Rohana Wijeweera
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Rohana Wijeweera (born 14 July 1943 - died 13 November 1989) was the leader of the JVP, a prominent follower of Che Guevara and Sri Lankan revolutionary whose communist views of spreading wealth to the poorer classes earned him great popularity.
A clever student born on "Bastile Day" (14th July 1789 - The French Revolution) in a coastal fishing village Kottegoda in southern Sri Lanka. His father was an active member of Communist Party of Sri Lanka (pro-Russian wing) and very close to Dr. S.A. Wickramasinghe. Later he was disabled after an attack of the opponent United National Party (UNP) thugs. He went to Lumumba University to study medicine. He conducted revolutionary activities and felt that the system existing in the USSR at that time was not real communism. He was expelled from Russia as a result of this. He returned to Sri Lanka and gained a large following in his beliefs in helping the poor. On the 14th May 1965 he formed the JVP after a discussion in a house at Akmeemana in Galle district southern Sri Lanka.
Like Che Guevara he raised an army but the Government found out and he was not prepared; the 1971 uprising followed: a brief but violent struggle that claimed 15,000 lives. Wijeweera was imprisoned but remained a popular figure.
In the 1977 elections, J.R Jayawardene promised to release him if he was elected. This earned him many votes and when Jayawardene was elected, Wijeweera was released.
The JVP was offered a chance at democratic elections and gained around 4% of the votes in the 1982 presidential election. However, civil disorder and mistreatment of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka followed. Jayawardene blamed the JVP for this and the leaders of the JVP were captured. Wijeweera managed to escape, but in the violence that followed, Wijeweera was captured and killed.
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[edit] Birth of the JVP
During this period, Rohana Wijeweera was studying medicine in Lumumba University. Whilst at university, he witnessed and experienced for himself the benefits offered to the society by the socialist system. Extensive reading of socialist literature, the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin followed. Rohana Wijeweera along with many other students described the Soviet system as a betrayal of socialism. In the Soviet Union, this stand attracted controversy and when Rohana Wijeweera returned to Sri Lanka in 1964 for a vacation, he was not allowed to go back to the Soviet Union to continue his studies.
[edit] Splitting of Communist Party
By this time, the Communist Party of Sri Lanka was also divided on this issue and as a result broke down into two factions; the pro-Chinese faction and the pro-Soviet faction. The Chinese faction as led by Premalal Kumarasiri. Through his father's political activities, Wijeweera had come to contact with Premalal Kumarasiri on earlier occasions and now Wijeweera met Premalal Kumarasiri to say that he would like to work for the Chinese faction of the Communist Party on the basis of a well wisher. Wijeweera made the trade union office of the Chinese faction his home and plunged himself in work. No one in the Chinese faction was quite conversant with the Sino-Soviet dispute as to be able to offer a clear explanation of it to the membership. This task fell on Wijeweera who was met by the members wanting know about the prevailing situation. He was invited by various branches of the party to deliver lectures to their membership on the Sino Soviet dispute. With all these activities, before long, Rohana Wijeweera became a person known to everybody in the Chinese faction. When the youth congress of the party was held, Rohana Wijeweera acted as the translator for the Albanian delegation who participated in the congress. This period strengthened the link between Wijeweera and the membership of the Chinese faction. He also helped in selling the party organ Kamkaruwa (The Worker), in organising trade union action, etc. Thus with time he became a known and popular person within the Chinese faction of the Communist Party.
In late 1964, Premalal Kumarasiri along with a part of the membership broke away from the Chinese faction, due to internal strife. This split affected adversely the youth organizations of the party. Following the split Shanmuganathan became the General Secretary of the Chinese faction and under his leadership the party deteriorated precipitously. While mouthing words about revolution, he was torpedoing strikes and lived in a capitalist elite. The party continued to break up and disputes with the leadership became common. Wijeweera observed many shortcomings in the Chinese faction. According to him, the leadership had double standards. Political activities consisted only of maintaining trade unions and blind veneration of the Chinese leadership.
[edit] Akmeemana discussion
In mid-1966, another discussion was held in Akmeemana (Galle district) by a group of members of the Chinese faction including Wijeweera. This group consisted more or less of the same people who had participated in the previous meeting in May 1965. Here it was decided that, since the Chinese faction leadership was blocking every effort at correcting the party, a movement truly revolutionary in body and spirit should be created in spite of the numerous certain obstacles to confront such a venture. Everybody present was conscious of the fact that they had absolutely no material resources to employ in their project. The only resources they had, the human resource comprised for the moment of only them. This was in complete contrast to the birth of other political parties in Sri Lanka. For example, the Communist Party was founded in 1943 by reading off considerable party of the LSSP membership. The Chinese faction was founded in 1962 in the very same fashion and took away with it over half of the trade union movement affiliated to the CP. When the NSSP was founded it carried with it a large portion of the membership of the LSSP. The UNP was deprived of a large part of its membership as Solomon Bandaranaike broke away from it to form the SLFP. Similarly Chandrika Kumaratunga and her husband carried with them not only part of the membership but also party funds and printing office from the SLFP when they fell out with it and formed their own party the SLMP.
[edit] Forming a new Revolutionary Party
But when Wijeweera and others decided in mid-1966 to launch a new revolutionary party they had to literally start from the scratch. The left movement that has existed (which is now generally referred to in Sri Lanka as 'old left') up to then had not produced even a few professional revolutionaries. Instead of developing the political outlook of the workers, late N. M. Perera, then the leader of the LSSP, declared that revolutions could not be realized in Sri Lanka and that the left leaders were doing the maximum possible. The working class accepted this stand and in fact loyally defended this leadership against criticisms. Such was the state of the working class when the embryo of the future JVP without any fanfare embedded itself in the political milieu of Sri Lanka.
[edit] 1971 insurrection
The leftist Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna drew worldwide attention when it launched an insurrection against the Bandaranaike government in April 1971. Although the insurgents were young, poorly armed, and inadequately trained, they succeeded in seizing and holding major areas in Southern and Central provinces before they were defeated by the security forces. Their attempt to seize power created a major crisis for the government and forced a fundamental reassessment of the nation's security needs.
Initially identified simply as the New Left, this group drew on students and unemployed youths from rural areas, most of them in the sixteen-to-twenty-five-age- group. Many of these new recruits were members of lower castes (Karava and Durava) who felt that their economic interests had been neglected by the nation's leftist coalitions. The standard program of indoctrination, the so-called Five Lectures, included discussions of Indian imperialism, the growing economic crisis, the failure of the island's communist and socialist parties, and the need for a sudden, violent seizure of power.
Between 1967 and 1970, the group expanded rapidly, gaining control of the student socialist movement at a number of major university campuses and winning recruits and sympathizers within the armed forces. Some of these latter supporters actually provided sketches of police stations, airports, and military facilities that were important to the initial success of the revolt. In order to draw the newer members more tightly into the organization and to prepare them for a coming confrontation, Wijeweera opened "education camps" in several remote areas along the south and southwestern coasts. These camps provided training in Marxism-Leninism and in basic military skills.
[edit] Preparing for the attack
While developing secret cells and regional commands, Wijeweera's group also began to take a more public role during the elections of 1970. His cadres campaigned openly for the United Front of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, but at the same time they distributed posters and pamphlets promising violent rebellion if Bandaranaike did not address the interests of the proletariat. In a manifesto issued during this period, the group used the name Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna for the first time. Because of the subversive tone of these publications, the United National Party government had Wijeweera detained during the elections, but the victorious Bandaranaike ordered his release in July 1970. In the politically tolerant atmosphere of the next few months, as the new government attempted to win over a wide variety of unorthodox leftist groups, the JVP intensified both the public campaign and the private preparations for a revolt. Although their group was relatively small, the members hoped to immobilize the government by selective kidnapping and sudden, simultaneous strikes against the security forces throughout the island. Some of the necessary weapons had been bought with funds supplied by the members. For the most part, however, they relied on raids against police stations and army camps to secure weapons, and they manufactured their own bombs.
[edit] Attacking the security forces
The discovery of several JVP bomb making huts gave the government its first evidence that the group's public threats were to be taken seriously. In March 1971, after an accidental explosion in one of these huts, the police found fifty-eight bombs in a hut in Nelundeniya, Kegalla District. Shortly afterward, Wijeweera was arrested and sent to Jaffna Prison, where he remained throughout the revolt. In response to his arrest and the growing pressure of police investigations, other JVP leaders decided to act immediately, and they agreed to begin the uprising at 11:00 P.M. on April 5.
The planning for the countrywide insurrection was hasty and poorly coordinated; some of the district leaders were not informed until the morning of the uprising. After one premature attack, security forces throughout the island were put on alert and a number of JVP leaders went into hiding without bothering to inform their subordinates of the changed circumstances. In spite of this confusion, rebel groups armed with shotguns, bombs, and Molotov cocktails launched simultaneous attacks against seventy- four police stations around the island and cut power to major urban areas. The attacks were most successful in the south. By April 10, the rebels had taken control of Matara District and the city of Ambalangoda in Galle District and allegedly came close to capturing the remaining areas of Southern Province.
The new government was ill prepared for the crisis that confronted it. Although there had been some warning that an attack was imminent, Bandaranaike was caught off guard by the scale of the uprising and was forced to call on India to provide basic security functions. Indian frigates patrolled the coast and Indian troops guarded Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayaka while Indian Air Force helicopters assisted the counteroffensive. Sri Lanka's all-volunteer army had no combat experience since World War II and no training in counterinsurgency warfare. Although the police were able to defend some areas unassisted, in many places the government deployed personnel from all three services in a ground force capacity. Royal Ceylon Air Force helicopters delivered relief supplies to beleaguered police stations while combined service patrols drove the insurgents out of urban areas and into the countryside.
[edit] Government victory over the youth struggle
After two weeks of fighting, the government regained control of all but a few remote areas. In both human and political terms, the cost of the victory was high: an estimated 15,000 insurgents- -many of them in their teens--died in the conflict, and the army was widely perceived to have used inhumane and anti-human rights methods. The army behaved like a terrorist organisation - which might be justfied given the results. In order to win over an alienated population and to prevent a prolonged conflict, Bandaranaike offered amnesties in May and June 1971, and only the top leaders were actually imprisoned. Wijeweera, who was already in detention at the time of the uprising, was given a twenty-year sentence and the JVP was proscribed.
[edit] Hidden life of Rohana Wijeweera 1983-89
[edit] Banning of the JVP
There was special announcement by the government media that the banning of the JVP and the orders were given to the Police to arrest top leaders of the party including Rohana Wijeweera. Most of the people thought this was done because of the JVP's involvement in the riots. But the truth is different, there was an intelligence report produce to President J.R. Jayawardane regarding the rapid growth of the JVP in rural areas is a threat to the national security and it would revealed 1971 insurrection. Western intelligence agencies also advice the President about the growth of the party would be a threat to their socio-economic policy changes carried out after 1977 landslide election victory of the United National Party (UNP).
[edit] Wijeweera's appeal to lift the ban
While in hiding Rohana Wijeweera sent letters to the international bodies about lifting the ban of the party which was done unlawfully and let them to do their politics in democratic framework. There was a poster campaign and distributing leaflets through out the country mentioning that their involvement of the riots was a false story and request the people to join the protest for lifting the ban. There was another secret plan of the government to hunt down the Rohana Wijeweera and general secretary Upatissa Gamanayake the operation was code named "Romeo Whisky". There were several Police raids were carried out in the country to arrest JVP supporters and sympathisers and interrogating them about the party affairs. That the people were arrested for JVP affairs most of them were tortured while questioning.
[edit] Arming the party
The government security forces pressure was increasing against the JVP and they has to find a solution for their survival. Finally JVP decided to carry out an armed struggle against the government and capture the state power. They were start training their cadre began on mid 1986 in remote jungles. This was happen to change the organisational structure of the party to suite an armed struggle. This has to change the identity of Rohana Wijeweera and the family members also.
[edit] Wijeweera in disguise
After changing his identity he took the name Nimal Kithsiri Attanayake and family members also change their names according to the new surname Attanayake. The party bought a land and bungalow in St. Mary's estate at Ulapane Kandy and started his new disguised life as a tea planter. His home was furnished with the style of a planters house and including small liquor bar but he never drank. At that time the party head quarters was in Lewwegoda estate Bandarawela and the politburo meeting was held twice a month at the same place.
[edit] Indian intervention
On the 29th July 1987 was a historic day for Sri Lankans because the government of India and Sri Lanka signed a peace accord and the protest movements against it happened through out the country 142 people were killed by security forces while they trying to stop the marches. Because of that JVP started their armed conflict of slogan of anti-Indian Imperialism. That some people thought about the Indian interference of Sri Lankan affairs happen due to the pro-U.S. policy of the President J.R. Jayawardane. After starting the armed conflict that the killing of political and non-political people accelerated in the island and various armed gangs were responsible for the killings. The situation of the country became worse until the capture of Rohana Wijeweera on 12th November 1989 by the special team at Ulapane.
[edit] Death of Rohana Wijeweera
Major-General Cecil Waidyaratne was the most senior officer in the anti-JVP thrust. He headed "Operation Combine", which started in November 1987, to take over the security of the Colombo district after the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord. The headquarters was housed in a spacious building close to Havelock Road in Colombo. Ranjan Wijeratne, the deputy Minister of Defense and the Foreign Minister, lived in a house adjoining the Operation Combine headquarters. This had 36 platoons assigned to it originally, which later increased to 58. It was meant to coordinate army, navy, air force and police activity in the Colombo district. Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne was the first commander of the unit. He was followed by Waidyaratne.
Ops Combine gave encouragement to the anti-JVP thrust. Thus they ran the risk of being marked by the JVP as dangerous enemies. In October 1989, Raja Mahataya, the Colombo district division number two leader, was arrested.
From information the army received from Raja Mahataya and from others, they were able to trace D M Anananda to the Ratnapura area. His arrest was a major breakthrough for the government. He was the functionary number 1 in the JVP. The JVP politburo never met in full session. They got together only in ones, twos or threes. It was Anananda who conveyed decisions from one group to the another. "When combined with his other functions as the political cum military leader of the Colombo/Sabaragamuwa area, the leader of the Bhiku, women's and workers' fronts and the leader of the Jathika Kmart Satan Madyadthanya, made him the single most powerful person in the organization."
Ananda was held in the Mattegoda army camp, where he divulged that Araliya Estate in Galaha was the group's headquarters in the region. This information was immediately followed up by Colonel Janaka Pererea and Major Gamini Hettiarachi. Perera was a Sandhurst-trained officer and was said to be one of the finest soldiers in the army. He was a specialist in terrorism with a master's degree in defense studies on the subject. He was the Provincial Commander of the North-Western Province, in addition to being in charge of the special operations of the Ops Combine in Colombo.
[edit] Capture of Wijeweera at Ulapane
A special operations team of the army arrested Piyadasa Ranasinghe and H B Herat in Galaha. According to information, they were JVP leaders who met Rohana Wijeweera frequently. Under interrogation, they told army investigators the whereabouts of Wijeweera and a few hours later Wijeweera was arrested at Ulapane, Kandy, at the estate bungalow where he lived, masquerading as a planter under the name of Attanayake. When the army party arrived at about 2pm, Wijeweera was taking a shave. The army team climbed over a gate and surrounded the house. Wijeweera came out and said, "I am Attanayaka and you have no right to come here. I am a peace-loving man."
At first, Janaka Perera was flustered by the confident air of Wijeweera and thought for a second that they had come to the wrong place. Still he cocked his pistol, put it to "Attanayake's" head and asked, "Oya Wijeweerada?" (Are you Wijeweera?). Wijeweera, fearing that the colonel would pull the trigger, admitted that he was, saying, "I will come with you, but don't harm my family." There were two women servants in the house other than Wijeweera's wife, and all the women, as usual, started wailing. Wijeweera was captured on November 12, 1989, and was immediately taken to Operation Combines headquarters in Colombo. Everybody in the defense establishment, including the deputy minister, Ranjan Wijeratne, went to see the prize catch.
Meanwhile, Major-General Sarath Munasinghe, one of the men, who met Wijeweera after his capture, writes in his A Soldier's Version, as follows, "On 12 November 1989, I paid a courtesy visit to my superior Colonel Lionel Balagalle, the Director of Military Intelligence. The time was around 8.00pm and the colonel was relaxing at home. While discussing activities of the JVP and also the LTTE, we had a few drinks. If I remember right, both of us had two each. The telephone rang. It was the commander of the army. The commander had an important message. Both of us were summoned to the residence of President Premadasa. Rohana Wijeweera, the JVP leader had been arrested at Ulapane in Kandy by some army personnel, who had proceeded from Colombo.
[edit] Interrogating Wijeweera
According to military officer, "After the telephone call we became cold sober. We were both in civilian clothing. Still we had to go. Mrs Balagalle was quick to give us a few cardamoms to neutralize the 'aroma' of the liquor. We were well received by the security staff at the 'Sucharitha', the residence of President Premadasa. Both of us sat close to each other at the conference table. Five minutes later, HE the President arrived with a smiling face and shook hands with us. We got into conversation. I was trying hard to remember all about Rohana Wijeweera and his JVP. But, to our dismay, His Excellency fired a barrage of questions about the LTTE. We managed to answer all questions. Just then, General Cyril Ranatunge, Secretary of Defense walked in, followed by Lt-Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe. Gen Wanasinghe informed the President that Rohana Wijeweera had been brought to Colombo, and that both of us were required to question Rohana Wijeweera. HE the President thanked both of us and we followed the commander and accompanied him in his car.
"The time was 11.30pm. We reached the premises of HQ 'Operation Combine'. There were many officers of other services too. We were conducted to the conference table where Rohana Wijeweera was seated. I was given a chair just opposite Wijeweera across the table. I commenced having a conversation with him. Mr Ernie Wijesuriya, Director, National Intelligence Bureau, his deputy and some others were present. I spoke to Rohana Wijeweera at length. Whenever I questioned him in English, he answered in Sinhalese. In fact, he asked me whether I knew the Russian language. I replied in the negative. Rohana Wijeweera told me that his second language was Russian. He told me all about his personal life, initially at Bsndarawela and later at Ulapane in Kandy. He was reluctant to talk about the activities of the JVP.
"While this discussion was going on, the 'Operation Combine' commander was with his deputy in the adjoining room, which was his office. Just past midnight, the deputy Defense Minister General Ranjan Wijeratne walked in and sat at the head of the conference table. Gen Wijeratne asked few questions, but Rohana Wijeweera did not respond. Gen Wijeratne joined the 'Operation Combine' commander in his office. We continued with our conversation. We had many cups of plain tea (dark tea), while talking. I made a request to Rohana Wijeweera to advise his membership to refrain from violence. He agreed after persuasion. So we managed to record his words and also his picture in still camera.
"After some time, a well-known Superintendent of Police arrived at the HQ Operation Combine. As the police officer walked in, he held Rohana Wijeweera's hair from the rear and gave two taps on Wijeweera's check. Wijeweera looked back, and having identified the officer said, 'I knew it had to be a person like you'. The police officer joined the Minister and Operation Combined Commander. We continued with our conversation. Wijeweera related a few interesting stories. One day, a group of JVP activists had visited the residence of Nimal Kirthisri Attanayake [Rohana Wijeweera] at Ulapane. They demanded money for their movement. Wijeweera responded quickly by giving Rs100. The youngsters did not have a clue about their leader. Wijeweera was full of smiles when he divulged this story.
"The time was around 3.45am on 13 November 1989. I was informed to conclude the questioning and to take Rohana Wijeweera downstairs. Together we walked downstairs and were close to each other. Wijeweera held my hand and said, 'I am very happy I met you even at the last moment. I may not live any longer. Please convey my message to my wife'. Rohana Wijeweera's message contained five important points. They were all very personal matters concerning his family.
Subsequently, National Intelligence Bureau cameraman filmed Wijeweera's voluntary appeal to the JVP to lay down arms and halt violence. Earlier, in 1971, after his arrest, Wijeweera had told officials everything about everybody else while trying to hide his own responsibility. His recorded statement in 1971 went to more than 400 typed pages. But the 1989 statement was very brief, and was broadcast to the nation.
[edit] Killing Rohana Wijeweera
"Moments later, Wijeweera was blindfolded and helped into the rear seat of a green Pajero. Two people sat on either side of Wijeweera. There were others at the rear of the vehicle. Just then a senior police officer arrived near the vehicle. I politely rejected his invitation to join them. The Pajero took off. I joined Col Lionel Balagalle standing near the main entrance of the Operation Combine HQ building. We were having a brief chat when a senior officer came downstairs to get into his car. We greeted him. He was in a very good mood. But the atmosphere changed all of a sudden. A military police officer appeared in front of us. The senior officer blasted him for not accompanying Wijeweera and party. The military officer dashed towards his vehicle and sped away. The senior officer departed. We also went home thinking of a good sleep.
The man who was born on Bastile day was killed of the year of bicentinary celebration of the "French Revolution".
[edit] External links
[edit] Reference
SRI LANKA - A LOST REVOLUTION ? The Inside Story of the JVP by Rohan Gunaratna, Institute of Fundamental Studies, Sri Lanka, 1995. ISBN 955-26-004-9