Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser

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Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser is a citizen of Yemen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] Naser's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 115. American intelligence analysts estimates that he was born in 1980, in Ma'rib, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

To comply with a Freedom of Information Act request, during the winter and spring of 2005, the Department of Defense released 507 memoranda. Those 507 memoranda each contained the allegations against a single detainee, prepared for their Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The detainee's name and ID numbers were redacted from all but one of the memoranda. However 169 of the memoranda had the detainee's ID hand-written on the top right hand of the first page corner. When the Department of Defense complied with a court order, and released official lists of the detainee's names and ID numbers it was possible to identify who those 169 were written about. Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser was one of those 169 detainees.[2]

[edit] Allegations

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban:
  1. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in Jan [sic] 2001 from Yemen via Syria and Iran.
  2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to "fight".
  3. The detainee received military training in Afghanistan.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or it coalition partners.
  1. The detainee fought against the coalition at the Kabarak line.
  2. The detainee spent six months with a fighting unit at Khavjeh Gar [sic].
  3. The detainee's unit was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces at Mazir-E-Sahriff [sic].

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Naser chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Naser were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[3]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after hearing and speaking with Sheik Al Zindani [sic].
  2. Abd Al Majid Zandani [sic] was an active supporter of Usama Bin Laden [sic]. Zandani was involved in raising funds and recruiting volunteers for the Bin Laden organization. Zandani is also a religious and legal expert for Usama Bin Laden.
  3. Executive Order 13224 designates Shaykh [sic] Abd Al Majid Al Zindani [sic] as a person who commits, threatens to commit, or supports terrorism.
  4. The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in Jan 2001 from Yemen via Syria and Iran.
b. Training
The detainee received training from Emir Abdul Salam on the Karabak front lines, along with forty other troops.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee's immediate commander was Turab al Najdi.
  2. Abu Turab Al Najdi attended the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan, and worked with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines.
  3. Abdul Salam served as a commander at the front lines for Abdul Hadj Al Iraqi, an al Qaida commander who worked for the Taliban government.
  4. An audiocassette tape from Abd Alsalam [sic] addressed to Abd Alhadi, contained a greeting from Usama Bin Laden [sic] to his commanders, specifically Alhadi and Alsalam. Usama Bin Laden also stated on the tape that there would be a second and third very painful strike against America similar to that witnessed on 11 September 2001.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to "fight".
  2. The detainee fought against the coalition at the Kabarak line.
  3. The detainee spent six months with a fighting unit at Khavjeh Gar.
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee's unit was captured by Dostum's Northern Alliance forces at Mazir-E-Sharif [sic].
  2. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment, assault, and inciting of disturbances during his detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

  • The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
  • The detainee denies seeing Usama Bin Laden [sic] while in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would return home to the family farm and get married.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 6, 2004 - page 242
  3. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Abdul Rahman Mohamed Saleh Naser Administrative Review Board May 18, 2005 - page 35
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