Wikipedia:WikiProject Pak-Afghan Relations
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Pak-Afghan Relations has always been disputed and bitter since the stablishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947.
Afghanistan and pakistan share 2,500 kilometer-long Durand Line which was delimited in 1893 and recognized both by British India and Afghan Amir Abdul Rehman.
Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line officially, while Pakistan claims the line is an internationally recognized border.
Although both Islamabad and Kabul expressed their good will and determination to have friendly ties and Afghan President Hamid Karzai and other Afghan leaders have visited Islamabad one after another since the formation of Afghan Interim Administration in December 2001, the Pak-Afghan relations remains volatile and will probably remain so due to border disputes, trade issues and mutual distrust in the anti-terror campaign.
[edit] History
Afghanistan ’s frontier with British India was drawn by a British civil servant, Sir Mortimer Durand, in 1893 and agreed upon by representatives of both governments. The border, named the Durand Line, intentionally divided Pashtun tribes living in the area, to prevent them from becoming a nuisance for the Raj. On their side of the frontier, the British created autonomous tribal agencies, controlled by British political officers with the help of tribal chieftains whose loyalty was ensured through regular subsidies. The British used force to put down sporadic uprisings in the tribal areas but generally left the tribes alone in return for stability along the frontier.
Adjacent to the autonomous tribal agencies were the “settled” Pashtuns living in towns and villages under direct British rule. Here, too, the Pashtuns were divided between the Northwest Frontier province and Baluchistan .
After Pakistan ’s independence from Britain in 1947, Pakistani leaders assumed that Pakistan would inherit the functions of India ’s British government in guiding Afghan policy. But soon after Pakistan ’s independence, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan ’s admission to the United Nations, arguing that Afghanistan ’s treaties with British India relating to Afghan borders were no longer valid because a new country was being created where none existed at the time of these treaties. Afghanistan demanded the creation of a Pashtun state, “Pashtunistan,” which would link the Pashtun tribes living in Afghanistan with those in the NWFP and Baluchistan . There were also ambiguous demands for a Baluch state “linking Baluch areas in Pakistan and Iran with a small strip of adjacent Baluch territory in Afghanistan .”
From Pakistan ’s perspective, this amounted to demanding the greater part of Pakistan ’s territory and was clearly unacceptable. The Afghan demand failed to generate international backing, and Afghanistan did not have the military means to force Pakistan ’s hand.
Although India publicly did not support the Afghan claim, Pakistan ’s early leaders could not separate the Afghan questioning of Pakistani borders from their perception of an Indian grand design against Pakistan . They wanted to limit Indian influence in Afghanistan to prevent Pakistan from being “crushed by a sort of pincer movement” involving Afghanistan stirring the ethnic cauldron in Pakistan and India stepping in to undo the partition of the subcontinent. Pakistan ’s response was a forward policy of encouraging Afghan Islamists that would subordinate ethnic nationalism to Islamic religious sentiment.
Pakistan ’s concern about the lack of depth in Pakistan ’s land defenses led to the Pakistani generals’ strategic belief about the fusion of the defense of Afghanistan and Pakistan . Pakistan ’s complicated role in Afghanistan beginning well before the Soviet invasion of 1979 and through the rise and fall of the Taliban can best be understood in light of this desire.
[edit] Cuase of the Civil War
How did Pakistan manage to lose the good will generated by its support of Afghan refugees and Mujahideen during their anti-Soviet struggle? The answer to this question can be found in the near-obsession of Pakistan ’s establishment with extending its influence into Afghanistan . Pakistan should have been content with having friends in power in Kabul after the fall of the pro-communist regime in 1992. Instead, Pakistan ’s intelligence community adopted the attitude of British officers of the 19th century when Britain and Russia competed for influence in Central Asia in the “Great Game” of espionage and proxy wars.
Pakistan funded the former warlord, who fought the Soviet troops, to fight for power and influence. This caused the bloody 1992-1996 civil war which killed thousands of innocent people, forced thousands to flee Afghanistan and completely destructed Kabul city and Afghan infrastructure, including the Afghan military, economy and educational institutes.