Abib Sarajuddin

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Abib Sarajuddin is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] His detainee ID number is 458.

Sarajuddin, his brother Khan Zaman, his son Gul Zaman, and his neighbor Mohammad Gul, were all captured on the night of January 21, 2002, early during the administration of Hamid Karzai.^[2] Gul Zaman, and Abib Sarajuddin, were released. Mohammad Gul and Khan Zaman were confirmed to have been correctly classified as "enemy combatants.

[edit] Identity

Another Guantanamo captive, identified by the Washington Post was identified as Sarajudim.^[3] Sarajudim is not a name listed on the official list of captives.^[1] The Washington Post reported that Sarajudim was one of eighteen men repatriated to Afghanistan on March 22, 2003, and released with a certificate of innocence by Afghan authorities on March 26, 2003.

[edit] New York Times article

The New York Times published an article about the search for Jalaluddin Haqqani, and how it lead to the aerial bombardment of Sarajuddin's home.^[2] The New York Times article was presented as an exhibit to Sarajuddin's Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

The New York Times article said that Sarajuddin hosted Jalaluddin Haqqini overnight out of traditional hospitality; that other villagers had reported Haqqini's stay; and that American forces had bombarded Sarajuddin's household from the air, on November 16, 2002, killing everyone except Sarajuddin and Haqqini. According to the New York Times, Sarajuddin, and the other three were arrested on January 21, 2002. The New York Times quoted various American officers who predicted that Sarajuddin would soon be released.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Sarajuddin chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[4]

[edit] Previous promises

Before the Tribunal's President proceeded, he addressed a promise made to Sarajuddin by one of his interrogators. Sarajuddin's interrogator had, apparently, promised him that "if he swore an oath on the Koran, and provided a statement, he'd be set free."

The Tribunal's President explained the Tribunal had nothing to do with previous promises; he hoped that Sarajuddin would choose to swear an oath, but that doing so wouldn't guarantee release.

[edit] allegations

Most detainees had the allegations against them read out, one at a time, and responnded to each in turn. But when Sarajuddin had finished his initial statement his Personal Representative suggested that his statement had addressed all but one of the issued in the allegations against him, so it would save time to skip reading out each allegation in turn. His transcript does not record the allegations against him.

[edit] Sarajuddin's initial statement

Sarajuddin described agreeing to a request by a tribal elder, Nazim, to speak to people in four neighboring village, asking them to rally in opposition to the Taliban, at the time the USA was about to attack. The tribal elder, named Nasim, made the request on behalf of Pacha Khan. The Taliban fell so quickly there was no local fighting. The new Hamid Karzai government subsequently appointed Khan the local governor of Sarajuddin's district.

Sarajuddin said a few days later Americans bombarded his house, killing his wife, and a number of other family members.

About a month later American forces came and captured himself, his brother, son, and a neighbor. There was no resistance. He didn't see or hear any sign of gunshots. He had no radio.

Sarajuddin said he still doesn't understand why the Americans killed his family and took him captive.

[edit] Sarajuddin's testimony in response to questions

At this point the Tribunal President wanted to give Sarajuddin an opportunity to answer each allegation one at a time. But Sarajuddin's Personal Representative convinced him that Sarajuddin's statement had answered all the allegations but one -- whether Pacha Khan was a renegade. Sarajuddin responded that Khan was working with the Americans at the time of his capture, and that he didn't feel responsible for what he might have done after his capture. According to the February 2, 2002 New York Times article Pacha Khan was one of the two politicians competing for American support over the city of Khost.

Sarajuddin was asked what training he had in electronics. He replied that he had none, and that he didn't even know how to read and write. He said his son and brother also had no training in electronics and that they too were illiterate.

Sarajuddin said he didn't know who might have denounced him.

[edit] Khan Zaman's testimony

Sarajuddin called his brother Khan Zaman as a witness.

The first questions were posed by Sarajuddin's Personal Representative. In answer to those questions Zaman said he was not present when their household was bombed. He was in Gardez. They didn't have any kind of radio. He didn't know why the Americans bombed their house.

Zaman confirmed that Sarajuddin had tried to rally opposition to the Taliban. He confirmed that Pacha Khan had asked Nasim, the tribal elder.

Zaman confirmed that none of them had any training in electronics, and that none of them could read or write.

Zaman confirmed that there was no opposition to the American.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Sarajuddin chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[5]

[edit] The following factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has traveled out of Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia twice and out of Pakistan once. The detainee last traveled to Saudi Arabia was to complete the Haj around ten or twelve years ago (approximately 1990).
2. The detainee indicated his involvement with Tabligh Jamaat was a religious group comprised of ten to fifteen people who prayed together. The detainee stated he was in a Jamaat once and he traveled to different villages in his area and preached about Islam and the Koran.
3. Some al Qaida members have joined the al Dawa al Tabligh religious organization, identifiable with the Jama'at al Tabligh, which was well known for it's (sic) support to Jihadist causes.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's relatives say that he and his family gave shelter to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the commander of Taliban forces in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, who was fleeing from Kabul.
2. The detainee was told about a report indicating that his son stated that Jalaluddin Haqqani and his bodyguards did come to his house and requested to stay.
3. Jalaluddin Haqqani was creating a Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin base in Waziristan, Pakistan, near the border of Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee explained that in previous interviews he withheld information or provided false information, specifically saying that his house was not bombed.
2. The detainee also stated that he went to the Governor of Khost, Pacha Khan Zadran, to get money to help rebuild his house, in previous interviews the detainee denied that he received money from anyone to rebuild his house.
3. The detainee was seized with three other individuals in an open area near a suspect Taliban facility on 20 January 2002. The Coalition Forces were fired upon during the seizure. The detainee's were in possession of an Icom Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

• The detainee stated that he has never provided shelter (support) to Jalaluddin Haqqani.
• The detainee claims that he does not know of any al Qaida members or training camps within his village of Zani Khel.
• The detainee stated he was still glad the Americans came to Afghanistan. The detainee felt that for the last 20 years the Afghans only knew war, but now that the Americans were there they had a chance for peace. The detainee did not harbor any resentment towards Americans for bombing his house and killing members of his family.
• The detainee stated that he was involved with recruiting people in his village to fight against the Taliban. The detainee's recruiting efforts involved going door to door to request volunteers to fight against the Taliban.

[edit] testimony

Sarajuddin acknowledged going to Saudi Arabia, once, for Hajj.

Sarajuddin denied any involvement with Tabligh Jamaat. He did once worship at a mosque named Jamaat.

Sarajuddin denied that any of his family members ever said that he gave shelter to Jalaluddin Haqqani. He denied that his son stated that Jalaluddin and his bodyguards came to his house and requested to stay. Rather he had a letter from his son that said the complete opposite. The Presiding Officer acknowledged that this letter had been filed into evidence. Sarajuddin asked him if the petition from everyone in his village had been entered into evidence. It hadn't. No one could explain why.

Sarajuddin said he and his relatives and neighbors were not captured in the open, near a Taliban site. They were all captured in their homes. And there were no Taliban installations anywhere in their area.

Sarajuddin said he had never denied that his house was bombed. He had told the whole world his house was bombed.

Sarajuddin said that the allegation that he was denying his house being bombed seemed to contradict the allegation that he went to the governor to request compensation for his house being bombed. However he did not approach the governor himself. His tribal elder Nazim approached him on his behalf.

Sarajuddin denied that there was any firing when he was captured.

Sarajuddin denied that he possessed a transceiver, or that anyone he knew possesses a transceiver.

His Board's Presiding Officer returned to the question of whether there had been any firing during the capture, and said: "I want you to be very clear about this allegation. This particular allegation is one of the (sic) only reasons you were made an Enemy Combatant."

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} Villagers Add to Reports of Raids Gone Astray, New York Times, February 2, 2002
3. ^ "Returning Afghans Talk of Guantanamo: Out of Legal Limbo, Some Tell of Mistreatment", Washington Post, March 26, 2003. Retrieved on February 27, 2007.
4. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abib Sarajuddin's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 36-41
5. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abib Sarajuddin's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 193