Treaty of Hanover
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The Treaty of Hanover is the name of two international treaties signed in the northern German city of Hanover.
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[edit] The 1725 treaty of Hanover
In response to the Treaty of Vienna (7 June 1725, in which king Philip V of Spain allied himself with Habsburg Austria after his daughter's engagement to Louis XV of France was broken off) it was concluded by Great Britain, France and Prussia on 3 September, 1725.
George I, becoming concerned about potential conflict with Spain, signed the Treaty of Hanover linking France, Sweden, the Netherlands (later acceded) and Denmark together in opposition toSpain.
[edit] Criticism
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, in a parliamentary speech on a motion for inquiring into the conduct of Sir Robert Walpole, on March 9, 1742, said: Now, sir, with regard to the foreign measures which the honorable gentleman has attempted to justify. The Treaty of Hanover deserves to be first mentioned, because from thence springs the danger in which Europe is now exposed; and it is impossible to assign a reason for our entering into that treaty, without supposing that we then resolved to be revenged on the Emperor for refusing to grant us some favor in Germany. It is in vain now to insist upon the secret engagements entered into by the courts of Vienna and Madrid as the cause of that treaty. Time has fully shown that there never were any such engagements, and his late Majesty's speech from the throne can not here be admitted as any evidence of the fact. Every one knows that in Parliament the King's speech is considered as the speech of the minister; and surely a minister is not to be allowed to bring his own speech as an evidence of a fact in his own justification. If it be pretended that his late Majesty had some sort of information, that such engagements had been entered into, that very pretense furnishes an unanswerable argument for an inquiry. For, as the information now appears to have been groundless, we ought to inquire into it; because, if it appears to be such information as ought not to have been believed, that minister ought to be punished who advised his late Majesty to give credit to it, and who, in consequence, has precipitated the nation into the most pernicious measures.
At the time this treaty was entered into, we wanted nothing from the Emperor upon our own account. The abolition of the Ostend Company was a demand we had no right to make, nor was it essentially our interest to insist upon it, because that Company would have been more hostile to the interests both of the French and Dutch East India trades than to our own; and if it had been a point that concerned us much, we might probably have gained it by acceding to the Vienna treaty between the Emperor and Spain, or by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction, which we afterward did in the most absolute manner, and without any conditions. We wanted nothing from Spain but a relinquishment of the pretense she had just begun, or, I believe, hardly begun, to set up, in an express manner, with regard to searching and seizing our ships in the American seas; and this we did not obtain, perhaps did not desire to obtain, by the Treaty of Seville. By that treaty we obtained nothing; but we advanced another step toward that danger in which Europe is now involved, by uniting the courts of France and Spain, and by laying a foundation for a new breach between the courts of Spain and Vienna.
I grant, sir, that our ministers appear to have been forward and diligent enough in negotiating, and writing letters and memorials to the court of Spain; but, from all my inquiries, it appears that they never rightly understood (perhaps they would not understand) the point respecting which they were negotiating. They suffered themselves to be amused with fair promises for ten long years; and our merchants plundered, our trade interrupted, now call aloud for inquiry. If it should appear that ministers allowed themselves to be amused with answers which no man of honor, no man of common sense, in such circumstances, would take, surely, sir, they must have had some secret motive for being thus grossly imposed on. This secret motive we may perhaps discover by an inquiry; and as it must be a wicked one, if it can be discovered, the parties ought to be severely punished.
But, in excuse for their conduct, it is said that our ministers had a laudable repugnance to involving their country in a war. Sir, this repugnance could not proceed from any regard to their country. It was involved in a war. Spain was carrying on a war against our trade, and that in the most insulting manner, during the whole time of their negotiations. It was this very repugnance, at least it was the knowledge of it which Spain possessed, that at length made it absolutely necessary for us to commence the war. If ministers had at first insisted properly and peremptorily upon an explicit answer, Spain would have expressly abandoned her new and insolent claims and pretensions. But by the long experience we allowed her, she found the fruits of those pretensions so plentiful and so gratifying, that she thought them worth the hazard of a war. Sir, the damage we had sustained became so considerable, that it really was worth that hazard. Besides, the court of Spain was convinced, while we were under such an administration, that either nothing could provoke us to commence the war, or, that if we did, it would be conducted in a weak and miserable manner. Have we not, sir, since found that their opinion was correct? Nothing, sir, ever more demanded a parliamentary inquiry than our conduct in the war. The only branch into which we have inquired we have already censured and condemned. Is not this a good reason for inquiring into every other branch? Disappointment and ill success have always, till now, occasioned a parliamentary inquiry. Inactivity, of itself, is a sufficient cause for inquiry. We now have all these reasons combined. Our admirals abroad desire nothing more; because they are conscious that our inactivity and ill success will appear to proceed, not from their own misconduct, but from the misconduct of those by whom they were employed.
The earl of Chesterfield wrote in a letter to his son on August 30, O. S. 1748: Now, sir, with regard to the foreign measures which the honorable gentleman has attempted to justify. The Treaty of Hanover deserves to be first mentioned, because from thence springs the danger in which Europe is now exposed; and it is impossible to assign a reason for our entering into that treaty, without supposing that we then resolved to be revenged on the Emperor for refusing to grant us some favor in Germany. It is in vain now to insist upon the secret engagements entered into by the courts of Vienna and Madrid as the cause of that treaty. Time has fully shown that there never were any such engagements,8 and his late Majesty's speech from the throne can not here be admitted as any evidence of the fact. Every one knows that in Parliament the King's speech is considered as the speech of the minister; and surely a minister is not to be allowed to bring his own speech as an evidence of a fact in his own justification. If it be pretended that his late Majesty had some sort of information, that such engagements had been entered into, that very pretense furnishes an unanswerable argument for an inquiry. For, as the information now appears to have been groundless, we ought to inquire into it; because, if it appears to be such information as ought not to have been believed, that minister ought to be punished who advised his late Majesty to give credit to it, and who, in consequence, has precipitated the nation into the most pernicious measures.
At the time this treaty was entered into, we wanted nothing from the Emperor upon our own account. The abolition of the Ostend Company was a demand we had no right to make, nor was it essentially our interest to insist upon it, because that Company would have been more hostile to the interests both of the French and Dutch East India trades than to our own; and if it had been a point that concerned us much, we might probably have gained it by acceding to the Vienna treaty between the Emperor and Spain, or by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction,9 which we afterward did in the most absolute manner, and without any conditions.10 We wanted nothing from Spain but a relinquishment of the pretense she had just begun, or, I believe, hardly begun, to set up, in an express manner, with regard to searching and seizing our ships in the American seas; and this we did not obtain, perhaps did not desire to obtain, by the Treaty of Seville.11 By that treaty we obtained nothing; but we advanced another step toward that danger in which Europe is now involved, by uniting the courts of France and Spain, and by laying a foundation for a new breach between the courts of Spain and Vienna.
I grant, sir, that our ministers appear to have been forward and diligent enough in negotiating, and writing letters and memorials to the court of Spain; but, from all my inquiries, it appears that they never rightly understood (perhaps they would not understand) the point respecting which they were negotiating. They suffered themselves to be amused with fair promises for ten long years; and our merchants plundered, our trade interrupted, now call aloud for inquiry. If it should appear that ministers allowed themselves to be amused with answers which no man of honor, no man of common sense, in such circumstances, would take, surely, sir, they must have had some secret motive for being thus grossly imposed on. This secret motive we may perhaps discover by an inquiry; and as it must be a wicked one, if it can be discovered, the parties ought to be severely punished.
But, in excuse for their conduct, it is said that our ministers had a laudable repugnance to involving their country in a war. Sir, this repugnance could not proceed from any regard to their country. It was involved in a war. Spain was carrying on a war against our trade, and that in the most insulting manner, during the whole time of their negotiations. It was this very repugnance, at least it was the knowledge of it which Spain possessed, that at length made it absolutely necessary for us to commence the war. If ministers had at first insisted properly and peremptorily upon an explicit answer, Spain would have expressly abandoned her new and insolent claims and pretensions. But by the long experience we allowed her, she found the fruits of those pretensions so plentiful and so gratifying, that she thought them worth the hazard of a war. Sir, the damage we had sustained became so considerable, that it really was worth that hazard. Besides, the court of Spain was convinced, while we were under such an administration, that either nothing could provoke us to commence the war, or, that if we did, it would be conducted in a weak and miserable manner. Have we not, sir, since found that their opinion was correct? Nothing, sir, ever more demanded a parliamentary inquiry than our conduct in the war. The only branch into which we have inquired we have already censured and condemned. Is not this a good reason for inquiring into every other branch? Disappointment and ill success have always, till now, occasioned a parliamentary inquiry. Inactivity, of itself, is a sufficient cause for inquiry. We now have all these reasons combined. Our admirals abroad desire nothing more; because they are conscious that our inactivity and ill success will appear to proceed, not from their own misconduct, but from the misconduct of those by whom they were employed.
[edit] The 1852 treaty of Hanover
The War of German Dissolution is ended ends with the Treaty of Hanover, which establishes the independence of the various German states, and limits the power of Prussia, though it does maintain the German Customs Union, expanding it to Britain, the NEU and Denmark. Even the east and west parts of Prussia itself became separate nations. Oldenburg, in north-west Germany allies with, and is then absorbed by, the NEU.
