Reliable Replacement Warhead

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The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is a controversial new design American nuclear warhead and bomb family that is intended to be simple and reliable and provide a long lasting, low maintenance future nuclear force for the United States. It is also the project name for the ongoing United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) design project, started in 2004, to develop those designs.

1 Background
2 The Reliable Replacement Warhead concept
3 Current Status
4 Potential Dangers of the RRW Program
5 See also
6 References
7 External links

[edit] Background

During the Cold War, the United States, in an effort to achieve and maintain an advantage in the nuclear arms race, invested large amounts of money and technical resources into nuclear weapons design, testing, and maintenance. Many of the weapons designed required high-upkeep costs, justified primarily by their Cold War context and the specific and technically sophisticated applications they were created for. With the end of the Cold War, however, nuclear testing has ceased in the United States, and new warhead development has been significantly lessened. As a result the need for high technical performance of warheads has decreased considerably and the need for a longer lasting and reliable stockpile has taken a high priority.

Prior nuclear weapons produced by the U.S. had historically become extremely compact, low weight, highly integrated, and low-margin designs which used exotic materials, in many cases toxic or unstable materials. A number of older US designs used high explosive types which degraded over time, some of which became dangerously unstable in short lifetimes (PBX-9404 and LX-09). ^[1] ^[2] ^[3] ^[4] ^[5] Some of these explosives have cracked in warheads in storage, resulting in dangerous storage and dissassembly conditions. ^[6]

Most experts believe that the insensitive explosives (PBX-9502, LX-17) currently in use are highly stable and may even become more stable over time. ^[7]

The use of beryllium and highly toxic beryllium oxide material as neutron reflector layers was a major health hazard to bomb manufacturer and maintenance staff. The long term stability of plutonium metal, which may lose strength, crack, or otherwise degrade over time is also a concern. (See Nuclear weapons design and Teller-Ulam design for technical context.)

However, on November 28, 2006 Linton F. Brooks, the administrator of the NNSA, released a report by the independent JASON group. The conclusion of the JASON group's study is that "most plutonium pits have a credible lifetime of at least 100 years." ^[8]

[edit] The Reliable Replacement Warhead concept

The concept underlying the RRW program is that the US weapons laboratories can design new nuclear weapons that are highly reliable and easy and safe to manufacture, monitor, and test. If that proves to be possible, designers could adapt a common set of core design components to various use requirements, such as different sized missile warheads, different nuclear bomb types, etc.

NNSA officials believe the program is needed to maintain nuclear weapons expertise in order to rapidly adapt, repair, or modify existing weapons or develop new weapons as requirements evolve. They see the ability to adapt to changing military needs rather than maintain additional forces for unexpected contingencies as a key program driver.^[9] However, Congress has rejected the notion that the RRW is needed to meet new military requirements. In providing funds for 2006, the Appropriations Committee specified, "any weapons design under the RRW program must stay within the military requirements of the existing deployed stockpile and any new weapon design must stay within the design parameters validated by past nuclear tests."^[10]

According to a Task Force of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board (SEAB),^[11] the RRW program and weapon designs should have the following characteristics:

Support an adaptable 1,700-2,200 weapon sustained force level (3.1)
- Resolve an issue with the weapons stockpile within 12 months
- Adapt a weapon to a new requirement in 18 months
- Design a new weapon within 36 months
- Be ready for full production within 48 months
- Be capable of conducting an underground nuclear test within 18 months
Produce all new weapons using Insensitive High Explosive (see TATB and Plastic bonded explosive) and replace all existing weapons which use other explosives (3.1.2)
Produce new weapons with the full spectrum of security and use control safety features available today, some of which are intrinsic to the basic design of a weapon and cannot possibly be retrofitted into the design of an existing weapon (3.1.3)
Designs which trade off higher weight and larger volume to maximise: (3.1.4)
- Certification without nuclear testing
- Inexpensive manufacture and disassembly
- Ease of maintenance, surveillance, and disposition
- Modularity (primaries, secondaries, non-nuclear) across systems
- Maximizing component reuse and minimizing life-cycle costs
Comparable or improved levels of reliability to existing designs, using larger margins and simpler components (3.1.5)
Lower cost (3.1.6)
Designs which can be designed and certified without necessarily undergoing nuclear testing (3.1.7)
Consolidation of many nuclear weapon production and maintenance functions to one site (4.1)
(in passing) Designs avoiding the use of Beryllium or Beryllium Oxide in the weapon fission reflector (4.6)

However, the full SEAB disavowed the Task Force's recommendations regarding the RRW, because the Task Force did not consider the program's potentially adverse impacts on U.S. nonproliferation objectives, which were beyond its expertise.

The RRW program has not to date publicly announced that it has developed any new nuclear weapon designs which are intended to be placed into production. Presumably, once that occurs, the weapons will receive numbers in the US warhead designation sequence, which currently runs from the Mark 1 nuclear bomb (aka Little Boy) to the W91 nuclear warhead, which was cancelled in the 1990s. RRW designs would presumably receive designations after that number, though new RNEP nuclear bunker buster weapons could conceivably be type-standardized and numbered prior to any RRW reaching that point, if the RNEP program does proceed.

[edit] Current Status

In an April 15, 2006 article by Walter Pincus in the Washington Post,^[12] Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the US National Nuclear Safety Agency, the US nuclear weapon design agency within the United States Department of Energy, announced that two competing designs for the Reliable Replacement Warhead were being finalized by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, and that a selection of one of those designs would be made by November 2006, to allow the RRW development program to be included in the Fiscal 2008 US government budget.

The article confirmed prior descriptions of the RRW, describing the weapons:

The next-generation warheads will be larger and more stable than the existing ones but slightly less powerful, according to government officials. They might contain "use controls" that would enable the military to disable the weapons by remote control if they are stolen by terrorists.

Based on prior weapons programs, the RRW should be assigned a numerical weapon designation when the design selection is made.

[edit] Potential Dangers of the RRW Program

Opponents the RRW program believe it has nothing to do with making US weapons safer or more reliable, but is merely an excuse for designing new weapons and maintaining jobs at the weapons laboratories.^[13] They note that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have certified that the existing nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable in each of the last nine years. The existing stockpile was extensively tested before the US entered the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. According to Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby, "It takes an extraordinary flight of imagination to postulate a modern new arsenal composed of such untested designs that would be more reliable, safe and effective than the current U.S. arsenal based on more than 1,000 tests since 1945."^[14]

The RRW program is contrary to the "general and complete disarmament" of atomic weapons required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the USA has signed.

Critics maintain that this innocuous-sounding program could significantly damage US national security. Critics believe an expansive RRW program would anger US allies as well as hostile nations. They worry it would disrupt the global cooperation in nonproliferation that is vital to constraining rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and to controlling clandestine trafficking in nuclear materials and equipment.

Additionally, critics question whether or not the RRW program would force the United States to once again resume nuclear testing, as the US is unlikely to consider the new warheads "reliable" enough unless they have been tested at least once.