Talk:Robert Kane (philosopher)

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[edit] Distinction from compatibilism

I'm trying to understand this before I can do any work on it. Right now I am puzzled because it seems to me that Kane's definition as presented, and taken literally, does not rule out compatibilism. It seems to me that some act of mine might satisfy this definition even though the act is determined at a deeper level by my brain acting in accordance with how it got into a particular state via the operation of scientific laws, or via God making it like that. Now, I realise that Kane is trying to rule out compatibilism, but at the moment I just can't see how his definition does it. I don't think I'm just being stupid; I think that if it confuses me it will confuse (for example) first-year philosophy students. Can someone give an explanation here on the talk page as to how it's supposed to work, and maybe we can find a way of elaborating the position in the article? I can't believe that Kane has simply made an elementary error here, so I must be misunderstanding something. Metamagician3000 23:58, 30 November 2006 (UTC)

Randolph Clarke asked this question as well. Kane's answer to the question of what causal indeterminism gets you is, “ultimate control—the originative control exercised by agents when it is ‘up to them’ which of a set of possible choices or actions will now occur, and up to no one and nothing else over which the agents themselves do not also have control.” (Kane, Robert. “Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient Problem.” (2003). In Free Will, Robert Kane (ed.) (2003) Malden, MA: Blackwell, p. 243). As far as I can tell, all it means is that the sufficient conditions for your actions don't predate your birth. I'll see if I can clear up the article a bit, it's pretty confusing as it is. NickelShoe (Talk) 01:26, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Okay, I tried, but I'm not sure how much that helped. Also, I can't find the original reference for Clarke's objection, just that I cited it in an undergraduate paper. NickelShoe (Talk) 01:43, 1 December 2006 (UTC)

Thanks. I'm still a bit puzzled as to how this is a libertarian theory, but you've helped the article. Maybe we'll get some more wisdom on this. Rather than pursuing it further, I'll just scratch my head for awhile. Alas, I think it's going to be some considerable time before I'll be able to do much reading of my own on it. Metamagician3000 03:51, 1 December 2006 (UTC)