Ancient Greek warfare
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Ancient Greek warfare is the term used to describe to warfare of the hellenic poleis (the city-states of ancient Greece) between the hoplite revolution of the 8th century BC and the emergence of the Macedonian empire in the 4th century BC.
Ancient Greek warfare was dominated on land by the phalanx formation, a deep line formation consisting of hoplites equipped with heavy shields, spears and swords. The phalanx's plan was basically to advance toward the enemy with each phalangite's spear stretched toward the enemy. When the phalanx got within sword range, the phalangites would draw their swords and start fighting that way. If enemy archers shot arrows at the phalanx, the phalangites would hold up their shields, so the unit was co-dependent for defense. This Greek phalanx was the ancient world's best heavy infantry, demonstrated by the Athenian victory at Marathon. 10,000 Athenian hoplites organized in a phalanx decisively defeated a much larger Persian army of about 26,000 with few losses. Another type of soldier was the peltasts which were lighter infantry than the hoplites and were equipped primarily with several javelins. The peltasts were usually used as skirmishers.
The ancient Greek state of Macedon perfected the phalanx with the use of the unusually long sarissa pike. In addition to the phalanx formation, the Macedonians under King Philip II began using organized cavalry units and tactical skirmisher units in battle. Another change brought by King Philip II was the creation and maintenance of a professional army. Early on, the Greek phalanges had been populated by citizen-soldier hoplites. Now, however, heavily trained professional armies became the norm, especially after Philip's son Alexander III conquered the vast Persian army and, with his death, left the several Diadochi states. It was not until the evolution from the phalanx of the more flexible Roman Legionary style of organization and equipment, combined with the more wide-spread use of light cavalry, that the Greek phalanx lost its on the battlefield. Another form of phalanx, the oblique phalanx, was used when opposing armies tried to flank the phalanx, or attack the vulnerable sides. To defend against flanking, the right and center parts of the phalanx would merge with the left side to form a fifty man deep phalanx.
Around the time of the Persian Wars, the Greeks (and especially the Athenians) had the idea of arming ships and fighting at sea. The basic Greek fighting ship was the trireme with three rows of oars on each side to increase speed and maneuverability. The Athenian strategy of naval engagement proved successful at the Battle of Salamis, where a smaller Athenian fleet based on the principle of ramming, burning, and capturing enemy ships soundly defeated the Persian fleet. After the by and large defeat of the Persians in the Aegean, the Athenians used their navy as defense against pirates and other dangers in an effort to promote trade within the Delian League. The naval side of war proved decisive in the Peloponnesian War when Athens' strategy again turned to naval superiority and the Athenians attempted to just sit inside their walls and use their fleet to block the harbors of Sparta's allies, limiting trade. After an ill-advised military venture in Sicily, however, Athens lost a large portion of its fleet and many of its finest soldiers. The Spartans took advantage of this crushing blow, and rapidly created their own navy with support from Persia. With an unquestionably dominate army and a passable navy, Sparta inspired many Athenian colonies to revolt, depriving Athens of the funds necessary to build more ships. It wasn't long before Sparta captured Athens, tore down the famed city walls and ransacked the city.
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[edit] Archaic Greek warfare
[edit] The hoplite phalanx
The hoplite was a very heavy infantryman that was the main soldier of warfare in Ancient Greece. The word hoplite (Greek ὁπλίτης, hoplitēs) derives from hoplon (ὅπλον, plural hopla, ὅπλα) meaning an item of armor or equipment and consequently the entire equipment of the hoplite (but not specifically the circular shield, which is sometimes incorrectly referred to as a hoplon, though it was in fact called an aspis). These soldiers probably first appeared in the late seventh century B.C. They were a citizen-militia, and so were armed as spearmen, and assumed a phalanx formation, which are relatively easy to equip and maintain; they were primarily drawn from the middle class, who could afford the cost of the armaments. Almost all the famous men of ancient Greece, even philosophers and playwrights, fought as hoplites at some point in their lives.
The (hoplite) phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, usually no less than four deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields, to try to gain the upper hand in the battle early on and as a result, allowing for the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. Therefore, one might say that the phalanx was essentially a formation in which the hoplites created a mass spear and shield wall. The effectiveness of the phalanx depended upon how well the hoplites could maintain this formation while in combat, and how well they could stand their ground, especially when engaged against another phalanx. It could be said that the main enemy of a phalanx was not the opposition forces (the majority of the soldiers would remain unengaged in a phalanx versus phalanx pushing match, because they were positioned at the rear and were responsible for keeping the front rows pressed forward) but fear. One theory was that the more disciplined and courageous the army the more likely it was to win - often disputes between the various city-states of Greece would be resolved by one side fleeing before the engagement. The Greek word dynamis, the "will to fight", expresses the drive that kept hoplites in formation.
Before the advance, both sides would sing the 'paean', the battle-hymn (notably, the Spartans rejected the use of a battle-hymn, thinking it needless bravado), then advance to the cadence (a marching beat) - on trumpets, pipes or drums. When nearing the enemy, the phalanx would break into a run that was sufficient enough to create momentum but not too much as to lose cohesion. Both sides would collide viciously, breaking many of the spears of the front row. The battle would then rely on the valor of the men in the front line and the rear men to maintain a push forward with their shields.
“Now of those, who dare, abiding one beside another, to advance to the close fray, and the foremost champions, fewer die, and they save the people in the rear; but in men that fear, all excellence is lost. No one could ever in words go through those several ills, which befall a man, if he has been actuated by cowardice. For ‘tis grievous to wound in the rear the back of a flying man in hostile war. Shameful too is a corpse lying low in the dust, wounded behind in the back by the point of a spear.” [Tyrtaeus: The War Songs Of Tyrtaeus]
The natural tendency during battle would be to drift towards the right side, or even for both lines to "wheel" as one side gave ground and the other advanced. This is because the individual hoplites carried their shields on their left arm, protecting not themselves but the soldier to the left (thus giving an incentive to stand very close together). Battles were won when the exposed right side (carrying spears) could overpower the opposing army's left side (carrying shields).
When in combat, the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation; thus when two phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match, in which, as a rule, the deeper phalanx would almost always win, with very few recorded exceptions
Since the hoplites were a militia force and did not receive permanent wages, campaigns were short and mainly confined to the summer. Armies marched directly to their target. There, the defenders could hide behind city walls, in which case the attackers generally had to content themselves with ravaging the countryside (as siegecraft was undeveloped), or meet them on the field. Battles were usually set piece and intended to be decisive. These battles were short, bloody, and brutal, and thus required a high degree of discipline. Both forces lined up on a level field, usually in a rough phalanx formation around eight ranks deep (though this varied). Other troops were less important; hippeis (cavalry) generally protected the flanks, when present at all, and both light infantry and missile troops were negligible. The best known hoplites were the Spartans, who were trained from birth to become well trained, professional warriors.
[edit] Ancient Greek Naval warfare
[edit] Tactical development of the 4th century BC
[edit] The emergence of the light infantry
light infantry began to appear with the rise of professional armies. They were used to hold enemies in place as cavalry or foot troops attempted to flank the enemies.
[edit] The oblique phalanx
[edit] The rising importance of the cavalry
The Phalanx seemed invincible in Greece, thanks in no small part to the formidable Spartan Army. It had been used as a battering ram and had won campaigns against Persia and the northern "barbarians". The Thebans, however, defeated Sparta with a powerful force of cavalry and claimed supremacy throughout Greece. The Cavalry tactics had probably been learned from the Persians, who took all manner of horseman to a battlefield, and won most of the time. When the Macedonians invaded, their army was mainly composed of Phalanx but the elite troops were the Companions, a powerful cavalry unit that had been adapted into a royal guard. Classical phalanxes were gone, as the Macedonians proved to be one of the most effective conquerers in Europe for over 1000 years.
[edit] The ascendence of Macedonian warfare
[edit] The warring city-states
[edit] See also
[edit] Bibliography
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