Talk:Weimar Republic/Archive 2

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Constitution?

A Political Science professor once told me that the Constitution of the "Weimar Republic" was one of the most beautiful legal documents he'd ever read. Is there an English translation of it available somewhere? Kingturtle 04:28, 3 October 2005 (UTC)

There's a link at Weimar constitution. --Chl 01:01, 5 October 2005 (UTC)
  • In the 'Institution' section re: the Constitution I think there should be some mention of the fact that the document was democratically advanced as regards ages for voting in comparison to Britain, for instance, and that also - I've heard this somewhere - many other European constitutions had provisions for an Emergency Decree like Article 48 (yet those countries did not regress into dictatorship etc.). 60.225.91.120 12:36, 24 October 2005 (UTC)
This and all the other constitutional aspects of the Weimar constitution should probably be fleshed out in more depth, but I think better fit on that page instead of here.
Though I haven't done extensive research into many national constitutions, my observation is that the Weimar Constitution was fairly advanced and liberal. Its flaw — a fatal one as it proved — was that it had insufficient checks and balances against abuses. In this event, the "integrity" of the emergency decree depended on the integrity of the leaders that invoked and executed those decrees, the strength of the democratic traditions of their nation, and the faith the citizens had in their government. Between 1919 and 1933, the emergency decree provisions of Article 48 had been invoked dozens if not hundreds of times. There'd been an incident in 1930 where the Reichspräsident invoked Article 48, whereupon the Reichstag voted to rescind the emergency decree (as was their right by a simple majority vote), at which time von Hindenburg simply dissolved the Reichstag and called for new elections. This was but one of a series of farcical episodes before Hitler's chancellorship. Furthermore, with later governments led by buffoons such as von Papen and von Schleicher under the presidency of a deteriorating old man like von Hindenburg (who I understand never had much in the way of backbone or character), it's not surprising that what little faith Germans had had in the Weimar Republic had long since evaporated by the time Adolf Hitler came calling.
In short, none of the pre-conditions for the safe use of emergency powers were present in Weimar Germany — there were negligable checks and balances, little in the way of democratic tradition, little faith in the government, and the leaders not trustworthy enough to exercise their powers wisely. It is a bit telling that the leaders themselves had so lost faith in the system (and perhaps themselves) that they used Article 48 routinely. One can almost see why even some Germans who didn't agree with Hitler's extreme views welcomed a strong leader as an alternative to "more of the same". — JonRoma 23:38, 24 October 2005 (UTC)

The problem with the constitution was that it was drawn up in the heady days after WWI, where politicians were almost as niave as 1960s hippies. They expected that in the era of democracy everyone would work together in unity and respect rather than be ruled by corrupt tyrants and despostic monarchs. So they failed to provide anything to cover the worst case senario should the electorate elect imbeciles, should politicians become corrupt, or in the case of Hindenburg, should an otherwise honourable man go senile. Many of the constitutions, eg, the Constitution of the Irish Free State, contained flaws caused by niave trust that things would go right, eg allowing for such things as popular referenda on laws which soon went wrong when it turned out that they weren't used by well-briefed voters but by cynical oppositions who convinced voters not by detailed discussions of the law but simplistic political slogans, etc. The Irish and Austrian constitutions both ended up being toughened up and having their more niave clauses dumped. In Weimar, the system contained a fatal flaw: a reich chancellor who was answerable both to the Reichstag and the Reich president. Once the Reichstag disintergrated into warring factions governments relied more and more on the president to enable them to govern through emergency decrees. Added to that, the honourable Hindenburg was never the sharpest penny on the block and by the early 1930s was mentally unfit for the post, showing clear signs of senility. So he could be manipulated. The final and most crazy flaw of all was that if the president died the Reich Chancellor became president. So when Hindenburg died, all the president's immense powers, the powers intended to protect the Weimar Republic, fell into the hands of its destroyer, the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler.

The lesson from Weimar was simple: never less high falutin' dreams of utopia shape your constitution drafting. Be idealistic by all means, but also be realistic, and create sufficient checks and powers to stop parliament becoming too weak or the executive becoming too strong. In simple, don't let democracy's survival depend on the powers and skills of one individual. FearÉIREANN\(caint) 23:57, 24 October 2005 (UTC)

Hello, Jtdirl.
I've been doing some in-depth reading on the German revolution and the early tumultuous days of the Weimar Republic. There's still much more to learn, but at this stage, my view is that the utopian and naive dreams were not so much that these dreams led to a defective constitution. IMHO, the more significant utopianism and naivete may have been in the expectation that the establishment of republican government was in itself capable of healing the deep divisions in German society. One can speculate that Germany was not ripe for an abrupt change in its type of government — say, one that was spontaneously declared. Seems to me that, in the context of the German Revolution, the abdication of the Kaiser, and the signing of the armistice may have all been too much too soon for a Germany that was accustomed to an authoritarian monarchy, and that the nation as a whole wasn't able to make such a major change to the established order. This should be considered in the context of the open fighting in the streets of German cities, and with the traditional power structures (Reichswehr and Junkers) working against the republic. Even some of the Republic's early leaders like Ebert seemed somewhat lukewarm to the idea of republican government, but found the nation already committed to that shaky course.
Under the circumstances — recall that the reason the Constituent Assembly met in Weimar was that Berlin was too unstable — I don't think anyone involved in that assembly could justifiably rely on utopianism to carry the day. It is fair to say that Germany was naive expectations about the terms of the Versailles Treaty until they saw those harsh terms, and naturally the economic and social effects that the reparations would have were also significant factors in the Republic's instability over the years.
On the whole, the Weimar Constitution was an exceedingly reasonable — albeit imperfect — document with ideas borrowed from other republics. Besides the ease at which emergency powers could be invoked, the Constitution's proportional representation promoted fragmentation (20 to 30 political parties represented in the Reichstag after any given election) and in turn impeded the formation of coalitions.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that it was not those structural flaws in the Constitution themselves that created the opportunity for Adolf Hitler. Rather, it was the flaws in the politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers who lacked a commitment to that constitution, and whose actions led the German people to withhold their faith in their government. In other words, Article 48 (and Hitler himself) would have been irrelevant if the various revolving-door governments had actually worked within the parliamentary system to achieve compromise instead of repeatedly invoking the emergency decree powers as a cop-out.
I have read one interesting statement about the broad powers granted by Article 48 made the Reichspräsident effectively a "surrogate Kaiser" with the same powers that the monarch wielded prior to his abdication. In part, this may have been a result of deeply-rooted authoritarianism, but also there existed factions within Germany which hoped to re-establish the monarchy (albeit not with the deposed Wilhelm II himself on the throne). Some of these views even prevailed up to von Hindenburg's death in 1934 until Hitler made it clear who would lead Germany for the coming years. Though I'm by no means a monarchist, the exercise of emergency authority is probably safer in the hands of the average hereditary monarch than in the hands of a party politican who can't even gain a parliamentary majority for his political program.
I agree wholeheartedly with your comments regarding the necessity of checks and balances and the risk of putting one's fate in the hands of a small number of people. — JonRoma 02:26, 25 October 2005 (UTC)
  • You mention the politicians, bureaucrats and military officers, however the judiciary - many of whom were Imperial remnants - didn't help Weimar either: Neithardt's sentence to Hitler after Munich. 60.225.76.7 06:44, 25 October 2005 (UTC)

I think the problem with the Weimar constitution was not that it was fatally flawed, but that if things went wrong, it contained too many flaws that could make the problems worse, and not enough strengths to help solve problems. In a different era it might have worked. But once it hit problems its basic design flaws were used against it. It was a brave attempt at democracy, but shows the problems that occur where niavety overrules restraint and cop-on in drafting a constitution. It was made for a perfect Utopia. Unfortunately for it Germany in the 1920s and certainly in the early 1930s was as far from Utopia as it was possible to be. That was to be its ultimate tragedy. FearÉIREANN\(caint) 01:43, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Hello Jtdirl. I'm curious why you cite naivete and utopianism as the basis of the Weimar Constitution. There's no dispute that it ended rather badly, but I see this more as a matter of a measure of structural weaknes (poor design) and a great deal of misfortune. What's more, I have a growing suspicion that the weaknesses were a result of political compromise much more than they were an act of head-in-the-cloud utopianism. I have only read snippets about the individual politicians who were central to the framing of the Weimar Constitution and, while there are a number who can be called weak-willed, I don't detect much of a radical nature among these politicians; my perspective is that they were a bunch of fair-to-middling leaders, but at least grounded in reality. One would think they could hardly not be so, given the street violence which moved the Constituent Assembly out of Berlin. Even so, at least one attempt to disrupt the proceedings at Weimar was quelled by the military. This is exactly the sort of environment in which I would expect vigilance; it is during times of peace and quiet that it becomes easy to be complacent. As an aside, it would probably be interesting to read the German imperial constitution to see how much of it was incorporated into Weimar — in other words, how many of the principles were borrowed from the Kaiser's time and and how much of Weimar was completely new. I would like to know more about your basis for citing naivete and utopianism. This is not a flame, but is an expression of interest in your perspective and any reading material that might lead me to a different view than I have today. — JonRoma 03:16, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

1918 Revolution

There's another article at German Revolution that doesn't seem to be linked to from this one. The two have a lot of shared content, but it doesn't actually seem to overlap. Any thoughts on whether/to what extent they should be synchronized? --Cantara 19:17, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

Correction

I have separated the sessions of the 23 March and recorded the events in order . I hope this clears up the difficulty .EffK 11:29, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

Hello, EffK. I have cleaned up some of the typos in recent edits to this section.
A larger issue about which I'd like to see consensus from other Wikipedians is
How much detail do we go into on the transition from Weimar to the Third Reich and on what happened after Weimar?
Most historians view Hitler's naming to the chancellorship on January 30, 1933 as the beginning of the Third Reich, but Hitler's unrestrained grip on power didn't really take hold until the enactment of the Enabling Act on March 23 — the latter date being the day when Weimar was dead and buried.
My view is that pivotal events leading to the death and burial of the Weimar Republic should be documented on this page, but that where significant events took place (e.g., the Reichstag Fire Decree or the Enabling Act), those pages would be the most suitable location for the wealth of detail that EffK and others have contributed about the behind-the-scenes maneuvering and so forth. Perhaps the stub Machtergreifung page can be filled in with some of the relevant details. I don't think that events that took place after March 23 have much of a place in the Weimar Republic page. And areas like the relationship between the Third Reich and the Catholic Church may be rich enough topics for their own pages. There's probably a bit of repetition between several pages as well.
Anyway, I'm interested in people's thoughts on these musings. — JonRoma 23:02, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

Thanks, Jon, for removing ([1]) the (even for EffK's standards over-the-top) slander I had overlooked and for cleaning these sections up better than I would have done it. As for Weimar dead and buried, please take Hindenburg's death into account as well, as this was the day that made Hitler's rule final and no longer assaiable by legal means. Str1977 23:37, 17 November 2005 (UTC)

Hello, Str1977:
Thanks, and agreed regarding Hindenburg. I think it's fair to say that the Republic was dead in '33, but Hindenburg was the only German of authority who could conceivably have stopped Hitler, though it's an interesting question what actions he could've taken had he had more lucidity and backbone once the Enabling Act had passed.
Further, one can also not discount the ability of the Reichswehr (the Army) to have deposed Hitler — had they wanted to — at any time up to the time the Army leadership dirtied their fingers by tacit approval of the SA's suppression in the Blood Purge. By the time Hindenburg died a month later, the Army had tied their fate to that of Hitler. — JonRoma 00:04, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

Dear Jon, of course my reference to Hindenburg was only the legal measure by which Hitler could be stopped. He could have deposed him at any time, which would have invalidated the Enabling Act as well, if I remember correctly. This all would have been based on the Reichswehr who would have followed Hindenburg. In fact, there was tension in the air in 1934 between conservatives (Papen et al.) and the Reichswehr on one hand and the SA under Röhm on the other hand. The SA wanted to replace the Reichswehr with itself as a militia. There were some secret talks about ending the Hitler government just as it had begun, by intrigue. Hitler however thwarted these dealings by siding with the Reichswehr and reducing the SA to a political entity and eventually decaptitating his paramilitaries. He did this because he knew that he was doomed if he sided with the SA and because the SA was not what he needed for the upcoming war. The end of Röhm thwarted conservative conspiracies, it earned Hitler the thanks of the military and also some respect from the dying Hindenburg. So I agree with you. Had Hitler not purged the SA before Hindenburg's death, a civil war might have been the result. I don't know with whom Hitler would have sided but in any case he would have come out damaged. Str1977 09:16, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

User:Str1977 Massage of source infringement?

As far as I am concerned , Str has no wikipedia right to massage a source . Perhaps after adjudication ,on discussions which could conclusively source the disproof of the source(in this case Klemens von klemperer ) then perhaps the entire source placed /next to/prior/as logically accepted as preceding at inclusion of source's name/reference , could disappear .

What I will not accept is cavalier change of sourced reference, which the particular user has full knowledge of, the hand in being a direct quote .

If this editor Str1977 wished to disprove the source by disproving the book, its author etc. he could remove it . I do not accept that he has the right to massage the words of that source to his interpretation in the manner that he has done .

I should like to be able to trust users on WP , and be able to turn my back without particularly this user emasculating import against accepted practice referred to above . I am appalled , more by the action than by the equally unacceptable manner in which the editor followed his unaccptable change with a subsequent edit that seems to have had no action other that to tone down the editing description he gave to the previous action.

I am not able due to these type of actions to myself retain much confidence in the contributions by this editor , and I suggest that others carefully check facts and assertions most scrupulously . certainly opinions expressed by him should not override careful presentation of source . EffK 11:20, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

EffK,

  • Though the "hand in" appears in your quote from Klemperer (and hence my second edit, correcting myself, in addition to cleaning up double spaces), there is (to my knowledge) no other book that supports in its claims your interpretation of "gost writership". Hence, I believe that Klemperer was formulating sloppily. My interpretation however is reasonable and supported by Morsey, who was an expert especially on these proceedings.
  • I should like to be able to trust editors, even a recently soft-speaking EffK, not to include such slanderous and possibly hate-mongering passages, as the one Jon removed ([2]) - passages based originally on Nazi propaganda and today spread by either "person too credulous" or "not careful enough" (chose to which camp you belong to, EffK) or by those who have as much love for the Church as Hitler had for the Jews.

Good day, Mr Goodfaith, 11:53, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

Str1977 allowance of Kaas' Importance

Confusion reigns within the Hitler era pages . This editor has possibly stopped removing the sourced assertion that kaas is along with papen the most important facilitator for Hitler's rise to power. he has not entirely stopped removing links to these factors of Kaas from the civil of the ecclesiastical pages, but he seems to begin to allow more balance. I decry that this should have taken so long for me to achieve, and claim that here there is still in-admissable gap in the relevant historical facts , and denial of linkage , and bad faith accusation that all this is my conspiracy . As it applies to this article as much as Nazi Germany I bring this talk here under 'Industrialists' following .

Industrialists

I note that Consolidation of Power on Nazi Germany contains nil reference to the Industrialists . Indeed this subject is hard to find anywhere in the German history pages, very hard . Str1977 rejects this below as off topic to Enabling Act (consequences) so I bring it here where it should form inform us as to out-come. .This is brought in by John Toland as immediate consequence of Hitler's rigged success .The subject of the magnates bank-rolling Hitler prior to the rigged success is completely absent here on Weimar Republic, and so is their link to his supposed economic miracle, concerning which this sheds light.

I emphasize that the Industrialists during the last winter of Weimar, commoded Hitler, along with others , but were the financial equivalent of the Enabling Act ie vital rigging in the sail to dictatorial power .

The Reichstag success also brought into the open a number of industrialists who had supported Hitler , and unlimited credit was extended to the regime in the form of Mefo bills ( Metall-Forschungsgesellschaft A.G.) which could be drawn by Government contractors , that acted as a form of promissary notes and which allowed Hitler to re-arm on a large scale.

With a link to Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Magnates. Why this blind-spot ? Why are we behaving as if the Nuremburg Trials , and their American lessor trials concerning Trading with The Enemy , never happened . There is effective absence of the truth , as sourceable, throughout Wikipedia Nazi pages. To point this out is not meant to be offensive , and I reject any suggestion that this is POV .

EffK 12:14, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

Balance

This article is way out of balance. Consider, there are currently 2,778 words on all of the Weimar Republic until Stresemann's death in 1929. (That's from "The period of German history from ..." until "marked the end of the "Golden Era" of the Weimar Republic".) and 3,486 words on the demise of the WR ("The Republic crumbles ..." until "if Hitler had not been named chancellor".). Granted, its demise is an important subject but isn't it a bit overblown. In my calculation I have not counted references etc and have also removed a unintegrated and unbalanced paragraph. Str1977 21:46, 26 November 2005 (UTC)

Nonsense and an edit that de-clarifies history .I revert .EffK 08:15, 27 November 2005 (UTC)
I have expanded the article as to its meaningful import and description from Papen on-wards. If someone decides that the story leading to the death of democracy and the resulting after-math of war is too long, then it will have to be forked ,again seemingly. Rosenberg is not frightened to speak of the true national forces by name, and it could be noted that this article and others have not availed hitherto of such clarity. I suggest that present incarnation of the same political forces may desire removal of such clarity as it redounds un-fortunately to such present blocs . I believe it is self evident that the actual history requires our fullest understanding, due to the world shattering results suffered by all , despite user:Str1977's counting of word numbers. EffK 10:11, 29 November 2005 (UTC)
AS you say, the demise of the Weimar Republic is an important subject. Word count alone is a poor argument for claiming this story is unbalanced. -- KarlHallowell 16:39, 7 December 2005 (UTC)
I never denied that it was important and the remedy to the imbalance is adding to the first half. However, one should not add minute details to the "demise" part to worsen the balance ven more. My call was merely pointing this out, not suggesting deletions. Str1977 17:33, 7 December 2005 (UTC)
Demise is surely a euphemism, murder was practised in the achievement of the demise: I ask Str1977 for proof that it was in any way a legal demise , and in the absence of such, I consider all the German or Thirties Articles to be skewed badly. Whatever is needed, it is understanding, howsoever many details are required, howsoever many words, or sections or pages. Tell us here and now- how do you understand that the arrests and murders of the Deputies was made legal, when Papen himself claimed negative knowledge of their mal-treatment,incarceration and deaths? EffK 00:52, 8 December 2005 (UTC)
Mr EffK, you can ask for "proof" any day of the week but you will not get any for this. You argue with yourself about that. Demise doesn't imply legal. I did not imply anything but only took up what Karl said. Str1977 01:49, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

Death of Weimar

This is the simplest the demise of the Weimar Republic can be assessed by me. *1:Demise is too passive a word as I don't think there is any legal basis for the Hitler conspiracy against Weimar, which is why Papen answered in the negative as to his knowledge of mal-treatment/arrests of deputies at his Trial. *2:Papen knew 'political opponents' were being arrested, but did not allow that he knew that this included deputies. *:3The logical inference is that Hindenburg's "Reichstag Fire Decree" did not cover anti-constitutional deputy arrests,*:4 and therefore the seizure of power was initiated by illegal conspiracy at at least 6 March when the arrests were, it appears, effected. This would explain Goering's statement that he/they needed no legality, cared for no legality, in this. *:5 However it rather begs the question: If Hitler knew the balance of the Reichstag to be affected by the day after the last free elections, 6 March, then the scenario of the Nazis 'robbing you car anyway', carries backwards to then. Hitler knew that he could rob the car/Reichstag from as early as this. *:6 Papen says he did not understand/know. We do know what Papen and Bruning and the rest of the Centre thought re the EAct vote. We know that Bruning was pushing a saving line re:Inquiry for the Fire/anulment of the 5 March elections:it would perhaps appear that Bruning knew that deputies were in captivity at 6 March. As Bruning himself argued right through to the 23 March against the Enabling vote,as treachery, only caving in to the promised letter negotiated by Ludwig Kaas c 22 or 23 /EAct day itself, presumably he saw the same alternative referred to at that Centre Party Germany 23 meeting by Kaas' words.This sourced: that a rejection of the EAct by the Centre bloc, would fracture the unity of that bloc(fraction' was the word). Bruning claimed that assent to the majority would of itself destroy the future identity of the Centre Party, in opposite to Kaas' analysis. *:7 Either way what is interesting is to relate these two opinions back to the period 6 March-15 March(when Hitler spoke at cabinet to the effect that he had the Centre's assent in the bag).From the Trials it is clear now that the first Coalition Cabinet met on the 30 January and, that the 15 March Cabinet simply gives a date for when Hitler thought he had that assent.*:8 We do not know why he thought so, but can relate it to your Str1977 original interpretation of the car's gonna be stolen anyway : Hitler may have simply suspected that the Centre would fold , but his "breezy confidence" of 15 March came from something more than suspicion. *:9 Vice-Chancellor non-Nazi Papen's activities, while "personally close" to the highest in the Vatican, and, in the absence of determining documentation (required from at least the Vatican Archives) could have determining bearing upon this breeziness. *:10 It is clear from the Trials that Papen considered accord and integration of Christianity as central to the future composition of the Reich. As the Protestant churches were heavily infiltrated with Nazism, it does not appear that the major problem was Protestantism. Rather it is clear that Papen strove to incorporate the Catholic Church as at least equal "bulwark" against out-right unspecified darker national/spiritual alternatives. It was Catholicism that Hitler had to tame, not German Protestantism. *:11 Catholics always (except in this instance of the eventual Reichskonkordat) retained autonomy of conscience subject completely to the pontiff (often called Rome). *:12 Hitler succeeded in requiring complete reversal of this autonomy, and that every cleric should obey the Government (by the time of the 20 July signing this meant in effect the NSDAP alone).*:13 Again, we know that Papen was building the bulwark from before January 30, and that *:14 Papen had close personal ties to Vatican power.*:15 Vatican power which in two days publicly assented itself to the known-to-be-brutal Nazis. *:16 Papen arrived in Rome on the 9 April, secretly with Ludwig Kaas. *:17 Kaas had the first Cardinal Pacelli audience, odd in itself. So later in the day Papen met with Pacelli. *:18 The following day Goering turns up , and he and Papen have an audience with the pontiff. The pontiff expresses his diplomatic pleasure as to the "un-compromising" strength of the new German Government . (At this later date it was clear that the un-constitutional, or as yet proven otherwise, arrests of the deputies had Enabled this strong man in Germany uncompromisingly opposed to ,well, such as these very KPD Communist Deputies. *:19 With no Reichskonkordat negotiations save a presumably brief Papen/Pacelli meeting the day before, the pontiff welcomes the uncompromising Hitler Government. This clear demonstration of shared motive, anti-communism whatever the means, appears to have been sufficient to over-ride that unconstitutionality of anti-communist KPD arrest and murder, which Papen claimed no knowledge of but which the other present on the 10 March Papal reception, Goering, on 6 March had publicly spoken of as being in-judicial . Negotiations between Papen for the Government and Pacelli for the pontiff suceeded in the one meeting of the 9 March, following his train journey with Kaas, which had seen Papen leave Berlin itself on the 8 March. Were it not for the two other factors, being Kaas , and being the avowed close personal relations Papen had with the highest powers( and there is only one highest power)in Rome, we could say that Papen had really solved the entire likely future of Catholicism in Germany in this one tired meeting, and that he achieved a successful co-ordination to Rome that had eluded both the German catholics and Rome, for centuries back.*:20 Kaas we know met Pacelli first, and Kaas presumably did not hover with Papen in ante-chambers and Hotel but was in fact a party to the out-come of the morrow, being assigned the task of completing the draft ot the Concord.*:21 In contrast to presentation of Kaas as incidental and un-important, is the curious shuttling he made between Rome and Berlin, of which this was the second journey,and being the final, bringing his self-exile. *:22 What makes the shuttle even more interesting to all historians is that Kaas had a mysterious, because totally private, meeting with Hitler after his first shuttle, as still Chairman of the Centre Party. *:23 We know that the Centre Party held meetings at which Kaas as Chair summarises members' positions prior to a vote. We do not know on what basis the Hitler meeting was held. We know that it was secret and we know that prior to it Kaas was in the vatican from 24 March to 31. He may have arrived on the 25 March, and he may not have arrived back in Berlin until the 1 April. *:24 We know that Kaas also had links to the vatican powers, that he too had close personal and Church/ P.A. relations to Cardinal Pacelli,the second highest power, originating in the previous decade . *:25 We know that formally Kaas went to Rome on the first shuttle to concern himself with problems in another matter to do with two towns. *:26 We know that as Centre Chairman, Kaas co-chaired with Hitler meetings that interpose between Hitler's breezy assertion in the Coalition Cabinet on 15 March, and the final handing in of the Centre vote consequent upon these meetings. *:27 We know that Kaas was deputed on 9 April at a Pacelli meeting, to draft the Reichskonkordat, if not at that first meeting , then at another meeting after possibly the Papen/Pacelli meeting of 9 April, but on 9 April. *:28 Of the actual 2 April Kaas meeting with Hitler, there is no account sourced thus far. It is said that this meeting was to have cleared up out-standing issues consequent on the Enabling Act. *:29 Histories mention the meeting, but all that appears in them consequent upon Kaas' vote at the enabling ct of 23 March, is the "Gentleman's Agreement" "most sardonic hypocrisy" of Hindenburg's letter to all the Centre leaders, which arrived somewhere around 24th or 25 March, when Kaas was in the vatican.*:30 We know that historians laugh at this letter and compare it with the peculiar and Kaas negotiated separate promised constitutional guarantee, which Kaas at the last moment of the 23 Reichstag Act did not receive . *:31 We know from histories and documents: record of Hitler's 23 u-turn Speech referencing the Holy See, the 28 March u-turn allowing catholics enter the NSDAP.*:32 Historians do not specify at what point the apparent quid pro quo negotiations open. *:33 The clean answer thus far presented in these Articles, is that Papen and Pacelli opened the negotiations on 9 April. *:34 That Goering appeared for the congratulations on behalf of the NSDAP-Nationalist German Government. *:35 We know that Hitler continued in his policies of conspiracy through-out, adhering to all prior published NSDAP plan, which was to destroy Parliamentary Democracy from within. *:36 Historians say that this is a rolling processs, and the Nuremberg Trials tried exactly this, as a crime of Conspiracy against the State. *:37 Therefrom arose the following fact that Hitler's conspiracy evolved within this co-alition. *:38 The Communists and quickly after the rigged Enabling Act, the Socialists are, in the first quasi- and second, then legally (the SPD) destroyed . *:39 The demise of the Weimar parties does not happen at the 23 Act. *:40 Hitler brilliantly rolls the 30 January opportunity/ process forward. *:41 He negotiates through his policy u-turn of the 23 March 1st session Speech towards the crucial shifting of, if not total allegiance , then utter toleration from, the entire Centre apparatus in both press and representatives. *:42 This is we know effected(viz Margaret Lambert)from 28 March, well before Kaas and Papen visit Rome on 9 April. In fact we see that that catholic Centre co-operation throughout Germany appears at the same u-turn made at the Fulda Bishop's Conference of 28 March . *:43 We see that the Holy See policy itself either allowed or effected a u-turn in its policy prior to the supposed start of negotiations on 9 April. *:44 Thus do historians carefully hint at quid pro quo. *:45 We know that they follow from the Nuremberg Trials, and that these themselves seem to grind to halt at the very edge of the mass or force of the Holy See. *:46 Papen shows that the Trials' Prosecution asserted the Reichskonkordat itself to be a "maneuver intended to deceive" . *:47 We know that in the rolling conspiracy, that the first word of auto-dissolution by the Centre Party, comes from the British Envoy and emanates from within the Vatican. This curious fact predates the first NSDAP formal acceptance of the Concordat, as from 5th to 12 July. *:46 The NSDAP only ratifies the Concordat in early September. *:47 We know that from before 30 January, that Papen worked to institute the fullest Church involvement as "bulwark" against Nazi 'anti-christianity'.*:48 That this process paralleled in time the Nazi destruction of all other parties. *:49 We have witnessed report of the Holy See's own rolling process as far back as May 1932, and we can only imagine as to whether the document referred to for that instruction has originating record within the Vatican Archive for May 1932. *:50 As the Holy See desired the Concordat and,it is claimed, even came to curiously desire the destruction of political catholicism in Germany, then we may see in future more light shed upon this history that so affected the world. *:51 History knows because of the Nuremberg Trials how Hitler effected the separate goal of mastery of the NSDAP, and that this was not complete at these events in time but that its own rolling process continued. *:52 We,lastly, know that in fact the Holy See was, at other linked moments in history, careful to avoid a future paper trail, so, whether even should all Archives be revealed, history will be any the wiser, is unsure. All the above was sourced as Neutral Point of View.

  • 53 My only conjecture is that Kaas stitched it up over the head of Papen, that he made a private deal with Hitler confirmed c 22 March by telephone. *:54 This was, and I have said this before, Hitler's idea: Kaas would persuade the Centre to vote by referring to the Hitler letter of guarantee, knowing that it would not arrive but equally knowing that the sardonic hypocrisy agreement would arrive later, but that by this means Hitler would finally achieve Kaas' master's bidding through an appearance of good-faith.*:54 As Str1977 always said, the car(the Reichstag) was going to be stolen for sure( by arrests) and it was simply whether you take the option of selling it cheap to the thief beforehand. *:55 To Kaas the car (the Centre) was not the object of concern, to the Holy See the object of concern was not the Centre, to Papen the Centre was not the object of concern, to Hitler the Centre was not the object of much concern (at 15 March he believed/knew it would crumble).*:56 Kaas had many meetings with Hitler prior to the Enabling Act, and opportunity for personal agreement made as to that which not Papen, but Kaas, could deliver from his true allegiance as a Prelate of the Catholic Church.
  • 57 Really, the Catholic Church seems to have, if you ignore its requirement for an anti-communist tryranny, obtained little else of great significance. Some considerable state recognition in the home of Martin Luther, but loss of autonomy; some continuing financial benefit, but perhaps ruination of its earlier German investments. In all a lot more problems than favours, excepting the 20th Century European defeat of atheistic nihilist Russian Communism.
  • 58 Kaas is described from es early as 1949, in a book that ran to 50 editions(ie. a lot of books) as being prevailed upon by the Vatican after his arrival on 9 April, to volubly commend Hitler. *:59 This he does by the 23 April, when he produces a Vatican approved declaration of approbation upon Hitler's Birthday, which Vatican stamp is reproduced by the million in the German Press.*60 We know catholic voters in droves join the NSDAP consequent on the quid pro quo ,whatever question remains as to how and when this starts. *:61 Kaas is not only assigned to draft the Concordat but is given the cushy and most convenient vatican position, which makes him the keeper of the keys of the vatican. *:62 Kaas figures later, in documents that are open, as involved in Vatican secret negotiations during the War. *:63 He also obtains a spectacular chance to oversee no less than the un-earthing of, perhaps, the very Tomb of St.Peter. *:64 The Keys are remarked upon whereas the Widerstand secrecy is only recently known.
  • 65 As far as one can tell the Archival position in the vatican now, is that there is not the man-power to catalogue or open the records between c 1923-24 and 1939, so everything pertaining to Kaas, Papen, Hitler and approbation thereto is as mysterious as it is possible to be. *:66 Only at the Cologne Synagogue new-pontiff's visit did public call arise directly to a pontiff that the Archives be opened. *:67 Since the Archive for the War is open, one can presume that the call relates to this earlier period. *:68 Or the call relates to the un-answered 47 questions concerning Pacelli-as-pontiff knowledge of the Holocaust. *:69 The Commission of enquiry into the knowledge of the Holocaust has not attempted to delve into any of the history of papal involvement during the rise of Hitler. *:70 The Commission has collapsed under its editor's inability to resolve its directions of enquiry for the War years. It requested more records and in the lack of them did not reach a conclusion .
  • 71 The many questions of the totalitarian rise of Hitler and of the Vatican enter completely into what is termed conspiracy-theory with Rolfe Hochhuth and questions of money. *:72 The shadowy figure of Papen here hovers close to the shadowy figure of Pacelli, accused by Hochhuth of having backed the Nazis for the sake of vatican investments in German Heavy Industry . *:73 Papen hovers because of his relationship to the German bankers and theirs to the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Magnates all of whose part in the rise of Hitler is entirely documented. The theory surmounts what is known by concentration on these financial investments, which existed, and which, presumably theory or not, were invested with the Magnates. *:74 The amounts seem paltry in today's stock-markets, but the accusation repeated by Hochhuth's Play The Deputy characterises the investments as reason for Pacelli-driven papal policy during the rise of Hitler. *:75 In so far as they were real , this is not theory, but the subject of how international capital relates to germany and to its magnates and banks opens a vast multi-national record that dwarfs any vatican Archive, and wherein lie extraordinary connections between people and their interests since. *:76 Herein theories abound which of their own weight, drive back-wards in time to the foundations of the U.S.A and the parts played in it by representatives of European and specifically south-German post-medieval Capital. *:77 It is a very interesting subject, yet could appear idle in its furtherest speculations until the casual reader discovers that not one but two of the three national British Newspapers forming public-opinion in the Thirties , were owned by descendants of precisely such Capital. *:78 At once the mysterious politics of Appeasement invade in their stark reality into the picture of "conspiracies" in a way that demands serious rationality . *:79 Hochhuth's Play , the history of the Thirties and the entirely logically resulting War interlink in manner to alert us to remaining forces materially as important as the Vatican remains spiritually. These forces provide the material day to day comforts that spiritually the remaining Vatican dispenses . The structures of our lives are enabled and so dominated, and as ever the spirituality, as from the Vatican, concedes this domination. Present Vatican counsels belie the essential underlying domination by Capital. *:80 Conspiracy theory on one side confronts secrecy on the other, in impasse. This information is delivered here in the good faith that rational thinking pre-supposes.
    81 All of the preceding points work on the premise that the Demise of Weimar was at the Enabling Ac. My recent perusal of source relevant to the legalities at Reichstag Fire Decree discussion relate the effective death of the Republic to October 1931 and the imposition of un-constitutional decrees thenceforward. All rule from then was un-constitutional .
    82 I remain interested to know how anyone can read the Section 2 of the enabling Act and still consider that any approximation to legality exists in the last 23 march freely elected Reichstag sitting. Deputies could not be arrested . Deputies represent not their voters but all the people. Their sovereignty can no more be legally removed, than can all the people be removed. Hitler knew that he had to rule with the assent and co-operation of the people.

EffK 13:56, 8 December 2005 (UTC)

links to other wikis

The links to wikis using non-Latin Characters in their title names have had those characters replaced by ?'s and should be fixed.

Echo Accolade

Their choosing the article I take as an accolade. EffK

Duplication

There are two sections that contain a similar sentence. One section is November and 'Socialist General' Schleicher. The other section is Reichstag Fire. They both have the sentence that begins with "Eyeing the Catholic..." and ends with "...dissolution of the Reichstag." This repetition slightly devalues the article.Lestrade 15:01, 13 January 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

The answer is that Hitler in fact eyed their centre seats at both separate occasions, therefore the solution is for you please to add the word "Again" prior to the second 'eyeing'. I do not enter articles, as I am told that I cannot be believed , and I dislike irrational tail-gaters telling me so and excising my good faith. I therefore suggest you do so , Lestrade, or anyone.
I believe the Rhenish-Westphalian Industrial Magnates , who are the red link to financial interests still here, as they were deleted with only one supporting vote recently, need to be re-recognised. They are saved upon the new page Cberlet put up called Hitler's rise to power, fortunately.( And perhaps that should be capitalised as with book titles?) I therefore suggest that a direction be interposed into this article at the appropriate point.
EffK 11:50, 23 January 2006 (UTC)
I explained this but Str1977 makes the excision to it anyway despite the brief clear explanation to Lestrade,, and now it is wrong. For what its worth pointing out.EffK 22:25, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

The two passages clearly refer to the same election and are identical. If you don't want others to clean up behind you than don't leave such a mess. If you do, don't complain that others do it not to your liking. Str1977 23:30, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

I again re-read and you are correct , so OK to that you re-point out.. clever you...One swallow does not a summer make tho. I'm here because there's a second exact duplication of Reichskonkordat, and Lestrade and you both missed that- so no one's finding this easy- probably my messed editing too. When are you gonna allow the RKKdt back into AH mainspace, Str1977? Its key to source, central in Shirer, part of the deal everywhere. If it was so important why is it invisible except here? You were offered it limited to the quid pro quo you accepted, but you POV charged it and the charge that it singled out the Centre is gonna have to fail. There is no RKKdt at AH, despite plenty of other less important factors, it is off Nazi Germany, and here on Weimar it is neutered. It is shamefully successful of you. And I can't be blamed for including any purely pasting mess whilst you were pumping POV buckshot into my back non-stop, now can I? Anything actually wrong of mine that you wish to raise, please raise it ? I raise your wrong, now, when do you raise factual wrong, sourced wrong, not a pasting duplication? Where is my POV pushing in the articles exactly? i see a large acceptance of the consitutional illegality marred by largely legal at Enabling Act. Do you wish to sat that the change to Wikpedia which I have sourced, and which is becoming apparent , is POV? Why aren't you fishing it all out, exactly? EffK 04:18, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

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