South Korean nuclear research programs

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In the autumn of 2004, South Korea publicly revealed for the first time the extent of its highly-secretive nuclear research programs, including some experiments which were conducted without reporting them to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in violation of its status as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state.

1 Early Nuclear Ambitions
2 Post-NPT Programs
3 IAEA Response
4 See also
5 External links

[edit] Early Nuclear Ambitions

Under the direction of South Korea's Weapons Exploitation Committee, the country attempted to obtain plutonium reprocessing facilities following the pullout of the 26,000 American soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division in 1971. However, under pressure from the United States, France eventually decided not to deliver a reprocessing facility to South Korea in 1975. South Korea's nuclear weapons research program effectively ended on April 23, 1975 with its ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[edit] Post-NPT Programs

The South Korean government insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

In 1982, scientists at the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute performed an experiment in which they extracted several milligrams of plutonium. Although plutonium has uses other than the manufacture of weapons, The United States later insisted that South Korea not attempt to reprocess plutonium in any way. In exchange, the US agreed to transfer reactor technology and give financial assistance to South Korea's nuclear energy program.

Later, in an experiment at the same facility in 2000, scientists enriched 200 milligrams of uranium to near-weapons grade (up to 77 percent) using laser enrichment. The South Korean government claimed that this research was conducted without its knowledge. While Uranium enriched to 77 percent is not considered weapons-grade, it could theoretically be used to construct a nuclear weapon. However, the construction of a nuclear weapon would require much larger amounts of such highly-enriched Uranium than the Korean researchers had produced. This event and the earlier extraction of plutonium went unreported to the IAEA until late 2004.

[edit] IAEA Response

Following Seoul's disclosure of the above incidents, the IAEA launched a full investigation into South Korea's nuclear activities. In a report issued on November 11, 2004, the IAEA described the South Korean government's failure to report its nuclear activities a matter of 'serious concern', but accepted that these experiments never produced more than very small amounts of weaponizeable fissile material. Following the report, the United States decided against bringing the matter before the UN Security Council, effectively bringing an end to the matter.