Robert Falcon Scott
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- "Scott of the Antarctic" redirects here. For the 1948 film, see Scott of the Antarctic (1948 film) .
- For other persons named Robert Scott, see Robert Scott (disambiguation).
Robert Falcon Scott (6 June 1868 – 29 March 1912) was a Royal Naval officer and Antarctic explorer. In the so-called 'Race to the South Pole' Scott came second, behind the Norwegian Roald Amundsen; and subsequently died, along with four companions, whilst trying to return to the safety of their base. Scott has become the most famous, and tragic, hero of the "heroic age" of Antarctic exploration.
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[edit] Childhood and early career
Scott was born at "Outlands", Stoke Damerel, near Devonport in England, to John Edward Scott, a brewer and magistrate, and Hannah Cuming. Scott left home at the age of thirteen to join the naval vessel HMS Britannia at Dartmouth and began his training.
Scott joined the Navy as a midshipman in 1881, first sailing on HMS Boadicea, the flagship of the English Channel Fleet at that time. He transferred to HMS Rover in 1887. He was promoted to sub-lieutenant on his subsequent transfer to HMS Spider. Scott rose to become an engineering lieutenant in 1891 on HMS Amphion, specialising in torpedoes. He became a First Lieutenant in 1892 aboard the HMS Majestic, at the time the flagship of the Channel fleet. However, the engineers were looked down upon within the Royal Navy, and Scott appears to have burned with a desire for acceptance.
[edit] Discovery expedition 1901-1904
At the request of Sir Clements Markham, the former polar explorer and then President of the Royal Geographical Society, Scott commanded the National Antarctic Expedition in Discovery which began in 1901. The major achievements of the expedition were an exploration of the Ross Sea, the land to the east of the ice sea was sighted for the first time and named "King Edward VII Land" in honour of the then British monarch, the Polar Plateau was discovered and a new "furthest south" was achieved. Scott and Dr Edward Wilson reached 82°17′ S on December 31, 1902. Ernest Shackleton did not reach this furthest south, having been ordered to stay behind with the dogs at 82°15 ′ S.
It was during the Discovery expedition that Scott met and explored with Ernest Shackleton, who served as his third lieutenant. Many subsequent biographers of both men wrote of an intense personal animosity and rivalry between the two. However Ranulph Fiennes, in his biography of Scott published in 2003, writes that there was in fact little evidence of this and that the two were friendly on the expedition. Fiennes dismisses the autobiography of Albert Armitage, Scott's navigator and second-in-command on the trip, whose account provides most of the primary source data of the split between Scott and Shackleton because Armitage, Fiennes says, felt slighted by Scott. Fiennes writes that Shackleton was sent home early (on the first relief ship) from the Discovery expedition only because he was ill, as Scott claimed, rather than because of a strained relationship between the two, as others have suggested. Scott and Shackleton both went on to organise and lead subsequent expeditions, and therefore found themselves in competition for experienced personnel and financial support.
The Chief Engineer, Reginald Skelton, who was also in charge of photography on the expedition, was the first person to discover an Emperor penguin breeding colony and to photograph Emperor chicks.
[edit] Terra Nova expedition 1910-1913
Scott had, following his Discovery expedition in 1902, been keen to return to Antarctica. And it was evident that he had enjoyed the command, the involvement with scientific endeavour, and had a strong personal desire to be the first to get to the South Pole. That it took nearly eight years for him to mount a second expedition was due to problems raising public interest (when the North Pole was a much more immediate challenge), and in handling financial difficulties in his own family.
After his marriage to Kathleen Bruce on September 14, 1908, and the birth in 1909 of his only son, Peter Scott, he embarked on his second polar expedition. His ship, Terra Nova, left London on June 1, 1910, sailing via Cardiff, which it left on June 15. Scott sailed with the ship only as far as Rotherhithe and then returned to London to continue raising money for the expedition, and departed a month later to join the ship in South Africa.
Scott was informed en route that Roald Amundsen, who had to all appearance been preparing an expedition heading to the North Pole, was instead heading South. It has been suggested that Amundsen did not mean to deceive Scott, but rather Nansen who had lent him the unique ship Fram specifically for the Arctic journey. Amundsen (like Scott) had borrowed heavily to fund his expedition, and having been beaten to the North Pole by Peary in 1909, turned to the South Pole in an attempt to recoup his costs. Certainly it was Amundsen who sent word to Scott, and who hosted a party of Scott's men at his camp in Antarctica, and offered them a site adjacent to his own as a base for exploration. This amity aside, in the public mind there was certainly now a 'race to the Pole'. Scott could not have avoided it, a large part of the interest and funding for the expedition was based on 'priority', and Scott could not have been unaffected personally by a desire to be 'first'.
Scott's expedition, however, had a very large scientific component that went well beyond the observations (primarily geographical and meteorological) that were expected of exploration parties at the time. Scott carried equipment and had a program of work for extensive geological and zoological study. Partly for this reason, and also because his ship Terra Nova did not have the strength of the Fram to withstand the ice further south, he elected to set up his base camp on Ross Island, some 100 km north of Amundsen's who had landed and set up base on the edge of the Ross Ice Shelf, called the Ice Barrier at the time, hundreds of miles from the nearest land.
After a year spent undertaking science work, and laying provisions along the route of the party who were to make the journey to the South Pole, a five man party (Scott, Lieutenant Henry Bowers, Dr Edward Wilson, Petty Officer Edgar Evans and army Captain Lawrence Oates) was selected for the final stretch to the pole itself. On arriving at the South Pole on January 17-January 18, 1912, Scott found that Amundsen had been there a month earlier. Scott had some months before predicted this would likely be the case. Amundsen returned to his base in good order, while Scott's entire party perished on the return journey. Scott acknowledged that there had been no margin for error or delay in his calculations and his party eventually succumbed to injury, frostbite, malnutrition and exhaustion. As their progress slowed the worsening and unusually cold weather further reduced their pace[1].
The first to die was Evans, who was injured in a fall and suffered a swift mental and physical breakdown near the foot of the Beardmore Glacier. Oates, afflicted by frostbite, had lost the use of one foot. His condition deteriorated, until at a point some 30 miles short of the One Ton supply depot he had come to the view that he could not go on. Waking one morning, Oates left the tent, stepping out into the blizzard with the memorable words 'I am just going outside and may be some time'. It was his 32nd birthday. His body was never found.
The tent containing the bodies of the remaining three members of the South Pole party was found six months later by a search party led by Atkinson which included amongst others, Apsley Cherry-Garrard. The South Pole team's last camp was only eleven miles (20 km) from the One Ton supply depot. With them were found their diaries, letters to family, friends and a "Message to the Public" written by Scott. Their sled was still loaded with rock samples. Scott's journal contained the final lines: 'Had we lived I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance and courage of my companions which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman', and ending with the words, 'We shall stick it out to the end, but we are getting weaker of course and the end cannot be far. It seems a pity, but I do not think I can write more. For God's sake, look after our people. R. Scott'.
Cherry-Garrard records that after retrieving the diaries and the rock samples, the tent was collapsed over the bodies of Scott, Wilson and Bowers and a cairn of ice and snow erected to mark the place. Atkinson knew that the place they made this burial was part of the Ross Ice Shelf, moving north towards the open sea at a rate of 500 metres a year, and that ultimately they were committing the bodies of Scott, Wilson and Bowers for burial at sea. The search party also looked further south for Oates' body but only found his sleeping bag. They erected a cairn near the spot in memory of 'a very gallant gentleman'.
[edit] After his death: the legend of "Scott of the Antarctic"
News of Amundsen's success reached Europe before Scott's fate was known. When Scott's death, and that of his companions, became known there was genuine sentiment expressed throughout the British Empire. Cherry-Garrard described the somber mood as the Terra Nova returned to New Zealand with the remaining expeditioners. Scott's eloquent diary became a best seller, and through it the public became acquainted with the story of Oates and Scott. The British establishment (Church, Government and Military) on the verge of confrontation with Germany were quick to adopt and further the view of Scott as a heroic figure. Books, art, sculpture, film and poetry subsequently developed the tragic, as well as the heroic aspects of the story. Streets, churches and towns throughout the British Empire were named after Scott and his companions.
Amundsen's achievement was eclipsed (in the British empire at least) by Scott's reputation. There were also accusations that Amundsen had breached convention by intruding into the Ross Sea, which had since James Clark Ross's discovery in 1841 been - in the public mind - an area of exclusively British endeavour. Conventions in exploration of that time gave subsequent exploration rights to the nation that first discovered an area. The public (but not Scott) would not have been aware that Norway had in fact previously undertaken significant exploration work - at the invitation of the British - in the Ross Sea in 1893 and 1898, and on the latter expedition discovered the Bay of Whales that Amundsen used as his base in 1911.
The mythologising of Scott, particularly after Cherry-Garrard's publication of The Worst Journey in the World took on an extra dimension - that of Scott as the flawed but very human character compared with Amundsen. Amundsen was portrayed in the British press as a professional explorer in an age where the amateur was seen as morally superior, and as a man pursuing personal ambition rather than national glory or the advancement of science. In fact, Amundsen was not unlike Scott, a highly driven amateur who had at times difficult relations with his men and was uncomfortable in the public spotlight.
Scott's widow, Kathleen, was granted the rank (but not the style) of a widow of a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, but (despite popular belief) this did not amount to Scott being posthumously knighted, there being no such provision in English law. It has in recent times been suggested that Kathleen, as Scott lay dying, was conducting an affair with the famous polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen (who had hired his ship, the Fram, to Amundsen). Certainly if this was known at the time it was not reported widely. Kathleen Scott had a reputation for being independent and strong willed, but never more formidable than when defending the reputation of Robert Scott, and of their child, Peter Scott.
Scott's brother-in-law, the Reverend Lloyd Harvey Bruce, was the rector of the Warwickshire village of Binton, and he commissioned a large stained glass memorial window, showing scenes from Scott's expedition, which still exists today. A large and recently refurbished memorial to Scott can be found in Plymouth, England overlooking the harbour. It is engraved with words from Scott's journal. Other notable memorials can be found in Christchurch and Port Chalmers, New Zealand, the Terra Nova's last two ports of call before sailing for Antarctica. The New Zealand permanent research base on Ross Island and the US permanent research base at the Pole, are named Scott Base and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station respectively. Three years after his death in 1912, the people of Cardiff, Wales raised a monument to Scott in Roath Park lake, in the form of a lighthouse with a small replica of his ship. It was erected in 1915 and a plaque reads, "Sailed in the Terra Nova from the port of Cardiff June 15 1910...to locate the South Pole, and in the pursuit of that great and successful scientific task, laid down their lives in Antarctic Regions. March 1912. Britons All, And very Gallant Gentlemen." Cardiff's affinity with Scott continues and in 2003 at Cardiff Bay near the site where Terra Nova and its crew left on her fateful trip, "The Captain Scott Memorial" a sculpture by Jonathan Williams was unveiled.
[edit] The debate
Criticism of Scott, and particularly of his planning for and conduct of the Terra Nova expedition was naturally muted at the time of his death, and in the years of the First World War that followed. In addition to the pressure brought by the public and institutions, and by Scott's widow, Kathleen, to preserve Scott's 'memory' unsullied, there was a natural reluctance by those who had direct knowledge of the circumstances of that expedition to speak ill of the dead, or enter the public fray.
Nevertheless, there was sufficient dissent from the view of Scott as 'faultless hero' for Apsley Cherry-Garrard in his 1922 classic 'The Worst Journey in the World' to address questions regarding Scott's competence. In doing so he opened the public debate on Scott, and the view that Scott was in some ways a flawed man whose character and errors of judgment contributed to the failure of the expedition. Cherry-Garrard, with the benefit of having 'been there', observed that the expedition was a success from the scientific viewpoint. He had no illusions that the scientific achievement was modest, but saw that it was part of a process of building knowledge of Antarctica. As a biologist he believed that a better understanding of the wildlife of Antarctica (particularly penguins) was a worthwhile endeavour. Significantly however, he indicated that there was nothing to be learnt from these early explorers in regard to travel across Antarctica. He predicted the future lay in air travel.
Cherry-Garrard's defence of the scientific achievement of the Terra Nova expeditions, however, did not extend without qualification to Scott's planning and management of the journey to the pole. Cherry-Garrard had lost his closest friends, Wilson and Bowers, and he held Scott responsible to some degree. Cherry-Garrard clashed with Kathleen on what was 'appropriate' to say publicly, with the result that his criticism in his book was muted, and the full story remained in his private papers. Cherry-Garrard was, however, also troubled by his own role in resupplying, but not continuing beyond, the One Ton Depot in March 1912 while Scott was only 55 miles further south.
Since Cherry-Garrard, others have weighed into the debate, notably Roland Huntford ("Scott and Amundsen/The Last Place on Earth", 1979) and Ranulph Fiennes ("Captain Scott", 2003). Certainly not just the elevation of Scott's reputation, but also the diminishment of Amundsen's achievement deserved 'correction', and the public seemed to gain an appetite for this by the 1970's. At that stage, looking back over 50 years, with nearly all of the participants dead, there was not much opportunity to discover new 'facts' about the case, and the discussion has turned largely on analysis of diaries of other participants, extent of pre-expedition Arctic research and its impact on preparations, and motives and decisions made by Scott, frequently with reference to Amundsen as a model of what Scott should have done and could have achieved. This comparison is unfair to both as the motives of the two men were different and they had different experience. Scott at the time was the most experienced Antarctic expedition leader whereas Amundsen's experience had been in the Arctic.
A television series called Blizzard: Race to the Pole was aired for the first time in August 2006, following a Norwegian and a British group recreating the Scott and Amundsen expeditions using only the same equipment as would have been available to the original teams.
The existing record shows that Scott and Cherry-Garrard were unstinting in praise for Admundsen's methods and abilities as an explorer, and that Scott particularly foresaw that Amundsen would reach the Pole first because he had more dogs, and had landed closer to the Pole. In that sense they agree with modern interpreters of Amundsen's achievement. Neither Scott or Cherry-Garrard, however, saw the Terra Nova expedition as having as its sole purpose simply 'getting to the South Pole'. Undoubtedly it was necessary to stress this aspect to gain funding and public support, and no doubt it appealed to some parts of the ego of some of the participants, not least Scott himself. The scientific aspect however was not unimportant in 'selling' the expedition to institutions and business who might see little benefit in the journeying to the frozen wasteland of the South Pole, but who could see profit in the advancement of knowledge of animal and mineral resources on the reasonably accessible coast. This was of course long before the concept of a non-commercial Antarctica where no State had claim to any part of the continent.
The dual nature of Scott's expedition, incorporating both scientific and exploratory endeavour, needs to be taken into account by anyone making a comparison with Amundsen's which was perfectly focused on the single task of reaching the South Pole. This is important not just in trying to weigh up the 'real' achievement of each, but in understanding some of the compromises that Scott made to accommodate science. This is not to say however, that any comparison of Scott's and Amundsen's methods is invalid, or that Scott did not clearly make mistakes. Some of the key considerations are:
- Scott did not have a ship to equal the immensely strong purpose-built Arctic exploration ship Fram, and had no funds to build one. Nor was the Fram available for hire, it had been contracted by Amundsen in order to make an attempt on the North Pole in 1909-1910. Knowing that the Terra Nova was not as strong a ship as the Fram, or even his previous ship Discovery, Scott did not wish to risk taking it into seas further south than Ross Island where it might have been - as had the Discovery - trapped in sea ice for the duration of the Antarctic winter. Scott instead had plans for the Terra Nova to run resupply missions between Ross Island and New Zealand. Amundsen on the other hand, having diverted his efforts from the North to the South Pole had an ideal ship in the Fram for penetrating to the Bay of Whales on the southernmost shore of the Ross Sea (closer to the South Pole) and for over-wintering there on board.
- Scott, and his financial backers, had made geological exploration a significant component of the expedition's work. The Bay of Whales, a small notch in the immense Ross Ice Shelf, hundreds of miles from land was unsuitable as a base for geological work, even if it was an ideal base for launching a 'dash' to the South Pole. Scott's base at Cape Evans on Ross Island, with access to the Trans-Antarctic mountain range to the west was a better base for geological exploration.
- Scott had explored the interior of Antarctica previously and had already determined in his mind that the Beardmore Glacier was the route to the central plateau and the South Pole. Amundsen took a chance that there was another way through, in a direct line between his base on the Bay of Whales and the South Pole. Amundsen's gamble paid off. Scott on the other hand believed from his and Ernest Shackleton's previous experiences that it would not be possible to get dogs up the Beardmore, and so laid all of his plans around man-hauling sleds above the Beardmore.
- Scott did not have Admundsen's experience of the Arctic and particularly lacked Admundsen's intimate knowledge of the Inuit and their way of life, which included an understanding of the proper selection and management of dog teams. In addition, Amundsen had ensured that he would have the first choice of any available sled dogs if Scott should try and obtain them. Scott, who did not have Amundsen's supreme confidence in the ability of dogs, only used them as part of his strategy below the Beardmore Glacier. He took two motorised sled/tractors and Siberian ponies as well. Scott did, however, consult with Nansen who had Arctic experience, and on Nansen's recommendation took with him Tryggve Gran, an expert Norwegian skier who had been planning his own expedition to the North Pole. Scott's growing confidence in the dog teams was, however, evidenced by the vital role he gave them in the follow-on depot resupply that he would need on his return journey. However, Scott had castigated Meares (the dog driver) to the point to where Meares left the expedition at first chance, leaving only a young Russian dog handler (Dmitri) as the only one left who understood dog driving. Scott had left a total of 4 orders concerning the resupply effort, the last of which was given verbally to Lt. Evans, who succumbed to scurvy, failing to pass along the most urgent request. Dr. Atkinson assigned Cherry Apsley-Garrard to take Dmitri and two dog teams to resupply the One Ton Depot and to go as far beyond as he saw fit. Apsley-Garrard was pinned down at the depot for several days by a blizzard, and could not go farther due to the limited amount of dog food that remained. Turning around at that point, he and Dmitri barely survived the return trip.
- Oates noted that the dogs and ponies were both affected by parasites picked up in Siberia, and that the feeding regimes for both were unsatisfactory. It has been suggested that Scott was unduly sentimental about the dogs and ponies, but his decisions about their deployment was largely dictated by his desire to conserve them for further scientific exploration intended to go ahead in 1912, and by his conviction that neither ponies or dogs would be able to get up the Beardmore Glacier onto the central plateau and the final route to the South Pole. Scott relied on Shackleton's experience with ponies in Antarctica, and knew that they would not be able to start working until later in the spring than the more hardy dogs. He knew that this meant that the time available to make the dash to the Pole and return safely was reduced. In 1911 when he heard that Amundsen was at the Bay of Whales with nearly one hundred dogs Scott stated that Amundsen's ability to get away earlier with his dogs-only hauling strategy meant that - barring misadventure - Amundsen would get to the South Pole first.
- Some commentators have suggested that Scott underestimated the effect of changing his original plan to take only four men to the South Pole in terms of food consumption. However, Scott's diary records that the party only ran short of food when beset by blizzards, well after they had descended the plateau and had replenished their supplies at several of the depots. As Scott approached the South Pole he would have been increasingly aware - because of their rate of travel during the earlier part of the expedition climbing the Beardmore glacier - that they had little margin for error on their return journey.
- Scott's record also show that apparently sealed cans of fuel from the depots were completely or partially empty, possibly due to the failure of the leather seals in the cold. This shortage of fuel for cooking, melting ice for water and heating the tent made the return journey more debilitating.
- More recent weather records have shown that March 1912 was particularly cold being 15 - 20°F below the average for the time of year[2]. It is clear that Scott encountered bad weather towards the end of his journey in March (a time at which the weather is always unsettled on the Ross Ice Shelf, it had been similarly cold the previous year when Lt. Evans made a one week expedition to resupply several depots). It is now known that the route up the west side of the Ross Ice Shelf that Scott used is subject to worse weather than Amundsen's easterly route. However, Scott endured weather conditions that may occur only once every 16 years, on average 20°F colder with blizzards for long periods. The low temperatures they encountered on the Ross Ice Barrier meant that their sledge would not slide easily over the snow in the familiar way.[1] Their task can be better compared to pulling a full bathtub across the Sahara. Scott and his meteorologist, Simpson, had estimated that the temperatures would be high enough to allow the sledge to slide more easily. The bottom line, however, is that Scott acknowledged his margin of safety in respect of the weather was very narrow[citation needed]. It has also been observed that the conditions on the Ross Ice Shelf encountered by Scott were not much different from those encountered by Shackleton, and detailed in his published diary.
- Scott's polar party were not fully aware of the nutrition requirements of the task they were undertaking. Although the role of vitamin c was unknown, Scott's party often ate lightly cooked horse and seal meat which would have provided enough to ward off scurvy in most cases. Man-hauling sledges requires a daily intake of over 5,000 calories and in those days the importance of a very high fat diet was not understood, except perhaps by the Inuit. Scott took large quantities of dried meat (pemmican) which was not high in fat although he did add extra fat to the rations used on the high polar plateau. The massive loss of body weight caused by the physical effort reduced the insulation from their own fat and made them more susceptible to cold. Once again, these problems were well-understood by the Inuit, and had been well-researched by Nansen and Amundsen. Although the precise cause of the deterioration of health and ultimate death of Scott and his companions is not known, Scott certainly noted that he felt they were getting insufficient nutrition. In Blizzard:Race to the Pole it was shown that body weight lost by the man-hauling team was split between fat and muscle.
- Scott made a virtue of his dedication to science. Amundsen set out only to reach the Pole and get back alive. Even as they were dying, Scott and Wilson continued to haul over 14 kg of rock samples. Scott could have left the samples at one of the cairns along the way to be picked up later, and his failure to do so might have been due to his desire to salvage some 'immediate result' to show for his otherwise failed journey to the South Pole - or simply due to lack of clear thinking brought on by exhaustion. A modern supporter of Scott, Ranulph Fiennes, has suggested that the extra weight would not have been a major handicap, even when they were short of food at the end of the trek.
- Scott was continuously concerned about raising sufficient money to equip the expedition adequately. A considerable amount had been borrowed, and the ability to repay it (through further donations and product endorsements) in large part depended upon the expedition being successful in their attempt to be the first to the South Pole. As it was, neither Scott nor Cherry-Garrard noted deficiencies in the equipment due to lack of funds, but they did note that the need for Scott to spend time raising funds took him away from day to day planning and management of the expedition at critical junctures. Scott's last entry in his diary, reflecting his concern at the fate of 'our people' back home, was written with a mind to the financial burden that they bore, and which he thought they would not be able to meet following the failure of the expedition. It should be noted that Amundsen, in turning at the last moment to an attempt on the South Pole, was said to be mindful of his debts incurred in hiring the Fram. When Peary beat him to the North Pole in 1909, Amundsen had to quickly look elsewhere for some significant 'exploration achievement' that would enable him to raise funds to cover his debts.
[edit] Further reading
- E C Coleman (2006), The Royal Navy in Polar Exploration from Franklin to Scott (Tempus Publishing)
- Ranulph Fiennes (2003). Captain Scott. Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. ISBN 0-340-82697-5.
- Roland Huntford (2000). The Last Place on Earth. Abacus. ISBN 0-349-11395-5.
- Reginald Pound (1966). Scott of the Antarctic. Cassell. ASIN B0000CNAZ5.
- J V Skelton & D W Wilson "Discovery Illustrated: Pictures from Captain Scott's First Expedition", 2001, Reardon Publishing, Cheltenham, ISBN 1-873877-48-X
- Judy Skelton, ed. "The Antarctic Journals of Reginald Skelton: 'Another Little Job for the Tinker'", 2004, Reardon Publishing, Cheltenham, ISBN 1-873877-68-4 [Hardback] & ISBN 1-873877-69-2 [Special Limited Edition]
- Susan Solomon (2000) The Coldest March: Scott's Fatal Antarctic Expedition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, ISBN 0-300-08967-8
- David Crane (2006) Scott of the Antarctic, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, ISBN 978-0-375-41527-2.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ S, Solomon, Stearns CR (Nov 9 1999). "On the role of the weather in the deaths of R. F. Scott and his companions". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96 (23): 13012-6. PMID 10557264. Retrieved on 04-05-2006.
[edit] External links
- Southern Polar exploration - Robert Falcon Scott
- Secrets of the Dead - Tragedy at the Pole (PBS)
- South-Pole.com - a substantial resource of polar exploration accounts and memorabilia
- Works by Robert Falcon Scott at Project Gutenberg
- The Worst Journey in the World, Volumes 1 and 2 Antarctic 1910-1913, available freely at Project Gutenberg by Apsley Cherry-Garrard
- Scott's Last Expedition Volume I, available freely at Project Gutenberg by Captain R. F. Scott
- Scott of the Antarctic at the Internet Movie Database
- Website for book describing research into Antarctic weather and Scott's expedition, The Coldest March by Susan Solomon
