Talk:Armoured warfare

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Erich von Manstein is not a notable practicioner of armoured warfare? --Trithemius 11:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

This is a bit tricky. He wasn't a typical Panzergeneral like Guderian or Rommel. As a higher level strategist he let himself be influenced by personal talks with Guderian when creating his plans for Fall Gelb. Of course he didn't put this plan himself into practice. His famous Charkov campaign in the winter of 1943 was obviously an excellent use of armour, but again he didn't himself lead the forces.--MWAK 06:04, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

A great deal of the Contemporary Tank Tactics section is equally applicable to WWII. Could we just change it to Tank Tactics, and let the text indicate whether particular tactics were limited to certain eras? — B.Bryant 13:27, 23 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I'm concerned that this is all being from a narrow scope, with bias and unattribution, and completely unreferenced yet grand and universal assertions such as "Four tanks have sixteen times the combat power of a single tank". At the very least, who argues four tanks have such combat power? Who argues the Allies did not properly practise armoured warfare, that they had "improper tactics"? 119 19:36, 1 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Good points.

I. The old rule of thumb (technically the Lanchester square law) that the fighting power of a unit increases with the square of the number of (e.g.) tanks it holds isn't empirically proven; but it reflects an important first principle: that the ratio of the respective ratios between your tanks and the enemy's will change this way. So if you increase your number of tanks by two, obviously each of your tanks will on average have to fight only half the original number of enemy tanks. And the enemy's tanks will obviously have to fight twice the original number of your tanks. Anybody can understand this. However most people I've known are at first puzzled by the logical implication that therefore the relative work load of your tanks improves by four, being the ratio between 0.5 and 2. Fighting power is always relative, as you're always fighting someone else.

Of course in practice an attacker especially will have great trouble bringing all his force to bear at once, so a disparity in numbers wouldn't be as nearly as advantageous. This has been confirmed by modelling in the last 25 years.

II. The old tale that before the war the French, British and Soviets had "inferior tactics" is of course a complete myth. The name "Lidell Hart" comes to mind as its main inventor. But you see, it's such a good myth. People need myths. Soldiers need myths most of all. It's all nice and well to expound some boring abstract theory, but then cadets won't get it. They need a real-life story - even if in real life it didn't happen. We have to invoke the power of the narrative. Should you care for historical fact though, here it is:

1. There's a difference between mechanised manoeuvre warfare in general and Blitzkrieg in particular. What is it? The difference is that in Blitzkrieg you take the collapse of the enemy for granted. That premiss allows for a much simplified operational planning. You can attack on a narrow front. You don't need superior numbers. There will be no concluding Kesselslacht so you don't need a large mass of divisions. There's no need to consolidate by digging in your mechanised forces. All your logistic efforts can be directed to supplying fuel for the strategic envelopment. There's no need for large production to sustain a prolonged war.

2. Blitzkrieg is a very dangerous tactic. If the premiss proves to be wrong you will be obliterated. For this reason all armies rejected it. Yes, the German too.

3. But then Guderian was a lone voice? False: he too rejected Blitzkrieg! All his writings were about mechanised manoeuvre warfare in general. And that doctrine was embraced by the German army.

4. So the true nature of German tactical superiority lies in the fact that the Germans tried to execute mechanised manoeuvre warfare, whereas the others were stuck in WWI tactics? False again: all major armies had mechanised manoeuvre warfare as their official doctrine. Yes, the French too.

5. But surely there must have been some difference between them? Now that's true. And the difference was between them advocating mechanisation and those proposing motorisation. All countries were too poor to fully equip their forces with both tanks and trucks, so a choice would have to be made. The French and Soviets chose for tanks. And the British and Germans chose for trucks. Surprise! Much of Germany's tactical superiority was based on the superior motorisation of its standard infantry divisions. This is what Guderian's Achtung:Panzer is all about: to get a bit more money for his tanks nevertheless.

6. But at least the Germans had superior combined arms tactics? Well yes, in as far as their infantry was more motorised (they had very few half-tracks). But it's a mistake to suppose that the French had such different ideas. It's only that when French texts speak of the need for close cooperation between infantry and tanks this is caricaturally interpreted as backward WWI tactics, whereas when German texts do the same it's seen as a sign of modernity. But the tactics are the same. Still in practice the French were more Fullerite: far from making the infantry tanks subservient to the infantry by giving each Infantry Corps its own organic tank battalion, they concentrated them in tanks-only units. On this point cooperation with the infantry was very poor, while at the same time infantry had become addicted to tanks: they wouldn't attack without them. The same isn't true of their cavalry tanks though.

7. How then can it be explained that Fall Gelb was planned as a Blitzkrieg campaign? Answer: it wasn't. Classic manoeuvre warfare: broad front, lots of infantry divisions, planned consolidation phase, logistics optimised for infantry support. But Guderian wasn't dogmatic. Though he rejected Blitzkrieg as a general doctrine, he understood this particular situation called for it. Convinced of his intellectual superiority he did as he saw fit and simply imposed it on his superiors.

8. Blitzkrieg then became the official doctrine for Operation Barbarossa. It had to. German production capacity was insufficient to build both enough submarines to defeat England and enough tanks for a prolonged war against the Red Army. So it became anathema not to assume the Soviet-Union would collapse. And if collapse is certain, Blitzkrieg is allowed. It nearly worked too. The Red Army had too few trucks, remember? And they still thought they could imitate the Germans and beat them in their own game...

As you can see historical reality is complex (of course I know you already knew this :o). Even this still very simplified account of it doesn't make for a good story. We have to find a balance between truth and explication.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 09:04, 2 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Don't stop there! Integrate the above with the German Great General Staff plan to begin a war no earlier than 1944, so all units would have trucks (instead of going to war with horse-drawn artillery and having the troops do forced marches in too many actions) then add the effect of thousands of trucks flowing from Detroit to the Red army, then factor in airlift, sealift and rail transport capacities during the cold war, and after all that maybe we will have a backbone to write a neutral, factual encyclopedia article on armoured warfare. --AlainV 10:50, 3 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Yes, but there are a few problems:

I. You and I might know this is truth but others don't. The myth has been too successful. They wouldn't see it as neutral but as horribly POV. Read the talk page of Blitzkrieg and you'll see what I mean. We would never reach consensus. And if you include the Cold War things would become real ugly. There are too many alive who built their career (or worse: their entire belief system :o) on alarmism. Those people really don't like their pet theories debunked.

II. As the article is now, it's more about armoured combat as an art. Historical events then function as examples - and so don't have to be historical! Myth will suffice. :o)

III. The scope of the article would change into something like Logistics of Modern Battle. Of course that's the clue to really understanding warfare. But for most people "combat" means something much more tangible. They would like to know things on a much lower level like "If I were a Tank Battalion commander what would I have to do to defeat the enemy?" And that's perhaps the real trouble with the article: should they only have the present text to guide their behavior they would surely lose...

--MWAK 20:19, 4 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Arrgh! I have just followed your link to the Blitzkrieg article. It treats tanks as if they were magical vehicles which do not need long motorised supply lines to feed them diesel oil, lubricants and spares. And of course, the tankers and the supporting infantry can eat fresh air and drink ether. --AlainV 00:12, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Most people hold indeed very romantic views on the subject. They also see Blitzkrieg as some Magic Tactic. :o) Use Blitzkrieg and victory is guaranteed. As Operation Barbarossa showed, in reality it's the other way round: far from guaranteeing the collapse of the enemy, that collapse is a necessary condition for Blitzkrieg to work. The German army was already doomed in July 1941.

--MWAK 08:59, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC)

This is an extreme simplification of the complex strategic and economic situation that led to failure of blitzkrieg on the Eastern Front. --Trithemius 11:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)
The situation was indeed extremely complex. But its fundamental parameters spelled doom for the German army, unless there would have been a total Soviet collapse. At least if they wanted to continue the offensive :o). It wasn't as if severe strategic mistakes surprisingly spoiled a certain success, as if the Germans had easily won if they had just done what was sensible.--MWAK 13:29, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] India-Pakistan war

New section on India-Pakistan war of 1965 and 1971 added which is one of the Biggest armoured wars in History. --Chanakyathegreat 14:29, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Isn't Longwela more an example of the use of strike aircraft than having anything in common with Kursk?GraemeLeggett 15:04, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
It's not really a section, merely "see also" links to two articles, so I've removed it, until someone writes something about the armoured tactics or relevant context of these conflicts. —Michael Z. 2006-07-26 16:13 Z
  1. Battle of Asal Uttar - 1965 war
  2. Battle of Longewala - 1971 war

Aircrafts are used in most of wars in modern times. In Assal Uttar tank battles have taken place. In Longewala it was Pakistani Armour against Indian Infantry till next day morning after which the IAF took part. This may not fall into the Armoured warfare section but the Battle of Assal Uttar can be considered as it was a armoured battle. Also if we take the large extend of the 1965 and the 1971 wars a large number of armoured fighting has taken place here and there and some of the famous ones are the Assal Uttar type of armoured battle. Also the brilliant tactics employed like flooding the fields to slow down enemy tank movements and waiting for them till they reach very near must be noted. If the said wars cannot be added here, I will be adding it in the air warfare section. Also the Gulf war must me added as it is seen as the modern armoured warfare that took place.

--Chanakyathegreat 04:09, 28 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Merge

The relatively weak articles mechanized force and mechanized warfare should be merged into this article, the best developed of the three. Let's work on one strong article on military motorization, mechanization, and armoured tactics, which can later spin off reasonably good new articles on the sub-topics.

This would be a general article on the subject of motorized/mechanized/armoured warfare and not a dictionary definition, so I suggest we don't launch into a discussion on the precise differences between the three, but put the energy into the article. There has also been some relevant discussion at talk:Mechanized warfare.

This merge doesn't stop us from moving the resulting combined article to another title, but that would be a separate issue to vote on. —Michael Z. 2006-10-14 02:25 Z

[edit] Support

  1. (nominator) —Michael Z. 2006-10-14 02:25 Z
  2. Certainly. It might also be a good idea to merge Armoured forces in. --Carnildo 04:44, 14 October 2006 (UTC)
  3. Yes. We can demerge them if necessary later. Buckshot06 01:45, 15 October 2006 (UTC)
  4. Yes, please. Jigen III 05:30, 30 March 2007 (UTC)
  5. Yes, a small article with no many chances to be expanded in the near future. Eurocopter tigre 16:15, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Oppose

[edit] Ambrose Is Wrong

Please see: "Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the US Armored Forces, George F. Hofmann and General Donn A. Starry, editors. In particular you will want to read Hofmann's chapter entitled "Army Doctrine and the Christie Tank," as well as Christopher Gabel's chapter, "WWII Armor Operations in Europe." And finally, General Starry's comments on the subject in the final chapter.

"Infantry divisions were assigned separate tank battalions to assist with infantry attacks. Armored divisions [during WWII] expanded on the cavalry's traditional missions of pursuit and exploitation, fighting as combined arms teams with the tank as the main maneuver element." pp. 130-131.

Armored force doctrine, that is to say how the Sherman tank was used in combat, was reflected in the operational art of the armored divisions, not in the misuse of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers who were ignorant of the correct armored force doctrine. The improper use of the GHQ tank battalions by infantry officers was the subject of much controversy during and immediately after the war, as evidenced in the relevant "Reports of the General Board, European Theater of Operations US Army."

Wake up children. Just because Ambrose is popular, does not mean he is right.

24 October, 2006 1450 Hours.

[edit] A little question

I made some slight modifications and reorganizations. Are they okay? AllStarZ 05:38, 2 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, such large headings are not conforming to the usual Wikipedia style.--MWAK 07:24, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
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