Tank desant
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Tank desant is a military combined arms tactic, where infantry soldiers would ride into an attack on tanks. They dismount to fight on foot in the final phase of the assault. Desant is the Russian word for airborne or parachute drops, but it can be used more generally, describing amphibious landings or "tank desant".
The tactic was institutionalized by the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War. Tank desant troops (tankodesantniki) were specialist infantry, trained in the technique. From WWII until the 1970s, Soviet tanks were built with hand-holds for this purpose. In the northern winter, similar tactics were used by Soviet infantry riding the skids of aerosans, or towed behind them on skis.
Riding on tanks during actual combat is very dangerous; soldiers are very vulnerable to machine gun and high explosive fire, and the high silhouette of most tanks would draw enemy fire. Smoke and covering fire may be used to reduce the hazards, but this tactic is mostly used by forces with a shortage of motor transport or armoured personnel carriers, as it enables troops to move about the battlefield faster than on foot.
Today, tank desant is considered a wasteful and human-costly improvisation, adopted by the Soviets because they failed to appreciate the problem of tank–infantry co-operation.[1] Almost universal mechanization has rendered this tactic mostly obsolete, with infantry riding special-purpose armoured personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles into battle. The use of explosive reactive armor, which creates a danger zone around an armoured vehicle by detonating an explosive charge when the tank suffers a serious hit, makes tank desant impossible.
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[edit] Riding armoured vehicles
Other military forces, including U.S. troops in Vietnam, Soviets in Afghanistan, and Russians in Chechnya have chosen to ride atop their carriers while on patrol or routine movement, rather than inside them.
In contrast to the offensive Soviet tank desant tactics of the Second World War, these were troops who wanted to be able to quickly move from their vehicles in case of ambush (which often turned their transports into death traps). Fearing land mines and rocket-propelled grenades widely used by guerrillas, these servicemen refused to stay inside the personnel carriers—contravening normal standing orders for several reasons:
- The infantrymen on the outside represented more eyes and rifles at the ready to locate and fire upon a small force or single ambusher.
- Explosive concussion inside the personnel compartment, caused by an RPG grenade or the land mine hitting the armour, was said to be more dangerous than enemy fire on the personnel mounted outside. many of these soldiers wore body armour, which reduced their fear of small arms fire.
- Wounded soldiers trapped inside were very unlikely to be extracted safely, especially if the vehicle was on fire.
The aluminum armour of U.S. M113 carriers was reputed to be highly flammable, although this reputation was likely due to the gasoline engine of the earliest version. Some American soldiers went as far as to improvise controls allowing the driver to be raised up out of the vehicle. See M113 modifications.
Soviet troops also adopted the tactic of riding the roofs of their BTRs (armoured personnel carriers), BMPs, and BMDs (infantry fighting vehicles) and, rarely, tanks. Recently, during the Chechen War and other local conflicts of post-Soviet era, the units of the Russian Army and law enforcement acquired the tactic, making it a routine. However, riding the vehicles outside is still prohibited by Russian army doctrine, so it is not used during training and maneuvers.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Zaloga, 1999: "Infantry mechanization remained one of the singular failures of Red Army tactics in World War 2, and forced the adoption of wasteful and humanly-costly improvisations such as the use of tanks to transport troops into battle, so-called tank desant. The problems with tank-infantry cooperation in Spain could have acted as a catalyst to a debate on infantry mechanization, but the dilemma was not appreciated by the Red Army."
[edit] References
- Zaloga, Steven J. (1999). “Soviet Tank Operations in the Spanish Civil War”, in Journal of Slavic Military Studies vol 12, no 3, September 1999. Available online at the New York Military Affairs Symposium web site (URL accessed 2006-11-13).
