Umar Abdullah Al Kunduzi

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Umar Abdullah Al Kunduzi is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] His detainee ID number is 222.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal's President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Mobley
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Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal's President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Mobley

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Kunduzi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[2]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Kunduzi were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[3]

Al Kunduzi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[4]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. After Jalalabad fell to Northern Alliance forces, detainee admits to fleeing to the Tora Bora region with another known al Qaida figure where he sought refuge in a cave for approximately one month and was armed with a Kalishnikov rifle.
  2. While in Tora Bora, the detainee carried a rocket-propelled grenade and was assigned the responsibility for preparing mortars for use as directed by the cave commander.
  3. The detainee and others were led out of the Tora Bora region by the leader of the Khalden training camp, who has been linked to Usama Bin Laden, Abu Zubaydah and several other major al Qaida leaders.
  4. While some people left their weapons behind as they were fleeing Tora Bora, the detainee chose to continue to carry his, along with three additional magazines.
  5. Following his flight from Tora Bora, detainee was captured along with a number of other armed Arab men by Pakistani military forces after crossing the border from Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee attended a terrorist training camp.
  2. The detainee attended urban warfare training at a training camp in the city of Murad Beek.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was identified as a fighter for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
  2. The detainee was separately identified as fighting along with the Taliban and other Arab fighters aligned with Usama Bin Laden.
  3. The detainee was seen at various guesthouses in and around Kabul in the summer of 2001.
  4. Detainee admits to traveling with armed Taliban forces to the Tora Bora region to escape U.S. bombings.
  5. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan along a route commonly used by al Qaida recruits: by air from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to Doha, Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan; and by ground from Karachi, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee admits to staying at the residence of a known al Qaida facilitator in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee admitted that some of the people staying at this guesthouse had weapons.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee repeatedly expressed a desire to kill a military guard.
  2. The detainee stated that he really wanted to be let free so he could kill "bad" Americans.
  3. The detainee stated that while he has never had ill feelings for Americans prior to his detention, he has now developed particular contempt and disgust for America as a result of his detention and treatment while in custody.
e. CSRT
  1. The detainee admitted he had a Kalishnikov while staying in the cave in Tora Bora.
f. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee threw water on a guard protesting the treatment of another detainee.
  2. The detainee struck a guard while being unshackled.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. CSRT
  1. The detainee stated he did not know the people he fled to Tora Bora with were members of al Qaida or Taliban.
b. Excuplatory
  1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to visit his familiy, not to fight.
  2. The detainee stated that he did not fight with al Qaida or the Taliban.
  3. The detainee stated that he was never recruited into the Taliban or al Qaida by anyone.
  4. The detainee denied that the names and phone numbers found on him when he was captured were those of al Qaida members; instead, they were of his brothers and friends.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee stated he has an uncle who is a friend of General Dostum and is a supporter of the Northern Alliance.
  2. The detainee stated that if he were released he would simply return home and would not harm anyone unless they were the aggressor.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  2. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Umar Abdullah Al Kunduzi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 75-77
  3. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Umar Abdullah Al Kunduzi Administrative Review Board - pages 59-61
  4. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Umar Abdullah Al Kunduzi's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 55