Trent Affair
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The Trent Affair, also known as the Mason and Slidell Affair, was an international diplomatic incident that occurred during the American Civil War. The United States and the United Kingdom came dangerously close to war as a result of it.
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[edit] Background
In an attempt to gain support for the Confederate States of America from European nations during the war, the Confederacy dispatched two diplomats, James M. Mason of Virginia as minister to Britain and John Slidell of Louisiana as minister to France on board RMS Trent, a British mail steamer. The Trent departed from Havana, Cuba, but was stopped by Captain Charles Wilkes of the USS San Jacinto on November 8, 1861, and the two Confederate diplomats and their secretaries were removed, over their protests and the protests of the Trent's captain. The Trent was then allowed to resume her voyage.
The San Jacinto met with acclaim when she landed in Boston on November 23 to deliver the prisoners to Fort Warren. The war had been going badly for the Union, and this was a bright spot in an otherwise dismal year. Northern newspapers praised Wilkes's conduct, and the House of Representatives passed a resolution honoring him. Reaction to the news in Britain, although equally passionate, could hardly have been more different. News of the affair arrived in London on November 27, where many perceived it as an outrageous insult to British honour, and a flagrant violation of maritime law. Prime Minister Lord Palmerston began an emergency cabinet meeting by throwing his hat on the table and declaring, "I don't know whether you are going to stand this, but I'll be damned if I do." The British Government issued an ultimatum demanding an apology and the release of the Confederate diplomats. Prince Albert, husband and consort of Queen Victoria, although ill with typhoid, intervened from his sickbed to soften the ultimatum, which he felt was too belligerent. This was his last official act, as he died shortly afterwards, and some historians have described it as his greatest service to the nation. The revised message was sent to Lord Lyons, British minister in Washington, who, in turn, presented it to Secretary of State William H. Seward on December 19. Meanwhile, the Government of France declared its willingness to support Britain in a war with the United States.
The British colony of Canada felt directly threatened by the affair. The Canadian militia grew substantially as the Canadian and Maritime colonies were called on by the colonial Minister of Militia and Defence, John A. Macdonald (a future Father of Confederation and the first Prime Minister of Canada), to double their active militia from 50,000 men to 100,000. Nova Scotia alone trained and armed 45,000 men.
Britain and the Southern states had close economic links because of their mutual involvement in the cotton trade (cotton diplomacy). Many Britons, particularly of the aristocratic and ruling classes, were far more sympathetic to the Confederacy than to the Union. British military preparations were swift. 13 crew transports were chartered to carry British troops to the Americas, each capable of embarking over a thousand troops with a round-trip time of about six weeks. These would have made approximately three runs each by the time campaigning season started in March, and would thus have raised British fighting strength in the Americas to approximately 50,000 (there were approximately 100,000 troops available for deployment to the Americas). Both the U.S. and British governments estimated that the maximum number of Union troops available for service against Canada was 50,000. While the first wave of reinforcement troops were still at sea, the crisis was averted, and no further reinforcements were sent.
Admiral Milnes's North America and West Indies Squadron already had 9 steam battleships, seven large cruisers and the ironclad HMS Terror. The British Channel Fleet concentrated at Lisbon, Portugal, with the massive ironclads Warrior, Black Prince, Defence, and Resistance, in addition to many wooden steamships, including the flagship, HMS Queen.
Yielding to British demands was difficult for the Union Government, since Wilkes' action was popular in the North. Nonetheless, President Abraham Lincoln and Seward had some room for maneuver because they waited to hear from Britain before they decided the fate of the prisoners. After heated meetings with his Cabinet, Lincoln decided upon a policy of "one war at a time". The question remained how to accept British demands while maintaining U.S. popular support. Seward resolved this conundrum by presenting to Lyons a brilliantly crafted reply to the British note on December 27. Seward conceded the issue at hand by announcing that the Confederates would be freed, but he salvaged American pride by forcefully and ironically asserting that Britain had finally adopted the American conception of neutral rights over which the two nations had fought the War of 1812. On January 1, 1862, Mason and Slidell and their secretaries were released and went to Europe. However, their missions were ultimately unsuccessful, since none of the European powers ever intervened on behalf of the Confederacy.
Many consider the Trent Affair one of the great "what ifs" of the American Civil War. Some contend that, had Britain and the United States gone to war, it is possible that the Union war effort would have failed and the Confederacy would have become an independent nation. Others maintain that a British invasion might have unified North and South in defiance against American submission to an Old World power.
The Trent affair had the unexpected effect of building confidence between the governments of Britain and the U.S. Before the crisis most British officials, whose sympathies lay with the Confederacy, had seen Seward as an aggressive Abolitionist who sought a war with Britain. His moderate and sensible behavior during the Trent affair gave them confidence that they could work with him. The successful resolution of the crisis produced a sense that continued peace with the United States was likely, and this perception became a self-fulfilling prophecy despite subsequent strains in Anglo-American relations.
[edit] British plans for war with the Union
The British had a fairly detailed plan for the defence of Canada and war with the Union.
Lieutenant General William Fenwick Williams planned on destroying the bridges across the St. Lawrence River and defending the cities of Montreal, Quebec and Kingston. To accompish this he had 12,000 British regulars and about 35,000 Canadian volunteers and militia. The Niagara peninsula was effectively to be abandoned until additional forces could arrive. This was not that serious, as the Union logistics chain to Michigan was non-existent, and months of preparation would be required for such an invasion. The defense of the peninsula was to be given to a British-Canadian Division at London, Ontario, which would screen the border and, if practicable, seize Fort Niagara as part of a forward defence.
The Beauharnois Canal was a major concern, since it ran south of the St. Lawrence. Its loss would limit the ability of the Royal Navy to put warships on the Lakes. A large force of gunboats and other small ships was being prepared in Britain for this service.
Additionally, since it was assessed that the main US invasion would come by the traditional Hudson Valley – Lake Champlain route, the British intended a preemptive strike at the incomplete Fort Montgomery at Rouses Point, dislocating the Union advance. A similar strike across Lake Ontario on Sackets Harbor was also planned. It was hoped to thus delay the Union until reinforcements from Britain arrived.
Reinforcements in the form of a 50,000-man expeditionary force were prepared in the UK, to be transported if needed. These three infantry corps and one cavalry division would integrate with the main 25,000-man army at Montreal to form a field army. Notably, suggestions were being made in Britain that 10,000 Volunteers could be raised to garrison the fortifications and free the regular army and militia for offensive action.
In the Maritimes, matters were complicated by the fact that Maine seemed close to secession herself. The British had around 5,000 regulars and a similar number of volunteer militia available to campaign in the area.
At sea, Rear Admiral Alexander Milne had a three part plan. First his squadron, along with Commodore Dunlop's, would smash the US Navy ships and squadrons in detail, or in a major action should they concentrate. This would not be an onerous task as the largest squadron the US had was in the Chesapeake under Goldsborough, comprising only two modern frigates and a host of wooden sailing ships and converted gunvessels with no fighting value. The damage done at the real Battle of Hampton Roads would be indicative.
Once this was done, Milne would institute a close blockade of the United States. Hydrography estimated 40 ships would be the minimum required. Milne decided to use in excess of 65. With a close blockade in place, Milne intended on campaigning in Chesapeake Bay, working his way up to Washington and Baltimore, using ironclads, gunboats and mortar vessels to reduce the fortifications en route.
[edit] See also
[edit] Sources
- Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War 2 vol (1924) online at Project Gutenberg vol 1 ch 7
- Ferris, Norman B. (1977). The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. ISBN 0-87049-169-5.
- Library of Congress Memory Archive for November 8
- civilwarhome.com
- First Edition Report of the Trent Affair
- Boune, K., British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; The English Historical Review Vol 76 No 301 (Oct 1961) pp600-632
[edit] Further reading (Fiction)
- Conroy, Robert (2006). 1862. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-345-48237-9.