Talk:Xiang Ying

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These victories and, thanks to them, the establishment and consolidation of the Communist bases of Subei were the main cause of the Wannan disaster (southern Anhui) in January 1941: the surrounding and destruction of the headquarters of the New Fourth Army by Nationalist forces, the capture of its commander (Ye Ting) and the assassination of its political chief of staff (Xiang Ying). This famous incident, which was the coup de grâce for the United Front, brings the book to a close. Related and analysed in the minutest detail, the incident directs the reader’s attention towards a third focal point of interest: the inevitable Mao. The infallible Chairman appears to have had a significant share of the responsibility in the January 1941 catastrophe: through his hesitation and the contradictory instructions with which he bombarded Xiang Ying and Ye Ting, his obsession with interpreting Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic choices only in an international context (for example in October 1940, during the signing of the tripartite Pact among the Axis Powers), and finally, perhaps especially, his overwhelming determination to obtain concessions in exchange for the evacuation of Wannan at a time when all that mattered was that they escape at the earliest possible moment and at all costs from the Nationalist forces surrounding them. Xiang Ying himself also contributed to the time-wasting and procrastination, but his responsibilities were regional and he was even less able to conceive the necessary global (quanguo) strategy as Yan’an very often left him in the dark. Even so, he made an ideal scapegoat and, as usual, Yan’an made the most of it: Xiang Ying was a rightwing opportunist, an advocate of surrender, partisan and even lieutenant of Wang Ming… The myth had to be maintained whatever the cost: and Mao never made mistakes.