Security dilemma

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In international relations, the security dilemma refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war, over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict.

Essentially, the security dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure vis-à-vis other states. None of the states involved want relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be declared, but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make itself more secure, the other states interpret its actions as threatening. An ironic cycle of unintended provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict which may eventually lead to open warfare.

A frequently cited example of the security dilemma is the beginning of World War I. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that the major European powers felt forced to go to war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of their neighbors, despite not actually desiring the war. Furthermore, the time necessary to mobilize large amounts of troops for defense led some Great Powers (such as Russia) to adopt a particularly accelerated mobilization timetable, which in turn put pressure on other states to mobilize early as well. However, other scholars dispute this interpretation of the origins of the war, contending that some of the states involved really did want the conflict.

The security dilemma is a popular concept with cognitive and constructivist theorists of international relations, who regard war as essentially arising from failures of communication. Cognitive theorists affirm that the key to avoiding war is the avoidance of miscommunication through proper signaling.

The notion of the security dilemma is attributed to John Herz, since he used in the Nº2 of the 2nd Vol of World Politics.