Sri Lankan civil war

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Sri Lankan civil war
Sri Lankan Army Airborne Commandos
Date July 1983 – present Location Sri Lanka Result Ongoing Casus belli Sharp disagreements over language and territory. Also riots between majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil community.
Combatants
Sri Lanka Army Sri Lanka Air Force Sri Lanka Navy IPKF	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	"Karuna" Faction (LTTE breakaway group)
Commanders
Junius Richard Jayawardene (1983-89) Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-93) Dingiri Banda Wijetunge (1993-94) Chandrika Kumaratunga (1994-2005) Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005-present)	Velupillai Prabhakaran	Karuna
Strength
111,000[1]	11,000[2]	5,000

The Sri Lankan civil war is an ongoing conflict on the island-nation of Sri Lanka. Since the 1983 "Black July" pogrom, there has been on-and-off civil war, mostly between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or the LTTE, who want to create an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the north-east of the island. It is estimated that the war has left more than 65,000 people dead since 1983 and caused great harm to the population and economy of the country. A cease-fire was declared in 2001, but hostilities renewed in late 2005. Following escalation of violence in July 2006, a senior rebel leader declared the ceasefire null and void,^[3] although both sides later reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire agreement.

[edit] Origins

Main article: Origins of the Sri Lankan civil war

[edit] Outbreak of civil war

Sri Lanka

This article is part of the series: Politics and government of Sri Lanka

President Mahinda Rajapaksa Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake Parliament Political parties Sri Lanka leftist parties Elections Provinces Districts Civil war Foreign relations

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Frustrated by the ongoing politics, Tamil youth started to form militant groups, some funded by bank robberies. The most prominent of these was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In response, the government expanded its military presence in the north^{[citation needed]}.

In July 1983, a deadly attack on the military in the north by the LTTE which killed 13 soldiers[1] [ sparked riots in Colombo, the capital, and elsewhere (see Black July Pogrom). Between 1,000 to 3,000 Tamils were killed,^[4] and many more fled Sinhalese-majority areas. This is usually considered the beginning of the ethnic conflict. In 1985, peace talks between the LTTE and the government failed, and the war continued. In 1987, government troops pushed the LTTE fighters to the northern city of Jaffna. In April 1987, the conflict exploded with ferocity, as both the government forces and the LTTE fighters engaged each other in a series of bloody operations.

In July 1987, the LTTE carried out their first suicide attack: "Captain Miller" of the Black Tigers drove a small truck with explosives through the wall of a fortified Sri Lankan army camp, reportedly killing forty soldiers.

Initially there was a plethora of resistance groups. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's position, adopted from that of the PLO, was that there should be only one. Over time the LTTE merged with or largely exterminated almost all the other militant Tamil groups. As a result, many Tamil splinter groups have ended up working with the Sri Lankan government as paramilitaries, and there remain legitimate Tamil-oriented political parties opposed to LTTE's vision of an independent Tamil Eelam.

[edit] Indian involvement

Main article: IPKF

See also: Operation Poomalai, Jaffna University Helidrop, Operation Pawan, Rajiv Gandhi, and Research and Analysis Wing

India became involved in the 1980s for a number of reasons – its leaders' desire to project India as the regional power in the area, worries about India's own Tamils seeking independence, and a genuine concern for the Sri Lankan Tamils' plight. The latter was particularly strong in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where ethnic kinship led to deep sympathy for the discrimination against Sri Lankan Tamils. In the 1980s, the Indian central and state governments supported both sides in different ways, although it is widely believed that India through its intelligence agency R&AW provided the LTTE and other Tamil guerilla groups with monetary and training support.

India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and in 1987 the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included devolution of power to the provinces, a merger — subject to later referendum — of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language (this was eventually enacted as the 13th Amendment). India agreed to establish order in the north and east with an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups including the LTTE, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF.

The Sri Lankan government was facing a mostly unrelated uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, and called in the Indian military immediately after the agreement was signed. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was formed, and initially oversaw a cease-fire and modest disarmament of the militant groups. The Sri Lankan government pulled its troops south and put down the JVP rebellion.

Few of the concessions agreed to in the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement were implemented. When the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters, the IPKF tried to demobilize them by force and ended up in full-scale conflict with the Tamils they had come to protect. Indian troops committed major human rights abuses in the north, were accused by many human rights groups, the LTTE, civilians and others of atrocities, and soon met stiff opposition from the Tamils.^[5][6][7][8] Simultaneously, nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence in Sri Lanka. These led to the Sri Lankan government's call for India to quit the island, and they allegedly entered into a secret deal with the LTTE that culminated in a ceasefire. However, the LTTE and IPKF continued to have frequent hostilities, and according to some reports, the Sri Lankan government even armed the rebels in order to see the back of the Indian forces.^[9] Casualties mounted and eventually India pulled out its troops in March 1990.

[edit] Rajiv Gandhi Assassination

Support from India dropped noticeably in 1991, after the assassination of a recent ex-Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, by a woman suicide bomber (Thenmuli Rajaratnam) an LTTE member. The Indian press has reported that Prabhakaran decided to eliminate Gandhi as he considered him to be against the Tamil liberation struggle and feared that Gandhi might re-induct the IPKF, which Prabakaran termed the "satanic force", if he won the 1991 Indian elections.^[10]

In 1998 a court in India presided over by Special Judge V Navaneetham found the LTTE and its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran responsible for the assassination.^[11] In a 2006 interview LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham stated regret over the assassination but came short of outright accepting responsibility for it.^[12][13]

India remains an outside observer to the ongoing peace process, with frequent demands to press for an extradition of Velupillai Prabhakaran, even if a peace deal is struck between the parties in the future. India's central government has been firmly against the LTTE, although it does still speak up for Tamils' rights. However, regional Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu have often discreetly spoken in favour of the LTTE.

[edit] The 1990s

In the 1980s and 1990s, successive governments officially revoked some of the discriminatory policies, and recognized Tamil as an official language. Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Muslims today claim they face reverse discrimination. Tamils deny the latter claim, and see the changes that have been made as too little too late.

The LTTE took significant parts of the north as the IPKF withdrew, and established many government-like functions in the areas under its control. A tentative ceasefire held in 1990 as the LTTE occupied itself with destroying rival Tamil groups while the government cracked down on another JVP uprising. When both major combatants had established their power bases, they turned on each other and the ceasefire broke down. The government launched an offensive to try to retake Jaffna.

This phase of the war soon acquired the name Eelam War II. It was marked by unprecendented brutality. The government placed an embargo on food and medicine entering the Jaffna peninsula. The air force relentlessly bombed the area, attacking houses, schools, hospitals, churches, and temples. At one point they even bombed the town of Jaffna with human excrement.^[14][15] Of the many temples destroyed, a notable attack occurred on the 18th October 1990, when the Sri Lankan air force indiscriminately bombed the Naguleswaram temple, one of the five ancient holiest Hindu Shiva temples around the island, destroying it. Hundreds of devotees were gathered at the temple to celebrate the Kedara Gowri festival, and many civilians were killed. The army rounded up young men merely on the suspicion of being insurgents, and executed them. The LTTE responded by attacking Sinhalese and Muslim villages and massacring civilians. The government trained and armed Home Guard Muslim units that took revenge on Tamil villages. The sight of burning bodies became a common sight along roadsides in the north and east. Throughout the country, government death squads hunted down, kidnapped, or killed Sinhalese or Tamil youth suspected of being JVP or LTTE sympathizers, respectively.^[16] The LTTE expelled the Muslims from Jaffna.

The largest battle of the war was in July 1991, when the army's Elephant Pass base, which controlled access to the Jaffna peninsula, was surrounded by 5,000 LTTE troops. More than two thousand died on both sides in the month-long siege, before 10,000 government troops arrived to relieve the base.^[17]

In February 1992, another series of government offensives failed to capture Jaffna. The LTTE, for its part, scored a major victory when one of their suicide bombers killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993.

In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the UNP was defeated. Amidst great hope, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party came to power on a peace platform. A ceasefire was agreed to in January 1995, but the ensuing negotiations proved fruitless. The LTTE broke the ceasefire on April 19. Thus began the next phase of the war, Eelam War III.

The new government then pursued a policy of "war for peace". Determined to retake Jaffna, it poured troops into the peninsula, leaving large parts of the town in ruins. The government forces often attacked civilian buildings such as temples, churches and schools in a bid to stem the growing resistance. These were often safe havens for Tamil civilians fleeing the air raids and their destruction resulted in a high amount of civilian casualties. In one particular incident in August 1995, air force jets bombed Navali's St. Peter's church, killing at least 65 refugees and wounding 150 others.^[18]

By early December 1995, they had succeeded in bringing Jaffna under government control for the first time in nearly a decade. The LTTE and more than 400,000 civilians fled to the Vanni region in the interior. Most of the refugees returned later the next year.

The government launched another offensive in August 1996. Another 200,000 civilians fled the violence. The town of Kilinochchi fell on September 29.^[19] On May 13, 1997, 20,000 government troops tried to open a supply line through the LTTE-controlled Vanni, but failed. Civilians were regularly killed and wounded by both sides.

LTTE suicide and time bombs were exploded numerous times in populated city areas and public transport, killing hundreds of civilians. In January 1996, the LTTE carried out their deadliest suicide bomb attack, at the Central bank in Colombo, killing 90 and injuring 1,400. In October 1997 they bombed the Sri Lankan World Trade Center and, in January 1998, detonated a truck bomb in Kandy, damaging the Temple of the Tooth, one of the holiest Buddhist shrines in the world. In response to this bombing, the Sri Lankan government outlawed the LTTE and with some success pressed other governments around the world to do the same, significantly interfering with their fund-raising activities.

In March 1999, in Operation Rana Gosa, the government tried invading the Vanni from the south. The army made some gains, taking control of Oddusuddan and Madhu, but could not dislodge the LTTE from the region.

The LTTE returned to the offensive with "Operation Unceasing Waves" on November 2, 1999. Nearly all the Vanni rapidly fell back into LTTE hands. The LTTE launched 17 successful attacks in the region which culminated in the overrunning of the Paranthan Chemicals Factory base and the Kurrakkan Kaddukulam base. Thousands were killed. The rebels also advanced north towards Elephant Pass and Jaffna. The LTTE was successful in cutting all land and sea supply lines of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the town of Kilinochchi and surrounding areas. In December 1999 the LTTE tried to kill Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga. She lost one eye, among other injuries.

Exhaustion with the war was building. By mid-2000, human rights groups estimated that more than one million people in Sri Lanka were internally displaced persons, living in camps, homeless and struggling for survival. At the same time, the suicide rate on the island climbed to become highest in the world per capita.^[20]

A significant peace movement developed in the 1990s, with many organisations holding peace camps, conferences, trainings and peace meditations, and many other efforts to bridge the two sides at all levels.

As early as February 2000, Norway was asked to mediate by both sides. The LTTE observed a unilateral ceasefire from December 2000 to April 2001; after this it launched another offensive. After securing a vast area controlled by the government forces, the LTTE further advanced northwards. This advancement of the LTTE was posing a serious threat to the Elephant Pass military complex that housed 17,000 troops of the Sri Lankan forces.^[21] On April 22, 2000 the Elephant Pass military complex, which had separated the Jaffna peninsula from the Vanni mainland for 17 years, completely fell to the hands of the LTTE.^[22][23]

The LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire in December 2000, but cancelled it on April 24, 2001. The army launched Operation Agni Khiela to take back the southern Jaffna Peninsula, but sustained losses. The LTTE carried out a suicide attack on Bandaranaike International Airport in July 2001, destroying eight of the air force's planes (2 IAI Kfirs, 1 Mil-17, 1 Mil-24, 3 K-7 trainers, 1 MiG-27) and four Sri Lankan Airlines planes (2 Airbus A330s, 1 A340 and 1 A320), dampening the economy and causing tourism to plummet.

[edit] Ceasefire, 2001-06

[edit] Beginning of the ceasefire

Approximate extent of area under the LTTE control, as of December 2005. Red areas are under full control, orange indicates partial control, yellow regions are claimed but not controlled.

In 2001, however, the LTTE began to declare their willingness to explore measures that would safeguard Tamils' rights and autonomy as part of Sri Lanka, and announced a unilateral ceasefire just before Christmas 2001. The LTTE are believed to have taken this action after fear of international pressure and even direct US support of the Sri Lankan Government as part of the War on Terror.

The government was facing increasing criticism over its "war for peace" strategy, with peace nowhere in sight. After losing a no-confidence motion, the elections of December 5, 2001 saw the defeat of the PA and the victory of Ranil Wickremasinghe's United National Front on a pro-peace platform.

The new government reciprocated another unilateral LTTE ceasefire offer on December 24, 2001. The two sides formalized it in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in February 2002. Norway was named mediator, and, together with the other Nordic countries, it also monitored the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Many other countries offered substantial financial support if peace was achieved. The government agreed to lift the ban on the LTTE in order to resume direct negotiations. Commercial air flights to Jaffna began. The LTTE opened the A9 road through its territory, allowing civilian traffic through the Vanni region for the first time in many years.

Both sides agreed to the principle of a federal solution. This was a key compromise from the LTTE, which had always insisted on an independent Tamil state. It also represented a compromise from the government, which had seldom agreed to more than minimal devolution.

[edit] Tensions begin again

For the first time in Sri Lanka's history, the president and prime minister were of two different parties. This co-habitation was extremely uneasy. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe and the UNP favoured talks with the LTTE; President Kumaratunga and the PA opposed them. President Kumaratunga and Sinhala nationalists did not trust the LTTE, which continued to levy taxes, recruit child soldiers, and engage in killings of members of rival Tamil groups and government intelligence agents.

On April 21, 2003, the LTTE walked out of peace talks. It cited as reasons:

• the presence of army troops in High Security Zones in civilian areas in Jaffna;
• its being excluded from a donor conference in Washington;
• insufficient attention given to the North and East in reconstruction efforts;
• continued government restrictions on fishing and agriculture in Tamil regions.

On October 31, the LTTE issued its own peace proposal, calling for an Interim Self-Governing Authority. The ISGA would be controlled by the LTTE and would have broad powers in the north and east. This provoked a strong backlash among the Sinhalese. Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and took over key government ministries. She then formed an alliance with the JVP, the United People's Freedom Alliance, opposed to the ISGA and advocating a harder line on the LTTE. The UPFA won the elections of April 8, 2004.

Meanwhile, the LTTE was fracturing between its northern and eastern wings. Colonel Karuna pulled 5,000 eastern troops out of the LTTE, claiming insufficient resources and power were being given to Tamils of the eastern part of the island. A civil war within the LTTE seemed imminent. After the election, brief fighting south of Trincomalee led to a rapid retreat and capitulation of the Karuna group, their leaders eventually fleeing to Colombo. It has now been revealed that a ruling Muslim politician was involved with Karuna's escape. Nonetheless, incidents of violence between the LTTE and Karuna faction became common in the east. The LTTE accused the army of backing Karuna behind the scenes.

The ceasefire still largely held. However, the situation was complicated by allegations that both sides were carrying out covert operations against the other. The government claimed that LTTE rebels were killing opponents and government soldiers and getting away with it, while the rebels accused the government of supporting paramilitary groups against them.

[edit] Tsunami and response

On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami hit Sri Lanka, killing more than 30,000 people. Aid poured in from donor countries, but disagreements broke out almost instantly over whether it was to flow to Sinhalese or Tamil regions. By June 24, the government and LTTE agreed on the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), but it received sharp criticism from Muslims and from the JVP, who left the government.

Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a Tamil sharply critical of the LTTE, was assassinated on August 12, increasing the atmosphere of tension on the island. The government blamed the LTTE, but no retaliation was made.

In the 2005 presidential election, the UNF candidate, Wickremasinghe, advocated reopening talks with the LTTE. The UPFA candidate, Mahinda Rajapaksa, called for a tougher line and renegotiation of the ceasefire. The LTTE openly called for a boycott of the election by the Tamils, but, believing the Tamils were getting ready to vote in large numbers, the LTTE was accused of using violence and intimidation to enforce the boycott. Losing the chance to get a large number of Tamil votes meant a loss for Wickremasinghe and a narrow win for Rajapaksa. Despite being seen as a hardliner, Rajapaksa promised to pursue peace and new talks with the rebels.

LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in an annual address in November, stated that the Tigers would "renew their struggle" in 2006 if the government did not take serious moves toward peace.

[edit] Renewed violence

Just days after Prabhakaran's speech, a new round of violence began. December 2005 brought increased guerrilla activity to the northeast, including Claymore mine attacks, clashes between the Sea Tigers and the Sri Lankan navy, and the killings of sympathizers on both sides. Prominent figures were targeted for assassination, including Taraki Sivaram, a journalist, and Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE MP gunned down at a Christmas Mass. This violence left around 200 people dead.^[24] The LTTE denied responsibility for the attacks, blaming "armed civilian groups" for them. Other incidents, such as assassination of Tamil journalists and civilians, led the SLMM to question whether a ceasefire could still be said to exist.^[25]

[edit] Talks and more violence

In light of this renewed violence, the co-chairs of the Tokyo Donor conference called on both parties to come to the negotiating table. The co-chairs—the United States in particular—were heavily critical of the LTTE violence. US State Department officials, as well as the US ambassador to Sri Lanka, gave warnings to the Tigers claiming a return to hostilities would mean that the Tigers would face a "more determined" Sri Lankan military.

In a last-minute effort to salvage an agreement between the parties, the Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim and the LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham came to the island. The parties severely disagreed on the location of the talks; however, these last-minute efforts produced a breakthrough when both parties agreed on February 7, 2006, that new talks could be held in Geneva, Switzerland on February 22 and February 23. These talks were reported to have gone "above expectations", with both the government and the LTTE agreeing to curb the violence and to hold talks on April 19-21.^[26]

Over the next few weeks following the talks, violence dropped significantly. However, beginning in early April, violence increased again. An attack on military vehicles using a Claymore anti-personnel mine killed 10 navy sailors on April 11th. The following day, coordinated bombings by rebels and rioting in the north-eastern part of the country left 16 dead. A Claymore anti-personnel mine exploded in Trincomalee, killing two policemen in their vehicle. Another blast, set off in a crowded vegetable market, killed one soldier and some civilians. Ensuing rioting by civilians left more than a dozen dead.^[27] Responsibility for these attacks was claimed by an organisation called the Upsurging People's Force, which the military accused of being a front for the LTTE.

In light of this violence, the LTTE called for a postponement of the Geneva talks until April 24-25, and the government initially agreed to this. Following negotiations, both the government and the rebels agreed to a civilian vessel transporting the regional LTTE leaders with international truce monitors on April 16, which involved crossing government-controlled territory. However, the climate shifted drastically when the Tamil Tigers cancelled the meeting, claiming not to have agreed to a naval escort. According to the SLMM, the Tamil rebels had agreed to the escort. "It was part of the agreement," said Helen Olafsdottir, spokesperson for the SLMM. "The rebels should have read the clauses carefully. We are frustrated.".^[28]

On April 20, 2006, the LTTE officially pulled out of peace talks indefinitely. While they stated that transportation issues had prevented them from meeting their regional leaders, some analysts and the international community held a deep skepticism, seeing the transportation issue as a delaying tactic to avoid attending peace talks in Geneva.^[29]

On April 23, 2006, six Sinhalese rice farmers were executed in their paddy fields by suspected LTTE cadres in Trincomalee district.^[30] The following day, two suspected Tamil Tiger rebels were shot dead in Batticaloa when caught planting mines after rebels reportedly hacked a young mother to death and kidnapped her infant.^[31]

International condemnation against the LTTE was repeated following an incident on April 25, 2006, when Black Tiger suicide bomber Anoja Kugenthirasah blew herself up at the Sri Lankan Army headquarters in the capital, Colombo, killing ten. Twenty-seven were injured, including the commander of the Sri Lankan Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka. The Sri Lankan military began aerial assaults on rebel positions in the north-eastern part of the island nation.^[32]

On May 10, the Sri Lankan Navy allegedly killed 13 Tamils, including two children, in Jaffna. (See Allaipiddy massacres) Human rights organizations condemned this incident.^[33]

New talks were scheduled in Oslo, Norway, for June 8-9. These were cancelled after the LTTE claimed its fighters were not being allowed safe passage to travel to the talks. On June 15, a Claymore mine exploded next to a bus in central Sri Lanka, killing at least 64 civilians; this attack prompted more air strikes against the rebels. The SLMM later suggested it was "highly probable" the LTTE or supporters carried out the attack, whilst the rebels continued to insist they had nothing to do with it. The SLMM also ruled that Government forces and paramilitary groups associated with them were responsible for Claymore mine attacks in Vavuniya and Mannar from April to June of 2006, in a "deliberate strategy against Tamil Tiger cadres and civilians", in "gross violation" of the ceasefire agreement.^[34]

Following a naval battle off the coast of the town of Pesalai, (see 2006 Mannar massacres) Sri Lankan navy personnel were accused of lobbing two grenades into the "Our Lady of Victory" church, killing one Tamil civilian and injuring others taking refuge inside.^[35] The navy denied their men were involved, and in turn, blamed the LTTE. However, several witnesses, including an international aid worker, gave near-identical accounts of the navy's involvement. The chief bishop stated his church had been desecrated, by "unjust aggressors, the Sri Lankan Navy" in an angry letter to the Vatican.^[36] Days later, the rebels were accused by the Government of Sri Lanka and the military of firing small arms at a Buddhist temple, however these claims were dismissed by the head Buddhist monk of the temple, who stated that his shrine was never targeted and "All through the conflict, we never had any trouble from the Tigers."^[37]

Sri Lankan general and Army Chief of Staff Parami Kulatunga was killed June 26 by an LTTE suicide bomber.

[edit] Resumption of hostilities

A new crisis led to large-scale fighting in July 2006 after the LTTE cut the water supply to villages in government controlled areas[2]. The Sri Lankan government claimed the LTTE was blocking a sluice gate in the north-east that provided water to civilians, and as a result 15,000 civilians were denied access to water. The Air Force attacked LTTE positions and ground troops began an operation to open the gate. This prompted the Head of the SLMM to state: "It is definitely the wrong method. It is definitely overkill if you want the water. We sat talking and got clearance from the government and tried to convince the LTTE to have confidence in the government...They dropped a bomb in the vicinity. That's not the right signal."^[38] Following these moves, LTTE political leader S Elilan announced an end to the cease-fire of 2001. Palitha Kohona, a government spokesman, stated that the government is committed to the cease-fire. However, fierce fighting erupted in the vicinity of the gate as well as in Trincomalee. Fighting near the Muslim-majority town of Muttur in early August killed at least 30 civilians and displaced 22 000 residents of the area.^[39][40] The LTTE eventually withdrew from the town of Muttur and it seemed an end to the stalemate was in sight as Norwegian mediators persuaded the Tamil rebels to reopen the sluice gates. However, as SLMM truce monitors and rebels approached the reservoir area, the Sri Lankan military recommenced artillery attacks thus forestalling the expected reopening of the gates.^[41] This attack on the rebels and SLMM officials prompted condemnation from SLMM Chief of Staff Tommy Lekenmyr, who stated "(The government) have the information that the LTTE has made this offer." "It is quite obvious they are not interested in water. They are interested in something else," "We will blame this on the government."^[42]

Soon afterwards, it emerged that 17 Tamil NGO humanitarian workers, working for the International French charity Action Against Hunger (ACF) in Muthur, were found executed (see 2006 Trincomalee massacres). They were found lying face down on the floor of their office, with bullet wounds, still wearing their clearly marked T-shirts indicating they were international humanitarian workers. The murders prompted widespread international condemnation. Relatives blamed the Sri Lankan armed forces for the murders.^[43] Some Western diplomats conceded that early indications "look like the Government was involved."^[44] The head of the ACF was denied initial access to the incident site by soldiers. Pressure on the Sri Lankan Government increased for a full, independent probe into the killings. Australian forensic experts have been requested to help in the investigation. The SLMM has claimed that the GoSL is behind the attack.^[45]. The allegation was categorically denied as ""pathetic and biased"" by the Sri Lankan Government Spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella who stated that the SLMM has "no right to make such a statement because they are not professionals in autopsy or post-mortem" [3]

The sluice gates were eventually reopened the next day with conflicting reports as to who actually opened them; despite this, the army continued major ground and air offensives against the rebels in the area.^[46] Aid groups accused the government of forcing civilians to flee Tiger areas by shelling and deliberately blocking aid. “The military and government are blocking the flow of aid into Tiger areas which is a violation of the cease-fire,” The Consortium for Humanitarian Agencies said late on August 10th. “We can’t reach people in need.”^[47] Fighting continued in the area.

A few days later, the Sri Lankan Air force carried out an air attack on rebel territory, killing a number of Tamil girls. The LTTE claimed there were 61 girls, but the SLMM counted only 19 bodies.^[48] The LTTE stated the victims were schoolgirls at an orphanage attending a course on first aid.^[49] However the government denied this and claimed it was a LTTE training facility and that the children were LTTE child soldiers.^[50] They also showed journalists, as Reuters reported, what appeared to be satellite footage of Tigers fleeing a training camp shortly after Kfir jets bombed it.^[51] However, a journalist who viewed the tapes stated "there was nothing in the footage that reporters could see to suggest any military activity except that the location was secluded and had lush green trees in the neighbourhood."^[52] The killings caused huge, widespread anger and condemnation across the Tamil community. Upon inspection and investigation of the incident site by UNICEF officials, who were near the site, and SLMM monitors, both claimed that the victims were all schoolchildren studying first aid in the area.^[53] SLMM officials stated that they could not find any military installations in the area, but said however it was a very good location for a military training camp or something.^[54] The Sri Lankan Government officials and military generals responded by declaring that "children who fight for the LTTE and are prepared to kill whoever comes in front of them are legitimate targets of the Sri Lankan armed forces", regardless of "age or gender."^[55][56] One military official declared, "If the children are terrorists, what can we do?"^[57] UNICEF and other international bodies condemned the massacre as "shocking," with the head of UNICEF declaring "These children are innocent victims of violence.".^[58] On September 1st, Sri Lankan police arrested three of the young women - aged 18, 19 and 20 - who were injured in the airstrike and were subsequently brought to a hospital in central Sri Lanka for treatment. Inspector General of Police Chandra Fernando said the three young women all claimed that they were taken by a member of the Tamil Tigers to a camp deep within rebel territory for first aid training but when they reached the camp, they were forced to undergo weapons training.^[59] The Defense Ministry also released a video of the 3 women confessing that they were taken by the LTTE for forced training sessions. (Link to Video)

Following suggestions that the strategic port city of Trincomalee - which is under the control of the Sri Lankan Government - was under threat from LTTE bases surrounding it, the Sri Lankan Military launched an assault on August 28th to retake the LTTE camps in Sampur, Kaddaiparichchan and Thoppur.^[60] This led the LTTE to declare that if the offensive continues, the ceasefire will be officially over. After steady progress, the Sri Lankan Military captured Sampur from the LTTE on the 4th of September, and begin to establish military bases there^[61] as the LTTE admitted defeat and stated their cadres withdrew from the strategically important town.^[62] It was the most significant area to change hands since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2002.

Despite these successes, the LTTE struck back in October. First, they killed nearly 130 soldiers in a battle in the north of the island. Just days later, a suicide bomber struck a naval convoy in the center of the country, killing about 100 unarmed sailors who were returning home.[4] [5] ^[63] Two days later, a Sea Tiger attack in the southern city of Galle struck a naval base, the farthest south any LTTE attack has taken place. Despite these incidents, both parties agreed to attend peace talks in Geneva on October 28-29.

[edit] Films on the War

A couple Tamil films from India portray the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka. Particularily, the Mani Ratnam film Kannathil Muthamittal clearly displays the suffering of Sri Lankan Tamils^{[citation needed]}' in an indirect way. The high-budgeted film had won many awards around the globe and in India.

Other Indian Tamil films which have Sri Lankan civil war content are Thenali and Nala Dhamayanthi. More Tamil films are currently being filmed in India which have the Sri Lankan civil war as a background story.[6]

[edit] See also

• Black July
• Ceylonese diaspora
• History of Sri Lanka
• Human Rights in Sri Lanka
• List of Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups
• List of riots and pogroms in Sri Lanka
• Prison massacres in Sri Lanka
• State terrorism in Sri Lanka
• Assassinations of prominent Sri Lankan Tamils attributed to the LTTE
• Military use of children in Sri Lanka

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Balasingham, Adele: The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. 2003, ISBN 1-903679-03-6.
• Dissanayaka, T.D.S.A.: War or Peace in Sri Lanka, Volume II. Swastika (Pvt.) Ltd., Colombo 1998.
• Dixit, J.N.: Assignment Colombo, ISBN 81-220-0499-7. (Dixit was the Indian High Commissioner during the 1980s negotiations that led to the IPKF presence.)
• Gamage, S. and Watson, I.B.: Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka. Sage, New Delhi 1999.
• Gamage, S.: Ethnic Conflict, State Reform and Nation Building in Sri Lanka: Analysis of the Context and Suggestions for a Settlement, in: Neelsen, John P. and Malik, Dipak: "Crises of State and Nation: South Asian States between Nation Building and Fragmentation", Manohar, New Delhi (forthcoming).
• Hoole, R., Somasundaram, D., Sritharan K., and Thiranagama, R. The Broken Palmyra - The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka: An Inside Account. The Sri Lanka Studies Institute, Claremont 1990. (Also available online[7].)
• Johnson, Robert: A Region in Turmoil. Reaktion, New York and London 2005. (Covers Sri Lanka and its regional context.)
• Narayan Swamy, M. R.: Tigers of Lanka: from Boys to Guerrillas. Konark Publishers; 3rd ed. 2002, ISBN 81-220-0631-0.
• Rajasinghan, K.T.: Sri Lanka: The Untold Story. 2001-2002. (Serialised in Asia Times Online [8]).

[edit] External links

• GoSL Peace Secretariat
• LTTE Peace Secretariat
• Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
• Tamil Net
• Lanka Academic, news site sponsored by Sri Lankan academics worldwide
• TamilWeek, Weekly Digest of Top News and Views
• Society for Peace, Unity and human Rights in Sri Lanka
• Sangam.org
• A Tamil human rights and news portal
• LankaTruth - Site covering Sri Lanka
• Texts of key agreements in the peace process and an analysis of the process by Conciliation Resources
• Report on the Sri Lankan peace process by Asiafoundation
• hWeb - Sri Lanka’s recent history of ethnic conflict and political crisis originates from its colonial legacy
• 18th anniversary of Jaffna hospital massacre
• Indian Express report on Valvetiturai massacre 1989
• India's My Lai - The Valvettiturai Massacre, 1989
• The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 1987 - 1991
• NorthEast Secretariat report on Human rights 1974-2004
• hWeb - Sri Lanka’s recent history of ethnic conflict originates from it's colonial legacy