Talk:Viktor Suvorov

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Talk:Viktor Suvorov/Archive1: August 2004 - January 2006

Contents

[edit] Suvorov's works -- new paths or much ado about nothing?

Mauno Koivisto has written: “Suvorov’s style of writing is distasteful, harping and sophistic. In addition to tendentiousness, his texts involve obvious mistakes.” Nevertheless, Koivisto has “diligently tried to keep abreast with the on-going discussion on the topic in Russia” and probably referring to newer Russian sources, accepts the basic reasoning of the planned Soviet offensive theory.

Naturally, one shouldn’t regard Suvorov as an infallible genius nor even as a conventional historian. But his new attitude to the old matter has done a favour to the objective history. The 'official WW2 history' does not hold water on many crucial points, and that’s obvious to every objective mind.

1) After all, why was this Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded? The idea of 'gaining time' and 'delaying the inevitable German attack' doesn’t even vaguely make sense, for how was this paper meant to hinder the German invasion? Had the Germans planned to invade before signing it, they could have done it anyway, were there a non-aggression treaty or not. And a direct consequence of the pact was the outbreak of war, which the Soviets were said to have feared. Where’s the logic?

2) What was the backgound of Soviet-German military and economic co-operation, that contributed to Hilter’s survival during the allied blockade of 1939-1941 (how was it in the interests of the USSR, sheavering before German might)?

Three-eighths of the oil used by Germany in 1940 came from the Soviet Union, including high-octane spirit for the Luftwaffe to fight the Battle of Britain. From the start of the war until Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin had supplied Hitler with 1.5 million tons of oil, the same quantity of grain, many thousands of tons of rubber, timber, phosphates (for making explosives), iron and many valuable metal ores, particularly chromium, manganese and platinum. At the time of the invasion, Germany was heavily in debt to the Soviet Union.

Was Stalin preparing Hitler so that the latter could invade him?

3) Koivisto has been wondering: “If Stalin was not yet ready to invade, then why were they not preparing for defence? [...] As I was writing this book, I re-examied the uncensored version of Zhukov’s memoirs in order to find out, if there were any references to possible Stalin’s invasion plans in summer 1941. There were no references, but Zhukov painted an unvarnished picture of how brusquely had Stalin forbidden all the defensive preparations.”

If the Soviets were waiting for the German invasion (and according to 'official history', nothing could have been more anticipated!), why were usual defensive measures not taken? Why was it that “the fortifications were rather demolished than set up” (Koivisto) and munition was deployed next to border (so that it could fell to enemy's hands immediately after the invasion)? How could they have been taken by surprise? Constanz - Talk 12:40, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

1. Very simple. Stalin was always paranoid about possibility that Germany and Western Powers gang up against Soviet Union. So he wanted to act to ensure USSR would not be in a war alone against all other major powers, and make a pact with West against the Germans. West did not accept. So, he went to next best option. Remember, the Pact was proposed by Germans, not Soviet.
2. "Was Stalin preparing Hitler so that the latter could invade him?" This passage makes little sense. If Stalin wanted to invade Hitler in 1941, why ship him raw materials which would help in coming war against USSR?
3. Lets give up "fortresses were being demolished" myth, shall we? They were demolished in Stalin Line, which was now far beyond Soviet border. Instead, they were being built on the new line at the border. Soviets were prepared for defense. They were just not prepared for kind of defense in depth required against German spearhead tactics. Red Army was in sorry state in Summer 1941. This contrary to what Suvorov claims about immensely powerful Red Army. And Stalin was not blind about shortcomings (having partly caused them in the first place...) --Mikoyan21 22:52, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

I'm afraid you're either missing the point or repeating old myths. Where's the proof that Great Britain and France were forming an alliance against USSR? Who was going to invade Soviet Union in 1939?

According to you the demolishing of the Stalin Line was because Soviets believed war would have been lost had the Germans reached so far. Well, why did Stalin risk taking new territories in 1939 and moving border away from defensive lines (turning them useless). You belive Germany was to invade Soviets as soon as possible and Stalin paranoically feared it. Did he then take this immense risk, naively believing the new (Molotov) line could be built overnight, eh?

As for hinterland of signing the MRP and failed tripartite negotiations, I would advise you reading some materials on the theme before presenting your Soviet apologies. Even if we believe Stalin dreaded Western military plot, we have to conclude that he could choose between two sides: Anglo-French and German. According to you, he somehow suspected the British more than Hilter (?!), albeit this choice led directly to war, which an alliance with the Western democracies could have prevented.

"Where's the proof that Great Britain and France were forming an alliance against USSR? Who was going to invade Soviet Union in 1939?" What the Western Powers were planning, and what Stalin was worrying do not need to match. The Western Powers had tried to eliminate emergent Soviet Union, and after that USSR lived in perpertual fear that it might happen again - even though in reality, the threat became non-existent very soon.
As for the Molotov line, an unfinished line is better than no line at all. Again, Suvorov supporters fail to address core question - if Stalin planned to invade, why was he building defensive preparations? --Mikoyan21 10:44, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

Not a very serious objection. I may offer similar rhetoric: if Stalin was only defending his country, why did his warlord plan almost exclusively offensive operations? User:Constanz/Draft#Soviet_strategical_planning--Constanz - Talk 15:52, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

I read your draft - I'm not sure what exactly you tried to prove there? All it seems to contain is that Soviets indeed had offensive warplans - not exactly news. Suvorov's thesis is very specific, in that USSR planned to invade and conquer entire Western Europe, and they planned it in summer 1941. Nothing there advances that thesis. --Mikoyan21 08:01, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
Constanz, your question No. 1 has puzzled me for quite some time now and I can't find any answer to it. In particular, how come was the Soviet Union defending its borders with Hitler's Germany by the pact, if it was the pact itself to establish those borders? If it wasn't for the pact, the USSR would have no border with Germany to care for in the first place. But this is obviously OT here. //Halibutt 13:47, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
There are some other people curious, and not on the last place some non-conventional professional historians. As mr. Nordling has wisely noted, so far for a couple of guys A professorial chair at Oxford seems to [have] be[en] tantamount to a license to write sheer rubbish. [1] --Constanz - Talk 09:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)
Interesting article. It seems that that 'licence' is not limited to Oxford and Cambridge only. Just take the latest Lukacs's book! Thank you, Constanz. Barbatus 15:31, 6 July 2006 (UTC)
Things become especially funny when the Anti-Suvorov authors themselves produce self-contradictions and break laws of logics: On the whole, Aleksey Valerevich appears as a typical Soviet-era agitator-propagandist, who bulkily and heatedly told about the sad lives of negroes in the US and from this concluded (!), that to live in the USSR was better than in anywhere else. You cannot argue with an agitator-propagandist, it is only possible to laugh at them.--Constanz - Talk 11:45, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Tripartite negotiations

What I've read, clearly show that the Western leaders were willing to sign a treaty. At first they tried to prevent forming an actual military alliance (believing two blocks would necessarily lead to war) but then they succumbed to Soviets and proposed common military action. The military-political treaty was to be signed during the common military conference summoned to Moscow in August.

BTW, it was Soviet side that suggested 'normalising' Soviet German relations (end of May 39), but Hitler soon rejected such talks. [2] (Never heard of?).

On March 21, Great Britain recommended appearing with a common declaration of the USSR, Britain, France and Poland that would have obligated the participants to start common consultations in case of whatever European country in danger of being invaded. Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov refused to sign, referring formally to the absence of Poland.1

According to French foreign minister Georges Bennet’s project (April 29), Soviet Union would have committed itself to giving assistance to two Western powers in case they were taken in war against Germany because of Anglo-French fight against violent changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The Franco-British side was to offer assistance to the SU under same circumstances. the Soviets didn't rerspond (fearing a trap and secret Anglo-German-Polish plot ...?)

In May, it had bacome clear that no informal alliance could be formed between the Western allies and SU. The western leaders gave up and suggested military alliance. A couple of proposal were made by both sides. On June 2, 1939 Soviet Union submitted its own project, which was discussed during the next two months, until the Western allies eventually almost completely accepted it.

The project suggested tripartite military action under three circumstances:

  • in case the European Power (i.e Germany) attacked a contracting party
  • in case of German agression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, or Finland (all of whom the contarcting parties had promised to defend)
  • in case of involvement to war of a participant due to rendering assistance to a European country which has plead for aid.

(Not enough for USSR to remove the German threat...?)

After seemingly endless discussions on the definition of 'passive agression' etc the Western powers yielded to pressure and agreed to Soviet demands, including the requirement to automatically declare war on Germany in case of her aggression on the Baltic states (July 1). But it didn’t seem enough for Soviets and Molotov began demanding Western states to automatically enter the war in case of ‘indirect aggresion’ or renouncement of neutrality (of E.European states) under German pressure etc. Such points were included in the Soviet proposal submitted to the represenatives of the Western powers on July 9, 1939. 1

The Western powers submitted their final proposal on July 17. The Western powers agreed with Soviet demands and Molotov responded on July 10 with the suggestion that the treaty should be signed together with military convention. On July 23, 1939, all three parties of negotiations reached the conclusion to summon the military delegations to Moscow. 1

And yet the treaty wasn't concluded: “The military negotiations lasted from August 12 to August 17. On August 14, Soviet side raised the claim (for the first time), that the treaty should fix the acceptance by Poland and Romania of Soviet troops on their territory in case of war. Klim Voroshilov assured no treaty would be signed unless such approval. As the Polish attitude was well-known, such a demand could only be an excuse to broke the negotiations.”1

Another stumbling stone was the Soviet demand (from August 15) for Anglo-French naval forces to push for the Baltic sea immediateley after the outbreak of war (?!). The British and the French were to use ports of Aland, West Estonian islands (Saaremaa, Hiiumaa), Pärnu, Liepaja etc. From the point of view of naval warfare, that demand was rather peculiar as instead of using British and French naval forces in order to block German ports and defend allies’ supply lines, the navy would have been closed to Baltic ‘plash’. To this the Western allies, quit correctly, replied by requesting Soviet Navy to be sent to the North sea and the Mediterranean in order to fulfill the allied vacuum.

Nevertheless, the Western allies hoped the treaty could be signed and they even pressurised Poland to let Soviets occupy their territory (the Western powers even threatened to denounce military alliance with Poland unless she accepted the terms).

Source (it's copyrighted, so I need to cite): *↑  Loss of independence of the Baltic states from the viewpoint of European global politics -- Kimm, Einart. Balti riikide iseseisvuse kaotus Euroopa globaalpoliitika vaatevinklist // Akadeemia (1991) nr. 10, lk. 2167-2187 ; nr. 11, lk. 2384-2403

BTW, I'VE GOT A SUGGESTION -- IF YOU WISH TO CARRY ON DISCUSSION, LETS SUBMIT IT TO USER TALK PAGES. Otherwise this page here would soon need archiving again. Constanz - Talk 12:56, 20 January 2006 (UTC)

First, what is old myths? Does it mean we have new myths now? The proof of GB's and France's intention? Well, 67 years later the access was allowed to all Western archives of the time, then you would get the proof. So far, the backscene negotiations are hiden from public. Using greatly beloved argument against the USSR, "i wonder why".
Stalin line. How do you imagine defending territory to the west of the line then? Hand out chop sticks to local population so they could stab several nazi soldiers and many more would die and retreat from laughing? Your point does seem to miss basic military logic at least. Building a new line from raw resources is pretty costy and that time it was hardly affordable.
MRP. This seem to become the our favourite discussion :) Can you present evidence that Stalin could choose Anglo-French side? Churchill was pretty descriptive, I guess, saying in summer 1941 that the UK should support the loosing side of Nazi-Soviet war. Or, calling to hold 'barbarians' rather to the east of Stalingrad during the battle. I know PM wasn't Churchill at the time, but it is impossible to argue independence of British politics. In the end, he came to power not through a revolution. The view was always there. Okay, not always, but since 1856.
What were they gonna sign with the USSR in August 1941, provided their delegation had no authority to sign anything with an exception of restaurant bills? That's to say the least.
Let's not discuss the history of negotiations between the west and the ussr as it is definitely too big for here. Shortly, you may want to ask Austrian and Czech governments of how much support the UK and France were to them and how helpful the west was. especially provided french guarantees for czechs and british unbelievable efforts to hold the french back. with poland, it is obviously needless to mention their refusal to let soviet troops in the czechoslovakia. even by strictly defined corridor, which was even accepted by british. having this experience, it was obvious an unneccessary will to eliminate a possibility of the same situtation happen in the future if the treaty with anglo=french bloc was signed.
soviet contribution to german economy. should we compare it with american and british loans to nazi germany in 30s? their cooperation with germans both in technical and economical fields? you tell give me the person who refuses western economic contributions to nazi's rise. btw, what was the US selling to Japan in 1938, when the latter invaded China and organised a genocide? were these natural resource? machines? how does it compare with soviet-nazi economic cooperation in which the ussr was selling low % iron ore to germans as only one example? [xiaoxiong]

You claimed: Churchill was pretty descriptive, I guess, saying in summer 1941 that the UK should support the loosing side of Nazi-Soviet war Your ideas are simply worth kindergarten. Had you read only a little bit, you would know that Churchill never expressed such an opinion, on the contrary: In a telegramm to Roosevelt (June 15, 1941), Churchill had suggested rendering Soviets every possible assistance in case a war between Germany and USSR broke out. Roosevelt accepted it without reserve (June 21). (Meltyukhov 2000:507-8) What is more, Churchill had expressed opinion that Soviet takeover of E.Poland was in British interests, as in the future, the Eastern front might be set up (nay, you maintain Churchill hoped this front would have ended up with Soviet defeat). I'm afraid I have to say it-- considering your previous claims as if Germany had had troops in Finland before the Winter war (proof?) etc -- please stop posting such rubbish here, until you do not have any proof for your 'sensational' ideas. As for this idiotic idea of Stalin 'preventing capitalist alliance', I've brought reference here to show Stalin had chances to cope with German 'threat', which he didn't. I've said my word in Talk:MRP and if you find it inaccurate, then discuss it there. And with regards to the military co-operation, you might consider this as well [[3]]. Constanz - Talk 17:45, 5 March 2006 (UTC)


The previous author must have mistaken Truman for Churchill.
I beg your pardon, but in my opinion your whole long article on Tripartite negotiations is quite useless, because according to Soviet history books and modern day opinions of some, the people representing the Western delegation had no authority to sign anything therefore all possibility of a treaty was stalled by the western side and this is the point that one should concentrate on. I'm yet to see any book by western author with the details of WHO was representing the British and the French side (where are the names dammit?! We all know that the Soviet side was represented by Voroshilov but what about the other two sides?) and WHAT KIND OF AUTHORITY these people had. --Theocide 10:47, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Recent changes

Hello, I hope all will find the changes I made to this article today to have improved it. I found the article as it stood full of unreferenced claims such as "some critics" or "his opposition." I believe we must fight against these "straw man" arguments and only present actual criticism and reference to actual works. Otherwise this whole article looks less like an academic debate and more like a school yard fight.

If any find my changes unwarranted or harmful, my apologies and hopefully a process will start today that will result in a better entry in the long term. JQ 04:21, 13 February 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. The article used to read like this: 'Suvorov is the author of sensational claims with no proof' (an obvious lie: Russian researchers have found remarkable proof; on the other hand, no documental proof for Soviet defensive planning exists), 'his theory is no longer discussed/studied by historians' (exactly the opposite is true, with regards to Eastern Europe&Russia), 'no serious (military) historian takes suvorov's claims into account' (though even in the West there are exceptions such as mr A.Weeks; in Russia, scholars worth mentioning are M.Meltyukhov, V.Nevezhin, V.Danilov).Constanz - Talk 13:06, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
Dear Constanz, you changed the following passage…
“In sum, Suvorov's thesis has attracted some support; however, this support tends to come from political leaders, not from professional historians.”
into...
“In sum, Suvorov's thesis has attracted some supporters both among politicians and especially in the Eastern Europe amongst professional historians; unfortunately, support from military historians has not been discussed in the West.”
Some questions that I think you really need to address in the article if you want to keep this wording. What professional historians in Eastern Europe have supported Suvorov’s thesis? If you are going to include this information in the article you need to give the names of his supporters in the article. The article only includes references to polititions who publically support Suvorov, not professional historians.
The second part, “support from military historians has not been discussed in the West.” This is incorrect information. Suvorov is frequently discussed among military historians of the Soviet-German war in the West in the west and across the entire world. His thesis is not accepted by most military historians, but it is discussed. How else would he be so well known in the United States?
Perhaps you would find acceptable this change. “In sum, Suvorov's thesis has attracted some support; however, this support tends to not come from professional historians.”
Best regards, JQ 14:45, 14 February 2006 (UTC)
I'll give reference to those professional historians who support his thesis (as already mentioned, Mikhail Meltyukhov is a professional historian supporting Soviet assault plans theory (see Stalin's Missed Chance). Constanz - Talk 15:14, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Anon's criticism, moved out of article

Observation from a reader of the books : I strongly recommend that this article should be regarded with extreme caution, because it seems that its author had not read the books himself. In his first book, Suvorov does NOT claim that the BTs were designed to operate on German autobahns. The term used by him is "good roads". The tank designed for Autobahns was A-20, which was a new model based on the BT concept, and the work on the project started in 1938, when Germany HAD autobahns. Those who do not believe me, I recommend checking the chapter 3 from Icebreaker, called "Why the communists need weapons". So, in the case of BTs, is not about autobahns, but about better roads, and, indeed, the german roads were in a much better shape than the soviet ones in 1931. The second argument is also feeble : in 1931, Germany and Soviet Union lacked a common border, but Stalin's intentions were to bring the Red Army in the Central Europe through Poland. Maybe the author of this argument would do well to remember that such an attempt was made in 1920, when the Red Army launched an offensive towards the West (which, by the way, according to the bolsheviks proclamations, was directed towards Germany) and only the unexpected defeat of the soviet troops led by Tuckhacevski against the poles stopped the soviets from reaching the german border. This also says a lot about the military talents of Tukhacevski, which, according to many articles, was a great general and his death costed the Soviet Union the defeats from 1941. If he had not been capable of defeating the poles, would he have stopped the Wehrmacht ? <by user:85.186.90.199>

"but Stalin's intentions were to bring the Red Army in the Central Europe through Poland". Where exactly were those intentions stated? The claim that A-20 was designed for Autobahns is equally ludicrous. Btw, Poles and Americans had Christie type tanks too - I guess they were going to invade Germany too? By the way, the high point of career of BT tanks was in Soviet Far East, against the Japanese. I wonder how, since according to Suvorov, they should have been useless there? --Mikoyan21 10:39, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
Not very serious rhetoric. Poles and Americans had Christie type tanks too - I guess they were going to invade Germany too? US and USSR were rather different, I suppose, with regards to ideology, leadership, aggressiveness etc. and naturally, also, intentions.--Constanz - Talk 15:57, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
Pfft. You miss the main point - there is absolutely no way to talk about one's aggressive or defensive intentions based on an army's technological pecularities. Never were and never will be. There are no "agressive" types of weapons, well with exception for Suvorov's imagination that is.
And the tanks with caterpillars were extremely popular also in Sweden and in many other countries. Why? Because at that time the technical thought of tank construction was like that - many believed that tanks should be both with wheels and with caterpillars. So why single out the USSR? Why make up false "proof" unless you have some sort of agenda to push? --Theocide 10:56, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
Yes, this amongst the chief problems of Suvorov's thesis. Since he has no hard evidence, he must rely on circumstantial evidence - which as such, would be perfectly fine if his arguments made sense, but since they are along the lines "Direct fire artillery is good for defence, indirect fire for offense, since Soviets had more latter than former, they must have been preparing for invasion", it makes one wonder, how on Earth he has so many supporters?--Mikoyan21 13:37, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Lack of indepth critics

Too bad that nobody actually cared to post some of the most serious critics of Suvorov: the critics which proves that he is a biased and dishonest author providing false quotes, false numbers, false technical characteristics and using propagandistic methods of work which renders his work hard to evaluate as a historical one. <by User:Theocide>

I'd appreciate if you could prove some of his alleged lies, proving that he is a biased and dishonest author.--Constanz - Talk 09:00, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Sure. The most evident example is his constant playing with numbers - like giving the amount of German tanks of 3300 on the Soviet border vs. the overall amount of 23000 of Soviet tanks, even those in the Far East, Middle-Asia, including those under repair and those that are being modified, etc.

Yeah, but probably Soviets still outnumbered the Germans, as contemporary research shows (some users here have reported that the ratio is similar to that given by mr Glantz):
June 21, 1941. Soviet-German front
Red Army German Army (inc allies) Ratio
Divisions 190 166 1.1 : 1
Personnel 3,289,851 4,306,800 1 : 1.3
Guns and mortars 59,787 42,601 1.4 : 1
Tanks (incl assault guns) 15,687 4,171 3.8 : 1
Aircraft 10,743 4,846 2.2 : 1

Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” --Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Yep, so? Are you discussing Suvorov or everything at once? Whether the USSR was or was not planning an offensive is a completely different thing. Right now, I'm talking about Suvorov's fakes. Deliberate fakes, I dare say. And the question that arises: why play with numbers, false quotes and fakes unless you have an agenda?--Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

He deliberately provides only parts of Mein Kampf so as to proof that Hitler didn't consider the slavic people to be inferior and to make the readers (especially those who never read Mein Kampf) believe that the book shows Hitler's only main intention - to defeat France.

Hilter's hatred towards the slavs (and just every nation except the germans) was of course true. With regards to defeating France, Suvorov seems to have a point though:But the Russians knew Germany and the Nazis. They had read Mein Kampf. They learned from this book not only that Hitler coveted the Ukraine, but also that Hitler's fundamental strategical idea was to embark upon the conquest of Russia only after having definitely and forever annihilated France. The Russians were fully convinced that Hitler's expectation, as expressed in Mein Kampf, that Great Britain and the United States would keep out of this war and would quietly let France be destroyed, was vain. They were certain that such a new world war, in which they themselves planned to stay neutral, would result in a new German defeat. And this defeat, they argued, would make Germany—if not the whole of Europe— safe for Bolshevism (Ludwig_von_Mises, [4])--Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Where exactly in Mein Kampf it is stated that Germany would attack bosheviks only after defeating France? --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

He claims tanks with letter "A" in their names to be special "Autobahn tanks" which were supposedly designed especially to drop their caterpillars and drive on wheels on good german roads during the Soviet offensive, while in reality the letter "A" meant that the tank was on the design stage (for example, T-34 before being launched into production was named A-34) and the country with a big amount of tanks possesing both wheels and caterpillars was Sweden. I wonder, how Sweden was planning to attack Germany?

His division of weapons into "offensive" and "defensive" ones is way out of this world and is either a demonstration of one's idiocy or a well-prepared provocation.

He quotes Liddel Hart as saying that "Hitler told his generals that Stalin was preparing for an offensive..." and the three dots hide the rest of the sentence which goes like "... but when the generals crossed the border they saw that Stalin fooled them". In other words, Suvorov provided only part of the quote so as to imply that his opinion is somehow shared by Liddel Hart.

True, I've heard of numerous other examples like this. This of course doesn't refute the Stalin's offensive thesis, though.

Once again, there is "Stalin's offensive thesis" and there are "Suvorov's books". Right now I'm mostly discussing the second. HIS proof of Stalin's offensive doesn't hold since it consists of many fakes. --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

but when the generals crossed the border they saw that Stalin fooled them", well many Germans regarded the situation as this:Hitler stated that the Soviets had placed a huge number of divisions along the German-Soviet border. What I saw when traveling through that forest were huge masses of well-camouflaged tanks, artillery, trucks, and other war materiel. Slonim was then only some 30 km. from the German-Soviet border and I must believe Hitler when he speculated that he had taken the jump against the Soviets because a few days later, they would have attacked. To judge from that much war materiel, I am inclined to believe Hitler. Remember: the Nazis were not the only ones who lied through their teeth. [5]--Constanz - Talk 15:33, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

What was that? The link is broken. --Theocide 11:09, 5 May 2006 (UTC)
You broke the link yourself. Constanz

One could go one forever showing his false quotes and false information.--Theocide 09:42, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Typical Suvorov trick is his comparison of Wehrmacht and Red Army. In that, he takes German forces at the Eastern Front (minus other Axis) and compared them to total size of Red Army, Navy, Air Force and NKVD combined. If I wanted to reverse the trick, I'd point out that there were 2.6 million Red Army soldiers facing total of 7.1 million Germans (total size of the German armed forces) plus 1 million+ (Finnish Army alone almost half a million) Axis troops...--Mikoyan21 10:50, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

I'd point out that there were 2.6 million Red Army soldiers facing total of 7.1 million Germans hard to believe, unless you give your sources. My source paints different picture (glance the table, if you have not yet done so)--Constanz - Talk 15:54, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
Constanz, relax. Mikouyan simply says that it is possible to manipulate with numbers in this way as well, by taking them from different contexts. `'mikka (t) 17:01, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

If we do exactly what Suvorov did, only reversing the sides, then we indeed get 7.1 million Germans (combined size of Heer, LW, KM and SS) vs 2.6 million Soviets (total strength of three Western Military Disricts). Of course, this is only one example of Suvorov's number game. His other trick is to compare Soviet division counts to Cold War era division counts to make it appear like Red Army was humongously large. By same logic, Finns must also have been planning invasion somewhere as Finnish Army had more divisions than US Army has today...--Mikoyan21 17:11, 1 May 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Further sources

Our bibliography is expanding all the time - may-be it would be wiser to sort the titles according to their relationship to the thesis: i.e *support/partial support, *critical or may-be *contra/*pro like here. Otherwise it'll turn out a mess one day.Constanz - Talk 09:15, 22 September 2006 (UTC)

By all means, Constanz! We can sort овец от козлищ ... would you do it yourself? —Barbatus 11:20, 22 September 2006 (UTC)
I surely can't decide on alll the titles, many of which I'm still completely ignorant. I'll add a new section here so as to edit it on talk.--Constanz - Talk 11:58, 22 September 2006 (UTC)
Aha! Here I can add my две копейки ... and more :) —Barbatus 14:25, 22 September 2006 (UTC)
Very well, such sorting is obviously to the benefit of the article, its credibility and usefulness for readers. I doubt if there's so much encyclopedic about the thesis and titles somewhere else to be found on the web.--Constanz - Talk 15:36, 23 September 2006 (UTC)
I added some more important German titles. Probably it's time we added the list to the article.Constanz - Talk 08:26, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Books and articles by other authors

[edit] Pro or partially pro

  • The Attack on the Soviet Union (Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV) by Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ewald Osers, Louise Wilmott, Dean S. McMurray (Editors), Ernst Klink (Translator), Rolf-Dieter Müller (Translator), Gerd R. Ueberschär (Translator). New York: Oxford University Press (USA), 1999 (ISBN 0-19-822886-4).
  • Dębski, Sławomir. Między Berlinem a Moskwą: Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941. Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2003 (ISBN 83-918046-2-3).
    • Reviewed by R.C. Raack in The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 718–719.
(based on that review—Barbatus)
  • Hoffmann, Joachim. Stalin's War of Extermination. Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (ISBN 0-9679856-8-4).
  • Maser, Werner Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Olzog, München 1994. ISBN 3-7892-8260-X
  • Maser, Werner Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin, Olzog, München 2004. ISBN 3789281344
  • Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2).
  • Raack, R.C. "Did Stalin Plan a Drang Nach Westen?", World Affairs. Vol. 155, Issue 4. (Summer 1992), pp. 13–21.
  • Raack, R.C. "Preventive Wars?" [Review Essay of Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka, ed. Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 3d ed. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-596-14497-3; Mel'tiukhov, Mikhail. Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu 1939–1941. Moscow: Veche, 2000. ISBN 5-7838-1196-3; Magenheimer, Heinz. Entscheidungskampf 1941: Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen. Aufmarsch. Zusammenstoss. Bielefeld: Osning Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-9806286-1-4] The Russian Review, 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 134–137.
  • Raack, R.C. [Review of] Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945 by Joachim Hoffmann, Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
  • Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History", World Affairs. Vol. 158, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 198–211.
  • Raack, R.C. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. (ISBN 0-8047-2415-6).
  • Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Plans for World War Two Told by a High Comintern Source", The Historical Journal, Vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1031–1036.
  • Raack, R.C. "[Review:] Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945", Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
  • Raack, R.C. "[Review:] Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffspläne 1940/41 by Walter Post; Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politishe System der SBZ by Stefan Creuzberger", Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Sring, 1998), pp. 212–214.
  • Topitsch, Ernst. Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 (ISBN 0-312-00989-5).
(the review is contra.—Barbatus)
  • Weeks, Albert L. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).
  • Ziemke, Earl F. The Red Army, 1918–1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to America's Ally. London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004 (ISBN 0-7146-5551-1).
(this one is still on my TBR list, so I follow the review by Thomas Titura—Barbatus)

[edit] Contra

  • Acton, Edward. "Understanding Stalin’s Catastrophe: [Review Article]", Journal of Contemporary History, 2001, Vol. 36(3), pp. 531–540.
  • Erickson, John. "June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" History Today, July 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 7, pp. 11–17.
  • Edmonds, Robin. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4. (Oct., 1990), p. 812.
  • Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998 (ISBN 0-7006-0879-6).
    • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 207–208.
    • Reviewed by Roger Reese in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), p. 227.
  • Glantz, David M. "[Review: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1991), pp. 263–264.
  • Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999 (ISBN 0-300-07793-0).
    • Reviewed by David R. Costello in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 580–582.
    • Reviewed by Stephen Blank in The Russian Review, 2000, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pp. 310–311.
    • Reviewed by Hugh Ragsdale in Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 466–467.
    • Reviewed by Evan Mawdsley in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3. (May, 2000), pp. 579–580.
  • Lukacs, John. June 1941: Hitler and Stalin. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006 (ISBN 0-300-11437-0).
  • Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3).
  • Roberts, Cynthia A. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293–1326.
  • Rotundo, Louis. "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War. (Apr., 1989), pp. 277–299.
  • Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lev A. Bezymenskij (Hrsg.): Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, Darmstadt 1998 (der Band enthält alle wichtigen Dokumente)

[edit] Neutral, cautious approach

  • Keep, John L.H.; Litvin, Alter L. Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium (Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions). New York: Routledge, 2004 (hardcover, ISBN 0415351081); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 041535109X).
    • See Chapter 5, "Foreign policy"

[edit] Category still needs to be clarified

  • Ericson, Edward E., III. "Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1936–1941", German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 263–283.
  • Haslam, Jonathan. "Soviet–German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out [Reivew Article]", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 785–797.
  • Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin and the German Invasion of Russian 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State?", International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 133–139.
  • Humpert, David M. "Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited." Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2005, 18, pp. 59–74.
  • Koch, H.W. "Operation Barbarossa—The Current State of the Debate", The Historical Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 377–390.
  • Roberts, Geoffrey. "On Soviet–German Relations: The Debate Continues [A Review Article]", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8. (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471–1475.
  • Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?" The Slavic Review, 1999, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 626–643.
  • Vasquez, John A. "The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation", International Political Science Review, Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 161–178.

[edit] Irrelevant polemics in this article; no clarity

I think this article suffers from excessive and disorganized polemics, although its overall organization is good. The description of Suvorov’s ideas seems to be too long and includes too many details. This could be done more concisely. Yes, Suvorov likes to present his views in a highly provocative manner, because he wanted people to read his books. For example, he argues that Allies did not win WW II. This war began from the German invasion of Poland. But it ended up by the Russian occupation of Poland. Thus, the initial goal of the war (to liberate the Poland) has never been accomplished. The actual winner of WW II was Stalin who installed the satellite Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, North Korea, and China. Is that logic valid? I think everyone can decide for himself. Suvorov also emphasized that Soviet Union began WW II on the side of Nazi Germany, when both countries almost simultaneously attacked the Poland, as has been agreed in the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. These ideas of Suvorov are probably important to mention, but I could not find them clearly stated in this article.

Main contention of Suvorov is that Stalin planed to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. Therefore, he provided a significant material and political support to Hitler, but at the same time created a very powerful Red Army to then “liberate” the broken Europe from the Nazi occupation. Suvorov argues that this war was lost by Hitler from the very moment he attacked the Poland, because he started war with UK and France, while the Russians were waiting to attack him from the rear at the most appropriate moment. This left Hitler with no other choices but to lunch a pre-emptive strike on Russia, which provided him an important tactical advantage but was strategically hopeless. Stalin was able to accomplish his plan with respect to Eastern Europe. I am not judging if this concept is right or wrong. I only think it is very clear and logical. So, it should be presented as such in this article.

Should this Wikipedia article discuss all “pro” and “contras” of Suvorov’s ideas? I do not think so. All sides have made their arguments in the books. After all, this article is about Victor Suvorov, not about his opponents and supporters, most of which are also described in Wikipedia. The critics argue that that Red Army was poorly prepared for the war. Suvorov justifies the opposite. Moreover, he states the Soviet Union was so strong because it had very powerful allies, UK and US, which is an undeniable fact. That is why Hitler has lost WW II. I do not see any other serious disagreements, if to put aside production of certain tanks, Ceausescu, and other minor details, which are not essential for readers of Wikipedia. For example, Suvorov tries to justify that Stalin planned the attack on Germany in July 1941 (see “Day M”), but the official Soviet version “states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for international war because he knew he would have to free Europe of Fascism”, as correctly written in this Wikipedia article. So, the difference is only in timing! Both sides agree that Stalin would eventually “liberate” the Europe. This part also could be more concise.

So, please tell me what you think. If there are no strong objections, I could try to modify this article to make it less emotional and more clear and concise. --Biophys 02:06, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I basically agree with you. The article pays too little attention to Suvorov's thesis, and once it used to read like arguments against Suvorov, until I and some others started adding support. But again, I would appreciate if you began a rewrite with regard to first sections of the article (the thesis itself), providing necessary references/sources.Constanz - Talk 10:54, 23 October 2006 (UTC)
So, I started the editing. We must remember that Suvorov is a living person. Therefore, we must be neutral. Currently he is a writer, not a GRU operative. Also, he is known for his books. Would you call Lev Tolstoi "an army officer", because he served in Russian Army? Besides, the contribution of Suvorov to understanding of history is such that he certainly should be described as "historian". I thought it is important to say something about his main ideas from the beginning. But this can not be done in a single sentence. In the next section, this should be done in more detail, including the thesis about the intrinsically agressive Kommunist regimes and so on. Nickname of Suvorov is irrelevant in this context.Biophys 23:14, 24 October 2006 (UTC)Biophys
Agreed as to the points mentioned here.I myself am leaving wikipedia for a while, for I'm disturbed by a certain unencyclopedic attitude elsewhere. When possible, I'll join editing Suvorov page later.--09:12, 25 October 2006 (UTC)Constanz - Talk
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