Able Danger

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Able Danger was a classified military intelligence program under the command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It was created as a result of a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early October 1999 by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, to develop an Information Operations Campaign Plan against transnational terrorism, "specifically al-Qaeda."

In one instance, the program used data mining techniques to associate open source information with classified information in an attempt to make associations between individual members of terrorist groups. The objective of this particular project was to ascertain whether the data mining techniques and open source material were effective tools in determining terrorist activities, and if the resultant data could be used to create operational plans that could be executed in a timely fashion to interrupt, capture and/or destroy terrorists or their cells.

An example of a chart produced as output by the project's data mining and visualization suite is called the 3.21.00 Chart (DIAC Link Chart declassified 3.21.00, produced on March 21, 2000 and reproduced on author Peter Lance's website for his book Triple Cross). Another barely readable sample chart was published by the Defense Department's Inspector General's Office on page 14 of the Able Danger Investigation Report. Patience Wait has reported that a follow-on project appears to have been funded and implemented by the Intelligence Community and was originally named Able Providence.[1]

According to statements by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and those of four others, Able Danger had identified the September 11, 2001 attack leader Mohamed Atta, and three of the 9/11 plot's other 19 hijackers, as possible members of an al Qaeda cell linked to the '93 World Trade Center bombing. This theory was heavily promoted by Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees. In December 2006 after an investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that those assertions are unfounded, rejecting as untrue "one of the most disturbing claims about the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes."[2] The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reached this conclusion without, apparently, interviewing all witnesses under oath, without explaining why it chose to believe some witnesses and their testimony and not to believe others, without explaining why defense contractor JD Smith appeared to have changed his story from an August 23, 2005 Fox News report, and why it thinks Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer would have lied and made the whole thing up. The 8 page letter from the Committee to its members, now publicly available and dated December 22, 2006, generally takes a "trust me" approach. The testimony of the individual witnesses is not available to the American public.

An investigation by the Defense Department Inspector General's office in September 2006 had studied a related but very different claim, namely, whether the Department of Defense had unfairly and illegally targeted Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer because of his efforts to bring the Able Danger scandal into public light. Essentially, the DOD was investigating itself. Not surprisingly, the DOD IG concluded that the DOD had done nothing wrong.

Contents

[edit] Assertion that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers

The existence of Able Danger, and its purported early identification of the 9/11 terrorists, was first disclosed publicly on June 19, 2005, in an article[3] by Keith Phucas, a reporter for The Times Herald, a Norristown, Pennsylvania, daily newspaper. Eight days later, on June 27, 2005, Representative Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and House Homeland Security committees, and the principal source for the Phucas article gave a special orders speech on the House floor detailing Able Danger:

Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.[4]

Rep. Weldon later reiterated these concerns during news conferences on February 14, 2006. He stated that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta 13 separate times prior to 9/11 and that the unit also identified a potential problem in Yemen two weeks prior to the 12 October 2000 attack on the USS Cole.[5] The Pentagon released a statement in response, stating that they wished to address these issues during a congressional hearing before a House Armed Services subcommittee scheduled for Wednesday, February 15, 2006.

[edit] Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission

Curt Weldon's assertion that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers was picked up by the national media in August 2005, after it was reported in the bimonthly Government Security News.[6] In addition to asserting that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also alleged the intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and ignored.[7] Two 9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman, both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.[6]

That claim avoids the issue, however. Information on the Able Danger program had been provided to the Commission staff, not to individual Commission members.

Following the GSN report, members of the 9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Al Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission,[8] both denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of Mohammed Atta prior to the attacks.[9] Hamilton told the media, "The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell.... Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation."[10]

On August 12, 2005, Hamilton and former 9/11 Commission chairman Thomas Kean issued a statementPDF (32.1 KiB) in response to media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the Able Danger program. They stated the Commission had been aware of the Able Danger program, and requested and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense (DoD), but none of the information provided had indicated the program had identified Atta or other 9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004 (just days before the Commission's report was released), by a United States Navy officer employed at DOD, but that

The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.[11]

This was an interesting response by the Commission. Rather than take the claim seriously, they invented a phony defense that the Navy Captain needed to have documentary evidence to back up his claim. This is foolish in light of the fact that the Able Danger program was surveillance, its information was classified, and individual employees of the team were not allowed to keep classified documents for personal use. The Commission insinuates that the interviewee lacked credibility without telling us why. The Commission also demands from the witness a full explanation of how Able Danger identified Atta, and drops his claim entirely when he cannot provide it. However, the Commission should not have demanded such a complete picture at the start. In fact, the Commission's job was to fully investigate questions such as that and come up with an explanation consistent with the evidence. Given that the 911 Commission's stated purpose was to provide "the fullest possible account of the events surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001", this refusal to even pursue such a significant claim is surprising at best.

Congressman Curt Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission statement clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI, and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger.

Please note that Congressman Curt Weldon was defeated in the November, 2006 election and that as a result his website was taken down and all links to his Congressional website are now dead.

The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements over the past week, each of which has significantly changed – from initially denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation ABLE DANGER and Mohammed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.[12]

Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005.[13][14] The Committee has said it will be looking into these claims.[15]

[edit] Able Danger data destroyed

In his book Countdown to Terror (2005, ISBN 0-89526-005-0), Weldon asserted that an Able Danger chart produced in 1999 identifying 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been presented to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in 2001, days after the 9/11 attacks. He later stated that he was no longer sure that Atta's name appeared on that document.[16]

House Intelligence Committee chairman Peter Hoekstra is currently investigating the matter at Weldon's request, but is reported to have cautioned against "hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough" probe. Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify the matter.[16]

"There's something very sinister going on here that really troubles me," Weldon told FOX News on August 25, blasting the 9/11 commission for not investigating the claims, and accusing some panel members of trying to smear Shaffer and Able Danger.

"What's the Sept. 11 commission got to hide?" Weldon asked. "The commission is trying to spin this because they're embarrassed about what's coming out. In two weeks with two staffers, I've uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayer money."[17]

On August 14, 2005, Mike Kelly, a columnist for The (Bergen) Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview, arranged by the staff of Rep. Curt Weldon, with a man who identified himself as a member of the Able Danger team, but asked that his name not be revealed. In the interview, the man claimed his team had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely al Qaeda terrorists operating in the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed he was ignored by the 9/11 Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able Danger's work.[18]

On September 15, 2005 Weldon asserted that he had identified an employee who had been ordered to destroy the 2.5 terabytes (TB) of data collected by Able Danger two years before the 9/11 attack.[19]

Able Danger's 2.5 Terabytes is a small percentage of all available internet data. A University of California, Berkeley study[1] "showed that, in 2002, 532,897 terabytes of new data flowed across the Internet, 440,606 terabytes of email was sent, and the Web contained 167 terabytes of data that was accessible to all users, plus another 91,850 terabytes in the Deep web where access is controlled."[2] Data collected by data mining techniques, such as was used in Able Danger, could result in large amounts of data; thus the quality of the data in those 2.5 terabytes is much more relevant than the amount, if it was insignificant or significant data.

[edit] Missing chart

A Time magazine article dated August 14, 2005, [3] reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was used for post-9/11 presentations. Weldon gave a talk at the Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as the one handed over on May 23, 2002. However, a week later he referred reporters to a recently reconstructed version of the chart in his office where, among dozens of names and photos of terrorists from around the world, there was a color mug shot of Mohammad Atta, circled in black marker.

[edit] Comments by members of the Able Danger team

[edit] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer

After Weldon's assertions were disputed by the media, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer claimed that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 about the information uncovered by the secret military unit "Able Danger," but he alleges three meetings he set up with bureau officials were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who at the time worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include this information in their final report.[4]

Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March, 2004, following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone.[5] Shaffer remains a controversial figure; he continues to wear the Ranger scroll as a combat patch on his Army uniform, despite never having been assigned or attached to any Ranger unit or otherwise earning that honor. Shaffer's claims of having participated in an air assault with the Rangers have been repeatedly rejected by those who served with him in Afghanistan.

Congressman Weldon has asked for a new probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col Shaffer from publicly commenting on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination." [6]

Shaffer has also told the story of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this." [7]

[edit] Navy Captain Scott Phillpott

Capt. Scott Phillpott confirmed Shaffer's claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command," Phillpott said in a statement to Fox News. "I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000," he was quoted as saying. [8]

[edit] James D. Smith

Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by James D. Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger. In an interview with Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals. [9]

Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.

Anonymous Pentagon sources have alleged Smith was fired after a similar data analysis project to examine Chinese strategic and business connections in the U.S. identified Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary William Perry based on their associations through Stanford University [10]. Kevin Drum has interpreted these allegations as a possible attempt to construct an alibi, and hence an indication that it is likely that Able Danger did identify a person named Mohamed Atta as a terrorist [11].

[edit] Major Eric Kleinsmith

Major Eric Kleinsmith, who was with the Army and chief of intelligence for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was ordered to destroy Able Danger’s information. “I deleted the data,” he said. “There were two sets, classified and unclassified, and also an ‘all sorts,’” which contained a blend of the two, “plus charts we’d produced.” Kleinsmith deleted the 2.5Tbytes of data in May and June, 2000, on orders of Tony Gentry, general counsel of the Army Intelligence and Security Command.[12]

[edit] Other witnesses

The Defense Department announced its findings on September 1, 2005, after a three-week investigation into Able Danger.[13] The DoD admitted they have found three other witnesses in addition to Shaffer and Philpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that "either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaeda operative [and/or] showed his photograph." Four of the five remember the photo on the chart. The fifth remembers only Atta being cited by name. The Pentagon describes the witnesses as "credible" but did not rule out the possibility their recollections were faulty. [14]

[edit] The wall

Former chief assistant U.S. attorney Andrew McCarthy and others have asserted that the Able Danger intelligence was suppressed as a result of a policy of forbidding the CIA and FBI to share intelligence known as "the wall." [15] During the 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified the wall was strengthened under the Clinton administration by Jamie Gorelick to prohibit sharing of terrorist intelligence within the federal government.[16]

This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9-11 Commission, who said, "nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.

[edit] Skepticism

[edit] The Two Attas theory

Mickey Kaus of Slate.com [17], referring to Tom Maguire's "Two Attas" theory,[18] speculates that "the 'Atta' fingered by Able Danger was really the first, 'Abu Nidal' Atta, and not the second, 9/11 'Al Qaeda' Atta," and that this may help explain this Able Danger issue. Snopes.com clarified a widely circulated email that claimed the two Atta's were one and the same.[19]

Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking.[20]

However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11 Commission staffers Able Danger identified terrorist cells and not just individual terrorists, and that the New York City al-Qaeda cell included Mohamed Atta and two other 9/11 terrorists. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second cell. [21] Eric Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers that Able Danger purportedly fingered? Possible answers:

  • 1) Mr. Shaffer was embellishing. (Has he named the specific hijackers who were purportedly identified?)
  • 2) They indeed were named and--just like Atta may be--are also cases of mistaken identity. That would be understandable." [22]

Office of the Inspector General:

When we reviewed INS records, they appeared to reflect two entries by Atta into the United States on January 10, 2001, which initially raised a question as to whether Atta had entered twice on the same day or whether a second person posing as Atta also entered on January 10, 2001. The NIIS printout for the first entry reflects that Atta entered with an admission period of January 10, 2001, to September 8, 2001 (admission number 68653985708). The second record reflects a second entry on January 10, 2001, with an admission period from January 10, 2001, to July 9, 2001 (admission number 10847166009). [23]

It should be noted that IG report is disputed by Lt. Col. Shaffer and other Able Danger team members, some of whom were never interviewed by the IG's office nor the 9/11 commission. Congressman Weldon also claims the report was a hurried, botched up investigation that was intended to close the books on the subject rather than report on the actual facts.

Broeckers/Hauss described in their last German book [24] the existence of two Attas, two Jarrahs [25], two Hanjours and al-Shehhis. Evidence in data, handwritten documents, INS-Report, description of faces and much more. [26]

For example this lead was never followed: "Normen Pentolino, operations manager at the Hollywood store, said two cashiers told FBI agents they might have recognized Atta, but weren't certain. Sources inside the store said Atta may have held a BJ's membership card for more than two years." Two years - counted from 9/11 backwards. Not "last year" or so ... [27]

[edit] Post 9/11 chart

Curt Weldon gave a speech to the Heritage Foundation post 9/11 in 2002 with a chart showing how Mohamed Atta was connected to other 9/11 hijackers. This post 9/11 information is being incorrectly thought of as pre 9/11 information by the people interviewed. People who remember a meeting with a chart showing Atta are remembering the Heritage Foundation meeting or other post 9/11 meetings in which Weldon did display a chart showing Atta. [28]

[edit] Timing

Kevin Drum, writing for The Washington Monthly notes that reports of the precise date at which the information was allegedly passed to the FBI vary considerably. It is most unlikely that Able Danger would have identified a terrorist called "Mohamed Atta" before May, 2000.

Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000 and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta," and prior to 2000 he went by "Mohamed el-Amir."

[edit] Documentation

To date no electronic or paper document has showed that any connection was made to Atta before 9/11. No emails to and from the Able Danger team make any references to Atta, nor do any paper documents between the team and any other DoD teams or offices. No notes taken at any pre 9/11 meetings between the DoD and FBI, or interoffice DoD meetings, show any mention of Atta or a terrorist cell in New York.

It should be noted that Able Danger documentation was destroyed and any that might have passed along to follow up programs may also have been destroyed. Thus it is impossible to state whether the data existed and most important, the absence of any notes or documentation is not evidence they did not exist before being destroyed. The rationale for destruction is also surrounded by controversy as well.[citation needed]

[edit] Congressional hearings

Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter held a hearing on September 21, 2005, looking into the facts about Able Danger. However, Lt. Col Shaffer and the other four members of Able Danger were ordered not to testify by the Department of Defense. Senator Specter decided to go forward with the hearings hoping "to produce a change of heart by the Department of Defense."

Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities, including gathering information on U.S. persons, despite the aliens were not specifically United States citizens. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people connected to US persons." [29]

Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified that he was instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in May and June of 2000. The instruction came from a top Pentagon lawyer. He testified, "I go to bed every night and other members of our team do as well [thinking] that if [Able Danger] had not been shut down that we would have at least been able to prevent something or assist the United States in some way. Could we have prevented 9/11? I could never speculate to that extent."

[edit] Subsequent investigations

On February 14, 2006, Congressmen Curt Weldon charged that contrary to testimony, not all the data on Able Danger had been destroyed. Weldon claimed to be in contact with people in the government still able to do data-mining who got 13 hits on Mohamed Atta. Weldon also claimed that Able Danger information was found in Pentagon files as recently as two weeks ago and that a general was present when the files were taken from the cabinet. Able Danger will be the subject of hearings by the Armed Services Committee on February 15, 2006. [30]

On September 21, 2006, The Washington Post reported that a Defense Department investigation into Able Danger found that Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other hijacker before the September 11 attacks, and that a widely discussed chart was "a sample document passed to the military as an example of how to organize large amounts of data," and was created after 9/11. Congressman Weldon disputed the inspectors claims, stating "I am appalled that the DoD IG would expect the American people to actually consider this a full and thorough investigation," Weldon said in an e-mailed statement. "I question their motives and the content of the report, and I reject the conclusions they have drawn." [31]

In December of 2006, a sixteen-month investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded "Able Danger did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to Sept. 11, 2001," and dismissed other assertions that have fueled 9/11 conspiracy theories. The Senate panel of investigators said there was no evidence DoD lawyers stopped analysts from sharing findings with the FBI before the attacks. No Able Danger information was improperly destroyed by Pentagon lawyers. Analysts had created charts that included pictures of then-known Al Qaeda operatives, but none including Atta. A follow-up chart made after the attacks did show Atta. The Senate Committee said its findings were consistent with those of the DoD inspector general, released in September 2006.[20][21]

[edit] Timeline

[edit] References

  1. ^ Data Mining Offensive in the Works - Patience Wait - GCN Magazine, 10/10/2005
  2. ^ Miller, Greg (2006). Alarming 9/11 claim is found baseless. latimes.com. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved on 2007-01-04.
  3. ^ Phucas, Keith. "Missed chance on way to 9/11", The Times Herald, Shelley Meenan, 19 June 2005. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  4. ^ United States Congress. "U.S. Intelligence.PDF" Congressional Record—House. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 27 June 2005. 109th Cong., 1st sess. HR H5244.
  5. ^ Hefling, Kimberley. "Weldon: 'Able Danger' ID'd 9/ll Ringleader", Associated Press, 14 February 2006. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  6. ^ a b Goodwin, Jacob. "Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta?", GSN: Government Security News, Edward Tyler, n.d.. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  7. ^ United States Congress. "U.S. Intelligence.PDF" Congressional Record—House. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 27 June 2005. 109th Cong., 1st sess. HR H5250. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  8. ^ Andrews, Wyatt, The Associated Press. "New Pre-9/11 Intel Questions", Special Report: War on Terror, CBS News, 9 August 2005. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  9. ^ Jehl, Douglas, Philip Shenon, Eric Schmitt. "Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00", New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr., 8 August 2005, corrected 9 August. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  10. ^ Herridge, Catherine, Liza Porteus, The Associated Press. "Source: 9/11 Panel Staffers Probing Documents on 'Able Danger'", FOX News Politics, FOX News Network, 11 August 2005. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  11. ^ Kean, Thomas H. and Lee H. Hamilton. "Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGERPDF (32.1 KiB)." 9/11 Public Discourse Project. 12 August 2005. p. 4. Retrieved 2006-08-03.
  12. ^ Weldon, Curt (12 August 2005). Weldon Responds to Omission of ABLE DANGER From 9/11 Report. Press Release. Curt Weldon Official Web Site. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  13. ^ Weldon, Curt (21 September 2005). Opening Statement: Weldon Testifies Before Senate Judiciary Committee on ABLE DANGER. Transcript. Curt Weldon Official Web Site. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  14. ^ United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. "Testimony of The Honorable Curt Weldon, United States Representative (R-PA, 7th District)." Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing. 109th Cong., 1st sess. S Doc. 1606-4667. Full Committee Hearing Testimony. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 21 September 2005. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  15. ^ --. "Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee." Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing. 109th Cong., 1st sess. S Doc. 1606-2629. ibid. Retrieved on 2006-08-03.
  16. ^ a b Bennett, Brian, Timothy J. Burger and Douglas Waller. "Was Mohammed Atta Overlooked?", Time, Time Warner, 2005-08-14. Retrieved on 2006-08-17.
  17. ^ Herridge, Catherine, Molly Hooper and Liza Porteus. "Third Source Backs 'Able Danger' Claims About Atta", FOX News Politics, FOX News Network, 2005-08-28. Retrieved on 2006-08-17.
  18. ^ Kelly, Mike. "Deadly tale of incompetence", The Record (Bergen Co., NJ), North Jersey Media Group, 2005-08-14. Retrieved on 2006-08-17.
  19. ^ de la Cruz, Donna. "Weldon: Atta Papers Destroyed on Orders", ABC News, American Broadcasting Company, 2005-09-15, p. 1. Retrieved on 2006-08-17.
  20. ^ Miller, Greg (2006). Alarming 9/11 claim is found baseless. latimes.com. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved on 2007-01-04.
  21. ^ Associated Press (2006). Senators Nix Pre-9/11 Hijacker ID Theory. npr.org. National Public Radio. Retrieved on 2007-01-04.

[edit] See also

[edit] Footnotes

↑  The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS's Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States; May 20, 2002

[edit] External links

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