R. v. Nette

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R. v. Nette

Supreme Court of Canada

Hearing: January 16, 2001
Judgment: November 15, 2001
Full case name: Daniel Matthew Nette v. Her Majesty The Queen
Citations: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488, 2001 SCC 78
Docket No.: 27669 [1]
Ruling: Nette appeal dismissed.
Court membership

Chief Justice: Beverley McLachlin
Puisne Justices: Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, Charles Gonthier, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major, Michel Bastarache, Ian Binnie, Louise Arbour, Louis LeBel

Reasons given

Majority by: Arbour J.
Dissent by: L'Heureux-Dubé J.

R. v. Nette, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 488, 2001 SCC 78, is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the standard for causation in criminal offences. The Court rejected the Smithers test for causation in a criminal charge for murder and held that the test for causation for second degree murder is that the act must be a "significant cause of death".

Contents

[edit] Background

A 95 year-old widow was robbed and left hog tied in her room. Over a period of 48 hours she suffocated to death. During an undercover investigation, a suspect, Daniel Nette, had admitted to an undercover officer that he had robbed and killed the widow. Nette was arrested and charged with first-degree murder under section 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The leading case on causation was R. v. Smithers (2001) which required proof of "a contributing cause of death, outside the de minimis range".

In his defence, Nette argued that the test used the show causation for first-degree murder was improperly applied.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the standard for causation should be the de minimus test from Smithers or the "significant contributing cause" test from R. v. Harbottle.

[edit] Opinion of the Court

Justice Arbour, for the majority, noted that the Smithers causation test applies to all forms of homicide. However, the current "de minimus" test, defining the standard as "not a trivial cause" or "not insignificant", is not helpful and instead should be formulated positively such as "significant contributing cause". She went on to say that since caution is largely fact-driven the judge should have the discretion to rephrase the test as the facts warrant giving the example of Harbottle where, given the high degree of blameworthiness and stigma of the charge, the test was formulated as "a substantial cause".

[edit] Dissent

L'Heureux-Dubé, in dissent, disagreed with Arbour's reformulation of the causation test. She argued that there is a distinction between "not trivial or insignificant" and a "significant contributing cause". Phrased positively, the test has a higher standard that requires a stronger causal relationship.

[edit] See also

[edit] External link