U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war

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Donald Rumsfeld meeting Saddām on 19 December – 20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984; the same day the UN released a report that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The NY Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name."
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Donald Rumsfeld meeting Saddām on 19 December20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984; the same day the UN released a report that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The NY Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name." [1]

The United States implemented a policy of support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War as a counterbalance to post-revolutionary Iran. At various times, the support took the form of technological aid, intelligence, the sale of dual-use and military equipment, and direct involvement and warfare against Iran.

The United States was among several powerful countries that supported Iraq during the war, including Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and West Germany.

On 9 June, 1992, Ted Koppel reported on ABC's Nightline that "It is becoming increasingly clear that George Bush Sr., operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s, initiated and supported much of the financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq into [an aggressive power]" and "Reagan/Bush administrations permitted — and frequently encouraged — the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq.”

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[edit] Initial U.S. reaction to the Iran-Iraq War

According to then National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, during the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the United States initially took a largely neutral position on the Iran-Iraq war, with some minor exceptions.

First, the United States acted in an attempt to prevent the confrontation from widening, largely in order to prevent additional disruption to world oil supplies and to honor US security assurances to Saudi Arabia. As a result, the US reacted to Soviet troop movements on the border of Iran by informing the Soviet Union that the US would defend Iran in the event of Soviet Invasion. The US also acted to defend Saudi Arabia, and lobbied the surrounding states not to become involved in the war. Brzezinski characterizes this recognition of the Middle East as a vital strategic region on a par with Western Europe and the Far East as a fundamental shift in US strategic policy.[2]

Second, the United States explored whether the Iran-Iraq war would offer leverage with which to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In this regard, the Carter administration explored the use of both "carrots," by suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iran upon release of the hostages, and "sticks," by discouraging Israeli military assistance to Iran and suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iraq if the Iranians did not release the hostages. (Ultimately, however, Brzezinski does not suggest that the Carter Administration provided military assistance to either side).[2]

[edit] U.S. support for Iraq

After the Iranian Revolution, enmity between Iran and the U.S. ran high. Realpolitikers in Washington concluded that Saddam was the "lesser of the two evils", support for Iraq gradually became the order of the day.

"In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982," said the "Teicher Affidavit," submitted on 31 January 1995 by former NSC official Howard Teicher to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida.[3]

According to retired Colonel Walter Lang, senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose." He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival"[4], however, despite this allegation, Reagan’s administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.[5][6][7]

[edit] Parties involved

Much of what Iraq received from the US, however, were not arms per se, but so-called dual-use technology— mainframe computers, armored ambulances, helicopters, chemicals, and the like, with potential civilian uses as well as military applications. It is now known that a vast network of companies, based in the U.S. and elsewhere, fed Iraq's warring capabilities right up until August 1990, when Saddam invaded Kuwait [8]

The "Iraq-gate" scandal revealed that an Atlanta branch of Italy's largest bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, relying partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans, funneled US$ 5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when FBI agents finally raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, the branch manager, Christopher Drogoul, was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.

Beginning in September, 1989, the Financial Times laid out the first charges that BNL, relying heavily on U.S. government-guaranteed loans, was funding Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons work. For the next two and a half years, the Financial Times provided the only continuous newspaper reportage (over 300 articles) on the subject. Among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government, according to the Financial Times, were Hewlett-Packard, Tektronix, and Matrix Churchill, through its Ohio branch. [9]

Even before the Persian Gulf War started in 1990, the Intelligencer Journal of Pennsylvania in a string of articles reported: "If U.S. and Iraqi troops engage in combat in the Persian Gulf, weapons technology developed in Lancaster and indirectly sold to Iraq will probably be used against U.S. forces ... And aiding in this ... technology transfer was the Iraqi-owned, British-based precision tooling firm Matrix Churchill, whose U.S. operations in Ohio were recently linked to a sophisticated Iraqi weapons procurement network."[10]

Aside from the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and ABC's Ted Koppel, the Iraq-gate story never picked up much steam, even though The U.S. Congress became involved with the scandal. [11]

In December 2002, Iraq's 1,200 page Weapons Declaration revealed a list of Eastern and Western corporations and countries—as well as individuals—that exported chemical and biological materials to Iraq in the past two decades. By far, the largest suppliers of precursors for chemical weapons production were in Singapore (4,515 tons), the Netherlands (4,261 tons), Egypt (2,400 tons), India (2,343 tons), and Germany (1,027 tons). One Indian company, Exomet Plastics (now part of EPC Industrie) sent 2,292 tons of precursor chemicals to Iraq. The Kim Al-Khaleej firm of Singapore supplied more than 4,500 tons of VX, sarin, and mustard gas precursors and production equipment to Iraq. [12]

By contrast, Alcolac International, for example, a Maryland company, transported thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, to Iraq. Alcolac was small and was successfully prosecuted for its violations of export control law. The firm pleaded guilty in 1989. A full list of American companies and their involvements in Iraq was provided by The LA Weekly in May 2003. [13]

On 25 May 1994, The U.S. Senate Banking Committee released a report in which it was stated that "pathogenic" (meaning disease producing), "toxigenic" (meaning poisonous) and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq, pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce. It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."[14]

The report then detailed 70 shipments (including anthrax bacillus) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program." [15]

A report by Berlin's Die Tageszeitung in 2002 reported that Iraq's 11,000-page report to the UN Security Council listed 150 foreign companies that supported Saddam Hussein's WMD program. Twenty-four U.S. firms were involved in exporting arms and materials to Baghdad [16]

Donald Riegle, Chairman of the Senate committee that authored the aforementioned Riegle Report, said, "UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs." He added, "the executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think that is a devastating record."

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control sent Iraq 14 agents "with biological warfare significance," including West Nile virus, according to Riegle's investigators [17] And The Simon Wiesenthal Center, a Jewish organization dedicated to preserving the memory of the Holocaust, also released a list of U.S. companies and their exports to Iraq. [18]

More sources and details can be found at the end of this article.

[edit] The Tanker War and US military involvement

The United States was wary of the Tehran regime since the Iranian Revolution, not least because of the detention of its Tehran embassy staff in the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis. Starting in 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield, the U.S. made its backing of Iraq more pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, economic aid, normalizing relations with the government (broken during the 1967 Six-Day War), and also supplying weapons[19]

Starting in 1981, both Iran and Iraq attacked oil tankers and merchant ships, including those of neutral nations, in an effort to deprive the opponent of trade. After repeated Iraqi attacks on Iran's main exporting facility on Khark Island, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker near Bahrain on May 13, 1984, and a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on May 16. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, and this phase of the war was dubbed the "Tanker War."

Lloyd's of London, a British insurance market, estimated that the Tanker War damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian mariners. The largest of attacks were directed by Iran against Kuwaiti vessels, and on November 1, 1986, Kuwait formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States offered to provide protection for tankers flying the U.S. flag on March 7, 1987 (Operation Earnest Will and Operation Prime Chance). Under international law, an attack on such ships would be treated as an attack on the U.S., allowing the U.S. to retaliate militarily. This support would protect ships headed to Iraqi ports, effectively guaranteeing Iraq's revenue stream for the duration of the war.

An Iraqi plane accidentally attacked the USS Stark (FFG 31), a Perry class frigate on May 17, killing 37 and injuring 21.[1] But U.S. attention was on isolating Iran; it criticized Iran's mining of international waters, and in October 1987, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged tanker Sea Isle City.[20]

On April 14, 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was badly damaged by an Iranian mine. U.S. forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on April 18, the United States Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian ships were destroyed, and an American helicopter was shot down, killing the two pilots.[21]

[edit] The USS Vincennes incident

In the course of these escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 with the loss of all 290 passengers and crew on July 3, 1988. The American government claimed that the airliner had been mistaken for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat, and that the USS Vincennes was operating in international waters at the time and feared that it was under attack. The Iranians, however, maintain that the Vincennes was in fact in Iranian territorial waters, and that the Iranian passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral William J. Crowe also admitted on ABC's Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.[22] The U.S. eventually paid compensation for the incident but never apologised.

According to the investigation done by Ted Koppel, during the war, U.S. navy used to set decoys inside the Persian Gulf to lure out the Iranian gunboats and destroy them, and at the time USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian airline, it was performing such an operation. [23]

[edit] References

  1. ^ National Security Archives: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82
  2. ^ a b Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1983). Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981. Farrar Straus Giroux, 451-454, 504.
  3. ^ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, CARLOS CARDOEN, FRANCO SAFTA, JORGE BURR, INDUSTRIAS CARDOEN LIMITADA, DECLARATION OF a/k/a INCAR, HOWARD TEICHER, SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC. EDWARD A. JOHNSON, RONALD W. GRIFFIN, and TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a, TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY. 1/31/95. Link: http://informationclearinghouse.info/article1413.htm
  4. ^ Colonel Walter Lang, former senior US Defense Intelligence officer, New York Times, Aug. 18, 2002.
  5. ^ Galbraith and van Hollen, p. 30
  6. ^ Jentleson, p. 78.
  7. ^ Robert Pear, "U.S. Says It Monitored Iraqi Messages on Gas," New York Times, 15 September 1988.
  8. ^ Russ W. Baker, IRAQGATE: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away, Who Chased it -- and Who Didn't. Columbia Journalism Review March 1993. Link: http://www.cjr.org/archives.asp?url=/93/2/iraqgate.asp
  9. ^ Russ W. Baker, IRAQGATE: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away, Who Chased it -- and Who Didn't. Columbia Journalism Review March 1993. Link: http://www.cjr.org/archives.asp?url=/93/2/iraqgate.asp
  10. ^ Russ W. Baker, IRAQGATE: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away, Who Chased it -- and Who Didn't. Columbia Journalism Review March 1993. Link: http://www.cjr.org/archives.asp?url=/93/2/iraqgate.asp
  11. ^ See Federation of American Scientists report: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm
  12. ^ See What Iraq Addmitted About its Chemical Weapons Program. Link: http://www.iraqwatch.org/suppliers/nyt-041303.gif
  13. ^ See:
  14. ^ Link: http://www.gulfwarvets.com/arison/banking.htm
  15. ^ See lists:
  16. ^ Link: http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php
  17. ^ Report by St. Petersburg Times: http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/16/Perspective/How_Iraq_built_its_we.shtml
  18. ^ See page 11 of this report: http://www.sfbg.com/News/32/21/images/b11.gif
  19. ^ Link: http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php
  20. ^ Link: http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-nimblearcher.shtml
  21. ^ Link: http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-prayingmantis.shtml
  22. ^ Link: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-nightline-19920701.html
  23. ^ See: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-nightline-19920701.html

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