Rhodesia

Rhodesia was the name of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia after 1965. Landlocked and located in southern Africa, it was governed by white minority rule until 1979. The colony was named after Cecil Rhodes, whose British South Africa Company acquired the land in the nineteenth century. The colony gained internationally-recognized independence from Britain in 1980 and became the Republic of Zimbabwe. At an earlier period, the name "Rhodesia" was used to refer to a larger region that corresponds to both Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia).

1 History
2 End Game
3 Politics
4 Publications
5 See also
6 External links
7 References

[edit] History

[edit] 1890-1953

The territory which later comprised Rhodesia was eventually taken over through military force by the British South Africa Company and the defeat of King Lobengula during the First Matabele War in 1893. The Second Matabele War, 1896-1897, resulted in the death of many white settlers, but this final uprising was quelled by the assassination of Mlimo, the Matabele spiritual leader. The early white settlers, including legendary military figures Baden-Powell, Burnham, and Selous, were mostly soldiers and mining prospectors who were either recruited or encouraged to come by the BSAC. Although viable mineral deposits (chromium, gold, platinum and coal) were found, these were modest in scale and many of the white settlers took advantage of generous land grants to build up agricultural estates (known as “white farms”). This process was facilitated by the fact that the authorities in Rhodesia did not initially recognise the ownership of land by native blacks. Blacks living on land granted to white settlers were either evicted or declared to be tenants.

In 1899, a Legislative Council was created with a minority of elected seats, through which the BSAC had to pass government measures. The electorate was almost exclusively comprised of white settlers, and the proportion of elected seats increased steadily over time. Prior to about 1918, the opinion among the electorate supported continued BSAC rule but opinion changed because of the development of the country and increased settlement. In addition, a decision in the British courts that land not in private ownership belonged to the British crown rather than the BSAC gave great impetus to the campaign for self-government.

The Legislative Council election, in 1920, returned a large majority of candidates of the Responsible Government Association and it became clear that BSAC rule was no longer practical. Opinion in Britain and South Africa favoured incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in the Union of South Africa, but, by forcing the pace of negotiation, the Southern Rhodesians obtained unfavourable terms and the electorate backed Responsible Government in a 1922 referendum. Self-government began in October 1923. Charles Patrick John Coghlan was the first Premier of Southern Rhodesia and upon his death in 1927 he was succeeded by Howard Unwin Moffat.

Land apportionment in Rhodesia in 1965

One major consequence of this was that the white settlers were able to enact discriminatory legislation concerning land tenure. The Land Apportionment and Tenure Acts reserved 50% of the land area for exclusively white ownership. 25% was designated “Tribal Trust Land” which was available to be worked on a collective basis by black tribes and where individual titled ownership was not possible.

Southern Rhodesia developed an economy that was narrowly based on the production of a small number of primary products (notably, chrome and tobacco). It therefore became very vulnerable to the economic cycle. The deep recession of the 1930s gave way to a post-war boom. This boom prompted the immigration of about 200,000 white settlers between 1945 and 1970, taking the white population up to 270,000. A large number of these immigrants were of British working class origin.

In the 1940s, the founding of a University to serve central African countries was proposed. Such a University was eventually established in Salisbury, with funding provided by British, CAF and Rhodesian governments and some private sources. One condition of British funding was that student admission should be based on "academic achievement and good character" with no racial distinction. University College of Rhodesia (UCR) received its first intake of students in 1952. Until 1971 it awarded degrees of the Universities of London and Birmingham. In 1971 UCR became the University of Rhodesia and started awarding its own degrees. In 1980 it was renamed the University of Zimbabwe.^[1]

[edit] 1953-65

In 1953, with calls for independence mounting in many of its African possessions, the United Kingdom created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (or the Central African Federation 'CAF'), which consisted of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, respectively). The idea was to try and steer a middle road between the differing aspirations of the Black Nationalists, the Colonial administration and the White settler population. The CAF sought to emulate the experience of Australia, Canada and South Africa - wherein groups of colonies had been federated together in order to form viable independent nations. Originally designed to be "an indissoluble federation", the CAF quickly started to unravel. It suffered the fate of similar ventures undertaken in the closing days of Empire including the West Indies Federation and East African Community.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on January 1, 1964. When Northern Rhodesia was granted independence by Britain on October 24, 1964, it changed its name to Zambia; Southern Rhodesia remained a British colony, resisting attempts to bring in majority rule. The colony attempted to change its name to Rhodesia although this was not recognised by the United Kingdom. The majority of the Federation's military and financial assets went to Southern Rhodesia as (a) the British Government did not wish to see them fall into the hands of the nationalist leaders, and (b) Southern Rhodesia had borne the majority of the costs of running the Federation. With regard to the latter, however, Northern Rhodesia was the wealthiest of the three member states (due to its vast copper mines) and actually contributed more to the overall building of infrastructure than the other two members. Southern Rhodesia, recognising an inevitable dissolution of the Federation, was quick to use federal funds in building up their infrastructure ahead of the others. A key component of this was the building of the Kariba Dam and its hydroelectric facility (shafts, control centre, etc.), which was situated on the Southern Rhodesian side of the Zambezi Gorge. This situation caused some embarrassment for the Zambian government later when it was a "front line state" in support of insurgents into Rhodesia in that its major source of electric power was controlled by the Rhodesian rebel state.

[edit] UDI

Ian Smith signing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965 with his cabinet watching

The British government adopted a policy known as No Independence Before Majority African Rule (NIBMAR). This policy dictated that those colonies with a substantial population of white settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of universal suffrage and majority rule. This policy was opposed by the European minority Rhodesian Front (RF) government, led by Ian Smith.

After failed negotiations with the UK government, on 11 November 1965, Smith's government declared the country independent from British government rule in what became known as UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence). The timing of Smith's telegram announcing UDI to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson is significant. It was sent precisely at 1 p.m. local time (11 a.m. in London) on 11 November, at the precise moment that the UK started its traditional one minute of silence to mark the end of World War I and honour its war dead. The not-so-hidden message to “kith and kin”, as Smith put it, was to recall the fact that Southern Rhodesia had helped the UK in its time of need in World War I and World War II and that the British should not forget that. British High Commissioner John Barnes Johnston, who disliked Smith, cleaned out the High Commission building of all official documents and left Rhodesia (though Smith left strict instructions that the High Commission building be left untouched, much to Johnston's surprise).

UDI was internationally condemned, and at the behest of Britain, Rhodesia was placed under the first United Nations Security Council authorised sanctions, beginning in 1965 and lasting until the restoration of British rule in December 1979. The terms of these sanctions forbade most forms of trade or financial exchange with Rhodesia. Sanctions were not universally adhered to, however. South Africa, Portugal, Israel and some Arab states helped Rhodesia. In the immediate term, Rhodesia was able to evade sanctions by various means — but the means of evasion typically involved “selling at a discount and buying at a premium”. Also, few outsiders would invest in Rhodesia.

From the time of UDI onwards, the Rhodesian government struggled to obtain international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. No significant state ever granted recognition to Rhodesia, and in 1970 the US government categorically stated that “under no circumstances” would it recognise Rhodesia.^[2]

Initially, the state maintained its loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II as “Queen of Rhodesia” (a title to which she never consented) but not to her representative, the Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs, whose constitutional duties were exercised by an “Officer Administering the Government”, Clifford Dupont. On 2 March 1970, Rhodesia's government formally severed links with the British Crown, and Rhodesia was declared a republic, with Dupont as President. Dupont was a London solicitor who had emigrated to Rhodesia in 1953.

2005 was the 40th anniversary of UDI and this prompted memorial events of various kinds. 40 years was sufficient time to make UDI history and allow it to be considered in proper perspective. But many people who were directly affected by or who participated in UDI were still alive.

Critics of UDI maintain that it was intended to defend the privileges of a small white elite at the expense of the black majority. In this view of things, UDI created a vacuum which the Mugabe regime eventually filled.^[3] Alternatively, until well into the 1990s, many Rhodesians sought to justify UDI on the ground that it had delayed independence by 15 years. They claimed that this delay enabled Zimbabwe to avoid some of the economic and political problems suffered by many other newly independent African nations.^[4]

[edit] The start of the Bush War

See also Rhodesian Bush War

A lengthy armed campaign by ZANLA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and ZIPRA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), against the Rhodesian government followed UDI. This became known as the "Bush War" by White Rhodesians and as the "Second Chimurenga" (or rebellion in Shona) by supporters of the guerrillas. The war is generally considered to have started in 1972 with scattered attacks on isolated white owned farms.

ZANU was led by Robert Mugabe, latterly based in Mozambique and was supported by the People's Republic of China. ZAPU was led by Joshua Nkomo, based in Zambia and was supported by the Soviet Union. ZANU and ZAPU together formed 'the Patriotic Front'. Broadly, ZANU represented the 80% of the Black population who were Shona speaking and ZAPU represented the 20% who were Ndebele-speaking. The degree of support offered by China and the Soviet Union to the nationalist parties was probably less than was commonly thought at the time. The nationalist parties were often described as 'Marxist', but events showed that this Marxism was largely superficial. The main priority of ZANU and ZAPU was to end white rule in Rhodesia.

Once the war started, an impression quickly took root that the Rhodesians were going to lose. Even the South Africans realised that attempting to sustain white minority rule in a situation where blacks outnumbered whites by 22:1 was untenable.^[5] International business groups involved in the country (e.g. Lonrho) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Nkomo was feted on his visits to Europe by business leaders and politicians. Funding was provided for his ZAPU party and associated ZIPRA military operations. This funding allowed ZIPRA to purchase sophisticated weaponry on the international arms market, which ultimately helped lead to the demise of Rhodesia. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take.^[6]

Initially, the war was very one-sided since the Rhodesian government was able to deploy an overwhelming superiority in manpower, firepower and mobility. Containing the insurgency required little more than a police action. But the situation changed suddenly after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, was pressing for a settlement.

A meeting, brokered by South Africa and Zambia, was held between the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists at Victoria Falls in August 1975. These talks never got beyond the procedural phase ^[7] and Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war in order to prevent majority rule.^[8]

“Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seem to have made the tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is becoming increasingly slippery with blood” – Rand Daily Mail editorial, May 1976^[9]

At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA guerrillas. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow guerrilla bases to be set up in their territories. From 1976, guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia - attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions.^[10]

Rhodesian national servicewoman takes aim with a Browning automatic, from 1976 army recruitment poster

The government mobilized the white population for war and adopted a 'strategic hamlets' policy of the kind used in Malaya and Vietnam to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government. This was deeply unpopular and served only to increase support for the insurgents. The war degenerated into rounds of increasing brutality from all three parties involved (Rhodesian army, ZANU and ZAPU).

"The war was both bloody and brutal and brought out the very worst in the opposing combatants on all three sides" - Mike Subritzky (former NZ Army ceasefire monitor in Rhodesia, 1980)^[11]

The Rhodesian government faced a serious economic struggle during the 1970s as a result of sanctions, emigration, and the strain imposed on the economic system by conscription of all white men. At this time volunteers were recruited from overseas to help in the fight. One particular source of volunteers was Vietnam war veterans (mostly USA and Australian nationals) who had found it difficult to adjust to civilian life. From the start of 1977, the Rhodesians began to take serious casualties, which left few white families untouched.^[12]

[edit] End Game

[edit] The end of the Bush War

Rhodesia began to lose vital economic and military support from South Africa, which, while sympathetic to the white minority government, never accorded it diplomatic recognition. The South Africans placed limits on the fuel and munitions they supplied to the Rhodesian military. They also withdrew the personnel and equipment that they had previously provided to aid the war effort. In 1976 the South African and US governments combined to place pressure on Smith to agree to a form of majority rule. The Rhodesians now offered more concessions, but those concessions were not sufficient to end the war.

Some Rhodesians claimed that one possible reason why South Africa started to withdraw aid from Rhodesia was the still embittered history between the British-dominated Rhodesia and the Afrikaner-dominated South Africa. It was seen by some as one last way the Boers could "stick it to the Brit" for the previous centuries of domination, and the lingering resentment over the Boer Wars. Ian Smith claimed in his memoirs that even though many white South Africans were supportive of Rhodesia, South African Prime Minister John Vorster's policy of detente with the Black African states ended up with Rhodesia being offered as the "sacrificial lamb" in order to buy more time for South Africa. Other observers perceive South Africa's distancing itself from Rhodesia as being an early move in the process that led to majority rule in SA itself.^[13]

The Umniati was downed by ZIPRA insurgents using an SA-7 Strela surface-to-air missile on 12 February 1979. All 59 passengers and crew aboard were killed

By early 1978 the Rhodesian armed forces were on the defensive. The early strategy of trying to defend the borders was abandoned in favour of trying to defend key economic areas and lines of communication with South Africa, while the rest of the countryside became a patchwork of "no-go areas". This last term was first used in Rhodesia and has since entered the English language. Rhodesia's front-line forces never contained more than 25,000 troops, eight tanks (Polish made T-55s) and nine old Hawker Hunter jets. Those forces could still launch raids on enemy bases, but Rhodesia was facing diplomatic isolation, economic collapse and military defeat.

During the closing stages of the conflict, the Rhodesian government resorted to biological warfare. Watercourses at several sites close to the Mozambique border were deliberately contaminated with cholera and the toxin sodium coumadin (an anti-coagulant commonly used in rat poison). Food stocks in the area were contaminated with anthrax spores. These biological attacks had little impact on the fighting capability of ZANLA, but caused considerable distress to the local population. Over 10,000 people contracted anthrax in the period 1978 to 1980 of whom 200 died. The facts about this episode became known during the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission during the late 1990s.^[14]

The morale of Rhodesians and their overseas supporters was stiffened by the work of journalists such as Lord Richard Cecil, son of the Marquess of Salisbury.^[15] Cecil produced regular news reports such as the Thames TV ‘Front Line Rhodesia’ features. These reports typically contrasted the incompetent insurgents with the “superbly professional” white government troops.^[16] On 27 April 1978 Cecil parachuted into enemy territory with a Rhodesian airborne unit and landed in the midst of a group of ZANLA insurgents, who immediately shot him dead.

The shooting down on 3 September 1978 of a civilian Air Rhodesia Vickers Viscount airliner (the Hunyani) in the Kariba area by ZIPRA insurgents using surface-to-air missiles, and the massacre of its survivors that followed, is widely considered to be the event that finally destroyed the Rhodesians' will to continue the war. Although militarily insignificant, the loss of this aircraft (and a second Viscount, the Umniati, in 1979) demonstrated just how vulnerable Rhodesian civil society was to insurgent attack.^[17]

The Rhodesians’ means to continue the war were also eroding fast. In December 1978, a ZANLA unit penetrated the outskirts of Salisbury and fired a volley of incendiary rockets into the main oil storage depot – the most heavily defended economic asset in the country. The storage tanks burned for five days giving off a column of smoke that could be seen 80 miles away. Half a million barrels of petroleum product (comprising Rhodesia’s strategic oil reserve) were lost. At a stroke, the country’s annual budget deficit was increased by 20%.^[18]

[edit] The end of UDI

The Rhodesian army continued its "mobile counter-offensive" strategy of holding key positions ("vital asset ground") while carrying out raids into the no-go areas and into neighbouring countries. These raids became increasingly costly and unproductive. For example, in April 1979 special forces carried out a raid on Joshua Nkomo's residence in Lusaka (Zambia) with the stated intention of assassinating him. Nkomo and his family left hastily a few hours before the raid – having clearly been warned that the raid was coming. Rumours of treachery circulated within Rhodesia. It was variously suggested that the army command had been penetrated by British MI6 or that people in the Rhodesian establishment were positioning themselves for life after independence. The loyalty of the country's Central Intelligence Organization became suspect.

In 1979, some special forces units were accused of using counter terrorist operations as cover for ivory poaching and smuggling. Colonel Reid-Daly (commander of the Selous Scouts) was court martialled and dismissed. Meanwhile, support for ZANU-PF was growing amongst the black soldiers who made up 70% of the Rhodesian army.^[19]

By the end of 1978, the need to cut a deal was apparent to most Rhodesians, but not to all. Ian Smith had dismissed his intransigent Defence Minister, P. K. van der Byl as early as 1976.^[20] "PK" had been a hard-line opponent of any form of compromise with domestic opposition or the international community since before UDI. PK eventually retired to his country estate outside Cape Town. But there were elements in Rhodesia, mainly embittered former security force personnel, who forcibly opposed majority rule up to and well beyond independence.^[21] New white immigrants continued to arrive in Rhodesia right up to the eve of independence.^[22]

P. K. van der Byl, hard-line Rhodesian Defence Minister

As the result of an "internal settlement" between the Rhodesian government and some fringe African nationalist parties, which were not in exile and not involved in the war, elections were held in April 1979. The UANC (United African National Council) party won a majority in this election, and its leader, Abel Muzorewa (a United Methodist Church bishop), became the country's nominal prime minister on June 1, 1979. The country's name was changed to Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The internal settlement left control of the country's police, security forces, civil service and judiciary in white hands. It assured whites of about one third of the seats in parliament. It was essentially a power-sharing arrangement which did not amount to majority rule.

While the 1979 election was described by the Rhodesian government as non-racial and democratic, it did not include the main nationalist parties ZANU and ZAPU. In spite of offers from Ian Smith, the latter parties declined to participate in an election leading to anything less than full and immediate majority rule.

Bishop Muzorewa's government did not receive international recognition. The Bush War continued unabated and sanctions were not lifted. The international community refused to accept the validity of any agreement which did not incorporate the main nationalist parties. The British Government (then led by the recently elected Margaret Thatcher) issued invitations to all parties to attend a peace conference at Lancaster House. These negotiations took place in London in late 1979. The three-month-long conference almost failed to reach conclusion, due to disagreements on Land reform, but resulted in the Lancaster House Agreement. UDI ended, and Rhodesia reverted to the status of a British colony ('The British Dependency of Southern Rhodesia').

The outcome was an internationally supervised general election in early 1980. ZANU (PF) led by Robert Mugabe won this election. Elements in the Rhodesian armed forces toyed with the idea of mounting a coup ("Operation Quartz")^[23] to prevent ZANU taking over government of the country, but the coup was never realised.

[edit] Independence

Mugabe and the victorious black nationalists were rather less concerned by Operation Quartz than by the possibility that there might be a mass exodus of the white community of the kind that had caused chaos in Mozambique five years earlier. Such an exodus had been prepared for by the South African government. With the agreement of the British Governor of Rhodesia, South African troops had entered the country to secure the road approaches to the Beit Bridge border crossing point. Refugee camps had been prepared in the Transvaal. On the day the election results became known, most white families had prepared contingency plans for flight, including the packing of cars and suitcases.

However, after a meeting with Robert Mugabe and the central committee of ZANU (PF), Ian Smith was reassured that whites could, and should stay in the new Zimbabwe. Mugabe promised that he would abide strictly by the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement and that changes in Zimbabwe would be made gradually and by proper legal process.

On April 18, 1980, the country became independent as the Republic of Zimbabwe, and its capital, Salisbury, was renamed Harare two years later.

[edit] Politics

Main Article: Politics of Rhodesia

Southern Rhodesia was self-governing from 1923, although it never gained full Dominion status within the old Commonwealth. Its electoral register had property and education qualifications (unexceptional for the early twentieth century) which allowed white settlers to dominate the government. Over the years, various electoral arrangements were made at a national and municipal level to maintain white dominance. For example, the franchise for the first Legislative Council election in 1899^[24] contained the following requirement:

voters to be British subjects, male, 21 years of age and older, able to write their address and occupation, and then to fulfill the following financial requirements: (a) ownership of a registered mining claim in Southern Rhodesia, or (b) occupying immovable property worth £75, or (c) receiving wages or salary of £50 per annum in Southern Rhodesia. Six months' continuous residence was also required for qualifications (b) and (c).

That was innocuous by the standards of the time, but the practical effect was to exclude black people from the electorate. Whites never comprised more than 5% of the country's total population, but up to 1979 they never had less than 95% of the total vote in national elections.

Up until the 1950s, Southern Rhodesia had a vibrant political life with right and left wing parties (by white settler standards) competing for power. The Rhodesia Labour Party held seats in the Assembly and in municipal councils throughout the 1920s and 30s. From 1953 to 1958 the prime minister was Garfield Todd, a liberal who did much to promote the development of the Black community through investment in education, housing and healthcare. However, Todd was forced from office when he attempted to widen the franchise in order to allow Blacks up to 20% of the total votes.

From 1958 onwards, white settler politics consolidated and ossified around one issue - resistance to majority rule. This set the scene for UDI. The 1961 Constitution governed Southern Rhodesia and independent Rhodesia up until 1969. It used the Westminster Parliamentary System modified by a system of separate voter rolls with differing property and education qualifications. The system ensured that whites had the majority of Assembly seats.

Under the 1969 republican constitution, there was a bicameral Parliament consisting of an indirectly elected Senate and a directly elected House of Assembly, in which the majority of seats were effectively reserved for whites. The office of President was a ceremonial post, with executive power remaining with the Prime Minister.

Under the Constitution of the short-lived Zimbabwe Rhodesia, which saw a black-led government elected for the first time, 28 of the 100 parliamentary seats were reserved for whites. The independence constitution, agreed at Lancaster House retained reserved seats for whites (20 out of 100 in the House of Assembly and 8 out of 40 seats in the Senate). The constitution prohibited the Zimbabwe authorities from altering it for seven years without unanimous consent, and for a further three years a three quarters vote in Parliament was needed. In 1987, the Constitution was amended to abolish the seats reserved for whites, and replace the office of Prime Minister with an executive President. In 1990 the Senate was abolished.

[edit] Publications

[edit] Some Black perspectives

Ranger, Terence O. The African voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 (Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970) ISBN 0-8101-0320-6
Parker, Franklin. African development and education in Southern Rhodesia (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1970) ISBN 0-03-432983-9
Hone, Percy Frederick. Southern Rhodesia (Negro Universities Press, 1969) ISBN 0-8371-2661-4
"Race Relations in Rhodesia, Survey for 1972-73" by D.K.Davies, London, 1975, ISBN 901720569

[edit] Some White perspectives

An American family on the African frontier : the Burnham family letters, 1893-1896, edited by Mary and Richard Bradford. LC call number: DT1850 .A64 1993. (1993) ISBN 1-879373-66-1
Boggie, Jeannie M.Experiences of Rhodesia's Pioneer Women (Bulawayo, 1st edition 1938, 2nd edition 1950).*

Gann, Lewis, H. A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934 (Chatto & Windus, London, 1965) ISBN 0-394-48068-6

Blake, Robert. A History of Rhodesia (Eyre Methuen, London, 1977) ISBN 0-394-48068-6
Mutambirwa, Chmunorwa, James. The Rise and Fall of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1923 (Assoc. Univ. Press, 1980) ISBN 0-8386-2267-4
Meredith, Martin. The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979 (Andre Deutsch, London, 1979) ISBN 0-233-97121-1
Colin, Leys. European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965) ISBN 0-313-23548-1
Haw, Richard C. (fwd. by Sir Godfrey Huggins) No other home: Co-existence in Africa (S. Manning, Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 1960?) ASIN B0007J5PVI
Rogers, Cyril A., Frantz, C. (fwd. by Sir Robert Tredgold) Racial themes in Southern Rhodesia: the attitudes and behavior of the white population (Kennikat Press, Port Washington, NY, 1962) ISBN 0-8046-1724-4
Kennedy, Dane Keith. Islands of White: Settler society and culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Duke Univ. Press, 1987) ISBN 0-8223-0708-1
Legum, Colin (ed.). Africa: A Handbook to the Continent (London, 1961). ISBN 0-03-387421-3
Hodder-Williams, Richard. White Farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1956 (London, 1983) ISBN 033327234

[edit] White government perspective

Smith, Ian Douglas The Great Betrayal (London, 1997) ISBN 1-85782-176-9
Smith, Ian Douglas Bitter Harvest (London, 2001) ISBN 1-903402-05-0
Murray, D. J. Governmental system in Southern Rhodesia (Clarendon P., Oxford, 1970) ISBN 0-19-821658-0
Palley, Claire. The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1966) ISBN 0-250-97676-6
Bean, Elizabeth Ann. Political development in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1953 (Univ. of Cape Town Libraries, 1969) ISBN 00408072
Summers, Carol. From Civilization to Segregation: Social ideals and social control in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1934 (Ohio University Press, 1994) ISBN 0-8214-1074-1
Symonds, Jane. Southern Rhodesia: Background to Crisis (Royal Inst. of Int. Aff./Oxford Univ. Press, 1965) ISBN 1-187-63496-5
The '96 Rebellions: British South Africa Company Reports on the Native Disturbances in Rhodesia, 1896-97 (Facsimile reproduction of the original reports, Bulawayo, 1975) ISBN 0-86920-122-0
Young, Kenneth. Rhodesia and Independence: A study in British colonial policy (London, 1967) ISBN 1-09-626662-9
Anatomy of Terror, Ministry of Information booklet (Salisbury, Rhodesia / Washington, D.C., May, 1974)
Reed, Douglas. The Battle for Rhodesia (Cape Town, 8th edition, 1967) ISBN 0-11-655081-4
Amery, Julian (Rt. Hon.), Biggs-Davison, John (M.P.), et al. Rhodesia and the Threat to The West (Monday Club booklet, London, 1976)
Hutson, H.P.W. Rhodesia: Ending an Era (London, 1978) ISBN 0-905947-85-1
Hudson, Miles. Triumph or Tragedy?: Rhodesia to Zimbabwe (Hamish Hamilton, London, c1981) ISBN 0-241-10571-4
Ward, Harvey. Sanctions Buster (Glasgow, 1982) ISBN 0-85335-251-8

[edit] Land

Weinmann, H. Agricultural research and development in Southern Rhodesia, under the rule of the British South Africa Company, 1890-1923 (Univ. of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1972) ISBN 0-86924-004-8
Van Onselen, Charles. African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (Pluto Press, London, 1976) ISBN 0-902818-96-1
Yudelman, Montague. Africans on the land: Economic problems of African agricultural development in Southern, Central, and East Africa, with special reference to Southern Rhodesia (Harvard Univ. Press, 1964) ISBN B0000CMAWI

[edit] Other

Kumbula, Tendayi J. Education and social control in Southern Rhodesia (R&E Research Assoc., Palo Alto, Calif, 1979) ISBN 0-88247-566-5
Evans, Henry St. John Tomlinson. The church in Southern Rhodesia (Society for the propagation of the gospel in foreign parts [etc.], London, 1945) ISBN B0006DBPTQ
Kane, Nora Sophie Hoffmann. (fwd. by Sir Godfrey Huggins) The World's View: The Story of Southern Rhodesia (Cassel, London, 1954) ISBN B0000CIZXU
Rayner, William. The Tribe and its Successors: An account of African traditional life and European settlement in Southern Rhodesia (Faber and Faber, London 1962) ISBN B0000CLA7K
Akers, Mary (ed.). Encyclopedia Rhodesia (College Press Pvt. Ltd., Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1973).
The South & East African Year Book & Guide (49th edition, 1949)
Jones, Neville. Rhodesian Genesis (O.B.E., Bulawayo, 1953) ISBN 1-09-628866-5
Gunther, John. Inside Africa (London, 1st edition 1955, reprinted 1957) ISBN B0000CJA7H
Reed, Douglas. The Siege of Southern Africa (Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1974) ISBN 0-86954-014-9
Lewis, Arthur R. (Rev.). Too Bright the Vision? (London, 1982) ISBN 0-85205-021-6
Sutton-Pryce, Ted. Zimbabwe: A Model for Namibia? (Pretoria, 1989) ISBN 0-86874-389-5

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

Embassy of Rhodesia in Iceland: Extensive collection of information pertaining to Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and Africa in general.

The Viscount disasters of 1978 and 1979

Ironing the lawn in Salisbury - the last days of Rhodesia (The Guardian)

'Sweet Banana' - song of the RAR regiment

Audio of Ian Smith's radio address announcing UDI

Ian Beckett, an account of the Bush War (in 2 parts)

Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s

1975 BBC report on the failure of negotiations between the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists

The Brookings Institution : Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa - Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

[edit] References

^ Historical Notes :history of the University of Zimbabwe
^ BBC: 1970: Ian Smith declares Rhodesia a republic
^ Herald online :a critique of UDI
^ Rumor Mill posting:justification of UDI, partisan comment
^ APF newsletter, 1975 :appraisal of Rhodesia in 1975
^ The Guardian, 21 April 2000 :British Multimillionaire bankrolls Mugabe party
^ Brookings Institution :p156, study on conflict resolution
^ BBC report, 1975:peace talks fail
^ Time magazine :p2
^ Time magazine, 3 May 1976: A Strike at the Lifeline
^ NZ History article:Operation Agila, "The British Empire's Last Sunset"
^ Mazoe: Rhodesian Roll of Honour
^ APF newsletter, 1976:appraisal of Rhodesia in 1976
^ Southern African News Feature:the plague wars
^ The Guardian, 15 July 2003 :obituary of sixth Marquess of Salisbury
^ Nick Downie report :caution, partisan comment
^ The Viscount Disasters - The Story
^ The Atlantic Monthly : The Fragility of Domestic Energy, see page 5
^ Ian Beckett :report on Bush War
^ Rhodesia Worldwide:"PK"
^ Newsnet report :saboteurs hit Zimbabwean military, partisan comment
^ Time magazine, October 1977 :The Land of Opportunity
^ Operation Quartz :possible military coup Rhodesia 1980
^ Rhodesian elections: Elections in Rhodesia, background to Rhodesian elections

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