Abu Faraj al-Libbi

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Abu Faraj al-Libi (Arabic: أبو فرج الليبي ) is an assumed name or nom de guerre of a Libyan alleged to be a senior member of the al-Qaeda terror organization. His real name is thought to be Mustafa al-'Uzayti^[1]. He was arrested by Pakistan's ISI on May 2, 2005, in Mardan (30 miles north of Peshawar). Finding al-Libi was a joint effort of the United States and Pakistan. He is now in American military custody in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp^[1], having previously been held at some secret location^[2].

In August 2004 Pakistani officials stated that al-Libbi (also known as Abu Faraj Farj) had become "number three" in al-Qaeda as "director of operations", a rôle once filled by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed^[3]^[4]. Upon al-Libbi's arrest U.S. and Pakistani authorities continued to claim him as the third most important figure in al-Qaeda.

According to a BBC report, he was riding pillion on a motorbike when he and his driver were ambushed by Pakistani agents, some of whom were wearing burqas ^[5]. While being apprehended, al-Libbi tried to destroy a notebook, which U.S. officials are now trying to decode. The events leading up to the ambush began with US agents intercepting a mobile phone call made by al-Libbi. They zeroed in his location to a busy road a quarter of a mile away on the outskirts of Mardan, about 75 miles northwest of Islamabad, and tipped-off Pakistani authorities. Plainclothes Pakistani agents arrived in Mardan and hung out, waiting for him to arrive.

Abi Faraj al-Libbi was named by Pakistani authorities as the main planner of the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot^[6]. He is also a suspect in two assassination attempts against Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf^[1]. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Libbi's suspected accomplice in those attacks was a well-known Pakistani militant named Amjad Hussain Farooqi, who was also implicated in the murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in February 2002. Mr. Farooqi was killed last September in a shootout with security forces in southern Pakistan."^[7]

Wikinews has news related to:

Pakistan captures al Qaeda suspect

In the early reporting of this capture, there was some confusion between Abu Faraj al-Libbi and the badly wanted al-Qaeda fugitive Anas al-Liby^[8]. Al-Libi is not a surname, but an adjective, meaning the Libyan. Such adjectives of nationality are used in nicknames, and sometimes to resolve ambiguity; they often admit several alternative English transliterations.

1 Combatant Status Review Tribunal
2 Cast
3 References
4 External links

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

US District Court Justice Joyce Hens Green ruled that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were unconstitutional. Nevertheless the Department of Defense scheduled Tribunals for the 14 high-value captives who were transferred from covert CIA custody for early winter of 2007.

Abu Faraj Al Libbi did not choose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[9]

The transcript for Guantanamo Abu Faraj Al Libbi was eight pages long. It said that he did not choose to attend his Tribunal. The first two pages of the transcript were consumed with Tribunal's officers swearing oaths, and the reading out of the Tribunals mandate and authority. He did dictate a statement to be read to his Tribunal.

[edit] Cast

name	role	rank	notes
Abu Faraj al-Libbi	captive	n.a.	Did not choose to attend. Dictated a statement to be read at his Tribunal.
redacted	Tribunal President	Colonel USAF
redacted	Tribunal Member	Commander USN
redacted	Tribunal Member	Lieutenant Colonel USAF
redacted	Personal Representative	Major USAF
redacted	Reporter	Sergeant First Class US Army
redacted	Recorder	Major USAF
redacted	Judge Advocate Member	Lieutenant Colonel United States Armed Services

[edit] Faraj Al Libbi's decision not to attend his Tribunal

After discussing the nature of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with his Personal Representative Al Libbi decided not to attend his Tribunal. According to Al Libbi's Personal Representatitive Al Libbi: "...decided that his freedom is far too important to be decided by an administrative process and is waiting for legal proceedings." — When asked to explain, his Personal Representative paraphrased Al Libbi: "Uh once questions were answered in regards to what was taking place and his representation; he decided to abstain from attending."

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Abu Faraj al Libbi would have faced, during his Tribunal, were:

"SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL ABU FARAJ AL LIBI: Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, a Tribunal has been appointed ot determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

"The detainee was a supervisor at the al Qaida training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee assisted in the creation of an urban warfare training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan. A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July to August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The same source also stated that the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida. The detainee was the supervisor of an al Qaida communications site in Afghanistan, in 2002. The detainee was a senior al Qaida facilitator. His primary duty was the care of al Qaida families residing in Pakistan. Additionally, the detainee was involved in vetting and transporting al Qaida fighters to Afghanistan. Individuals wanting to fight in Afghanistan were required to be sponsored by an al Qaida member and be interviewed by the detainee to verify their bona fides. Once the detainee, a former commander in Afghanistan, was comfortable with the individual's background, the detainee would arrange travel to Afghanistan for the individual. The detainee would arrange travel to Afghanistan for the individual. The detainee was the deputy to al Qaida's third in command and was responsible for al Qaida activities and logistics throughout Pakistan. In December 2003, a large group of Islamic extremists; including the detainee, representatives of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin ^[sic] and Taliban officials met in Raiwand, Pakistan and discussed operations against the United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan. In September 2004, several members of al Qaida involved in terrorist operations, including planned operations in the United States, Europe and Australia. A coputer seized during the capture of the detainee contained manuals related to explosivies, detonator circuits, chemicals, military tactics, missiles and tanks. A computer seized during the capture of the detainee contained a detailed manual on fabricating and using circuitry for detonators.

"An al Qaida and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group associate requested assistance from the detainee in acquiring explosives and weapons according to seized letters found on the associate's computer. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witness, excuse me, witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or ^[sic] witnesses."

[edit] Statement

Abu Faraj al-Libbi asked his Personal Representative to read the following statement to his Tribunal:

Mr. President and board ^[sic] members of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal; I Mustafa Al Libi thank you for your time. It is my opinion the forming of this Tribunal is a good initial step towards justice and righteousness. I was informed by my Personal Representative that this Tribunal is purely a military administrative procedure and is not based on the Judicial Procedure of the United States. In regards to this issue I offer the following:

This Tribunal should have been a procedure in accordance with the Judicial Procedure of the United States. I have been held by the United States for over two years without any indication of how the judicial system is going to deal with my situation. This is a very long period of time without being subject to a court of justice.
The handling and reviewing or determining of my Enemy Combatant status and legality of my detainment by the United States is a judicial matter and not administrative as described in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal are incomplete for the following reasons:
- No lawyer, either assigned to the detainee or by the detainee's choosing, has been made available to the detainee to assist in determining the nature of the evidence against him, its legality and its validity as evidence. The detainee needs legal guidance as to what kind of testimonies and statements are enough to refute the evidence presented against him.
- The lack of protections against detention or other legal or administrative actions make it impossible for me to produce any witnesses in my defense. For example the definition of Enemy Combatant includes the verbiage "supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces". If I am classified as an Enemy Combatant, it is possible that the United States will deem my witnesses are Enemy Combatants and judicial or administrative action may be taken against them. It is my opinion the detainee is in a lose-lose situation.
- If not classified as an Enemy Combatant the detainee may not get released immediately. I was informed by my Personal Representative that the detainee would be released once arrangements could be made. This means from military custody. It is possible the detainee would still be retained by the United States.
- If the detainee is classified as an Enemy Combatant, he won't be transferred directly to the United States Judicial System but will remain under supervision of the Military. He will then meet the Annual Review Board indefinitedly to review the detention status.

Mr. President and members of the board ^[sic], to summarize, I don't find myself attending the Tribunal unless the above mentioned factors are resolved such as being represented by a lawyer and legal protection for myself or my witnesses. I am extremely keen to exercise my rights fully according to the law of the United States.

This process, the processes associated with my detention are extremely important to me and my family and could prove detrimental to our well being. I am not prepared to have this matter linked to a mere "administrative procedure" where I don't fully understand the ramifications and extent of the process.

Finally, I do not believe the Combatant Status Review Tribunal process is a complete process. The United States Government is fully represented while I have not been given the same opportunities. Mr President and members of the board ^[sic], thank you for your attention and consideration during my statement.

I affirm that these words are my words and truth as I know it, signed and dated.