United States v. Booker

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United States v. Booker

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 4, 2004
Decided January 12, 2005


Full case name:	United States v. Freddie J. Booker; United States v. Ducan Fanfan

Citations:	543 U.S. 220; 125 S. Ct. 738; 160 L. Ed. 2d 621; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 628; 73 U.S.L.W. 4056; 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 70

Prior history:	Recommendation to deny motion to quash, No. 03-026, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24609 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2003); defendant convicted, sentenced, W.D. Wis; sentence reversed and remanded, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004)

Subsequent history:	Amended January 24, 2005. On remand, defendant resentenced, W.D. Wis.; affirmed, 149 Fed. Appx. 517 (7th Cir. 2005)

Holding

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by requiring judges to determine facts for criminal sentencing, and so are to be made advisory rather than mandatory, in all cases currently pending on direct review. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded.

Court membership

Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Case opinions

Majority by: Stevens
Joined by: Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg
Majority by: Breyer
Joined by: Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg
Dissent by: Stevens
Joined by: Souter, Scalia
Dissent by: Scalia
Dissent by: Thomas
Dissent by: Breyer
Joined by: Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy

Laws applied

U.S. Const. amend. VI

United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan were a pair of cases decided together by the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Court held, relying on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that the Federal guidelines were unconstitutional for the same reasons they found in Blakely. The Guidelines were instead made advisory by the Court, as it severed the provisions in the United States Code concerning the Guidelines' mandatory nature.

In Blakely, the Court held State of Washington's sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, as it allowed a judge to enhance criminal sentences based on facts other than those decided by a jury or confessed to by a defendant. The Federal guidelines, which were similar to Washington's, were called into question.

1 Case Background
2 Supreme Court opinion
3 External links

[edit] Case Background

[edit] Booker

On February 26, 2003, Booker was arrested after police officers found 92.5 grams of crack cocaine in his duffle bag. He later gave a written statement to the police admitting to selling an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine. In 2003, a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin found Booker guilty of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) provided for a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison with a maximum sentence of life.

At sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant: (1) distributed 566 grams over and above the 92.5 grams that the jury had to have found and (2) had obstructed justice. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the judges finding increased the defendant's base offense level from 32 to 36, U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(c)(2), (4). The enhancement for the drug possession and obstruction of justice (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) made Booker's sentencing range of 30 years to life; the judge sentenced Booker to the minimum.

Booker appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit claiming the sentencing guidelines violated his Sixth Amendment rights as the judge was able to find facts, other than his criminal history, that determine the defendant’s sentencing range absent findings of the jury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Booker's conviction but found the application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely, reversing Booker's sentence. The Government appealed the 7th Circuit's ruling to the Supreme Court.

[edit] Fanfan

Narcotics agents discovered 1.25 kilograms of cocaine and 281.6 grams of cocaine base in Fanfan's vehicle and arrested him. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine found Fanfan had conspired to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). The maximum sentence for Fanfan under the Federal Guidelines, without any additional findings, was 78 months in prision.

At sentencing, the judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, determined that Fanfan was responsible for 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder, and 261.6 grams of crack and was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity. This would have resulted 188 to 235 months sentence under the Guidelines, which was a 10 year increase in the sentencing range above thatwhich the jury found. The Supreme Court issued its Blakely decision four days before the judge imposed Fanfan's sentence. The sentencing judge believing that Blakely had implications on federal judges increasing sentences on facts not found by juries, imposed the 78 month maximum sentence based on the jury's verdict. The Government asked the judge to correct Fanfan’s sentence, which was denied.

[edit] Consolidation

The Government filed a notice of appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court in the Fanfan case. Due to the importance of the case, the Supreme Court granted the petition and as well as a similar petition filed by the Government in Booker’s case, following the 7th Circuit's ruling in favor of Booker. The Government asks the Court to determine whether the Apprendi cases applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, and what portions of the Guidelines were constitutional.

[edit] Supreme Court opinion

On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued two majority opinions written by Stevens and Breyer respectively. Stevens writing for the majority found that the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Blakely, applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court cited its previous rulings in Jones, Apprendi, and Ring to support their ruling. Stevens wrote, citing Blakely: Our precedents, we explained, make clear "that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. The court also found, as the dissenting opinions in Blakely recognized, there is no distinction of constitutional significance between the Guidelines and the Washington procedures. The court acknowledged that if the Guidelines as written were advisory, rather than required, then the Sixth Amendment would not be implicated. However, as the court pointed out, the Guidelines as written are mandatory and binding on all judges. The opinion reaffirmed the Court's holding in Apprendi, that:

Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Breyer's opinion, the Court addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § §3553(b)(1), the section of the statute making the Guidelines mandatory, could be severed. The Court concluded that §3553(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) which depended upon the Guidelines’ mandatory nature, were unconstitutional, and therefore needed to be severed or the Guidelines would be struck down. Breyer wrote that the two sections could be severed and the intent of Congress in passing the supporting legislation for the Guidelines could remain intact. The Court left it open to the United States Congress to pass legislation to "devise and install, long-term, the sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal system of justice."