User:Thegn/sandbox
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Tim Fetherston-Dilke is owner of Maxstoke Castle, patron of the arts and a senior manager at Accenture.
Hardware Products: Cell microprocessor | Cloudscape | Mainframe | PC | POWER
Software Products: AIX | DB2 | Lotus Notes | OS/2 | WebSphere | Workplace
See also: IBM India | IBM PC compatible | IBM Public License | List of IBM acquisitions and spinoffs | List of IBM products
Annual Revenue: 
$91.1 billion USD (FY 2005) | Employees: 329,373 (2005) | Stock Symbol: NYSE: IBM | Website: www.ibm.com
Gavin
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[edit] Education
Fetherston-Dilke (born 1958) was educated at St Anthony House, Oundle School, and Queens' College, Cambridge, where he graduated in natural sciences in 1980. He qualified as a cost and management accountant, awarded by the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants in 1983.
[edit] Work
Fetherston Dilke has worked at the Royal Institution, British Petroleum and Accenture.
[edit] References
- Fetherston-Dilke's support for the Arts]
- Fetherston Dilke, TH (2002). Financial Risk and Financial Risk Management (Research in International Business & Finance). JAI Press. ISBN 0-7623085-8-3.
[[Category:1958 births|Fetherston-Dilke, Tim] [[Category:Living people|Fetherston-Dilke, Tim] [[Category:Oundle|Fetherston-Dilke, Tim] [[Category:Old Oundelians|Fetherston-Dilke, Tim] [[Category:Alumni of Queens' College, Cambridge|Fetherston-Dilke, Tim]
[[Mike Simpson (writer)]
Mike Simpson is a British writer and educator. He described his experiences as a teacher in That'll Teach You! under the pen-name of Michael James. He is also a director of Thames Ditton Lawn Tennis Club.
[edit] References
- Simpson, Mike (2005). The Troublesome Adventures of Robert the Robot. Recognition. ISBN 0-9537373-2-2.
- James, Michael (2005). Nanny. Recognition. ISBN 0-9537373-1-4.
- James, Michael (2000). That'll Teach You!. Recognition. ISBN 0-9537373-0-6.
[edit] Example
Your landlord would record an income event on the day your rent comes due (you owe it to him). He records an expense event when the fee owed to the rental agent comes due for your apartment that month (he owes it to the agent). The details of the actual cash flows and their timing are tracked by bookkeeping.
Ian G Walker CEng FIEE is the managing director of Rotary Electrical and a principal non-political figure in the renovation of Sheffield. He has been a non-executive director of South Yorkshire Strategic Health Authority since April 2002. Walker is also a director of Sheffield Medical Products. He also sits on the South Yorkshire Forum, and is chairman of the board of governors at Ashdell School.
[edit] Education
Born in Sheffield, Walker was educated at Birkdale preparatory school, and Dryden House, Oundle School. From there, he won a place at Trinity College, Cambridge to read for an Electrical Engineering degree. Upon graduation, he worked for several years for Yokogawa, a Japanese instrumentation company, after which he studied for an MBA at the London Business School (LBS).
[edit] Work
Upon leaving LBS, Walker went straight to BOC, where he worked until eventually leaving to take the helm at Rotary Electrical, the Sheffield-based engineering firm founded in 1952. Walker negotiated and supervised the acquisition of Rotary by the Wood Group in 2002.
[edit] References
- Walker, Ian (1992). Buying a Company in Trouble. Gower. ISBN 0-5660728-9-0.
- Walker, Ian (2002). Commercial Management in Construction. Blackwell Science. ISBN 0-6320582-7-7.
[edit] External links
- South Yorkshire Strategic Health Authority
- Rotary Electrical home page
- Walker's role as chairman of governors at Ashdell
[[Category:1958 births|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:Living people|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:Oundle|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:Old Oundelians|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:Alumni of the London Business School|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:Alumni of Trinity College, Cambridge|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:People from Sheffield|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:English engineers|Walker, Ian G] [[Category:English business people|Walker, Ian G]
A simplified Income Statement and Balance Sheet for accrual basis accounting will look like the following (note the existence of receivable and payable):
Voidvector Corporation
Income Statement
For the year ended December 31, 2004
Revenues ........................... $1,200
Expenses ........................... $ 800
Net income ......................... $ 400
Voidvector Corporation
Balance Sheet
For the year ended December 31, 2004
Assets
Cash .............................. $5,500
Accounts receivable ............... $ 200
Total assets ..................... $5,700
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity
Accounts payable .................. $ 200
Common stock ...................... $5,500
Total liabilities and Equity ..... $5,700
[edit] 1990s -- the failure of Portfolio Theory
On October 5, 1992, at the COMDEX computer expo, IBM announced the first Thinkpad laptop computer, the 700c. The computer, which then cost US$ 4350, included a 25 MHz Intel 80486SL processor, a 10.4-inch active matrix display, removable 120 MB hard drive, 4 MB RAM (expandable to 16 MB) and a TrackPoint II pointing device.[1]
On January 19, 1993 IBM announced a US$4.97 billion loss for the 1992 financial year, which was at that time the largest single-year corporate loss in U.S. history. Since that loss, IBM has made major changes in its business activities, shifting its focus significantly away from components and hardware and towards software and services.
When assessing Gerstner's significance to IBM, we can put to one side, for the moment, the massive emigration of IBM talent during his watch. The amount of money taken out of the company and passed to shareholders, of which he had one of the largest individual holdings[2], can also be ignored in this dicussion. If the company strategy had been right, the effect of such actions could have been minimised over the long term.
The irretrievable loss that Gerstner inflicted upon IBM was the loss of many key markets, such as PC operating systems. Much can be blamed on the portfolio management technique[3] that Gerstner brought with him from McKinsey.
Until the 1980s, IBM provided the customer with everything in computing that they wanted: computer, storage, support services, programming, finance etc. IBM probably made a profit on each of these items, but it didn't bother too much with unpicking the individual elements to discover the financial truth. The customer wanted the whole package together, and if IBM meant customer service, it was best if it provided the whole bundle.
In the early 1990s, before Gerstner arrived, IBM was already unpicking these elements, and setting up separate profit centres[4]. Thus for the first time there was a Software Business, even though it depended almost entirely on colleagues in the System Business to generate sales of, for example, the OS/400 operating system.
Gerstner pursued the logic of these separate divisions further. Using portfolio theory, he would let each division run for a couple more years, and if it didn't make a profit or show revenue growth, the division would see its problem offerings discarded. It seemed that Gerstner was prepared to let anything go, if it didn't meet the tests within the timescales. The problem was that IBM was competing against highly focussed competitors for whom the survival of their rival products meant life or death for the company.
Thus, for example, discarding OS/2 was a difficult decision for IBM[5], but it didn't mean the death of the company or even any executive resignations. Over at Microsoft, the success of Windows 95 and Windows NT, the principal rivals of OS/2, was regarded by Gates and Ballmer as a matter of life and death for the company. No matter how many years it took, Microsoft was determined Windows 95 and NT would win.
Gerstner's willingness to discard unprofitable elements meant that holes developed in IBM's offerings. If, for example, IBM no longer offered maintenance on the hardware it sold, how could it guarantee the overall customer experience?
The problem with Gerstner was that, despite his obvious intelligence, his understanding of IBM's product range was very poor, even at the strategic level. For example, in his autobiography he states that by the mid-1990s, it was obvious that client-server[6]
architectures would be supplanted by the Web. This begs the question, "If you knew that then, why for goodness sake did you subsequently buy Lotus, whose main product (Notes) was the archetypal client-server product?". It is hard to think of another exceptionally bright CEO in any industry who knew less about his or her own company's products. Unaware of the linkages between products and their interdependencies, IBM dropped out of several markets that wih hindsight, it shouldn't have.
