time then Italy would declare war on Austrian forcing Austria to fight a war on two fronts. If that three month time period passed without an Austrian war then Prussia would not get the Italian aid in a war which Prussia would happily receive if it was offered. This would force Prussian to fight the war alone or renew the alliance. In addition Feutchwanger believes that the alliance was established for defensive purposes in case of a war. So he believes that Bismarck set it up to frighten the Austrians out of the idea of going to war with Prussia, which contradicts what Bismarck, said in his memoirs. Carr on the other hand believes something completely different to Feutchwanger and actually goes along with what Bismarck said what it was set up for to an extent. Carr believes that it was set up to frighten Austria into surrendering Venetia to the Italians which was unlikely and was probable that it would result in war. So therefore Carr’s opinions completely contradicts that of Feutchwanger's and believes that it was set up merely to provoke Austria into a war rather than to make them back down. A.J.P Taylor on the other hand also believes that the Italian alliance was used to make Austria give up Venetia and provoke Austria into either Bismarck getting exactly what he wants (more land for Prussia and for Venetia to go to the Italians) or on the other hand what nobody wants, war. It can also be seen that Bismarck therefore provoked Austria into war and consequently caused the Austrian – Prussian war.
Further proof to suggest that Bismarck didn’t plan for the war with Austria is the fact that he believed war was a “clumsy way of settling international disputes ” .As a civilian, Bismarck was wary of the consequences of war and saw this option as a last resort. He preferred the ‘wait and see’ strategy and hope to find a diplomatic and peaceful solution to disputes where possible. Therefore this is a general belief between most historians that Bismarck didn’t want or like war and while he wanted Prussian expansionism to enhance their position, he wasn’t committed to fighting a war to make this possible unlike some others. A.J.P Taylor believes that Bismarck wanted peace and where possible tried to use diplomatic measures. We can see he is good at this because of his foreign policy from 1871-90 he managed to keep Prussia out of a war which would have been difficult following the Franco Prussian war which would see France wanting revenge for such a crushing defeat. Not only did Bismarck not want war but many people had doubts in the army but Bismarck had confident in it but a lot of powerful people in the country had doubts in it. As Feutchwanger says “there was still a widespread belief, shared on the Berlin stock exchange, that Austria was militarily stronger than Prussia ”. This will obviously make Bismarck move very cautiously in his diplomatic manoeuvres as ha doesn’t want to aggravate anymore people than he has too and wants to stay in power as long as possible (Realpolitik). So therefore that is another reason that suggests that Bismarck didn’t plan the Austrian war due to the fact that very simply he didn’t want it and that a lot of powerful people in Prussia also were sceptical on the idea of a war with Austria.
If there was to be an Austrian – Prussian war the time was perfect because everyone was either tied up in an alliance to forbid them from entering or had matters of their own to attend with. Britain had no interests with the Austrian – Prussian war because it didn’t concern them at all and didn’t involve them in any way. Russia was very unlikely to enter on the side of Austria because it still feels bitterly towards Austria because she let Russia down in the Crimean war and also Prussia stood by Russia over the polish revolts where as Austria didn’t. France was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria because Bismarck and Napoleon the 3rd met in Biarritz and allegedly discussed the event of an Austrian – Prussian war and whether or not France would intervene. Nobody knows what was discussed at this meeting because nothing was written down but many think Bismarck achieved in getting French neutrality in the event of a war. Italy was in an alliance with Prussia which meant that this would be a perfect time for Prussia to go to war because it had an alliance with Italy and Austria was alone and had no alliances with anyone. Bismarck knew this but still “he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he gave a favourable account of the international situation ”.
[edit] Military factors
Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages which the Prussian army enjoyed over that of the Austrian Empire. To oppose this view, A.J.P Taylor believes that Bismarck was reluctant to go to was war as it "deprived him of control and left the decisions to the generals whose ability he distrusted". The two most important personalities within the Prussian army were War Minister Albrecht Graf von Roon and Chief of the General Staff Helmuth Graf von Moltke.
[edit] Rival military systems
In 1862, von Roon had implemented several army reforms (and to do so had been instrumental in ensuring that Bismarck was appointed Chancellor). Roon ensured that all Prussian citizens were liable to conscription. Before this date, the size of the army had been fixed by earlier laws which had not taken population growth into account, making conscription inequable and unpopular for this reason. While some Prussian men remained in the army or the reserves until they were forty years old, about one in three (or even more in some regions where the population had expanded greatly as a result of industrialisation) escaped with only token service in the Landwehr, a loosely organised "Home Guard".
Universal conscription, combined with an increase in the term of active service from two years to three years, dramatically increased the size of the army. It also provided Prussia with a reserve army equal in size to that which Moltke actually deployed against Austria. Had France under Napoleon III attempted to intervene in force on Austria's side, the Prussians could have faced him with equal or superior numbers of troops.
The three-year term of active service, during which troops were continually trained and drilled, also ensured a better standard of training and discipline than that of the Austrian army, particularly in the infantry. Some Austrian commanders still dismissed infantry conscripts to their homes on permanent leave soon after their induction into the army, retaining a cadre of long-term soldiers for formal parades and routine duties. The conscripts sent on leave had to be trained almost from scratch when they were recalled to their units on the outbreak of war. The Austrian cavalry and artillery however were as well-trained as their Prussian counterparts. Austria possessed two incomparable divisions of heavy cavalry, but weapons and tactics had advanced since the Napoleonic Wars and heavy cavalry were no longer a decisive arm on the battlefield.
[edit] Speed of mobilisation
An important difference in the Prussian and Austrian military systems was that the Prussian army was locally based, organised as "Kreise" (lit. circles), each containing a Korps headquarters and its component units. The vast majority of reservists lived within a single day's journey from their regimental depots, and mobilisation to full strength would take very little time. By contrast, the Austrians deliberately ensured that units were stationed far from the areas from which their soldiers were recruited, to prevent army units taking part in separatist revolts. Conscripts on leave or reservists recalled to their units as a result of mobilisation faced a journey which might take weeks before they could report for duty. The Prussian army was therefore able to mobilise far more quickly than the Austrian army.
[edit] Speed of concentration
The railway system of Prussia was more extensively developed than that within Austria. Railways made it possible to supply larger numbers of troops than had previously been possible, and also allowed the rapid movement of troops within friendly territory. The better Prussian rail network therefore allowed the Prussian army to concentrate more rapidly than the Austrians. Von Moltke, reviewing his plans to von Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men". Von Moltke had also said earlier, "Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the war that we must have".
The Austrian army under Benedek in Bohemia (the present-day Czech Republic) might previously have been expected to enjoy the advantage of the "central position", being able to concentrate on successive attacking armies strung out along the frontier. The Prussian ability to concentrate faster nullified this advantage. By the time the Austrians were fully assembled, they would be unable to concentrate against any one Prussian army without having the other two instantly attack their flank and rear, threatening their lines of communication.
[edit] Command and control
Von Moltke headed the General Staff, a full-time body responsible for continually drawing up and reviewing war plans. General Staff officers, who had undergone rigorous selection and training, were also responsible for directing operations at all major headquarters. The Austrian empire had no such corps of professionals, and its staff officers were either light-hearted amateurs or unimaginative officials. The Austrians failed to take advantage of its permanent Army organisations in Bohemia and Italy to prepare plans in advance or to exercise their commanders and staffs. While Moltke could direct operations by short directives to three Army commanders, Benedek's overworked staff had to produce written orders for thirteen different formations, for Corps and Army troops and for the supply columns of the entire army.[1]
[edit] Armaments and tactics
Finally, the Prussian infantry were equipped with the Dreyse needle gun, a breech-loading rifle capable of far more rapid fire than the muzzle-loading rifles with which the Austrians were equipped. While the Prussian tactics had actually changed little since the Napoleonic Wars, and perhaps did not fully take account of this weapon's capabilities, the Austrians' tactics were to prove disastrous. In the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, French troops had taken advantage of the fact that the rifles of the time fired high if sighted for long range. By rapidly closing the range, French troops could come to close quarters without sustaining too many casualties from the comparatively ill-trained Austrian infantry. In the aftermath of this war, the Austrians had adopted the same methods, which they termed the "Stosstaktik". Although they had some warnings of the German weapon, they ignored these and retained the crude "Stosstaktik" as their main method.
In one respect, the Austrian army had superior equipment in that their artillery consisted of breech-loading rifled guns, while the Prussian army retained many muzzle-loading smoothbore cannon. New Krupp breech-loading guns were only slowly being introduced. In the event, the other shortcomings of the Austrian army were to prevent their artillery from being decisive.
[edit] Economic factors
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In 1866 the Prussian economy was a lot better than the Austrian and if the war would turn into an economic war Prussia would certainly win. Prussia’s booming economy some people believe was a direct result of the Zollverein. It was able to produce more weapons than Austria if needed and had no problem supplying the Prussian armies with the best rifles and (later) with new Krupp breach loading artillery. Many of historians believe that the economic success of Prussia alone had an indirect impact on the outbreak Austrian-Prussian. A.Stiles and J.Bruilly both believe that the economy had an impact on the outbreak of war. Carr also Believes “the conflict between Austria and Prussia for mastery in Germany had an important economic dimension ” so therefore this suggests that conflict between Austria and Prussia on the battlefield had a lot to do with the economic battle that they had been fighting for many years. The Prussian economy also had plenty of money to pay for it as well due to the economy. Bismarck knew that the Prussian economy was a lot better than the Austrian so therefore he knew that this was another reason to go to war at this stage along with the army and international situation so therefore this is another reason which may lure people in to thinking Bismarck was the sole cause for the outbreak for the war and this is why he did allegedly planned the war for this time.
[edit] Political and dynastic factors
Although it may seem that only the Prussian people wanted a war with Austria but this is not the case. Austria had their own war party that wanted nothing more than to defeat the Prussians in war. So maybe when the option came to declare war on Prussia the Austrians barely gave it a second thought and declared war that instant and this information suddenly contradicts what the iron chancellor says in his memoirs which he says that he provoked Austria into the war which this contradicts with and suddenly the Austrian war doesn’t seem to be solely the creation of Bismarck seen as the Austrians had a hand in it too. On the other hand Feutchwanger says, “Vienna’s cabinet beset as it was with difficulties, could not allow itself to break with Prussia ” .In addition to this Carr says that Prussia “nor the Austrian’s any desire for war ”. This clearly indicates that there is a widespread debate to whether or not Austria wanted to go to war with Prussia. If it was true that Austria did want to go to war with Austria then it would seem that there is another reason which contradicts the opinion that Bismarck was the sole cause of the Austrian war of 1866.
The most important cause for war apart from Bismarck was the Kaiser. As Feutchwanger says the “king had decided on war however reluctantly; and the people of Prussia had to obey his orders ” and it is a well shared belief that the only person that Bismarck was scared of in Prussia was the king because he was the only man who could remove him from power. He obviously had to keep the king onside in order to stay in power (realpolitik) and also “Bismarck is a master of cabinet diplomacy ” So therefore had to go to war with Austria. A.J.P Taylor agrees with Feutchwanger on this issue as seen in the words “William 1st, not German nationalists made the war of 1866 possible ”. So therefore that is another reason to suggest that it wasn’t Bismarck who was the sole cause for the war 1866 as the king made the final decision and made the war possible.
[edit] Alliances
Most of the German states sided with Austria against Prussia, even though Austria was perceived as the aggressor. Those that sided with Austria included the Kingdoms of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hanover. Southern states such as, Baden, Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau also joined with Austria.
Some of the northern German states joined Prussia, in particular Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Brunswick. The Kingdom of Italy participated in the war with Prussia, because Austria still held the territory of Venetia that the Kingdom of Italy wanted in order to further the cause of Italian unification, they needed just the territory of Rome. In return for Italian aid against Austria, Bismarck agreed not to make a separate peace until Italy had obtained Venetia.
Notably, the other foreign powers abstained from this war. French Emperor Napoleon III, who expected a Prussian defeat, chose to remain out of the war to strengthen his negotiating position for territory along the Rhine, while the Russian Empire still bore a grudge against Austria from the Crimean War.
| Alliances of the Austro-Prussian War, 1866 | ||
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| Kingdom of Prussia | Austrian Empire | neutral |
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Kingdom of Italy |
Kingdom of Bavaria |
Limburg |
| Disputed Territory | ||
[edit] Course of the war
The first major war between two continental powers in many years, this war used many of the same technologies as the American Civil War, including railroads to concentrate troops during mobilization and telegraphs to enhance long distance communication. The Prussian Army used breech-loading rifles that could be rapidly loaded while the soldier was seeking cover on the ground, whereas the Austrian muzzle-loading rifles could only be loaded slowly.
The main campaign of the war occurred in Bohemia. Prussian Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke had planned meticulously for the war. He rapidly mobilized the Prussian army and advanced across the border into Saxony and Bohemia, where the Austrian army was concentrating for an invasion of Silesia. There, the Prussian armies led nominally by King Wilhelm converged, and the two sides met at the Battle of Königgrätz (Sadová) on July 3. The Prussian Elbe Army advanced on the Austrian left wing, and the First Army on the centre, prematurely; they risked being counter-flanked on the left. Victory therefore depended on the timely arrival of the Second Army on the left wing. This was achieved through the brilliant staffwork of its Chief of Staff, Leonhard Graf von Blumenthal. Superior Prussian organization and élan decided the battle against Austrian numerical superiority, and the victory was near total, with Austrian battle deaths nearly seven times the Prussian figure. It is worth noting that Prussia was equipped with von Dreyse's breech-loading needle-gun, which was vastly superior to Austria's muzzle-loaders. Austria rapidly sought peace after this battle.
Except for Saxony, the other German states allied to Austria played little role in the main campaign. Hanover's army defeated Prussia at the Second Battle of Langensalza on June 27, but within a few days they were forced to surrender by superior numbers. Prussian armies fought against Bavaria on the Main River, reaching Nuremberg and Frankfurt. The Bavarian fortress of Würzburg was shelled by Prussian artillery, but the garrison defended its position until armistice day.
The Austrians were more successful in their war with Italy, defeating the Italians on land at the Battle of Custoza (June 24) and on sea at the Battle of Lissa (July 20). Garibaldi's "Hunters of the Alps" defeated the Austrians at the Battle of Bezzecca, on 21 July, conquered the lower part of Trentino, and moved towards Trento. Prussian peace with Austria–Hungary forced the Italian government to seek an armistice with Austria, on 12 August. According to Treaty of Vienna, signed on October 12, Austria ceded Venetia to France, which in turn ceded it to Italy (for details of operations in Italy, see Third Italian War of Independence).
[edit] Aftermath
In order to forestall intervention by France or Russia, Bismarck pushed King William I to make peace with the Austrians rapidly, rather than continue the war in hopes of further gains. The Austrians accepted mediation from France's Napoleon III. The Peace of Prague on August 23, 1866 resulted in the dissolution of the German Confederation, Prussian annexation of many of Austria’s former allies, and the permanent exclusion of Austria from German affairs. This left Prussia free to form the North German Confederation the next year, incorporating all the German states north of the Main River. Prussia chose not to seek Austrian territory for itself, and this made it possible for Prussia and Austria to ally in the future, since Austria was threatened more by Italian and Pan-Slavic irredentism than by Prussia. The war left Prussia dominant in Germany, and German nationalism would compel the remaining independent states to ally with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and then to accede to the crowning of King Wilhelm as German Emperor. United Germany would become one of the most powerful of the European countries.
[edit] Consequences for the defeated parties
In addition to war reparations, the following territorial changes took place:
- Austria – Surrendered the province of Venetia to Italy and lost all official influence over member states of the former German Confederation. Austria’s defeat was a telling blow to Habsburg rule; the Empire was transformed via the Ausgleich to the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in the following year.
- Schleswig and Holstein – Became the Prussian Province of Schleswig-Holstein
- Hanover – Annexed by Prussia, became the Province of Hanover
- Hesse-Darmstadt – Surrendered some of its northern territory (the Hessian Hinterland) to Prussia. The northern half of the remaining land (Upper Hesse) joined the North German Confederation
- Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, Frankfurt – Annexed by Prussia. Combined with the territory surrendered by Hesse-Darmstadt to form the new Province of Hesse-Nassau
- Saxony, Saxe-Meiningen, Reuss-Greiz, Schaumburg-Lippe – Spared from annexation but joined the North German Confederation in the following year
[edit] Consequences for the neutral parties
The war meant the end of the German Confederation. Those states who remained neutral during the conflict took different actions after the Prague treaty:
- Liechtenstein – Became an independent state and declared permanent neutrality, while maintaining close political ties with Austria. This neutrality was respected during both World Wars.
- Limburg and Luxembourg – The Treaty of London in 1867 declared both of these states to be part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Limburg became the Dutch province of Limburg. Luxembourg was guaranteed independence and neutrality from its three surrounding neighbors (Belgium, France and Prussia) but it rejoined the German customs union, the Zollverein, and remained a member until its dissolution in 1919.
- Reuss-Schleiz, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt – Joined the North German Confederation
[edit] Notes
- ^ McElwee, William. The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons Purnell, London, 1974
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Further information about the war (German)
