Second strike
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In nuclear strategy, second strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker.
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[edit] Theory
The possession of second strike capabilities counters a first strike nuclear threat and can support a no first use nuclear strategy.
Reciprocal second strike capabilities usually cause a mutual assured destruction defence strategy, though one side may have a lower level minimal deterrence response.
An example of how second strike capability can be strengthened is the implementation of fail-deadly mechanisms.
[edit] Implementation
The crucial goal in maintaining second strike capabilities is preventing first strike attacks from taking out a nation's nuclear arsenal, allowing for nuclear retaliation to be carried out. The nuclear triad is a way for countries to diversify their nuclear arsenals in order to better ensure second strike capability.
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the classic, but very expensive, method of providing a second strike capability, though it needs to be supported by a reliable method of identifying who the attacker is. This is a serious problem due to the fact that in retaliation for a submarine launched ICBM the wrong country could be targeted, causing the conflict to escalate.
[edit] History
As early as 1940, science fiction writer Robert A. Heinlein wrote Solution Unsatisfactory in which he described a nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. In one episode, the US cabinet discusses the scenario of a Soviet surprise attack in which American cities would be destroyed, but the US armed forces would survive and launch a counter-attack.
[edit] See also
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