Abdul Aziz Abdullah Ali Al Suadi

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Abdul Aziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi is a Yemeni citizen held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantánamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Gunantanamo detainee ID number is 578. The Department of Defense reports that Al Suadi was born on June 16, 1974, in Milhan, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Al Suadi's name was spelled inconsistently on the official documents the DoD has released. On the official lists released on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006

  • His name was spelled as Abdul Aziz Abdullah Ali Al Suadi on the official lists released on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006.[2][1]
  • His name was spelled as Abdulaziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi on the first page of the inclassified dossier released to the Associated Press in early 2005.[3]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

 Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive.  During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant".  Participation was optional.  The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Suadi chose not to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[4]

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Al Suadi would have faced during his Tribunal were:

a. Evidence in support [sic] the allegation:
  1. The detainee is an electrician from Yemen who traveled from his home to Afghanistan via Syria and Iran in September 2000.
  2. The detainee reported to the al-Farouq training facility upon his arrival in Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee participated in advanced training at the al-Qaida Tarnak Farms training facility in 2001

[edit] Personal Representative's notes

Although Al Suadi didn't attend his Tribunal, the brief handwritten notes his Personal Reprentative prepared were part of his dossier:[5]

  • Detainee will attend tribunal, to what degree is unclear.
  • No lawyer/legal representation
  • Circuitous interview
  • In final interview, detainee changed to non-participation.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Al Suadi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[6]

[edit] The following factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen where he heard about jihad from a Sheikh. An individual urged him to go to Afghanistan to participate in jihad against the Russians [sic].
  2. The detainee was urged to help with the jihad and he traveled to Afghanistan near the end of 2000.
  3. The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria, to Tehran, Iran to Mashaad, Iran to Tibett [sic] Iran and the [sic] to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
b. Training:
  1. In 1990-1991, the detainee completed basic training and served as a volunteer National Guardsman in the Yemen National Guard.
  2. The detainee received training with the Rocket Propelled Grenade, AK-47, Puleymot Kalashnikov and a weapon similar to the .50 caliber machine gun. The training took place between 1991-1992.
  3. The detainee attended the explosives course at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. After graduation, the detainee was chosen as an assistant to teach an explosives course at Tarnak Farms.
c. Other Relevant Data:
  1. The detainee was seen at a guesthouse in Kandahar during August 2001.
  2. The detainee and the others were waiting [sic] training while in Afghanistan. An operative stated he assumed the detainee was traveling to Chechnya for jihad.
  3. An operative saw the detainee in January 2002 at a guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was eventually captured. The operative did not know exactly how the detainee traveled there from Afghanistan, but stated typically, a network of Pakistanis would bring them [sic].
  4. The detainee was in a Karachi guesthouse for approximately one month before his arrest. During that time, the Yemenis were waiting to travel home to Yemen. All the men had turned in their cash, passports, and identification over to al Qaida facilitators upon their arrival in Afghanistan, for safekeeping.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.
c. The detainee denied any knowledge of bomb making or explosive instructors. The detainee claimed the entire notion of building a bomb out of homemade materials seemed very strange and foreign to him.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  3. ^ OARDEC legal advisor's declaration (.pdf) from Abdul Aziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, September 3, 2004, page 1
  4. ^ Summary of Evidence (.pdf) from Abdul Aziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, September 3, 2004, page 12
  5. ^ Detainee election form (.pdf) from Abdul Aziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, September 3, 2004, page 15
  6. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Aziz Adbullah Ali Al Suadi's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 207-221