T-26

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

T-26 Model 1933

Finnish T-26 at the Parola Tank Museum
Type Light tank
Place of origin Soviet Union
Specifications
Weight 9.4 tonnes
Length 4.88 m
Width 3.41 m
Height 2.41 m
Crew 3

Armour ~7 - 16 mm
Primary
armament
45 mm gun Model 32
Secondary
armament
Up to 3x DT machine gun
Engine gasoline GAZ T-26
91 hp (68 kW)
Power/weight 10 hp/tonne
Suspension leaf-spring
Operational
range
175 km
Speed 28 km/h

The T-26 was a light tank used by Soviet Union from the 1930s until World War II. It was based on the British Vickers 6-Ton tank, one of the most successful designs of the 1930s.

The T-26 made-up the majority of the Red Army's armour force until late 1941 and it would see a long history in the armed forces of different nations around the world. For almost a decade the T-26 proved to be one of the best tanks in production and some 12,000 tanks would be produced in all. It would ultimately play its part in shaping history, by influencing the Soviet doctrine of tank warfare in the late 1930s and thus largely contributing to the big defeats of the Red Army during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Although the T-26's reputation would be marred by its abysmal performance during the Second World War, it was the decisive tank in the Spanish Civil War and it would play major roles in the Winter War and at Khalkin Gol in 1939.

Contents

[edit] Design

By 1933 the Red Army fielded at least six different types of tanks to fulfill Mikhail Tukhachevsky's view of mechanization for his theory of deep operations. These models included the T-26 for armour attachments to infantry divisions, the BT-5 for mechanized cavalry, the T-35 as a heavy breakthrough tank and the T-37/T-38 as an amphibious vehicle and as a reconnaissance vehicle.[1] By 1940 the T-26 would be the most widely produced of all these tanks, with over 12,000 rolling off the production lines.

The T-26 was designed to replace the obsolescent T-18 (also called MS-1) and was born in 1929 when several Soviet military officials travelled to Western Europe to choose a new tank model to indigenously produce and perhaps even upgrade.[2] Originally, the Soviet Experimental Design department (OKMO) would attempt to produce two 'pirated' prototypes of the Vickers Six-Ton, the T-19 and T-20,[3] but neither prototype fulfilled the Red Army's role for the tank, and therefore the Soviets opted to simply purchase the production license.[4] Production of the T-26A, a copy of the Vickers Six-Ton, would begin in 1931 after acquiring the production license.[5]

T-26 Model 1931 twin-turreted machine gun tank
Enlarge
T-26 Model 1931 twin-turreted machine gun tank

Like its British counterpart, the T-26A had a twin turret configuration and was designed to carry two machine guns; one in each turret. However, in 1933, two years later, the Soviets would unveil the T-26B with a single cylindrical turret which carried a single 37mm canon and a single 7.62mm machine gun.[6] However, ultimately this 37mm primary cannon would be replaced by the more well-known 45mm cannon, which was based on the German Pak 35/36 which had been acquired in 1930.[7] The T-26 could carry up to three secondary Degtyarev 7.62mm machine guns, in coaxial, rear, and antiaircraft mounts. The majority of T-26 built would be of the T-26B model, otherwise known as the T-26 model 1933.

The T-26B carried 122 pieces of hand-loaded 45mm ammunition, firing armour-piercing 45mm rounds with a muzzle velocity of 820m/sec, or lower-velocity high-explosive munitions.[8] The tank was powered by a GAZ 91 horsepower gasoline engine which gave the tank a maximum speed of almost 30 km/h. The hull had a maximum steel thickness of 16 mm, which proved enough to stop light machine gun ammunition, including German 7.92mm armour-piercing rounds. The hull armour, however, would later prove to be too light against newer German anti-tank weapons in 1941. There would be subsequent attempts to thicken the front plate, but ultimately the T-26 would end production in favour of newer and superior tank designs, such as the T-34.

Between 1931 and 1940 over 12,000 T-26s were produced, the majority of these being the T-26B. Even by 1940, the T-26 continued to be the backbone of the Red Army's mechanization efforts, which would prove nearly fatal to the Red Army during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The T-26, however, saw a rich and valuable service during the Spanish Civil War.

[edit] Spanish Civil War

The tank of the Spanish Civil War: T-26B

—Lucas Molina Franco

T-26 Model 1933 tank in the Spanish Civil War. Note partially welded hull construction and anti-aircraft DT machine gun
Enlarge
T-26 Model 1933 tank in the Spanish Civil War. Note partially welded hull construction and anti-aircraft DT machine gun

The first shipment of T-26Bs to Spain was conducted on October 15, 1936, at the Spanish port city of Cartagena which was occupied by the Popular Front at the time. It was to be one of the first of many shipments to Spain covered by the term Operation X which would be the Soviet Union's stream of aid to the Spanish Republic's cause. This first shipment, provided by the Soviet ship Komsomol provided 50 new T-26Bs to Spain under the command of General Krivoshein. This would ultimately spark German aid to Franco and the first shipment of Panzer Is would arrive only weeks later. Both tanks would see their first combat during the Nationalist advance towards Madrid and during the Siege of Madrid proper. Ultimately, the Soviet Union would provide a total of 281 T-26Bs, half of which would fall into Nationalist hands by the end of the war and form the crux of the Spanish Brunete armoured division until 1953.[9] Additionally, the Soviets would provide over 50 BT-5 fast tanks.

T-26Bs sent to Spain between 1936 and 1939
Date Ship Number of Vehicles Additional Information
  October 15, 1936 Komsomol 50 Led by General Krivoshein
  November 30, 1936 Cabo Palos 37 Led by General D.G. Pavlov
  November 30, 1936 Mar Caribe 19  
  March 6, 1937 Cabo Santo Tomé 60  
  March 8, 1937 Darro 40  
  May 7, 1937 Cabo Palos 50  
  March 13, 1938 Gravelines 25 Last shipment received
References: García, José María, Lucas Molina Franco (2006). Las Armas de la Guerra Civil Española (in Spanish). 28002 Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 613. ISBN 8497344758.

Krivoshein only had ten days to prepare his armour for the defence of Madrid. On October 26 he was ordered to put at least some of his tanks to defend the Spanish capital from the nationalist advance. Unfortunately, Krivoshein's force only numbered 15 tanks and was crewed by poorly trained Republican militia.[10] The Republic's new armour was put under the command of Spanish Captain Paul Arman and it was used immediately in a counterstroke dedicated against the town of Torrejon de Velasco. Although the offensive saw initial success against the unprepared Nationalist infantry poor communications influenced Arman's tanks to separate themselves from the supporting infantry provided by Colonel Enrique Lister's infantry brigade, allowing Nationalist infantry to knock out at least one T-26 and force the rest to withdraw under severe pressure with the help of one of the nationalist legion's cavalry brigade. Furthermore, while the T-26s exploited the breakthrough Lister's infantry continued to fight around the village of Seseña, making further infantry support impossibly in any case. Republican armour would suffer from similar problems throughout the war, ultimately shaping STAVKA's and Stalin's view of the tank in war.

Stalin also inadvertently became the largest provider to the Nationalist armoured forces. Due to the superiority of the Soviet T-26 over both the Italian CV-33/35 and the German Panzer I the Nationalist front would put many captured T-26s into service, using them against their previous masters. During the Republican offensive towards Torrejon three T-26s were captured, and a few days later another four were captured as well. By the end of the Siege of Madrid there would be enough captured T-26s to create an ad hoc armoured battalion. By the end of 1937 the Nationalist front had created and equipped a battalion of engineers solely responsible for the capture of Soviet armour, especially the T-26, and by the end of the war 178 T-26Bs would be captured by Franco's Nationalist forces. Of these, 30 were so damaged that they could not be used (although they would be scavenged for their parts) and another 50 which were captured by different bodies of the Nationalist armies and not utilized.[11] The T-26 would remain the backbone of the Spanish armoured forces until the beginning of American aid in 1953.

The presence of the T-26 during the Spanish Civil War would also spark several interesting developments within the context of tank design and anti-tank tactics. The most widely known development would be that of the Molotov cocktail, a bottle of explosive fluid with a cloth fuse designed to splash against the hull of a tank to achieve a mobility kill. One of the most interesting Nationalist responses, however, would be the Breda upgrade on the Panzer I. This was the attempt to fit a 20 mm Breda anti-air machine gun in a tweaked Panzer I turret to achieve penetration of the thickest part of the T-26B's frontal armour. Only four Panzer I 'Bredas' were built and the project would ultimately be cancelled due to the sheer number of captured T-26Bs and their reformation into Nationalist armoured units. There would also be less known upgrade plans to fit both Soviet 37mm anti-tank guns on the Panzer I and Soviet 45 mm guns (scavenged from captured unusable T-26Bs), which is a testament to the killing power of the 45mm gun against Nationalist light tanks.[12] Given the lack of information on the latter upgrade attempts it's possible to deduct that both projects never got off the drawing board.

A T-26 advancing during the Spanish Civil War.
Enlarge
A T-26 advancing during the Spanish Civil War.

Despite the T-26's success in the Spanish Civil War, the fact that it performed badly within the context of tank operations, its days were numbered and it would fatally influence post-Spanish Civil War Soviet military thinking. It would also prove to be ineffectual against more advanced anti-tank weapons and better-armed tanks.

[edit] Comparing tanks

Of the three major tanks which saw action during the Spanish Civil War the T-26 proved itself superior to both the Panzer I and the CV-33. The T-26 was the only tank equipped with an actual cannon, as opposed to a machine gun, and although heavier, was no less manoeuvrable than its enemies. The T-26 was also deployed in greater numbers than the Panzer I and CV-33 combined. The Italians would ultimately equip Nationalist Spain with 155 CV-33s in 9 shipments between August 26 1936 and December 1938.[13] The Germans would provide a total of 122 Panzer Is in 5 shipments. On the other hand, Moscow provided 281 T-26Bs to the Spanish Republic by 1938, although many of these would fall into the Nationalist's hands. Below is a comparison of the different tanks used during the Spanish Civil War.

Comparison of light tanks in the Spanish Civil War
T-26 Panzer I CV.33 CV.35
Weight 9.4 t 5.4 t 3.15 t 2.3 t
Gun 45 mm cannon 2x 7.92mm MG 13 6.5 mm or 8mm machine gun 8mm Breda machine gun
Ammunition 122 rounds 2,250 rounds 3,200 8 mm or 3,800 6.5 mm 3,200
Road range 175 km 200 km 125 km 125 km
Armour 7-16 mm 7-13 mm 5-15 mm 5-13.5 mm
References: Franco, Lucas Molina (2005). Panzer I: El inicio de una saga (in Spanish). Madrid, Spain: AF Editores, 613. ISBN 8496016528.; Franco, Lucas M. (2006). "El Tanque de la Guerra Civil Española" in Historia de la Iberia Vieja, No. 13. ISSN 1699-7913; L3/33 (CV 33), WWII Vehicles

Perhaps the single largest advantage the T-26B had over the Panzer I and CV-33/35 was the 45mm cannon. Although Panzer Is were able to perforate the T-26B's front armour plate during the first clashes of the Spanish Civil War using armour piercing 7.92mm ammunition, it was only able to do this at under 150 m. Republican and Soviet tank crews countered this by engaging at ranges of up to 1,000 m.[14] This advantage in engagement range outweighed the fact that all tanks had similar protection levels at their thickest point, and the Italian and German tanks had slightly better mobility. It allowed the T-26B unrestricted dominance during the Spanish Civil War. The relatively high power of the 45mm gun was one of the reasons Spanish nationalist engineers attempted to upgrade the gun of the Panzer I, (although, as stated, this would prove ultimately unsuccessful). The power of the Soviet 45mm gun was matched by the accuracy of the gun sights, which allowed for engagement ranges of 3,000 m.[15] Nationalist anti-tank gunners using the Pak 37 could not accurately hit at beyond 900 m, and although the Spanish did use the German 88 mm anti-aircraft cannon in the anti-tank role, which would make the gun infamous during the Second World, they were not supplied in large enough numbers to make an impact.[16]

[edit] Inter-war years and the Second World War

In 1938 the T-26B would see an additional upgrade to the C version which had its front armour plate thickened to 25mm of steel. This still proved to be insufficient against better anti-tank weapons, and the tank would be upgraded one more time. This time it would manifest itself as the T-26S and would be completed after the T-26 had done rather poorly against Japanese light tanks during the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union in Mongolia. After the Spanish Civil War the T-26 was used in large numbers during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War in 1939. The poorly coordinated Soviet offensive would end in large numbers of the tanks utilized being knocked out by Finnish anti-tank weapons and more than 40 captured and even more would be captured during the offensive phase. The Finns also rearmed their Vickers 6-Ton tanks with the Soviet 45 mm gun and these would be re-designated as T-26Es and would be used during the Continuation War. 75 T-26s and 19 rebuilt Vickers tanks were used after the end of the Second World War.[17] Fortunately for the Soviet Union, the debacle in Finland would persuade them to reassess the value of armour in an offensive war. Unfortunately for the Soviets, it would make public gashing weaknesses in the Red Army. These weaknesses would not be corrected until after the catastrophic losses of 1941 against invading German armour.

Inside a T-26 turret, looking forward at the gun breech.
Enlarge
Inside a T-26 turret, looking forward at the gun breech.

Prior to the Second World War the T-26 would see one last successful encounter against Japanese tanks at Khalkin Gol, under the command of Soviet General Georgi Zhukov. Zhukov's offensive included 469 light tanks, most of which were T-26s. Infantry during the offensive rode on the hulls of armour and armoured cars various times to reduce the time it took to close with the enemy, which aided in co-operation between armour and infantry.[18] Although the offensive against Japanese forces infiltrating Mongolia proved to be a sudden success within the stream of Soviet military failures in Poland and Finland, it was obvious by then that the T-26 was obsolete against newer tanks. One of the largest faults of the tank was the riveted armour, which was found to be too weak to protect against direct hits. This would be corrected on the T-26S variant which replaced the riveted front plate with a thicker welded plate.[19] The T-26S had an increase in armour thickness from 16 mm to a maximum of 25 mm at 55 degrees on the upper glacis plate. The turret featured in increase to 20 mm at 45 degrees sloping.[20] Unlike the T-26B in Spain, the T-26S used a maximum of two machine guns, one of which was mounted in the rear.[21]

[edit] Soviet military developments

The greatest caution must be used in deducing general lessons from this war: a little adroitness and it will be possible to use it to “prove” any preconceived theory

—Anonymous British attaché to the Spanish Republic[22]

The 1937 purges of the Red Army claimed the life of General Tukhachevsky, one of the most important theorist of armoured warfare of the inter-war period. With no major proponents of Tukhachevsky's theories alive or willing to speak, previous advances were thrown out the window. Based on observations from the Spanish Civil War it was decided that armour was too unwieldy to successfully interact and operate with infantry. Tanks moved too quickly for the infantry to accompany, and there was no clear communications doctrine between tanks and infantry. Furthermore, some infantry refused to accompany tanks and there was no clear training of Spanish soldiers to correct these tactical inefficiencies. Republican tanks frequently fell to anti-tank gunnery, due to the lack of infantry support, as there was no infantry to locate and knock out enemy anti-tank positions that were hidden from the armour.[23] Republican tanks rarely operated on the move in Spain since the radios often broke down, and the majority of tanks simply didn't have radios. Due to the difficulties encountered, many old-school Soviet military leaders believed that tanks were not a worthwhile weapon of war, and so the role of the tank was played down considerably. One of the most fatal decisions to curtail production of the T-34 which would lead to too few advanced tanks present during the German invasion.

It was only after the German success in Poland and the Soviet stumbling in the same country, as well as the Soviet debacle in Finland, that Stavka and Stalin were persuaded to reintroduce the T-34 into production to replace the obsolete T-26 and other light tanks, and to reform large mechanized formations. It would prove to be too little, too late. The period between April 1, 1939 and June 22, 1941, was not all dark, however. A commission under the leadership of Soviet General Grigory Kulik oversaw a new reorganization of the Soviet armoured force. Perhaps driven by the obstacles faced by the Red Army in Poland, the Red Army's armour corps was reorganized in December 1939. It was found that the large mechanized corps which had been proposed by Tukhachevsky proved to be unwieldy and hard to coordinate due to the sheer bulk of armour. Nonetheless, the commission emphasized using armour for infantry support, as opposed to using them in stand-alone armoured divisions. Therefore, Kulik planned for fifteen new motorized divisions to replace the Soviet mechanized corps. By 1940, four of the fifteen had been created.[24]

However, impressed by the German campaign of 1940 against France, the Soviet NKO ordered the creation of nine mechanized corps on July 6, 1940. Between February and March 1941 another twenty would be ordered, and all larger than those of Tukhachevsky. Although, on paper, by 1941 the Red Army's 29 mechanized corps had no less than 29,899 tanks it proved to be a paper tiger.[25] There were actually only 17,000 tanks available at the time, meaning several of the new mechanized corps were under-strength, and the sheer majority of these were obsolete designs. By June 22, 1941 there were only 1,475 T-34s and KV series tanks available to the Red Army, and these were too dispersed along the front to provide enough mass for even local success.[26] To put this into perspective, the 3rd Mechanized Corps in Lithuania was formed up of a total of 460 tanks, 109 of these were newer KV-1s and T-34s. This division would prove to be one of the lucky few with a substantial number of newer tanks. However, the 4th Army was composed of 520 tanks, all of which were the obsolete T-26, as opposed to the authorized strength of 1,031 newer medium tanks.[27] This problem was universal throughout the Red Army's available armour. This fact would play a crucial role in the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 at the hands of the German Armed Forces.[28]

[edit] Second World War

The T-26 formed the backbone of the Red Army's tank force during the first months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This and the lack of coordination between different units of the Red Army influenced a very poor performance of the Red Army against the Germans between June and August 1941. Even in instances where Soviet commanders showed initiative, such as Soviet General Kirponos counterstroke in the Southwest, Soviet forces were simply not coordinated enough to stall the German advance, nor were their tanks comparable to the newer generation of German armour, such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV.[29] By the end of fighting along the central axis in August 1941, in preparation for the end of German operations around Kiev and Leningrad, the majority of the Red Army's armour had been destroyed or captured. Although the Germans also fielded various obsolete designs, such as the Panzer I and Panzer II, their heavier armour was packed together to provide enough mass to punch through Soviet front lines and exploit any breakthroughs achieved. In instances where Soviet heavy and medium armour was available the German offensive was many times stalled. For instance, a Soviet counterattack in front of Raseiniai, Lithuania, on June 24, 1941, was able to overrun an advance reconnaissance detachment of the German 6th Panzer Division, forcing the divergence of 1st Panzer Division and stalling the offensive for a day.[30] By the end of the year the T-26 had been reverted to other duties, including logistics, and began to be used as a chassis for new tank surrogates.

Many T-26s were captured by the Germans during the offensive. Most of the captured tanks were captured without serious damage, which is a testament to existent mechanical problems within the tank. Under German usage the T-26 was found to have severe clutch problems, a hot steering apparatus and seized bearings. Several T-26Bs were used by the German 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" as renamed Mistbiene tanks, or 'manure bees'. The T-26B, redesignated as the T-26B 738(r.) was used extensively by the German Army. Many T-26Cs were also used on the Eastern Front during the war by the Germans. Several T-26s of all versions were abandoned by their new German owners due to severe mechanical defects, as explained above. Many light tanks were used as tractors to carry Pak guns and artillery guns. There were instances that German T-26s were used to support infantry operations as well—these were renamed the T-26 C740(r).[31]

[edit] After World War II

Four-view drawing of the T-26S
Enlarge
Four-view drawing of the T-26S

As noted above, 94 T-26 tanks remained in service with the Finnish Army by 1945. The highest number was during the summer of 1944, when the Finns kept up to 126 various T-26s, including 22 T-26Es, 2 T-26 m 1931s, 1 OT-26, 63 T-26 m 1933s, 32 T-26 m 1937s and 1939s, and 1 T-26 T.[32] Some of these tanks were kept as training tanks until 1959, when they were finally phased out and replaced by newer British and Soviet tanks.

Additionally, Franco's Spain kept captured T-26Bs as the backbone of the new Spanish armoured division, the Brunete. After the end of the Spanish Civil War, Spain received additional T-26 tanks from France which had been taken from retreating Popular forces and interned in French warehouses. In 1942 the Spanish Army had 139 T-26Bs in service.[33] After the end of the Second World War Spain had at least 116 T-26Bs on front line service, along with 20 Panzer IVs, 93 Panzer Is, 60 CV-33s and another 80 assorted machine gun carriers.[34] The T-26s were organized into two battalions of 30 tanks each, along with a single Panzer I command tank, six other Panzer I Ausf. As and a CV-33 for reconnaissance in each battalion. The T-26 would not be replaced until 1953 when Spain and the United States signed an agreement for open shipments of new military matériel to Spain. The first twelve M47 Patton tanks, dedicated to replace the T-26, would arrive at Cartagena in February 1954.

  • Finland Finland: 126 T-26
  • Spain Spain: 116 T-26B

[edit] Variants

T-26 model 1931 tanks in pre-war markings
Enlarge
T-26 model 1931 tanks in pre-war markings
  • T-26 model 1931 (T-26A) - Twin turret version with machine guns.
  • T-26 model 1932 - Twin turret version with 37 mm gun in one turret and machine gun in the other. Used as a Platoon leader's vehicle.
  • T-26TU - Command version with radios.
  • T-26 model 1933 (T-26B) - Single turret version with 45 mm gun. Most numerous variant.
  • T-26 model 1938 (T-26C) - New semi-conical turret with sloped armour. Welded construction.
  • T-26 model 1939 (T-26S) - Semi-conical turret, increased armour with sloped hull sides and welded construction.
  • T-26A artillery support tank - Mounting enlarged turret with 76.2 mm howitzer Model 27/32. The chassis was overloaded, and few were built.
  • OT-26 - Flamethrower variant, using a single machine gun-type turret.
  • OT-130 - Flamethrower variant of model 1933, using larger 45 mm gun turret without the gun.
  • OT-133 - Flamethrower variant of model 1939, without a gun.
  • OT-134 - Flamethrower variant of model 1939, with 45 mm gun.
  • TT-26 - Teletank
  • SU-5-1 - Self-propelled gun armed with 76.2 mm howitzer (few built).
  • SU-5-2 - Self-propelled gun armed with 122 mm howitzer (few built).
  • SU-5-3 - Self-propelled gun armed with 152.4 mm mortar (few built).
  • T-26-T - Armoured artillery tractor based on the T-26 chassis. Early version had an unarmoured cab, the later T-26-T2 was fully armoured. Small numbers were produced in 1933 for motorized artillery batteries, to tow 76.2 mm divisional guns. Some remained in service until 1945.
  • TN (Tank Nabludatel, "Observation Tank") - Experimental observation version of the T-26-T, with five-man crew and radio.
  • T-26E - During the Interim Peace (1940–41), the Finns re-armed their remaining Vickers 6-Ton tanks with captured Soviet long 45 mm guns and the coaxial machine guns of the T-26s. The new tanks were renamed T-26E. They were used in combat in 1941–44 and remained in service until 1959.

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Candil (1999), p. 34 See also: House, "Towards Combined Arms Warfare"
  2. ^ Finegold (2006)
  3. ^ Miller, p. 216
  4. ^ García, p. 319
  5. ^ Franco (2006), p. 74
  6. ^ Franco, p. 74
  7. ^ Franco, p. 74
  8. ^ Candil, p. 34
  9. ^ García, p. 320. Some Soviet sources state that a total of 312 T-26Bs were provided to Spain. These sources include at least 16 FT-17 light tanks and at least 15 T-26Bs which never made it to Spain.
  10. ^ Daley (1999), p. 33
  11. ^ García, p. 328
  12. ^ Franco, Panzer I, pp. 47–50. Covers information dealing with the Breda upgrade and the failed attempts to mount the much larger 37mm and 45mm guns
  13. ^ García, p. 314
  14. ^ Candil, p. 36
  15. ^ Candil, p. 36
  16. ^ Candil, p. 36
  17. ^ Muikku, p. 191
  18. ^ House, p. 69
  19. ^ WWII Vehicles.com. T-26 Light Tank
  20. ^ Book of Tanks: Russian/Soviet (pdf)
  21. ^ Book of Tanks: Russian/Soviet (pdf)
  22. ^ Zaloga, "Soviet Tank Operations"
  23. ^ Zaloga, "Soviet Tank Operations"
  24. ^ House, p. 69
  25. ^ House, p. 96
  26. ^ House, p. 96
  27. ^ Glantz, pg.35
  28. ^ Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, p. 117
  29. ^ Glantz and House, p. 54
  30. ^ Raus, p. 34, Zaloga & Grandsen (1981), pp. 10–12
  31. ^ Regenberg, pp. 4–10
  32. ^ Muikku, p. 191
  33. ^ García, p. 328
  34. ^ García and Franco, "La Brunete", p. 31

[edit] References

[edit] Printed sources

  • Candil, Antonio J. (1999). "Aid Mission to the Republicans Tested Doctrine and Equipment" in Armor, March 1, 1999. Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center. ISSN 0004-2420.
  • Daley, Dr. John (1999). "Soviet and German Advisors Put Doctrine to the Test" in Armor, May 1, 1999. Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center. ISSN 0004-2420.
  • Finegold, Jonathan (2006). ["The T-26 in the Spanish Civil War"] in Modern War Studies, October 10, 2006.
  • Franco, Lucas M. (2006). "El Tanque de la Guerra Civil Española" in Historia de la Iberia Vieja (Spanish), No. 13. ISSN 1699-7913.
  • Franco, Lucas Molina (2005). Panzer I: El inicio de una saga (in Spanish). Madrid, Spain: AF Editores, 613. ISBN 8496016528.
  • García, José María, Lucas Molina Franco (2005). La Brunete (in Spanish). Valladolid: Quiron Ediciones, 80. ISBN 8496016285.
  • García, José María, Lucas Molina Franco (2006). Las Armas de la Guerra Civil Española (in Spanish). 28002 Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 613. ISBN 8497344758.
  • Glantz, David M. (1998). Stumbling Colossus. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas Press, 374. ISBN 070060879.
  • Glantz, David M., Jonathan M. House (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas Press, 414. ISBN 0700608990.
  • House, Jonathan M. (1984). Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 231.
  • Miller, David (June 30, 2000). Illustrated Directory of Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: From World War I to the Present Day. Zenith Press, 480. ISBN 0760308926.
  • Muikku, Esa, Jukka Purhonen (1998). Suomalaiset Panssarivaunut 1918-1997 (The Finnish Armoured Vehicles 1918-1997) (in Finnish/English). Jyväskylä: Apali, 208. ISBN 9525026094.
  • Raus, Erhard (2002). Peter G. Tsouras: Panzers on the Eastern Front: General Erhard Raus and his Panzer Divisions in Russia, 1941-1945. United States of America: Greenhill Books, 253. ISBN 0739426443.
  • Regenberg, Dr. Werner, Horst Scheibert (1990). Captured Tanks Under the German Flag. United States of America: Schiffer, 49. ISBN 0887402011.
  • Zaloga, Steven J., James Grandsen (1981). Soviet Heavy Tanks. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 0-85045-422-0.
  • Zaloga, Steven J., James Grandsen (1984). Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 0-85368-606-8.

[edit] Websites

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to:
Soviet armoured fighting vehicles of World War II
List of armoured fighting vehicles of World War II
Soviet armored fighting vehicle production during World War II